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Preface and Acknowledgements  
One needs no powers of prophecy to predict that perilous economic times lie ahead for our 
nation and the rest of the world.  While uncertainty surrounds the global economic crisis—
how long it will last, for example, and whether conditions will worsen further before they 
improve—there can be little doubt that national budgets for defense acquisition will 
experience considerable pressure and quite possibly decline in the coming years. 
Under such conditions, we may be tempted either to accept with fatalism some reduced 
level of expectations for acquisition outcomes or, alternatively, to embrace trite exhortations 
to do more with less.  Neither of these is, of course, a tenable position for serious scholars 
of acquisition.  Rather, we ought to continue to seek the best possible understanding of 
acquisition that will lead to the best possible outcomes given available resources.  This 
entails continued work on what Don Kettl has termed the “smart buyer” problem: knowing 
what to buy, who to buy it from, and how to assess its quality.   
Nor can the “how to buy” problem be neglected, as new laws, regulations, and other policies 
continue to subject acquisition processes to what many see as excessively “bureaucratic” 
requirements.  While these new structures often have worthy goals to increase 
accountability, transparency, and social equity, their economic costs can’t be ignored.  
Acquisition scholars should find ways to, paraphrasing Aaron Wildavsky, “speak scientific 
truth to power” so that policy-makers’ decisions are informed by the best possible research 
on their costs and benefits. 
Currently, DoD investments in acquisition research represent about one one-thousandth of 
one percent of the total defense budget, yet we believe they have the potential to lead to 
considerable savings, both in the near and long term.  We see strong evidence that this 
potential is being realized through the products of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Acquisition Research Program. 
Our goals remain the same, with recent highlights noted below: 
1. Position the ARP in a leadership role to continue to develop the body of knowledge in 
defense acquisition research 
• Over 450 published works since inception, 
• All completed research is published in full text on the ARP website, 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, allowing ready access by any and all parties 
interested in the DoD acquisition process, 
• Sponsoring our 7th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, the first of 
which was held in May 2004, draws thought leaders of the DoD acquisition 
community, academia and industry. 
2. Establish acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for DoD officials. 
Some processes informed by this research include: 
• Open Architecture implementation practices and policies to include 
software/hardware reuse repository characteristics such as ontology, search 
engines, licensing issues and testing requirements; Creation of the concept of 
Integration Readiness Levels paired with technology readiness levels to 
create a System Readiness Level scale; 
 ===================
     ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ== ii=
=
• Development of logistics resource strategies for selecting among Contracted 
Logistics Support, Organic Logistics Support or Blended Logistics Support; 
• Identification of the scope and causes of bid protests and recommendations 
for reducing same; and 
• Creation of a database of key contracting workforce demographics for the 
Army Contracting Command. 
3. Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
• The body of knowledge on the DoD acquisition process continues to increase 
by over 140 research products a year. 
• Faculty researchers routinely give multiple presentations, in both national and 
international fora, featuring their research work—thereby increasing exposure 
to a broader audience. Typical audiences include the London School of 
Economics, the Federal Reserve, the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, the Western Economics Association International Conference, the 
International Procurement Conference and the National Contracts 
Management Association. At a minimum, over 90 presentations of sponsored 
research results were made in 2009. 
• The International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management is the ARP’s 
initiative to promote defense acquisition research in the peer-reviewed 
literature.  All published articles can be freely downloaded from the journal’s 
website. During 2009, three more articles were published in the journal from 
authors in the US, Australia, and the UK, bringing the total to six since the 
journal was founded in May 2008.  There are also seven articles currently 
under review. The journal substantially increases the “reach” of our research 
products. 
4. Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the defense 
acquisition process.  
• The ARP plays a major role in providing a DoD-relevant graduate education 
program to future DoD officials. Synergy between research conducted and 
course content delivered enhances both the teaching and learning processes. 
• The number of students engaged in focused acquisition research for their 
MBA projects continues to grow.  These students have the benefit of being 
able to immediately apply their newly acquired acquisition skills to real-world 
issues. 
• Student projects on the economics of the shipbuilding industrial base and 
services contracting are expected to contribute significantly to the body of 
knowledge and decision-making process for these two very important and 
timely subjects. 
5. Collaboration among universities, think tanks, industry and government in acquisition 
research.  
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• Over 60 universities/think tanks have participated in the annual Acquisition 
Research Symposium or the Acquisition Research Program as a result of a 
focused effort to create a Virtual University Consortium.   
• Emerging collaborative research efforts continue to bring new scholar and 
practitioner thought to the business issues facing the DoD, as was 
demonstrated by the large response to our fourth Broad Area Announcement 
(BAA) in support of the OSD-sponsored acquisition research program. As we 
write this, our fifth BAA is being prepared for release. 
• The International Journal of Defense Acquisition is attracting scholars from 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Nigeria, Singapore, The Netherlands, the 
United States and Australia.  
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, whose 
foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition Research 
Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, US Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio 
System 
• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics 
Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Director, Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business 
Transformation Agency 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its generous 
contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)   Associate Professor 
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The Acquisition Research Program Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, facilitates graduate student research 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
RADM Greene received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading 
and administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Dr. Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management 
in the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management. 
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Chair of the Acquisition Academic Area.  
Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point. He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
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Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is a former member of 
the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.  
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.  
Dr. Snider received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading 
and administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager, General Dynamics Information Technology, 
supporting the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing Consultant on 
various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating marketing materials, 
initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing project lifecycles, 
processes and cost-savings strategies. As a Resource Specialist at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, Shaffer developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and helped secure a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the 
Operations Manager, she also launched the MWTC’s Conference site, managed various 
marketing conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors, Adrianne Malan, Jessica Moon, Steve Williams, and 
Lyndsee Cordes, for all that they have done to make this publication a success, to Shellee 
Dooley and Tera Yoder for production support, and to the staff at the Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy for their administrative support. Our program success is directly 
related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Symposium Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 8th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 11-
12, 2011 in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  
We seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, 
and industry who are well placed to shape and promote future research in 
acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential 
research areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement 
policy, supply chain management, public budgeting and finance, cost 
management, project management, logistics management, engineering 
management, outsourcing, performance measurement, and organization 
studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 5, 2010.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 10, 2010.  Final papers must 
be submitted by April 1, 2011. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
contact information and short bio for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 
20 minute presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should 
include the same information as above as well as a description of the panel subject 
and format, along with participants’ names, qualifications and the specific 
contributions each participant will make to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org 
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Call for Research: Broad Agency Announcement 
GRANTS.GOV -- NPSBAA10-002 
The Acquisition Research Program 
Open until 5:00 p.m. PDST 18 June 2010 
 
Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management and 
policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2011 (1 Oct 2010 - 30 Sep 
2011).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to investigations 
in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved in the acquisition of 
products and/or services for national defense, or (2) could potentially be 
brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It includes but is not limited to 
economics, finance, financial management, information systems, organization 
theory, operations management, human resources management, and marketing, as 
well as the “traditional” acquisition areas such as contracting, program/project 
management, logistics, and systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $120,000 each for a 
basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in mid-August 2010. The actual date of grant award 
will depend on availability of funds and the capabilities of the grants office.  Prior 
year awards occurred in the August – January timeframe. Awardees may request 
approval of pre-award costs (up to three months), or they may request adjustments 
in the grant period of performance. 
Full Text can be found at www.grants.gov  
To locate the call quickly: 
1) Go to www.grants.gov 
2) Use Quick Links on the far right hand corner under FOR APPLICANTS, 
Grant Search. 





























Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 
Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943 
 
Acquisition Research 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change
May 12 - 13, 2010 
 






























Table of Contents 
Keynote: The Honorable Robert O. Work, Under Secretary of the Navy ......................... 1 
Plenary Panel – National Security Acquisition Challenges .............................................. 3 
Panel #2 – Assessment and Oversight of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs ............................................................................................................................... 5 
The Effect of the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment on Unit Cost Growth of 
Defense Acquisition Projects................................................................................... 7 
Cost and Time Overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs .................... 12 
Panel #3 – Cost Analysis Support to Acquisition ............................................................ 23 
Cost-Benefit Study of a Project to Lower Cost and Improve Fleet 
Readiness through Integrating the Management of Technical 
Information............................................................................................................... 24 
Queues in Acquisition ............................................................................................ 28 
Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis: Enabling Early Acquisition 
Decisions ................................................................................................................. 35 
Panel #4 – Program Management and Contracting in a Performance Based 
Environment ........................................................................................................................ 40 
A Model for Determining Optimal Governance Structure in DoD 
Acquisition Projects in a Performance-Based Environment .............................. 42 
A Simulation Model for Setting Terms for Performance Based Contract 
Terms........................................................................................................................ 47 
Contractor Incentives for Success in Implementing Performance-
Based Logistics: A Progress Report..................................................................... 63 
Panel #5 – Software Acquisition Strategies and Challenges.......................................... 76 
Comparing Acquisition Strategies:  Open Architecture versus Product 
Lines......................................................................................................................... 78 
The Challenge of Heterogeneously Licensed Systems in Open 
Architecture Software Ecosystems ....................................................................... 91 
Exploring Acquisition Strategies for Adopting a Software Product Line ........ 111 
Panel #6 – Acquisition Reform: Beyond Marginal Adjustments .................................. 123 
Goldwater-Nichols: Military-run versus Civilian-run Acquisition: Will 
the Twain Ever Meet in the DoN?......................................................................... 124 
Risk Factors versus Dollar Value: Changing How Weapon System 
Programs are Managed......................................................................................... 151 
Panel #7 – Integrated Testing for Business Systems.................................................... 165 
Test and Evaluation at the Speed of Need.......................................................... 166 
Integrated Testing and Independent Evaluation Model..................................... 177 




Understanding and Mitigating Protests of Major Defense System 
Acquisition Contracts ........................................................................................... 179 
Innovations in Defense Acquisition: Bid Protests ............................................. 181 
Better Acquisition Management Through ADR and Other Practices for 
Preventing and Resolving Bid Protests .............................................................. 183 
Panel #9 – Software Control and Development for DoD Weapons Systems............... 185 
Ontology-based Software Repository System ................................................... 186 
Enabling Software Acquisition Improvement: Government and 
Industry Software Development Team Acquisition Model ................................ 203 
On Open and Collaborative Software Development in the DoD ....................... 219 
Panel #10 – Aligning Requirements with the Defense Acquisition Process ............... 236 
Illustrating the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) Continuum and Its 
Relationship to the Acquisition Lifecycle ........................................................... 238 
The Illusion of Certainty ....................................................................................... 257 
Towards Real-time Program Awareness via Lexical Link Analysis ................. 265 
Panel #11 – Satisfying Requirements While Achieving Life-Cycle Cost Goals .......... 288 
Achieving Life Cycle Capability: Ensuring Capability for Today and 
Tomorrow............................................................................................................... 290 
Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Armored 
Vehicles: A Case Study ........................................................................................ 306 
Panel #12 – Cost Containment in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment............. 310 
The Correct Use of Subject Matter Experts in Cost Risk Analysis................... 312 
Correcting Extrema and Quartiles for Truncation.............................................. 314 
Addressing Cost Increases in Evolutionary Acquisition .................................. 329 
It’s Time to Take the Chill Out of Cost Containment and Re-energize 
Key Acquisition Practice ...................................................................................... 346 
Panel #13 – Software Testing in an Open Architecture Environment.......................... 363 
An Information-theoretic Approach to Software Test-retest Problems ........... 364 
The Rapid Integration and Test Environment: A Process for Achieving 
Software Test Acceptance.................................................................................... 365 




Keynote: The Honorable Robert O. Work, Under Secretary 
of the Navy 
 
Robert O. Work was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the 
Navy on May 19, 2009. In this capacity, Work serves as the 
deputy and principal assistant to the secretary of the Navy 
and acts with full authority of the secretary in the day-to-day 
management of the Department of the Navy. Work was a 
distinguished graduate of the Naval Reserve Officers Training 
Course at the University of Illinois, and was commissioned a 
second lieutenant in the US Marine Corps in August 1974. 
During his 27-year career, Work held a wide range of 
command, leadership, and management positions. He 
commanded an artillery battery and artillery battalion, and was 
the base commander at Camp Fuji, Japan. His last 
assignment was as Military Assistant and Senior Aide to the 
Honorable Richard J. Danzig, 71st secretary of the Navy.  
After retiring from the Marine Corps, Work joined the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), first as the senior fellow for maritime affairs, and later as 
the vice president for strategic studies. In these positions, he focused on defense strategy 
and programs, revolutions in war, Department of Defense transformation, and maritime 
affairs. He wrote and spoke extensively on US Navy and Marine Corps strategies and 
programs; directed and analyzed war games for the Office of Net Assessment and Office of 
the Secretary of Defense; contributed to Department of Defense studies on global basing 
and emerging military missions; and provided support for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review.  
In addition, he studied and prepared several reports on future defense challenges, 
including the changing nature of undersea warfare, power projection against regional 
nuclear powers, and power projection against future anti-access/area denial networks. 
During this time, Work was also an adjunct professor at George Washington University, 
where he taught defense analysis and roles and missions of the armed forces.  
In late 2008, Work served on President Barack Obama’s Department of Defense 
Transition Team. In this role, he was the leader of the Department of the Navy issue team, 
and served on the defense policy, acquisition, and budget teams.  
Work earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology from the University of Illinois; a 
Master of Science in Systems Management from the University of Southern California; a 
Master of Science in Space System Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; and a 
Master in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 





























Plenary Panel – National Security Acquisition 
Challenges 
 
Wednesday, May 12, 2010 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. Chair: Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Director, Center for Public Policy & Private Enterprise, University of Maryland; former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
Panelists:  
Dr. Robert H. Trice, Senior Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corporation 
Dr. Steven J. Kelman, Weatherhead Professor of Public Management, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government 
 
Jacques Gansler—The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is a Professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, at the University of Maryland. He is the 
Director of both the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology 
Industry Center.  As the third-ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Professor Gansler 
was responsible for all research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, 
environmental security, defense industry, and numerous other security programs.  
Before joining the Clinton Administration, Dr. Gansler held a variety of positions in government and 
the private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (electronics), Executive Vice President at TASC, Vice 
President of ITT, and engineering and management positions with Singer and Raytheon 
Corporations.  
Throughout his career, Dr. Gansler has written, published, and taught on subjects related to his work. 
Gansler recently served as the Chair of the Secretary of the Army’s “Commission on Contracting and 
Program Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.”  He is a member of the Defense Science 
Board and also a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration.  Additionally, he is the Glenn L. Martin Institute Fellow of 
Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering, an Affiliate Faculty member at the Robert 
H. Smith School of Business and a Senior Fellow at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of 
Leadership (all at the University of Maryland). For 2003–2004, he served as Interim Dean of the 
School of Public Policy.  For 2004–2006, Dr. Gansler served as the Vice President for Research at 
the University of Maryland. 
Jacques Gansler 
jgansler@udm.edu 
Center for Public Policy & Private Enterprise, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland 
2101 Van Munching Hall 
Room 2211B 


























Panel #2 – Assessment and Oversight of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs 
 
Wednesday, May 12, 2010 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. Chair: Dr. Nancy Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
The Effect of the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment on Unit Cost Growth of 
Defense Acquisition Projects  
Jacques Gansler, William Lucyshyn, and Adam Spiers, University of 
Maryland 
An Assessment of Acquisition Outcomes and Potential Impact of New 
Legislation and Policy Changes  
Michael Sullivan, Government Accountability Office 
Cost and Time Overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs  
David Berteau, Joachim Hofbauer, Gregory Sanders, and Guy Ben-Ari, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies 
 
 
Dr. Nancy Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis, Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
Dr. Nancy Spruill received Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics, in 1971. From 1971 
to 1983, she held a variety of positions with the Center for Naval Analyses, including 
Technical Staff Analyst, Professional Staff Analyst and Project Director. She earned her 
Master of Arts in Mathematical Statistics in 1975 followed by her Doctorate in 1980. 
Dr. Spruill served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to 1993. 
Initially, she was the Senior Planning, Programming, and Budget Analyst in the Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs and Logistics Secretariat. Later, she served as the Director for Support and 
Liaison for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. Then 
she served as the Senior Operations Research Analyst in the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. 
In 1993, she joined the staff of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), serving as the Chief of 
Programs and Analysis Division for the DMA Comptroller. Subsequently, she served as 
Acting Deputy Comptroller and was a member of the Reinvention Task Force for the Vice 
President's National Performance Review. 
In March 1995, she was selected as the Deputy Director for Acquisition Resources for the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). In 
February 1999, she was appointed Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis (ARA) for 
USD(AT&L). In this capacity, she is responsible for all aspects of AT&L'S participation in the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); the Congressional process; and the 




Acquisition Board and is responsible for the timely and accurate submission to Congress of 
Selected Acquisition Reports and Unit Cost Reports for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs. She manages the Defense Acquisition Execution Summary monthly review of 
programs; monitors cost and schedule status of high interest programs; and conducts 
analyses of contract and program cost performance including analysis of the effective use of 
Integrated Program Management principles through the use of Earned Value Management. 
She leads the Department in developing plans to manage Property, Plant and Equipment, 
Inventory, Operating Materials and Supplies/Deferred Maintenance and Environmental 
Liabilities. She proposes modifications to, or acquisition of, new DoD feeder systems, in 
support of achieving an unqualified audit opinion on DoD Financial Statements as mandated 
by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. She also manages the studies program for OSD, 
oversees USD(AT&L)'s office automation system and manages its information system 
network. She serves as the focal point for DoD-wide software-intensive systems program 
initiatives to improve mechanisms for the management of defense acquisition programs; 
manages software intensive systems assessment initiatives; performs systemic analysis 
from independent expert program reviews to improve acquisition policy and education, and 
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense’s acquisition projects have experienced close to 50% 
unit cost growth since at least the 1950s.  The most direct policy to curtail unit cost growth 
was the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment (NM), which Congress implemented in 1982 and later 
revised in 2006 and 2009.  NM requires the DoD to report when the unit cost growth of any 
major defense acquisition program is known, expected, or anticipated by a program 
manager to exceed certain cost growth thresholds.  Implementation of NM does not appear 
to have significantly impacted acquisition outcomes, although the long-term impact of recent 
revisions is indeterminate at this point in time.  The authors performed several data 
analyses.  The authors concluded that (1) the DoD’s current metrics are not useful for 
determining the root cause of unit cost growth in acquisition programs and (2) programs that 
experience high, unit-cost growth are not randomly distributed.  NM breach is highly 
correlated with a project’s value size and the amount of estimating cost growth the program 
experiences.  Two relevant cases, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High 
program, and the Virginia-class Submarine (SSN 774), are analyzed. Finally, the authors 
make recommendations to improve NM and reduce unit cost growth. 
Executive Summary  
The Department of Defense (DoD) has faced significant acquisition problems over an 
extended period of time.  As noted by one GAO report, the “DoD’s major weapon system 
programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities 
than originally planned” (Sullivan, 2008).  For example, the programs that comprise the 
DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition Projects (MDAPs)1 for 2007 had an average program cost 
growth of 26% when compared to initial estimates, which collectively culminated in $295 
billion dollars in additional costs (Sullivan, 2008).  Given other pressing financial obligations, 
                                                
1 The DoD’s largest programs, which represent roughly 80% of the DoD’s acquisition budget in a 




the DoD cannot afford to incur similar development problems in the future that it has 
experienced in the past. 
Cost growth is defined as the positive difference between actual cost and budgeted 
costs.  Due to its relative ease of measurement, cost growth provides a simple barometer to 
determine if the acquisition process is achieving its stated goals or not.  Since the 1950s, 
numerous reports have found that, in general, the DoD’s acquisition process experiences 
high cost growth at both the program and unit levels.   
Congress has made several attempts to implement reforms that would control 
program and unit cost growth, but these have not achieved their intended results.  The most 
direct policy that attempted to curtail unit cost growth was the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment 
(NM), which Congress implemented in 1982.  The law was significantly modified in 2006 and 
2009 (as described below). 
NM requires the DoD to report when unit cost growth of any major defense 
acquisition program was “known, expected, or anticipated” by a program manager to exceed 
certain cost growth thresholds (US Congress, 2007).  More specifically, NM stipulates two 
levels of unit cost growth breach, the significant level and critical level.  A significant unit 
cost breach occurred if a program experienced cost growth over 15% of the current baseline 
estimate, whereas a critical unit cost breach occurred if a program experiences cost growth 
of 25% over the current baseline estimate.  A unit cost breach occurs if a program 
experiences unit cost growth above specified thresholds as measured by either program 
acquisition unit cost2 (PAUC) or average procurement unit cost3 (APUC).  
The NM law requires a program manager to fulfill specific criteria when a program 
breaches.  For a significant unit cost breach, the “Service Secretary must notify Congress 
within 45 days after the report (normally program deviation report) upon which the 
determination is based… [and] submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the required 
additional unit cost breach information” (Axtell & Irby, 2007)..  For a critical unit cost breach, 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) 
must fulfill and complete all ‘significant’ breach requirements and must additionally certify to 
Congress within 60 days of the SAR that the program meets four criteria: (1) the system is 
essential to national security; (2) there are no alternatives to such system which will provide 
equal or greater military capability at less cost; (3) the new estimates of the unit cost are 
reasonable; and (4) the management structure for such major defense system is adequate 
to manage and control unit cost (US Congress, 2007).    
Implementation of NM did not seem to have any significant impact on acquisition 
outcomes.  The most consistent criticism of NM was that the measure was ineffective 
because programs would avoid incurring a NM breach by rebaselining a program (i.e., 
establishing a new “current” baseline)—a procedure that did not require Congressional 
notification (Axtell, 2006).   
The NM statute was amended in 2006 to close the rebaselining loophole.  The new 
provision included language specifying a second condition for incurring a NM breach: unit 
cost growth over the original baseline estimate.  A significant unit cost breach occurs when 
cost growth exceeds 30% of the original baseline and a critical unit cost breach occurs when 
                                                
2 (Total Development cost + Procurement cost + Construction cost)/(Total program quantity) 




cost growth exceeds 50% of the original baseline estimate.  The revision did not change the 
reporting requirements for either the significant or critical unit cost breach. 
Soon after the implementation of the 2006 NM revision, the DoD reported 40 of the 
85 current MDAP programs were experiencing unit cost growth high enough to warrant a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach.  Although 25 of these programs experienced unit cost growth of 
over 50% relative to their original baseline, the DoD did not report programs as having 
incurred a Nunn-McCurdy breach as the National Defense Authorization Act permitted the 
“original baseline estimate to be revised to the current baseline estimate as of January 6, 
2006” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2006).  Between 2006 and 2007, 16 
additional programs experienced unit cost growth high enough to incur a NM breach.  
Despite the impact of the new legislation on the number of programs that breached, it is too 
soon to determine the long-term impact of the legislation on current acquisition performance, 
although the immediate short-term impact has been to place greater visibility, as well as a 
great deal more emphasis, on the unit cost growth, relative to the original program baseline.  
Congress again amended NM with The Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009.  This law added two requirements to the process of recertifying programs that 
incur a NM breach.  A program with a NM unit cost breach now must (a) rescind the most 
recent Milestone approval and (b) receive a new Milestone approval before any actions 
regarding the contract may continue.  The new Milestone approval requires a certification 
that the costs of the program are reasonable, and the certification must be supported by an 
independent cost estimate that includes a confidence level for the estimate (US Congress, 
2009).  This statute was implemented too recently to evaluate its impact upon the defense 
acquisition process.  
The authors performed several data analyses, based on the limited, publicly 
available information, to determine if any reported variables were correlated in a statistically 
significant way with NM unit cost breach.  The data analysis computed several tests of 
independence, using Fisher’s “exact test.”  This analysis produced two conclusions.  First, 
the DoD’s current metrics are not useful for determining the root cause of unit cost growth in 
acquisition programs.  Second, despite data limitations, it appears that programs that 
experience high, unit-cost growth are not randomly distributed.  Going further, programs that 
experience a NM unit cost breach appear to have the strongest relationship with two 
factors—value size of project and the estimating cost category.  Programs appear much 
more likely to breach if the total program has a large value (above $7.95 billion) and positive 
cost growth from the estimating category.  Conversely, programs with small total program 
value (below $3.5 billion) appear to rarely breach. 
The report analyzed two relevant case studies.  The Space-Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS) High program highlights how the threat of a NM breach does not necessarily lead 
to improved acquisition outcomes, and as a result the program subsequently breached.  The 
Virginia-class Submarine (SSN 774) program highlights how programs that experience high 
unit cost growth can implement policies to achieve substantial cost reductions (i.e., the 
desired action, to avoid a NM breach).  
This study resulted in 8 findings: (1) unit cost growth has remained high; (2) few 
programs incurred a NM breach until the recent 2006 revision of the law that requires 
programs to consider unit cost growth above a program’s original baseline; (3) the DoD’s 
data collection has been inconsistent (regarding: definitions, moving baselines, quantities, 
etc.); (4) the DoD often has not conducted systematic analysis of root-cause problems; (5) 
limited and inconsistent data undermines an effective analysis; (6) NM may identify 




effective; (7) NM’s effectiveness may be limited by its focus on the development and 
procurement of assets, as opposed to the entire life-cycle of the program; and (8) recent 
legislation has not been implemented long enough to evaluate its impact on DoD acquisition 
processes. 
The authors developed 8 recommendations.  Regarding NM, the DoD should: (1) 
develop a system to determine and distribute lessons-learned from a NM breach, throughout 
the DoD and (2) develop leading indicators.  In order to control cost growth, the DoD should 
(1) fully embrace and implement the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
legislation as prior attempts to reform DoD acquisitions have been ineffective in large part 
due to the DoD’s institutional resistance; (2) implement a more complete acquisition data 
information system; (3) consider lifecycle costs when rendering acquisition decisions; (4) 
directly address the lack of incentives that allow current underlying problems to persist; (5) 
work with Congress to increase funding flexibility (e.g., being able to use production money 
to increase development costs so as to save far more significant unit production costs); and 
(6) provide programs with greater requirements flexibility (e.g., allowing cost/performance 
trade-offs, especially for “block I” of the deployed system, so that the last 5 to 10% of 
performance “requirements” doesn’t double the unit costs). 
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Abstract 
Cost and time overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have 
become a high-profile problem attracting the interest of Congress, government and 
watchdog groups.  According to the GAO, the 96 MDAPs from FY2008 collectively ran $296 
billion over budget and were an average of 22 months behind schedule. President Obama’s 
memo on government contracting of 4 March 2009 also highlighted this issue. 
This paper presents interim findings of research on the root causes of cost and 
schedule delays for MDAPs. This research is ongoing and will incorporate the 2010 SAR 
data. The final findings and policy recommendations will be presented at the May 2011 
Naval Post Graduate School annual Acquisition Symposium.  
Introduction 
Cost and time overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have 




watchdog groups.  According to the GAO, the 96 MDAPs from FY2008 collectively ran $296 
billion over budget and were an average of 22 months behind schedule. President Obama’s 
memo on government contracting of 4 March 2009 also highlighted this issue. 
This paper presents interim findings of research on the root causes of cost and 
schedule delays for MDAPs. This research is ongoing and will incorporate the 2010 SAR 
data. The final findings and policy recommendations will be presented at the May 2011 
Naval Post Graduate School annual Acquisition Symposium.  
 
Figure 1. Relative Cost Growth Versus Absolute Cost Growth for FY2008 
MDAPs 
Note: Only FY2008 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the 
September 2008 SAR were included 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Problem Definition 
Past studies on this topic either have not offered rigorous data analysis or were 
focused on a narrow aspect of the problem, such as technical maturity.  As a result, 
acquisition reform efforts, most recently the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, are hampered by an insufficient analytical basis. 
For instance, in its annual assessment of selected weapon systems, the GAO 
primarily focuses on technology maturity and associated program decisions as causes for 
these problems. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics 
John Young claimed in a memorandum on March 31, 2009, that many of the allegations of 
the GAO are based on inadequate analytical methods and that consequently many of the 
results are misleading.  
This disagreement is exemplary of the diverging set of opinions that exists regarding 
the root causes of MDAPs cost overruns and schedule delays. The result amplifies 
disagreement regarding potential fixes. On the government side, Senator McCain identified 
the usage of cost plus contracts as a major source for cost increases and Secretary Gates 




some MDAPs. Defense contractors, on the other hand, regularly cite the altering of 
requirements in advanced program stages as an important factor for cost increases. 
The currently ongoing process of reforming and fixing defense acquisition system still 
lacks the foundation of a detailed evaluation of the causality chain of cost overruns and 
program delays of MDAPs. This lack of understanding of underlying mechanism makes the 
design of adequate solutions inherently difficult and renders them potentially ineffective. This 
study directly aims at developing the urgently needed knowledge base that will better guide 
efforts to correct the growing trends of cost increases and schedule overruns.  
Methodology 
This brief analysis a series of variables—namely realism of baseline program cost 
estimates, government management and oversight, the role of contractors and lead military 
services, levels of competition, and contract structures—to determine what factors might 
contribute to the observed cost overruns in the execution of MDAPs. 
The research draws on four primary data sources: 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs): The SARs track Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs reporting on their schedule, unit counts, total spending, and progress through 
milestones.  The unit of analysis is the programs themselves, making it the ideal source for 
top level analysis.   
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS): The FPDS is a database of every 
government contract, with millions of entries each year.  Each entry has extensive data on 
the contractors, contract type, competition, place of performance, and a variety of other 
topics as mandated by Congress.  Cross-referencing individual contracts with MDAPs is 
possible using the system equipment codes (which match up with those of MDAPs).  This 
source provides the most in-depth data on the government contracting process. 
Department of Defense Budget Documents: In addition to budget data, these 
documents provide topical information on each MDAP and its subcomponents.  They will 
primarily be used to categorize projects as well as to support and double check spending 
figures from the other two sources. 
The initial analysis phase focuses on MDAPs from the FY2008 MDAP list. Within this 
sample group, the analysis is limited to 87 MDAPs with cost estimates set at Milestone B or 
beyond. That gate is meant to be a hurdle that requires programs to reach a certain level of 
technological maturity.  As a result Milestone B “is normally the initiation of an acquisition 
program.” This common starting point ensures that only programs in a relatively mature 
acquisition phase are compared. Unfortunately, full data is not available on all 87 MDAPs 
when examining contract type and competition because only a majority of the programs 
have at least 50% of the SARs contract value accounted for in 2004-2008 FPDS data. The 
“unclear” category is used to signify this missing data in competition and contract type 
findings. In addition, FPDS totals for program spending are sometimes higher than the 
funding status according to the SARs. In those cases, the SAR totals are treated as the 
more reliable figure. 
This preliminary snapshot provides an adequate starting point for detecting 
correlations between a series of potentially relevant factors and cost growth. Subsequent 
analysis will examine multiple factors at the same time, expand the breadth of the sample 





The initial analysis focuses on examining the impact of baseline cost estimates, 
quantity and schedule changes, as well as engineering problems; the extent of competition 
in contracts (full and open, partial, none)4; contract structure; lead branch of military service; 
and identity of prime contractor on the cost performance on MDAPs.  
 
Figure 2. Functional Reasons for Cost Growth 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
Breaking down cost growth by functional areas as provided in the SARs identifies 
mistakes in the estimating process as the primary driver for cost growth, being responsible 
for $145.5 billion in cost growth for the 87 MDAPs analyzed.  
Another noteworthy observation is the fact that the cost savings achieved through 
quantity changes almost equals the cost growth originating from changes in unit numbers. 
Quantity based changes are unlike the five other types of changes as the SARs adjust the 
top-line cost overrun figures to remove the impact of quantity changes. The key distinction is 
that for programs with upfront research and development costs, reducing the number of 
units lowers the overall cost but increases the unit cost. In turn, cost increases deriving from 
increases in the number of units require a higher overall budget but lower the price per unit. 
Similarly, Nunn-McCurdy breaches are based on the growth in the acquisition unit cost and 
not the overall cost. 
                                                
4 Full competition refers to programs competed under full and open competition with at least two 
bidders. Partial competition includes all other competed contracts such as follow-ons to competed 
contracts, competitions where the number of bidders is legally limited, and full and open competition 





Figure 3. Time-cost Correlation 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
The next explanatory variable examined for its impact on program performance is the 
time-cost growth correlation. If cost increases accrue over time then programs with an older 
baseline estimate would tend to accumulate relatively higher cost increases. The data for 
the analyzed programs shows that older programs indeed experience larger overruns.   
When measured in compound annual growth rate5 rather than aggregate relative 
cost growth, the time-cost growth correlation is almost constant. This does not only provide 
further evidence for the assertion that cost growth occurs steadily throughout the program 
lifespan, but it also suggests that younger programs are not performing better than older 
programs. On the other hand, this sample does not include older programs that were 
cancelled. Future research with a broadened sample set will be better able to avoid this 
confounding factor and thus provide more insight into the successes and failures of past 
reform efforts. 
                                                
5 The compound annual growth rate describes the average year-to-year cost growth of a program 
spending since its baseline. Thus if comparing two programs with same percentage of cost growth 
since their baseline estimate, the program with an earlier baseline year would have a smaller 





Figure 4. Cost Overruns by Lead Service (I) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
The analysis on the correlation between the lead branch of military service 
responsible for MDAPs and cost growth patterns reveals that programs led by the Navy 
appear to perform best, followed by the Air Force and Army, while DoD-wide programs tend 
to accrue significant higher cost overruns. As broken down by the SARs, DoD-wide refers 
not just to programs managed by DoD agencies but also joint programs such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter. The outcome of this data analysis might be skewed based on the relatively 
small sample group utilized in this preliminary analysis. For instance, it appears that the 
DoD-wide category might be heavily influenced by the negative developments for the Joint 
Strike Fighter program. As for the other components, further analysis with larger sample 
groups are required to validate observed trends. 
Any conclusions identifying superior program management of existing programs by 
the better performing services as means of avoiding cost growth would be premature, even 
if additional data and analysis will confirm this variation in cost performance based on lead 
service. A number of other factors occurring before Milestone B may explain the differences, 
such as a tendency toward less risk-prone MDAPs or better cost estimating at the outset of 
programs. Further research will be needed to analyze the underlying causality and detect 





Figure 5. Cost Overruns by Lead Service (II) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
Comparing the share of cost growth for which each service is responsible with the 
share of contract value, based on baseline estimates, which each service is managing 
supports the poor cost performance of DoD-wide managed MDAPs. DoD-wide led programs 
are responsible for an over-proportional large share of absolute cost overruns. The picture is 
reversed for the Navy, meanwhile for the Air Force and the Army the share of cost overruns 
and is slightly larger than the share of baseline value. This comparison provides further 
support for the assertion that Navy managed MDAPs over-perform, while DoD-wide 
managed MDAPs underperform. However, the level of analysis conducted so far does not 







Figure 6. Figure 6. Cost Overruns by Prime Contractor (I) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Another predictor for program performance could be the identity of the prime 
contractor executing a given program. The picture becomes a lot more complex, based on 
the amount of actors involved. One striking trend that is visible for the “big five” US defense 
companies is the fact that Raytheon on average appears to deliver significantly better cost 
performance outcomes than the other four defense companies.  
Again, the preliminary character of the analysis does not fully validate these findings. 
In addition, even if confirmed, it would be premature to start praising Raytheon for superior 
program execution, as other factors such as specialization in technologically more mature 
program areas might be the true drivers behind this trend. As was the case for the 






Figure 7. Cost Overruns by Prime Contractor (II) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
The comparison between the share of cost growth and the share of contract value for 
MDAPs, aggregated by prime contractor correlates with the finding that Raytheon managed 
MDAPs appear to exhibit the best cost performance amongst the “big five” defense 
companies. However, the above graph also shows that the respectable performance of 
Raytheon contracted MDAPs has only a marginal impact on aggregate cost growth bottom 
line due to the small contract value share of Raytheon led programs.  
 
Figure 8. Cost Overruns by Type of Competition 






Contract awarding mechanisms could potentially also have an impact on cost 
performance of MDAPs. Competitive contracts6 are outperforming contracts awarded with 
no competition or under unclear circumstances with regard to cost performance. This might 
indicate that competition either results in more realistic bids or that winning companies have 
more incentives to keep costs under control. This advantage holds for the category of partial 
competition, which includes cases open for competition but with only a single bidder, follow-
ons to competed contracts, and competitions with a legally limited pool of applicants. In fact, 
somewhat surprisingly, partially competed MDAPs appear to have lower overruns than fully 
competed ones. However, without further study, it is impossible to say whether this is due to 
benefits of partially competitive structures or is fully competitive procedures are deemed to 
be a necessary for high risk programs. 
 
Figure 9. Cost Overruns by Contract Type 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Contract structure provides another possible determining factor for the performance 
of MDAPs. One key observation is that fixed price contracts appear to over-perform and 
unspecified contract types appear to under-perform when comparing the share of cost 
growth and the share of contract value for MDAPs.  
Acquisition reformers often point towards over- and misuse of cost plus contracts as 
a factor driving cost overruns.  Yet as the comparison reveals the use of cost plus contracts, 
award fee and incentive as well as conventional, seem not to be responsible for dramatically 
over-proportional cost growth. In addition, fixed price contracts are often the vehicle of 
choice for mature technology in full rate production, which are generally considered low risk.
                                                
6 Full competition refers to programs competed under full and open competition with at least two 
bidders. Partial competition includes all other competed contracts such as follow-ons to competed 
contracts, competitions where the number of bidders is legally limited, and full and open competition 






The initial analysis yielded a number of preliminary trends for determining the 
sources of cost overruns in MDAPs. One key finding from the SAR data is that overly 
optimistic cost estimating is responsible for almost half of the accumulated cost overruns. In 
fact, of all the services the Army is the only one with cost estimating not being the primary 
reason for cost growth.  
Of the tested variables, only the time-cost correlation appears to have no impact on 
cost overrun developments once accounted for on a compound annual growth rate. This 
suggests that program performance might not have been improving in recent times. If this 
trend is further validated it hints toward the concerning conclusion than any acquisition 
reform efforts prior to 2008 have so far failed to create any improvements for cost 
performance. In this context, it must, however, be noted that cost performance as measured 
in the SARs constitutes clearly a lagging indicator for the impact of any acquisition reform. In 
addition, some of the worst performing older programs of the past have already been 
cancelled and if included would increase the overrun compound annual growth rate for 
earlier years. 
The examination of all of the other examined variables reveals patterns that suggest 
that each of them, or associated secondary or tertiary factors, could play a role in explaining 
the occurrence of MDAP cost overruns. While one service may appear to have the best cost 
performance; or one company may seem to deliver fewer cost-overrun programs of the “big 
five” defense contractors; fixed price contracts appear to constitute the contract vehicle with 
the best cost growth control; and awarding contracts in a competitive fashion seems to 
ensure better cost performance than alternative awarding mechanism, all of these trends 
need to be further validated through additional analysis, incorporating larger sample groups. 
Afterwards, more rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis is required to identify the 
actual root causes for cost overruns, which might be only masked by the examined 
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Cost-Benefit Study of a Project to Lower Cost and 
Improve Fleet Readiness through Integrating the 
Management of Technical Information  
Dan Levine— Dr. Dan Levine holds a PhD in physics and an MA in economics. After a time at 
Harry Diamond Labs and the National Bureau of Standards, he has been working since 1962 on 
economics and cost-effectiveness studies at the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for 
Defense Analyses. His areas of research have been in Navy and Army logistics, and a variety of 
areas in OSD planning. Levine gives the lecture on cost effectiveness analysis for the course in cost 
analysis that the IDA Cost Analysis and Research Division gives annually to graduate students in 
operations research at George Mason University. 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes a cost-benefit analysis by the Institute for Defense Analyses of 
the “Bridge Project” that ADL (Advanced Distributed Learning) is conducting for the Office of 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD(AT&L) to improve the 
management of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). The Project is part of the OSD RTOC 
program (Reduction in Total Ownership Cost). The Bridge Project focuses on integrating 
(Bridging) the management and production of technical manuals and training courses. The 
benefits would be lower cost to produce these manuals and courses in the future, and 
improved readiness through insuring the delivery of consistent and up-to-date logistics 
support to the Fleet. 
Manuals and courses are currently produced by entirely separate processes. Tech 
writers and course developers obtain contractor data on systems and equipments in parallel, 
they express the information in different formats, they organize the data in different 
structures, and they store the data in different repositories. Cost is therefore higher because 
of duplication of resources and the difficulties in re-using data. The lack of integration can 
also reduce readiness, since it opens up the possibility that the tech manuals and training 
courses present disparate information, thus depriving ship operators and maintainers of the 
most effective support. 
The Bridge Project seeks to relieve these problems by designing new software, 
technical and business processes to integrate the production of technical manuals and 
training courses. All technical and learning content would be expressed by the same digital 
specification (the S1000D industry specification), they would employ the same structure 
(Data Modules), and the data would all be stored in the same repositories (Common Source 
Data Bases, or CSDBs). The project is developing an API (Application Programming 
Interface) to enable course developers to exchange data with any CSDB, and a Web 
Service to more quickly update tech manuals and training courses in response to 
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). 
The analysis finds that the Bridge would achieve net benefits (benefits less costs) of 
approximately $87 million over 10 years, far more than enough to cover the $8.7 million 10-
year cost of producing all Navy HM&E (Hull, Mechanical and Electrical) technical manuals 
and training courses delivered by Navy e-Learning, a part of the Naval Education and 
Training Command (NETC). A sensitivity analysis of the most uncertain inputs yields a 




The Bridge could also contribute to shipboard readiness by insuring the Navy’s policy 
of providing up-to-date and consistent information to the Fleet upon installation of new 
systems and equipment. A parametric analysis indicates that by increasing the availability of 
the electronic, ordnance and HM&E components of a single new DDG 1000 destroyer for 
only a single day would increase effectiveness the Navy values at $2 million. 
Executive Summary 
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) is conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the 
“Bridge Project” that the Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) office is conducting for the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD(AT&L)). 
The project is part of OSD’s RTOC program (Reduction in Total Ownership Cost). The 
project’s focus is on improving how the Navy manages several aspects of Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) in order to reduce the cost of producing technical manuals and 
training courses. A related benefit is increasing readiness through insuring the Navy’s policy 
of having the appropriate logistics support on hand when new systems and equipment 
upgrades are fielded. 
Under current ILS management, manuals and courses are produced by entirely 
separate processes. Tech writers and course developers obtain contractor data on new 
systems and equipment upgrades in parallel. They express the data in different formats, 
they organize the data in different structures, and they store the data in different 
repositories. The cost of producing logistics support is therefore higher because of the 
duplication of resources and the difficulties in re-using data. The lack of integration can also 
reduce readiness, since it opens up the possibility that the tech manuals and training 
courses present disparate information. And there may be delays in updating the information 
in response to Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). These disparities and delays can 
deprive ship operators and maintainers of the most up-to-date information on their systems 
and equipment. 
The Bridge project is designing a new process—new software, technical and 
business processes to integrate (“Bridge”) the production of technical manuals and training 
courses. The initial beneficiary of the funding is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission 
Modules Program (PMS 420), which is integrating the Mission Modules into the LCS. Under 
the Bridge Project, all technical and learning content would be expressed by the same digital 
specification (the S1000D industry specification), organized by the same structure (Data 
Modules), and stored in the same repositories (Common Source Data Bases). The project is 
also developing an Application Programming Interface (API) to grant all course developers 
access to any CSDB, and a Web Service to quickly identify the technical and learning 
content that must be reviewed for updating in response to Engineering Change Proposals 
(ECPs). 
The cost-benefit study estimates the investment and implementation costs of 
designing and implementing the integrated approach. Investment is measured by the 
personnel and related expenses of the project during the second, or coming year of this 2-
year project. (The first-year costs are sunk, and no longer relevant.) Implementation involves 
training technical writers and course developers in using the Bridge, and the licenses and 
user fees to cover the additional costs of maintaining the networks and the data repositories. 
The Bridge Project’s benefits are the anticipated reduction in the costs of producing future 
technical manuals and training courses, and possible improvements in shipboard readiness. 
The cost savings were estimated by first listing the dozens of tasks (38 for the 




nominal one-content-hour training course. Project personnel estimated the number of staff 
hours to produce these tasks under both current and Bridge processes, and thus the staff 
hour savings from using the Bridge. Pay rates are used to convert the staff hour savings to 
cost savings. The final step is scaling up the results to the sample of yearly production of 
technical manuals and training courses. Costs and benefits were expressed in 10-year 
present values calculated using the 2.4% annual discount rate mandated by OMB for 10-
year studies. 
Two different samples were chosen for analysis, reflecting the different perspectives 
of OSD and the PMS 420 Program Office. The first analysis recognizes OSD’s interest in 
seeing whether the new software and technical and business processes that comprise the 
Bridge would lead to positive net benefits to DoD overall—would the benefits cover the costs 
if implemented by the Navy and other Services as a whole. This analysis is therefore 
conducted for a substantial number of the Navy’s yearly production of technical manuals 
and training courses: all Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) technical manuals 
produced by the Naval Ship System Engineering Station (NAVSSES) in Philadelphia (over 
45,000 pages annually), and 50% of the Computer-Based Training (CBT) courses delivered 
by Navy e-Learning (NeL), a part of the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) 
(approximately 3,300 content hours annually, in total). 
Only 50% of the NeL courses were considered because our analysis of the course 
titles indicated that only half of the courses trained “hard skills.” These are the training 
courses that deal with equipment and other technical content, and whose cost would 
therefore be reduced by integrating the production of training courses and technical 
manuals. (Although courses that train “soft skills” such as leadership and personal 
advancement would not be directly affected by integration, they might benefit from the 
information-organizing features of the other Bridge innovations.)  
The second analysis, reflecting the Program Office’s perspective, is a test case of 
the results of the aggregate analysis in which the Bridge is applied to a particular system, 
the LCS’s AN/AQS-20A mine hunting sonar. The focus here is on the benefits alone—
whether the Bridge would lead to reductions in future cost of producing future technical 
manuals and training courses for this system. It would not be reasonable to expect the 
benefits for a single program to cover the full investment and implementation costs of the 
Bridge, which could lead to savings across DoD. 
The first analysis finds that the Bridge would save approximately $87 million in 10 
year cost in producing the Navy HM&E manuals and 50% of NeL delivered courses—far 
more than enough to cover the $8.7 million investment and implementation costs of the 
program. The second analysis finds that the Bridge would produce substantial savings of 
almost $306 thousand in producing technical manuals and training courses for the LCS 
AN/AQS-20A. 
Dealing with uncertainty was a major analytical problem. Although much of the 
analysis used historical data from NAVSSES, NETC and the AN/AQS-20A program, the cost 
savings are also based on several uncertain inputs relating to the new Bridge process. A 
sensitivity analysis was conducted of five inputs: 1) the future pay rate for technical writers 
and course developers who are trained in using the Bridge, 2) the percentage of training 
hours that would be benefited by the Bridge, 3) the investment cost (to hedge against 
unanticipated cost of developing the Bridge), 4) the implementation cost (to hedge against 
problems caused by the cultural changes in Navy programming), and 5) the percentage 
saving in course developer staff hours from using the Bridge. Considering these changes in 




varying from a minimum of $32 million to the Base Case of $78 million ($87 million less $8.7 
million) to a maximum of $160 million. Efforts will be taken in the second year of this study to 
further refine the inputs. 
There is every reason to expect that net benefits would be significantly larger if the 
Bridge were applied to all Navy manuals and courses, and those of the other Services as 
well. 
The final benefit for analysis was the improvement in Fleet readiness. Integrated 
production of technical manuals and training courses would increase the likelihood of 
providing the Fleet with up-to-date and consistent information, thus providing some 
insurance to the Navy’s policy of fielding new systems and equipment upgrades only when 
the appropriate logistics support is available. A parametric analysis indicates that increasing 
the availability of the electronic, ordnance and HM&E components of a single new DDG 










Acquisition programs have inherent variability in their task durations, which often 
results in unforecasted completion delay.  Using concepts from Lean Production and Lean 
Product Development, queues that are at the heart of these delays can be made visible and 
can be managed.  Observing queues in acquisition programs can give early warning of 
project problems.  Several techniques can be used to manage queues. 
Keywords: Queues, queueing theory, acquisition, product development, lean 
product development, cost of delay, utilization 
Introduction 
This paper is intended to be an introduction to a portion of a large subject.  
Conferences, scores of books, hundreds of papers, and uncounted consultants have been 
devoted to product development in the public and private sectors.  Issues such as 
configuration management tools, quality of the IMS (Integrated Management Schedule), 
domain-specific considerations, and people management—all important issues—will not be 
treated here.  This paper focuses on a topic that may not be as well known as other product 
development topics, but I believe has great potential to better manage acquisition programs. 
Queues are generally unrecognized entities in acquisition programs, yet they are 
valuable information sources and useful handles for controlling them.  Lean manufacturing 
experts have long viewed queues as near-evils to be managed in a production environment, 
but only relatively recently have they viewed them as either problems or opportunities in 
product development.  There is now a rich literature on lean production (Ohno, 2008) and 
lean product development (Morgan & Liker, 2006) that relies on insights gained from 
queueing theory.  
Queues are easy to recognize in a production environment—piles of physical product 
in front of a workstation or machine make them obvious.  What is a queue in acquisition, 
where the thing being manufactured, at least in the early stages, is only information?  In this 
paper, I take the point of view of the Program Manager (PM) or PM leadership and focus on 





Recognizing a Queue 
Figure 1 shows 
a project overview.   
The top line shows how 
many tasks have been 
started since the 
beginning of the project 
as of the date on the x 
axis.  The bottom line 
shows how many tasks 
have been finished 
since beginning of the 
project as of the date 
on the x axis. Thus, in 
period 13, there are 15 
projects that have been 
started since the 
beginning and 10 
projects that have been 
finished since the 
beginning, leaving 5 
projects in the queue. 
Figure 1. Where is the Queue? 
Queues arise whenever there are unfinished tasks.  Thus, some amount of queueing 
is inevitable.  In the figure, the only points where the lines meet (where the queue has 
disappeared) are at the beginning and at the end.  However, when the number of unfinished 
tasks is large, queues are large.  In the figure, the gap between cumulative started and 
cumulative finished tasks is the queue size.  Note that both the vertical (quantity) and 
horizontal gaps (time) grow for increasing queues. The key fact to note is that queue size 
will increase well before the task completion dates prove that the schedule is slipping.  Thus, 
queue size is a leading indicator of schedule slips. 
This graph can be created using the program management tool to create a scatter 
plot of numbered task actual start dates and actual finish dates, sorted by actual start date. 
In the graph, there are a few points where the queues are dramatically reduced.  
This occurs when the cumulative complete line jumps up after going horizontal for some 
time (approximately periods 8, 17, and 24).  These points correspond to authorization points 
such as milestone decisions.  Here the queue arises not only because it takes some time to 
complete several tasks—in synchrony—but also because the milestone meeting may not 
occur immediately after the tasks are complete.  The milestone decision meeting may be 
delayed.  While teams will not completely stop work while they wait for the milestone 
decision, the milestone decision may render speculative work irrelevant. 
What Makes Queues Large? 
The factors that make queues larger are longer task durations, the number of tasks 
being worked on simultaneously, waiting for completion of other dependent tasks, and 




breaking down tasks into small-enough chunks, multi-tasking key people (thus spreading 
them too thin), poor metrics that do not allow queues to be better managed, insufficient 
parallelization of tasks when staff is adequate to support more simultaneous tasks, and 
infrequent review meetings that increase team wait time. 
A pernicious kind of queue is created by rework.  Rework is usually not visible in 
common project management software.  In particularly risky acquisitions, where new 
science and engineering knowledge are being developed, rework is inevitable, and is 
sometimes represented as a finite number (i.e., a guess) of iterations of a set of tasks.  
Other reasons that rework occurs is when it is due to team directions that are either under- 
or over-specified, when testing is delayed, or when authorization reviews do not take place 
regularly. 
A more fundamental cause of large queues arises from the variable nature of work 
that dominates a typical acquisition.  Task durations can only be approximately estimated, 
and duration varies widely among different tasks.  Variability in both estimated and actual 
durations produces unexpected, non-obvious task duration (cycle time) increases, which in 
turn increases queues.  Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon The two curves result from two 
different values for coefficient of variation.  The more variation there is in task duration, the 
more that cycle time tends to “blow up” with increasing utilization. 
This phenomenon is well known to practitioners of lean production.  Their normal 
response, as opposed to the response of lean product development practitioners is to 
aggressively reduce variability.  This is often not an option in acquisitions that require 
knowledge work, such as science and engineering.  Variability is inherent in knowledge 
work, so other approaches must be used to make an impact on project cycle time and 
queues.  
How Do You Measure 
Queues? 
Unlike estimated 
schedule completion, queues are 
measured with actual data.  
Their size is the accumulated 
person-hours actually spent on 
started but unfinished tasks.  
This number can be calculated 
from most project management 
software if incurred person-hours 
are entered into the tool.   
 
Figure 2.  
Figure 3. C
Cycle Time versus Utilization 





Figure 4. Measuring Queues from IMS 
Above is a simple example taken from a typical IMS.  For simplicity, only two started-
but-unfinished tasks are shown, with 270 and 7 workdays invested in the two tasks.  
Workdays from any additional started-but-unfinished tasks would simply be added to 277.  
This value would be valid only on the day that this data is recorded.  By recording this data 
every week and graphing it, queue size and trends would become apparent.   
However, for very large programs, there may be scores of open tasks, and not very 
timely accounting for actual hours spent.  Lack of timely data entry defeats the purpose of 
providing early warning, but there is an easier way to providing nearly the same information.  
Tracking only workdays (without regard to how many people are working on each task) 
spent on started-but-unfinished tasks provides a good substitute.   
Figure 4 is a graph of queue task-periods for the graph shown in Figure 1.  In other 
words, they have been calculated for every period in the project rather than just one period 
as in Figure 3.  Figure 4 
shows the queue in period 13 
growing above the previous 
maximum.   This is early 
warning that work may not be 
completed as scheduled.  
While the cause may be long 
duration tasks and not late 
tasks, the graph provides 
triggers to ask questions about 
what is going on.  The height 
of the curve in Figure 4 
represents the area between 
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The beauty of this metric is that it can be calculated from PMO (Program 
Management Office) IMS data with little extra work.  In other words, no matter the size of the 
program, this metric is easily calculated and tracked. 
How Can We Reduce Queues? 
Three general measures can be taken to reduce queues: 
 Manage demand, 
 Increase capacity, and 
 Project management. 
Demand can be managed via requirements management.  Most requirements’ 
development processes bucket requirements into “must haves” versus “nice to haves.”  This 
can be expanded to ranking (possibly by dollarizing) requirements so that when a schedule 
slip with a given set  of requirements looks likely, there is a list of “nice to have” 
requirements that can be jettisoned in rank order.  The key is to rank order requirements.  
The program would then have a requirements relief valve.   
Increasing capacity will reduce utilization, thereby reducing queues and cycle time 
(see Figure 2).  Capacity can be increased by staff additions or staff adaptation—that is, 
intelligently and dynamically allocating staff.  Many programs assume that only IMS people 
do IMS, only acquisition people do acquisition planning, only manpower people do 
manpower planning, etc.  Using people with multiple domain capabilities can help increase 
utilization and decrease cycle time.  They can either be teams of senior people who move 
from function to function as problems crop up, or teams of junior people who may not need 
as much domain-specific knowledge to change function and still perform adequately in a 
reduced role.  These teams are sometimes called SWAT teams or tiger teams.  
Understanding queues gives the program manager extra tools.  First, as mentioned 
above, queues are a leading indicator of program health.  Second, developing expectations 
of where specific queues are likely to occur makes it possible to prevent them, not just fix 
them.  For example, task parallelization can be concentrated on the potentially longest 
(riskiest) queues, and efforts can be made to move these potential queues from the critical 
path.  Third, as mentioned in the paragraph above, SWAT-like teams can be constructed 
with the right skill sets for expected queues.  Fourth, with the right economic guidelines, 
which we will discuss next, the program manager can respond quickly to rapidly developing 
queue problems.  Finally, the program manager and his or her leadership can schedule 
reviews of the program both internally and externally on a frequent, regular basis (a 




Quick Response Based on Solid Economic Guidelines 
 Controlling queues means getting the right resources put on solving real-time design 
and planning problems.  This requires 
knowing what level of resources is 
reasonable to apply to the problem.  This 
can only be done well if tradeoff 
guidelines based on data are created at 
the beginning.   
Figure 5 shows these tradeoff 









and cost of delay 
3. Between development cost and cost of delay 
 
Figure 6. Economic Tradeoffs 
The most difficult metric to calculate is the cost of delay.  This is not often done in 
either government or private industry, since the cost of delay has a high subjective 
component.  Nonetheless, an intelligent guess, especially if there is buy-in at every level of 
leadership, is better than none at all.  For, if there is not even a guess, many decisions that 
may affect queues and cycle time—and thus the program being on schedule—may have to 
be made above the PMO or after the program slips.  Or to put it another way, having upfront 
guidelines to make these tradeoffs makes it possible to push many decisions down to the 
PMO’s teams where quick response at the most detailed level may help prevent schedule 
slips. 
An example of a tradeoff guideline is, “you are authorized to spend up to $100 to 
save $200 cost of delay, without asking for permission.”  One dollar value can be given to 
the PMO, who may give smaller limits to the teams below depending on the degree of 
oversight desired.  As Reinertsen has pointed out regarding product development (2009), 
this kind of guideline can become a core part of mission-type orders (Lind, 1985) to the 







Figure 7. Sample Economic Guidelines 
Summary 
Queues in acquisition are good leading indicators of future schedule slips.  Queues 
can be managed by ranking requirements, controlling task starts, staffing adaptively, setting 
up “SWAT teams” of acquisition experts, parallelizing tasks, reviewing cadences, and 
establishing guidelines for tradeoffs.  A list of references is provided to direct the reader to 
the latest writing I found on the subject. 
This publication contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of 
this publication, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or 
other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such 
professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or 
action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any 
action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional 
advisor. Deloitte shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who 
relies on this publication. 
About Deloitte 
As used in this document, “Deloitte” means Deloitte Consulting LLP, a subsidiary of 
Deloitte LLP.  Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of the 
legal structure of Deloitte LLP and its subsidiaries. 
Copyright ©2010 Deloitte Development LLC.  All rights reserved 
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Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis: Enabling Early 
Acquisition Decisions  
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Abstract 
The use of systems engineering early in the acquisition cycle is being advocated for 
programs as a means to add analytic rigor prior to Milestone A.  Modeling and simulation 
(M&S) coupled with early requirements and effectiveness analyses can shape programs and 
test alternatives prior to costly program commitments.  Conceptual modeling and early cost 
effectiveness analyses are key to revitalizing development planning and early systems 
engineering, which will enable more-informed decisions by acquisition leadership.  Early 
systems prototyping, coupled with continuous program support and assessment, will enable 
better acquisition decisions through the series of milestone decisions. 
Keywords: modeling, simulation, analysis, early systems engineering, prototyping 
Research Issue 
 In the current DDR&E organization, the Systems Engineering Directorate includes 
modeling and simulation as part of the Systems Analysis Division.  This new organization 
places powerful assessment capabilities and access to modeling and simulation for systems 
engineering early in the acquisition program lifecycle. 
Background 
During the last several decades, we have witnessed incredible progress improving 
underlying modeling and simulation (M&S) technologies.  Dr. Anita Jones (1988) led a 
Defense Science Board Study (DSB) published in 1988 that recommended improving our 
simulations to allow for more home station training of commanders and staffs, facilitate the 
sharing of our simulation data and arrive at more simulation-based training with less 




fundamental issues in M&S that we are still working to improve today—some two decades 
later.  A few years after the DBS study, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office 
(DMSO) was formed, and Dr. Jones took over as the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E).  During the 1990s, a progressive series of architectures and 
standards were developed to improve the DoD’s ability to form distributed, interoperable 
simulation environments with reusable scenario data and content. Each of the three M&S 
communities—Analysis, Training, and Acquisition—kicked off major joint programs during 
that time.  The Acquisition Community formed the Joint Modeling and Simulation System 
(JMASS) to expand on simulation-based acquisition (SBA)7 and to leverage simulation 
capabilities across the acquisition lifecycle.  The main thrust of both of these programs was 
to incorporate models and simulations as very integral components in each phase of the 
Acquisition process.  Although there was not widespread follow-up support, the concepts 
are still relevant today.   
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD(AT&L)) is the single focal point for the coordination of all matters related to DoD M&S 
(USD(AT&L), 2007).  The DoDD 5000.59 provides for the management of M&S via an 
executive-level DoD M&S Steering Committee, comprised of key agencies in the OSD, the 
Joint Staff, Services and Combatant Commands.  Chair of the M&S SC is delegated to the 
DDR&E.  With the publication of the M&S Steering Committee’s Strategic Vision for 
Modeling and Simulation (2007) and The 2008 Modeling and Simulation Corporate and 
Crosscutting Business Plan (DoD, 2009), the DoD M&S community has moved forward on a 
series of high-level tasks (HLTs) aimed at improving the M&S tools, data, functional 
representations and enterprise services across the Department.  The HLTs are consistent 
with the five M&S goals contained in the Strategic Vision.      
For example, the instantiation of Live Virtual and Constructive (LVC) environments 
for training, experimentation and testing applications show that we can today achieve many 
of the interoperability goals discussed in the late 1980s.  The training community can 
establish persistent networks dedicated to distributed simulations to link together nodes that 
are located all over the globe.  The technology that has been assembled at the US Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) in their LVC training environment is supported by Joint Training 
and Experimentation Network (JTEN) and is used by three of our Communities enabled by 
M&S as well as the Services.  The JFCOM training environment has also served the 
Information Operation (IO) Range to examine cyber network issues for the future.  The 
success of these LVC environments today provides us only a glimpse of the opportunities 
likely available to enjoy in the net-enabled world of the future.  Another area that has seen a 
tremendous increase in capability is the use and reuse of data for common scenarios and 
other wide-ranging applications.  A number of existing programs in the Services as well as 
for joint applications have collaborated to solve many of the hard issues that have precluded 
meaningful data reuse over the last decade. We have learned over time that in M&S, both 
the user needs and the enabling technologies are continuously evolving.  Information 
technology now supports an environment that allows the creation of more realistic, more 
capable, and more powerful simulation tools.  Significant reductions in program 
                                                
7 Overview from Chapter 11.13, Defense Acquisition Guidebook: SBA is the robust and interactive 
use of M&S throughout the product lifecycle. The program manager should employ SBA and M&S 
during system design, test and evaluation, and modification and upgrade. The program manager 





development times, lifecycle costs, and improved systems performance can be realized 
through use of M&S in acquisition.  
Acquisition Reform 
It is widely perceived that there are problems with the DoD acquisition process.  
Several of the common complaints from the user communities are as follows: 
 Too slow,  
 Requires significant labor investments just to satisfy and document the process, 
 Capabilities frequently reach concept decision and enter Milestone A without 
sufficient concept refinement and contact with the users, and 
  Too many requests from senior management for more rigorous analysis to drive 
decisions for program start up and/or no go early in the process. 
The acquisition reform goals and policies of the Obama Administration outline 
actions that impact government procurement, acquisition programs and contractors in a 
wide variety of areas.   The convergence of new administration priorities, burgeoning costs, 
and outdated procurement processes has prompted major contracting and policy initiatives 
designed to: 
 Develop more agile acquisition processes to increase the speed of technology 
deployment,  
 Increase transparency of the acquisition process,  
 Institute stricter risk and performance parameters, and  
 Reduce costs through cuts in contractor spending and use of “high-risk” contract 
types.  
This paper proposes that M&S can assist the USD(AT&L) in meeting the new 
administrations’ acquisition reform initiatives.  Key to reform is the ability to both compress 
timelines and add more analytic rigor to the acquisition process through the use of modeling 
and simulation.  Especially in the early stages of the acquisition process, the use of M&S for 
rapid prototyping and to support the analyses stages prior to Milestone A is useful to 
influence the early concepts, design and recommendations for major systems procurements.  
Although extremely important in the early stages of acquisition, the use of M&S applications 
at every stage of the process provides efficiencies and improvements in a wide variety of 
uses from requirements to technical aspects of design and development to sustainment of a 
given system.  M&S is more than a single tool or set of tools used at critical points in the 
process; it is rather a way of doing business that impacts every aspect of a system’s 
lifecycle.  In July 2009, the DDR&E introduced four Imperatives to focus the organization in 
support of the immediate and future needs of the Department of Defense: 1) accelerate 
delivery of technical capabilities to win the current fight; 2) prepare for an uncertain future; 3) 
reduce the cost, acquisition time and risk of our major defense acquisition programs; and 4) 
develop world class science, technology, engineering, and mathematics capabilities for the 
DoD and the nation.  The use of M&S is a clearly an enabler to achieve Imperative 3 above.  
Simulation-Based Acquisition (SBA) 
 The concepts of the SBA program formed a decade ago are still viable—but largely 




and industry partners are enabled by the robust, collaborative use of simulation technology 
integrated across all acquisition phases and programs.  The goals of SBA are very 
consistent with the current administration’s acquisition reform policy initiatives:   
 Reduce time, resources, and risk associated with the entire acquisition process; 
 Increase the quality, military worth and supportability of fielded systems; 
 Reduce total ownership costs throughout the system lifecycle; and  
 Enable integrated product and process development across the entire acquisition 
lifecycle. 
In keeping with the SBA vision and goals, the Department can provide a systems 
engineering environment that emphasizes M&S as a primary analysis tool and fosters the 
use and reuse of data and M&S content across programs and phases.  It is envisioned that 
use of models can refine the needs and provide the underpinning for more rigorous 
analyses prior to Milestone A, while transitioning critical content to guide systems design 
and later development and production processes.  As far back as 1997, Dr. Pat Sanders, 
the then-Director, Test, System Engineering and Evaluation, OUSD (A&T), was writing 
magazine articles on SBA as an effective, affordable mechanism for fielding complex 
technologies.  Even almost 13 years ago, it was believed that the extensive use of 
constructive models for system-of-systems evaluations would provide significant benefits—
particularly as they would enhance virtual prototypes that could be operated on future 
synthetic battlefields.  One can believe the future as regards these simulation environments 
is very close at hand today.  
Early Prototyping 
From the early requirements and conceptualization stages, the use of M&S and in 
particular system prototyping provides a powerful analytic capability to meet user needs.  It 
has been argued that prototypes are platforms for productive participation, as well as for 
perfecting products and performance (Schrage, 2010).  The power of producing systems 
prototypes early in the process serves as a way to iterate with the end user to arrive at 
better systems and solutions for the operational needs.  The more obvious use of prototypes 
is to guide the engineering analysis in the development planning stage of the acquisition.  
Any number of firms can be found through the internet proposing services to industry in the 
area of model making and prototyping.  Many of these firms are highly successful, providing 
rapid prototyping services that encompass proof of concept and proof of design with 
functional working simulations and models.  The use of prototyping can encompass 
constructive simulations, virtual environments or physical mock ups of the end system or 
product.  With the use of such tools as 3D visualization, one can progress to “model making” 
to influence the construct of actual 3D models.  The area of rapid prototyping uses state-of-
the-art CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided machining or modeling) 
techniques.  Significant advances in the area of M&S make it now more important than ever 
that we incorporate oversight policies and directives to include contracting language that 
requires the use of simulations, models and prototypes in all phases of the acquisition 
process.  
 Research Result 
M&S can provide a combination of live, virtual and constructive acquisition 
environments to impact policies and acquisition decisions early in program development and 
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Product acquisition and sustainment have traditionally been separate and not 
necessarily equal concerns in defense acquisition.  To reconcile this deficiency, the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) proposed a modernization of the defense acquisition 
process that resulted in the adoption of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), which 
integrates a performance-based environment for both acquisition and sustainment. The 
basic tenets of PBL suggest that the governance structure used must address the potential 
long-term nature of the relationship between the government and suppliers by integrating 
more collaboration and adaptability into the contractual mechanism.  Knowing this, the 
ultimate challenge for a contractor is being able to understand the relationship they have 
with the government and be able to evaluate whether the governance structure chosen 
permits, inhibits, or prohibits the government and contractor from achieving desired 
outcomes.   
The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual model that describes the 
conditions under which defense acquisitions should be structured as either being more 
short-term, transactional exchanges; long-term relational exchanges; or plural form (which 
recognizes the complementary nature of contracts and cooperative norms).  Using this 
conceptual model coupled with the logic provided by Transaction Cost Theory (TCE), we 
should be able to better explain whether the government-contractor relationship has a 
significant impact on the outcome of the contract.  For those contracts that fail as a result of 
endogenous conditions, we realign those programs with alternative contract types and 
alternative governance structures that are more suitable for the conditions of those 
programs.  We conclude this study with a discussion of how managers should match 
contract type with optimal governance structure and a preliminary empirical examination of 
the conceptual model. 
Background and Concepts 
Performance-Based Contracts 
Geary and Vitasek (2008) argue that longer term contracts encourage long-term 
investments to improve product or process inefficiencies.  Their logic is that long-term 
(greater than one year) contracts justify higher up-front investments on the part of the 
contractor, while short-term (one year or less) contracts generally discourage up-front 
investment on the part of the contractor and are therefore less effective at obtaining a higher 
degree of performance.  Keeping this in mind, we recognize that because the preferred PBL 




only choosing to invest in the acquisition of a technology or system, it is also investing in a 
relationship with that contractor.   
Formal Contracts 
There are different schools of thought concerning the impact of formal contracts on 
the relationship between the parties involved.  Ghoshal and Moran (1996) and Fehr and 
Gachter (2000) argue that formal contracts may signal distrust which could encourage one 
or all of the parties to exhibit opportunistic behavior.  Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that 
when relational governance exists, formal contracts are an unnecessary expense and could 
potentially be counter-productive.  Other scholars seem to think that because transactional 
uncertainty is inherent in long-term contracts, having formal agreements are necessary for 
combating market dynamism (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972), which is a result of evolving 
technology, shifting prices, or variance in product availability (Cannon et al., 2000).   
Cooperative Norms 
We define the term cooperative norms as being the relational norms that exist 
outside of the formal contract.  In other words, if a formal contract establishes a set of legal 
conditions, in theory, the relational norms that exist between the parties involved are the 
means by which those conditions are satisfied.  Williamson (1993) argues that contractual 
incompleteness notwithstanding, an ex post maladaptation problem will not arise if (1) the 
parties promise to disclose all relevant information and behave cooperatively during contract 
execution and renewals, and (2) these promises are self-enforcing.  We view cooperative 
norms as being complementary to formal contracts, which agrees with Gundlach, 1999; 
Gulati, 1995; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Allen and Lueck, 1992.    
Transaction Cost Theory 
When it comes to understanding how managers construct governance 
arrangements, transaction cost theory has become a common supposition for explaining the 
rationale behind these arrangements.  Understanding the impact of transaction costs will 
allow contractors in the defense industry to better articulate and account for the hazards 
associated with multi-party, multi-year procurement and sustainment contracts. 
The theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is centered on two basic principles: 
(1) human beings are bounded rationally, and (2), as a result of being rationally bound, will 
always choose to further their own self-interest (i.e., opportunism) (Williamson, 1985).  
Within the context of TCE, scholars define three categories of exchange hazards that 
require contractual safeguards: (1) asset specificity, (2) difficulty of measurement, and (3) 
uncertainty.  Asset specificity arises as sourcing relationships require significant relationship-
specific investments in physical and/or human assets (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Difficulty of 
measurement arises when the rewards given to a contractor cannot be objectively linked to 
a set of performance parameters.  Lastly, uncertainty arises because of one’s inability to 
know and account for all hazards that occur as a result of seen and/or unforeseen changes.   
Several variables give rise to transaction cost issues in the defense industry.  Some 
of the most commonly recognized are the defense budget cycle, rapidly evolving 
technology, a bimodal distribution in the age of government employees, and a giant gap 
between first and third-tier suppliers (Chao, 2005).  Although the degree of significance may 
vary greatly amid these and other variables, we assume that their collective impact on the 




we believe that both the government and the contractor construct contractual agreements 
that: (a) reduce the level of risk assumed by the contractor, and (b) provide a product or 
service that meets the government’s needs at a reasonable price. 
Governance. Over the past 30-40 years, several scholars have contended that 
interorganizational exchanges are driven by variables outside of the formal contract.  
Governance emerges from the values agreed-upon processes found in social relationships 
(Macneil, 1978; 1980; Noordewier et al., 1990; Heide & John, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
Tubig and Abetti (1990) found that both exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal) 
variables influence contractual performance.  Their research found that endogenous 
variables such as type of R&D, type of solicitation, and type of contract, all had an effect on 
contractual performance.   
When we think about specific types of governance structures we see governance as 
existing along a spectrum that moves from transactional to relational (see Conceptual 
Model).  Transactional governance implies that there are fewer hazards to exchange (i.e., 
environmental uncertainty, transaction-specific investments, or difficulty in measurement); 
therefore, continual interaction between the government and the contractor may be 
unnecessary.  Relational governance, on the other hand, implies that there are greater 
hazards to exchange; therefore, continual interaction would be needed between the 
government and the contractor to ensure that both players are acting in ways that reflect 
their mutual interests and not in ways that exhibit opportunism. 
We hypothesize that for a large majority of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), contractual success is permitted when there is a strong mix of both legal and 
social conventions.  This plural form governance structure, however, does have both pros 
and cons.  According to Dyer (1996) and Dyer and Singh (1998), social governance may 
lead to a reduction in transaction costs when compared to formal contracts.  Gundlach 
(2000), however, takes the view that the institution of social norms requires a history of 
interaction and reinforcement, whereas the absence of such a history could lead to conflict, 
distrust, and opportunism.   
Conceptual Model 
In government contracting, formal contracts serve as the primary governing 
mechanism for acquiring and supplying organizations.  Yet studies consistently report that 
performance is typically higher among organizations that use non-legal principles to govern 
the relationship among the buyers and suppliers.  Our conceptual model aligns the 
alternative governance structures derived from transaction cost economics, normative 
structures derived from relational exchange theory, and plural forms derived from the joining 
of these two frameworks to explain the three possible mechanisms for governing DoD 
contractual relationships.  The model also describes the hazards of exchange and 
moderating variables that suggest a shift from more traditional transactional exchanges to 
more relational exchanges.  Finally, the model provides a framework for aligning alternative 
contract mechanisms with the optimal governance structures and accessing the impact of 





Figure 1. Matching Award Type with Optimal Governance in DoD Acquisitions 
Type of Contract 
FAR 16.101(b) states the following: “contract types are grouped into two broad 
categories: fixed-price contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts.”  On one end of the 
contractual spectrum you have the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract where there is no 
mitigation of the cost risk associated with producing an end item by the government; 
therefore, the contractor assumes all of the cost risk associated with that end item.  On the 
other end of that spectrum you have the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract where 
objective incentive targets are not feasible for critical aspects of performance; therefore, the 
government’s objectives are more broad, giving the contractor flexibility to interpret how to 
achieve those objectives.  As a result of those broad objectives, the government chooses to 
share in the risk associated with creating that end item. 
The contractual spectrum reveals certain proclivities about the types of relationships 
one would find given certain types of contracts.  As an example for major weapon systems 
(MWS), under an FFP contract, the government is not investing in any of the current 
developmental risk associated with that product; therefore, the type of relationship the 
government has with the contractor may not be a critical issue.  On the other hand, under a 
CPAF contract, the government is investing in the development of a product that may be 
currently immature, or perhaps, does not even exist; therefore, we assume that the success 








Using contract data housed by the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) 
coupled with performance data found in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) housed by 
the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system, we evaluated 
16 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that spanned across the different service 
branches.  Three programs were selected from the US Army, 3 from the US Air Force, 5 
from the US Navy, and 5 programs were classified as Joint Service Products (see Appendix 
A).  The programs selected were based upon a predetermined set of criteria that allowed the 
analysis done to be well-balanced.     
Matching Contract Type with the Appropriate Governance 
Structure 
When one considers the type of contractual mechanism and governing structure that 
should be applied to a particular program or project, it is important to first evaluate the types 
of variables that would, or could potentially, have the most significant impact on the overall 
success of the project.  In the defense industry, some of the variables to consider would be 
relational history (contractor-government and/or contractor-contractor), duration of the 
contract, level of investment risk, wartime verses peacetime, state of the economy, rate of 
technological change for the item being procured, and complexity of development.   
As a contractor, it is vital to understand the role the firm plays in the defense 
industry.  This will allow the firm to better predict which variables could have the greatest 
impact on the firm’s ability to achieve desired outcomes.  Once those variables have been 
identified and a suitable governance structure has been selected for dealing with those 
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This paper sets forth a model-based approach for selecting terms applicable to a 
heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract capable of 
addressing both near- and long-term support considerations over the torpedo life cycle.  
Several performance measures commonly used in PBL contracts are described, and a 
model is presented that is based on an "availability" metric.  This metric is calculated using 
the number of times a required part is not available at field maintenance sites.  The metric is 
computed at the Functional Item Replacement (FIR) or modular level of replacements.  The 
contractor is made responsible for maintaining an inventory of parts on the shelf at the 
maintenance locations.  This is referred to as the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List 
(COSAL), which is not to exceed a negotiated maximum.  Terms of the contract are not 
specified with regard to lead times such as logistical delays and manufacturing and 
restocking lags.  These times are assumed to be under the contractor's control as are 
production quantities, quality, and responsiveness.  A newsvendor approach for determining 
optimal shelf inventory levels is first developed.  An augmented model is evaluated using a 
simulation to determine the performance sensitivity to changes in product quality, demand 
rates, and various supply chain related lead times.  Practical collateral issues such as 
obsolescence, reliability, and cost are also discussed.  This concept is being evaluated as a 
possible go-forward supportability strategy for the MK48 Common Broadband Advanced 
Sonar System (CBASS) Torpedo. 
Keywords: Supportability, Operational Availability, Performance Based Logistics, 
and Torpedo Enterprise. 
Introduction 
The history of modern HWT production and the procurement of associated spares 
can be divided into four major phases starting in the early 1970s.  Each phase was self 
sustaining for that period; however, with a typical torpedo life cycle of 25-40 years and a 
philosophy of upgrading existing inventories versus funding the production of new all-up-
round (AUR) torpedoes, new approaches are needed to address the spares question.  
Current factors that combine to challenge those responsible for the continued maintenance 




implementation of torpedo acquisition reform requirements (starting in 1995), and the need 
to maintain a high state of readiness across the entire inventory at minimal cost. 
The first modern US HWT, the MK 48 Mod 1, entered production in 1972 after an 
intensive “shootout” between competitors.  This first HWT production contract was a sole 
source, high production quantity effort.  It employed a fully documented “build to print” data 
package, which consisted of hundreds of military specifications and standards, as well as 
source/specification control drawings and detailed weapon specification packages.  This 
type of production lasted for over 14 years.  Thousands of torpedoes were produced during 
this period and spares were easy to produce concurrently with production.  Since there was 
a well-documented data package, the Navy Supply System obtained all the spare 
assemblies and parts needed.  This was a technically low risk approach since having proven 
product disclosure documentation essentially eliminated the risk.  During this time period, 
torpedoes were not only produced but several upgrades were implemented and the 
configuration advanced to a MK 48 Mod 4 version. 
As the enemy threat changed during the height of the Cold War with the emergence 
of quieter, faster, and deeper-diving nuclear submarines in the Soviet fleet, the US Navy 
initiated development of a more advanced and capable HWT.  The areas of greatest 
technology improvement included the lowering of torpedo self-noise and the use of 
ruggedized, embedded, digital micro-processors.  The latter capability made it possible for 
digitally controlled torpedoes to be upgraded with new software as threats and 
countermeasures evolved.  The U.S. Navy initiated an advanced torpedo acquisition 
program to capitalize on these improvements and to counter quiet coated threat submarines 
capable of employing sophisticated acoustic countermeasures.  The MK 48 Mod 5 
Advanced Capability (ADCAP) submarine-launched HWT for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) applications was the follow-on to the older MK 48 Mod 3/4.  
The MK 48 Mod 5 ADCAP entered pilot production in 1986.  Production was at the AUR 
level and evolved into a series of dual-source competitive production contracts.  This 
approach sustained the selected contractors by issuing various production quantities to 
each until 1992.  At this time, a winner-take-all production contract was implemented due to 
reduced quantity requirements.  During this time, torpedoes were still procured using a 
build-to-print fully disclosed documentation package in competitive contracts.  As system 
requirements evolved, new torpedo variants were procured.  Again, spares were readily 
available via competition and could be procured by the US Navy Supply system using fully 
documented disclosure packages at low risk.  The ability to procure spares by the US Navy 
Supply system provided significant savings to the program’s logistics/acquisition disciplines.  
Separate funding sources ensured that sufficient spares would be available as the need 
arose.  In the event torpedo spares were not transitioned into the US Navy Supply system 
due to a lack of adequate re-procurement documentation, the spares were procured using 
program funds.  Therefore, it was important that the spares be well documented and 
transitioned into the supply system as soon as possible. 
Starting in 1986 with the Packard Commission Report (1986), “A quest for 
excellence” and continuing into 2002, a number of acquisition reform initiatives were issued 
that changed the way the US Navy and other organizations acquired new systems.  Perry 
(1994) started to shift the focus of the acquisition world from processes to outcomes.  Since 
that time there has been a wholesale embracing of Acquisition Reform (AR) initiatives and 
cancellation of military specifications and standards.  The US Navy torpedo program 
embraced the AR initiative and in 1995 was one of the first to issue a contract under AR 
guidance.  The Torpedo MK 48 Modification Program low rate initial production (LRIP) 




Guidance and Control (G&C) Section and reduced the use of military specifications and 
standards to five.  Detailed weapon specifications were also removed.  The major thrust was 
to replace the proscriptive build-to-print and military specification requirements in the 
ADCAP production technical data package (TDP) with performance specifications and 
appropriate commercial specifications.   The ADCAP propulsion section remained build-to-
print because of its largely mechanical (versus electrical) design, maintenance/replacement 
complexities, and the effort required to validate/qualify any change in the design.  The 
supply system retains support of the afterbody to this day, but it became the program’s 
responsibility to support the forebody. 
It was during this phase of torpedo production that modification kits instead of AURs 
were procured.  The combination of AR requirements, kit procurement, and hardware 
complexities began to have an impact on forebody spares availability, as well as how spares 
could be procured.  The HWT production contracts had transitioned from a technical “risk 
avoidance” construct based on the use of a proven detailed TDP that could be built by many 
qualified vendors to a “risk management” construct based on high level performance 
specifications.  This transition requires vigilant management to avoid problems.  Under AR 
the Navy cannot tell the vendor how to build the item being procured; it can only define the 
item’s performance and interface requirements.  Since each vendor has the latitude to build 
the end item in a different manner, the risk of compatibility within the system as well as 
across systems became more complex and presents a number of challenges related to 
production and logistics. 
The Supply System Construct  
Supply support for the HWT program has been provided by the Navy Supply 
(NAVSUP) system.  The Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) manages supply support 
for what is referred to as Depot Level Repairables (DLR) (i.e., unique torpedo items) and the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages supply support for consumable items.  For the 
HWT, NAVICP (Mechanicsburg, PA) is the Program Support Inventory Control Point 
(PSICP).  They receive the TDP for the torpedo-unique hardware from the MK48 In-Service 





assigns National Stock Numbers (NSN) to the items and updates the COSALs for the 
various Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA).  This supply system construct is depicted 
in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Torpedo Supply Chain Construct 
Supply system stocking levels are forecasted based on past demand.  A rolling 
average for the demand from the past eight quarters is used to trigger procurement or 
repairs.  Procurement lead times are adversely impacted by diminishing manufacturing 
sources, obsolescence, rejected deliverables, and contract defaults.  At times, the program 
must directly compensate for these deficiencies in availability by making their own 
procurements.  Demand for items filled from outside the supply system (i.e., procurements 
made by the program) is provided to the PSICP via an unfunded “Demand Requisition Only” 
document, so this data may be factored into overall demand for the item.  Attempts have 
been made to utilize alternative methods to forecast future demand such as “anticipated 
workload.”  These types of forecasts can be submitted using “Special Program 
Requirements” (SPR) to NAVICP and “Demand Data Exchange” (DDE) to DLA.  It has 
proven difficult to identify long term workload requirements and fluctuations, and as a result 
the program has had limited success using these methodologies.  Another attempt to 
compensate for extensive procurement lead times was the establishment of a program-
funded Centralized Logistics Support (CLS) in 2005.  The idea was to improve parts 
availability utilizing central procurement and management for all IMAs.  This organization’s 
charter was to overcome shortages and improve availability at the IMAs.  CLS was 
disbanded in 2009 as it was deemed too costly.  In parallel with CLS efforts, the enterprise 
attempted various methods to contract with the prime HWT OEM to provide total commercial 
supply support responsibility for the HWT program without success; the Request for 
Proposal (RFP) was never issued.   
For support of the major FIR hardware items, which are still being produced (CBASS 
kits), there exists Contract Line Item Numbers (CLIN) on the production contract to buy 
spare FIRs and repair FIRs.  At this time, the quantity of spares procured is based on known 
failure rates (calculated by the Government) and limited by the available spares budget.  
The repair CLINs have a small amount of funding available for a “pay-as-you-go,” best effort 
type arrangement with very few requirements and no contractual obligation.  The contractor 
is not responsible to repair the item if he encounters obsolescence issues.  As a result, 
availability suffers as spares are consumed and/or when failure rates exceed anticipated 
levels. 
As the follow-on production contract was being established, a supportability CLIN 
was proposed, which would have implemented a PBL-like methodology that established a 
FIR availability requirement at the IMA as the contractor’s responsibility.  The contractor 
would negotiate a firm fixed price to provide a defined percentage of availability for the FIRs 
he produces over a given performance period.  This CLIN was not added to the RFP due to 
the perception that it was not affordable, and that it might limit competition.  As a result, the 
enterprise decided to continue with the established methodology of procuring spares on the 
production contract in conjunction with repair CLINs.  
Several recent papers have highlighted the reluctance of Program Managers to 
implement the PBL construct within the DoD.  In Fowler (2009), a comparison is made 
between performance-based logistics (also called performance-based life cycle product 
support) and the fictional superhero Batman.  Like Batman, PBL has received a poor 
reputation because of the unconventional techniques it employs.  PBL is usually accused by 




(PSI).  The author points out that the PSI only integrates the product support, and does not 
eliminate the need for logistical services within the DoD.  He further points out that the PSI 
does not have to be the OEM but can be either a government or industry entity.  However, 
because in most cases the OEM is the PSI, the misconception has developed that the PSI 
must be the OEM.  The author also provides figures showing recent cost and time savings 
within the DoD, which can be directly attributed to a program’s use of PBL strategies.  
Kim, Cohen and Netessine (2007) also recognize the difficulties encountered when 
seeking to implement PBL contracts.  This paper provides guidance with respect to what 
type of contract should be used in certain contractual situations.  In this paper, the authors 
present a PBL strategy of purchasing the “results of a product” as opposed to buying the 
actual repair parts, spares, and maintenance activities.  Due to its success in the private 
sector, PBL was implemented in the DoD as the preferred method for purchasing product 
life cycle support.  The PBL approach does not specify how a contractor must support the 
product, only the required level of support.  However, very few contractors have embraced 
PBL, and the Government Accountability Office stated that savings related to the 
implementation of PBL could not be demonstrated.  With this background, the authors seek 
to show how a PBL-type contract can be successfully executed based on the participants’ 
risk strategies.  The authors also seek to show which type of contract (fixed-price, cost-plus, 
or PBL) or combination of contracts is best suited for certain contractual settings.  Their 
results show that if a contractor’s decisions are able to be observed and defined, a fixed-
price/cost-plus contract is preferable.  However, if the contractor’s services are 
unobservable and all parties are risk neutral, a fixed-price contract with PBL incentives is 
best.  Lastly, the authors determine that if any of the parties is risk averse, an optimal 
contract cannot be executed.  In this case, the best contract combines elements of each of 
the evaluated contract types.  The models used in this paper to analyze the different 
contracting environments are an inventory allocation model and the moral hazard model. 
The importance of optimizing how we buy and implement supportability is a vital part 
of the acquisition process.  Critical factors impacting procurement of supportability are 
limited funding from disparate sources coupled with an uncertain time frame in which the 
OEM is available to provide the spares/repair capability associated with modern torpedoes 
and for which the OEM holds the product design and repair know-how.  As a result, it is 
more important than ever to implement a sound methodology that can quickly and 
accurately address our spares requirements.  The following section compares and contrasts 
PBL versus traditional life cycle support. 
Pay Me Now, Pay Me Later 
When considering the trade-offs between the performance-based contracting 
approach (pay me now) and the standard contracting approach (pay me later), it is important 
to analyze several factors associated with the product or system to be acquired.  These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the overall life-cycle cost, the expected future service 
and spares’ costs, the acquisition’s complexity, and the life-cycle length. 
In the standard approach to contract writing, services and spares are purchased 
post-production as needed.  This offers several distinct advantages and disadvantages.  
Because the costs for future services and parts are not added into the contract’s overall 
cost, the starting contract cost is reduced.  This in turn lowers the budget allocated to the 
contract, and allows the unused money to be used for other program needs.  However, even 
though the costs of services and spares are not seen in the original contract cost, they are 




customer.  First, in the case of products with a long life cycle (let us assume a life cycle 
greater than 10 years), if replacement parts or spares are needed for the product after 
manufacturing has ended, the customer has limited (and often expensive) options for 
obtaining the needed parts.  The customer could approach the original contractor about 
restarting production, which is likely to be more expensive than the original production cost.  
This is because the part may be obsolete at this point and unable to be sold or used for any 
purpose other than as a spare.  The customer could also approach a new contractor about 
recreating the original part.  This approach can face problems due to lack of know-how, 
incomplete documentation on the original part, and testing time and money needed to 
integrate the new part into the original system.  The last option would be to design an 
entirely new part, which could boost the functionality of the system but would most likely be 
time consuming and expensive to build and test. 
In the PBL approach, spares and services based on a performance measure are 
purchased up-front and included in the cost of the production contract.  This approach also 
has several advantages and disadvantages.  The main hurdle to this approach is the early 
planning to reprogram out-year supportability funding into the current contract year (aka 
transition year).  The transition year necessitates auxiliary funding to pay for the PBL CLIN.  
This contributes to a perceived increase in the overall contract cost at contract inception.  If 
the negotiated costs associated with the PBL CLIN were equal to or less than the cost of 
spares, there would be no increased cost to the enterprise.  Purchasing services and spares 
based on a performance measure, such as operational availability, can save money in the 
long term.  The source of auxiliary funding could be the funding currently used to procure 
spares; this also requires reprogramming money intended for hardware spares procurement 
to purchase “supportability” services.  An additional challenge for the TE is the inconsistency 
between the production contract period of performance and torpedo life-cycle.  The 
production contract has a period of performance of six years (i.e., one base year, four option 
years, one warranty year), whereas the torpedo’s life-cycle is 25 to 40 years (although its 
maintenance due date is significantly less than that).  If a contractor is obligated to support 
and provide a system’s spares for the full life cycle, the disadvantages for the standard 
contracting approach become the advantages of the PBL approach.  The money (and 
perhaps the time) that would have to be spent in the future is eliminated.  It becomes the 
contractor’s responsibility to determine how the system will be supported.  The contractor 
can manufacture a large surplus of spares and stock-pile them for the future, maintain (or 
mothball) a small production line to satisfy future demand, and/or build a highly reliable 
product that minimizes (or eliminates) the need for the first two options. 
In conclusion, when determining which contracting method to employ, it is important 
to determine the complexity, life-cycle length, and expected costs associated with the 
product being acquired.  Simple products that should not require extensive or unique 
sparing and servicing in the future might be better suited to the standard approach.  
Likewise, short life cycle products that are not expected to outlive the manufacturing 
processes producing them might also be better suited to the standard approach.  However, 
complex and extended life cycle products would most likely be better supported and 
maintained using a PBL contract.  The final factor when determining which contract to use is 
the expected life cycle cost of the system.  If the future costs for sparing and services of the 
system are expected to exceed the extra cost associated with a PBL contract, then a PBL 
contract should be used.  Cost estimates need to consider the future cost of money in this 
process.  After deciding to utilize the PBL contract methodology, contract requirements in 




A Short Discussion of Common Inventory Metrics 
To better understand the status of an inventory’s current state and level of 
effectiveness, an abbreviated list of relevant and commonly used inventory metrics are 
identified below.  The metrics selected (DAU, 2010) are separated into two categories: 
“Enterprise” and “Source.”  Enterprise metrics measure the variables determined by the 
customer, while Source metrics measure the variables determined by the contractor. 
First we will discuss the Enterprise inventory metrics.  These include: 
 Inventory turns, 
 Perfect order fulfillment rate, 
 Supply chain response time, and 
 Weapon non-mission-capable (NMC) rate. 
The inventory turns metric measures how much inventory is being used compared to 
the amount of inventory that is on hand (average) over a certain time period.  It can be 
defined as how much of a certain measure of inventory (i.e., monetary worth, amount, or 
number of assemblies) is removed from the inventory divided by the average of that 
measure over the time period being analyzed.  In the case of the HWT spares inventory 
being discussed, the spares stored are used to replace parts (FIRs) internal to the product 
(HWTs).  For this reason, the optimal value for the spares inventory turns metric is zero, 
which correlates to an organization that never needs to replace parts internal to its products. 
Perfect order fulfillment rate, when related to the organization’s inventory, is defined 
as the ratio of perfectly satisfied orders and total orders filled from the organization’s 
inventory.  A perfectly satisfied order is defined as an order delivered with all of the ordered 
parts in perfect condition, on time and with all of the necessary documentation. 
The supply chain response time of an enterprise is defined as the average amount of 
time it takes from recognizing the need for a certain part to the time the part arrives at the 
organization and is ready for use.  This metric can be broken down into more discrete 
segments such as the time it takes to plan an order, the time it takes to source the part, and 
the amount of time it takes for the part to be delivered to the organization. 
The metric referred to as the weapon Non-Mission-Capable (NMC) rate is the ratio of 
weapons in the fleet that cannot be used to complete their specified mission and the total 
amount of weapons in the fleet.  This is a very important metric for the TE because it helps 
define the mission readiness of the larger submarine enterprise.  If the submarine’s primary 
weapon is not mission ready at an acceptable rate, then the mission readiness of the 
submarine will be greatly decreased and therefore the mission readiness of the Navy will be 
adversely impacted. 
We will now proceed to discuss some common Source inventory metrics.  The 
following metrics are mostly concerned with the quality of the delivered order and the time it 
takes for an order to be delivered.  They are: 
 Percent of perfect order fulfillment,  
 Percent of correct quantity deliveries,  
 Percent of defect-free deliveries, 
 Percent of deliveries with correct documentation,  




 Total source lead-time, 
 Handling lead times, 
 Receiving lead time, and 
 Supplier lead time. 
Percent of perfect order fulfillment if shown in a Venn diagram would be the unity of 
the percent of correct quantity deliveries, percent of defect-free deliveries, percent of 
deliveries with correct documentation, and percent of on-time deliveries metrics.  These 
metrics are relatively straight forward to measure and are self defining.  The importance of 
the percent of perfect order fulfillment is that it gives a high-level view of the a contractor’s 
actual order fulfillment capability, while the metrics that make up a perfect order are more 
granular and point to actual problems the contractor might be experiencing in their order 
filling process.  These insights can then lead to correction strategies for these problems. 
The metric total source lead time is very similar to the Enterprise metric supply chain 
response time, except that this lead time is calculated from the contractor’s point of view.  
Total source lead time can be viewed as the amount of contractor time elapsed, from the 
time they become aware of an order being placed to the time that order becomes available 
to the customer.  This is equal to the supply chain response time minus the time it takes for 
the customer to recognize its need to order a part and the order being placed. 
Handling lead time refers to the amount of time it takes from receipt of a shipment 
until the individual parts are put in their first official storage positions at the customer’s 
facility.  In the case of an order of office supplies, this lead time would be the amount of time 
elapsed between the shipment being recognized as arriving at the office and the supplies 
being placed in the supply buffer area. 
Receiving lead time is slightly different than handling lead time.  Receiving lead time 
is the time immediately before handling lead time.  Receiving lead time is the amount of time 
that elapses between delivery to the customer’s facility and the time when the ordering 
facility recognizes the shipment as being received.  Using the office supplies example again, 
let’s suppose that the shipment were delivered to the office building after hours and the box 
was first found by the secretary the next morning.  The time between delivery and the 
secretary finding the box would be the receiving lead time.  
Supplier lead time is defined as the amount of time it takes from order confirmation to 
the time the order arrives at the ordering facility.  Again using the office supplies example, if 
the secretary ordered the office supplies online, this would be the amount of time from when 
the secretary received the order confirmation e-mail to the time the shipment was left at the 
office building by the delivery company. 
Several other metrics commonly associated with inventories are: 
 System Reliability, 
 Product Reliability, 
 Operational Availability, 
 Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), 
 Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), 
 Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT), 




 Mean Accumulated Down Time (MADT). 
System reliability refers to the ability of a system to achieve its specified goals and is 
measured as a percentage value.  For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that a 
system is comprised of many products.  In our case, the system we are considering is the 
torpedo and the products are the FIRs.  The torpedo’s reliability can be calculated by 
dividing the number of in-water runs in which there are no failures by the total number of in-
water runs.  It is important to remember that torpedo reliability is determined by the reliability 
of the torpedo components. 
Product reliability is calculated by dividing, at the FIR level, the number of times a 
product performs its task correctly by the number of times the product is asked to perform its 
specified task.  As stated in the previous paragraph, product reliability determines system 
reliability.  Therefore, system reliability cannot be greater than product reliability. 
Operational Availability (Ao) is determined by a number of factors, including system 
reliability.  Operational availability is defined as the percentage of time that a group of 
products or systems is available to be used for its intended purpose or the percentage of the 
group’s up-time. 
Mean time to repair is the expected amount of time it takes from the time a product 
or system fails until that product or system is available for use again. 
Mean time to failure is the expected amount of time a product is available for use 
after a repair or purchase until the product or system experiences its next major (or 
debilitating) failure. 
Mean logistics delay time is the sum of the two logistical activities at the beginning 
and end of the mean time to repair metric.  The first logistical activity is the amount of time 
from when the product or system fails to the time it arrives at the repair facility and is 
available for the needed reparatory action.  The second logistical activity is the amount of 
time it takes from the time the repair is completed to the time the product or system is again 
able to be used by the product’s (or system’s) owner. 
Mean supply response time is the expected amount of time it takes for a product’s or 
system’s supply system to respond to, repair or replace, and return the working 
product/system to the user.  
Mean accumulated down time is the time that a group of systems or products is not 
operational and can be seen as an inverse metric to operational availability. 
Metrics are Not a Two-way Street 
The relationship between the metrics is illustrated in Table 1.  When viewing Table 1 
please note that while the metrics on the horizontal X- and vertical Y-axis are the same, the 
variables on the X-axis are the independent variables and the variables on the Y-axis are 
the dependent variables.  This means that while variable “a” might influence variable “b,” 
variable “b” does not therefore have an influence on variable “a.” 
This can be understood in Table 1 by considering the metrics “system reliability” and 
“product reliability” with the assumption that multiple products make up a system.  In this 
case, the reliability of the individual products influences the reliability of the system.  
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% of Correct Quantity 
Deliveries 
00% 
% of Defect-Free 
Deliveries 
00% 
% Deliveries with 
Correct Documentation 
00% 






Handling Lead Times 
Receiving Lead Time 
Supplier Lead Time 
00% System Reliability 
00% Product Reliability 
00% Operational Availability 
Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) 
Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF) 
Mean Logistics Delay 
Time (MLDT) 












Down Time (MADT) 
As shown in this matrix, the “availability” metric is affected by many of the other 
metrics and may serve as a good indicator of the contractor’s performance on a PBL 
contract. 
Newsvendor-based Approaches for Designing PBL Contracts 
The newsvendor problem is a single period mathematical model used to determine 
optimal inventory levels when the demand is uncertain (Porteus, 1991).  The model 




period. Subsequently, the random demand (D) for the item is revealed.  The distribution of D 
is assumed to be F(D), with a mean μ.  An ordering/restocking cost of C is charged per unit.  
If the number of items procured exceeds the realized demand, a per unit effective disposal 
cost of CH is charged for the period.  However, if the demand exceeds the amount procured, 
a per unit shortage cost of CP is assessed for the period.  An assumption is made that F(x) = 
0 for x < 0.  In this scenario, the cost function for one period is: 
 




Here, F-1 is the inverse of the distribution function.  The quantity (CP – C)/(CP + CH) is 
the critical fractile and is the optimal probability of not stocking out (Porteus, 1991). 
The newsvendor problem has been used as a starting point for analyzing many 
scenarios.  A review of some extensions can be found in Khouja (1999). Among the cases 
that can be related to the analysis of contractor performance are Dada, Petruzzi, and 
Schwarz (2006); Bensoussan, Feng, and Sethi (2004); Kim et al. (2007); and others.  In 
Dada et al., a newsvendor model is used to structure a scenario when a single newsvendor 
is served by several suppliers, some or all of whom may be unreliable. This can be used for 
modeling operations in PBL when several vendors are contracted to maintain a supply of 
either weapon assemblies or subsystems (FIRS).  In Bensoussan (2004), a vendor commits 
to an initial purchase, following which some estimate of the demand is revealed.  Additional 
purchases can be made for a higher cost, subsequent to which the final demand is realized.  
An overall service constraint is also satisfied in determining the solutions to the two stages 
for ordering.   In the context of PBL, each stage can represent the ordering decision at the 
IMA and the manufacturing facility for the vendor, while the service constraint can guarantee 
the availability.  However, as noted by the authors, when there is private forecast 
information, the mechanism for coordination of the fleet and vendor’s decisions remains to 
be determined.   
As mentioned earlier, Kim et al. (2007) evaluated PBL as a strategy for purchasing 
the “results of a product” as opposed to buying the actual repair parts, spares and 
maintenance activities. One of the significant factors identified by the authors when 
designing incentives for PBL is the observability of contractor performance and the tolerance 
for risk by the parties involved in the contract.     
In Kang, Doerr, and Sanchez (2006), it was noted that PBL specifies outcomes, not 
numbers of spare parts or hours of maintenance.  The emphasis of the contract is on 
metrics to be achieved by the contractor (in this paper the metrics are operational availability 
and readiness risk) not the way in which the contractor must achieve the specified metrics.  
The authors use a simulation to show which alternatives customers should specify to 
increase operational availability and reduce readiness risk.  Their simulation then helps 
estimate which alternatives will best improve the specified metrics for a given contractual 
environment.  The model shows that transportation/administrative delay is a main 




In the context of torpedo production, under PBL contracts, the interaction between 

















Figure 2. Contractor’s Role in the Spares Support Process 
The COSAL is the safety stock, and the random demand is generated by fleet usage.  
The cost of understocking is the total time spent by the IMA waiting for a particular FIR.  The 
cost of overstocking can be assumed to be related to the average amount that it costs a 
single FIR to be shipped and the cost of managing and maintaining the inventory.  Typically, 
the overstocking cost is low relative to the understocking cost, which implies that the vendor 
will have an incentive to maintain a large shelf inventory.  However, in the context of PBL, 
the contractor must incentivize lower inventory levels so that the ultimate thrust is on 
reducing the need for an inventory (i.e. reducing the number of failures during fleet usage). 
Simulation-Based Models of PBL Operations 
Based on the discussion above, the following protocol for operating a PBL has been 
proposed:  The contractor is made responsible for maintaining spares for the FIRs at the 
IMA. The maximum number of FIRs is specified in the COSAL for each IMA, and 
modifications to the COSAL to meet the required availability can be negotiated as part of 
this contract. When an incoming torpedo needs a replacement FIR, the inventory status of 
the FIR is determined by the current availability number in the system (a).  If a is zero or 
negative, a request for immediate replenishment will be issued to the contractor. If a is 
positive, the spare FIR is removed from the container and issued to the IMA floor.  The failed 
FIR is placed in the empty container and returned to the contractor.  The contractor has 






Clearly, the COSAL should relate to the failure level of a FIR.  If the FIR never fails in 
service, then the corresponding COSAL value can be set to zero.  However, since a zero 
failure rate is unlikely to be achieved, the COSAL must be set to some positive value.  
Based on analytical and simulation models and using specified reliability numbers for the 
FIRs, appropriate COSAL levels can be determined that will achieve desired supportability 
levels.   If the contractor cannot meet availability numbers using the COSAL levels in the 
contract, this is an indicator that the reliability for the FIR has slipped below the expected 
reliability, and appropriate action must be taken to address this.   
The following measure of performance has been developed for availability for an 
initial analysis: 
Availability =  
The performance of this measure is a function of the failure rate, the stock level on 
shelf, and the variation in failure rates.  Based on a hypothetical usage rate in excess of five 
hundred per year, Table 2, below, shows the results of a simulation exploring the 
relationship between the failure rate, the variation in failure rate (which would also represent 
the variation in the demand or number of torpedoes needed per week), and the COSAL 
values. 
Table 3. Simulation Results for Evaluating Interaction of COSAL and 
Failure Rates 
Availability 
(OPTEMPO = above 500 per year, Logistic Delay = 1 week) 
  Failure Rate Variation 
FIR 
Failure 
Rate 25% 50% 75% 100% 
↓ Common Shipboard Allowance Level (COSAL) 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
0.05 96.1% 100.0% 100.0% 96.1% 100.0% 100.0% 87.9% 100.0% 100.0% 76.5% 100.0% 100.0%
0.06 89.7% 100.0% 100.0% 83.9% 100.0% 100.0% 74.3% 100.0% 100.0% 65.8% 100.0% 100.0%
0.07 73.2% 100.0% 100.0% 67.5% 100.0% 100.0% 63.4% 97.8% 100.0% 57.1% 95.7% 100.0%
0.08 63.4% 100.0% 100.0% 59.1% 97.9% 100.0% 54.2% 96.0% 100.0% 48.1% 88.3% 100.0%
0.09 56.5% 100.0% 100.0% 51.5% 97.0% 100.0% 46.4% 94.4% 100.0% 43.7% 85.0% 99.2%
0.1 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 47.3% 93.6% 100.0% 42.6% 84.4% 100.0% 39.1% 75.4% 98.5%
0.11 47.7% 93.6% 100.0% 41.3% 85.2% 100.0% 40.3% 74.5% 99.3% 35.4% 71.7% 94.6%
0.12 40.9% 86.7% 100.0% 38.5% 77.6% 100.0% 35.4% 70.7% 97.3% 32.7% 65.8% 92.0%
0.13 38.8% 78.8% 100.0% 35.9% 69.8% 98.6% 32.7% 64.6% 93.7% 30.6% 61.5% 88.9%
0.14 36.9% 73.8% 100.0% 34.2% 65.0% 95.5% 30.4% 62.3% 88.8% 27.7% 55.6% 82.0%
0.15 33.5% 70.3% 98.7% 30.4% 62.7% 90.1% 28.4% 58.1% 84.2% 26.1% 52.0% 78.3%
The entries in the table are the average (over 1,000 runs) of the Availability metric for 




column group header) and different COSAL levels.  This simulation, implemented in a 
spreadsheet, verifies that as failure rates drop, the COSAL required to support fleet 
operations is smaller.  The entries in this sheet could have been computed using a 
newsvendor approach directly—this did not require simulation.  However, the actual nature 
of variation is somewhat more complicated.  The simulation is designed to take variations in 
exercise rates typically encountered throughout the year and changes in the logistic delay to 
determine the optimal COSAL required to support the fleet.  Furthermore, this simulation can 
also be used when negotiating with the contractors prior to the award of contract to 
determine what the contractors’ estimates of their own failure rates are and to work with 
them to set mutually satisfactory expectations. 
As mentioned in Kang et al. (2006), the transportation delay correlates most 
significantly with the operational availability. This is also borne out by the simulations 
performed above.  Because of this, the responsibility for delivery to the shelf is best 
delegated to the contractor in a PBL setting. 
An extension of this simulation allows an optimization of the COSAL required to 
achieve a given service level.  This is not dissimilar to the approaches developed in 
Schneider (1978) and Shang and Song (2004), but the advantage of the 
simulation/optimization is that it dispenses with the assumptions of independence of failure 
rates that are often necessary for analytical solutions and the distributional assumptions that 
go along as well. 
Conclusion 
This paper discusses the application of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
contracts for supporting the Torpedo Enterprise. Several performance measures commonly 
used in PBL contracts are described, and a model is presented that uses an “availability” 
metric for observing and measuring contractor performance.  This metric is calculated using 
the number of times a required part is not available to field maintenance sites.  Terms of the 
contract are not specified with regard to lead times such as logistical delays and 
manufacturing and restocking lags.  These times are assumed to be under the contractor’s 
control, as are production quantities, quality, and responsiveness.  A newsvendor approach 
for determining optimal shelf inventory levels is developed.  An augmented model is 
evaluated using a simulation to determine the performance sensitivity to changes in product 
quality, demand rates, and various supply chain-related lead times.  Practical collateral 
issues such as obsolescence, reliability, and cost are also discussed.   
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Abstract 
In implementing performance-based logistics (PBL), the need for several resources 
like inventory investment decreases.  Therefore, the contractor’s profit, which was based on 
the level of these resources, may decrease.  Therefore, a contractor may have disincentives 
to implement and use PBL.  One way to handle such a situation is to develop financial 
models to assist with profit/cost sharing during the implementation of PBL.  Another way is 
to study the broader topic of contractor incentives in PBL to find appropriate ways to 
motivate the contractors to enhance their performance.  While most literature in PBL 
mentions the importance of contractor incentives, not much research has been conducted in 
this topic.  With such situations in mind, this research program proposes a framework to 
study and develop appropriate possible contractor incentives to succeed in the PBL 
environment.  Our proposed framework considers the possibility of financial and non-
financial contractor incentives to ensure PBL success.  We anticipate that the final results of 
this research program will be useful in the defense and related public- and private-sector 
organizations to maximize the overall benefits of PBL projects.  This paper provides a 






PBL is the desired product support strategy in the DoD, and it is being integrated into 
legacy programs as well as into new contracts (Berkowitz, Gupta, Simpson & McWilliams, 
2005; Vitasek et al., 2008; Vitasek & Geary, 2008).  It is used by all services at the 
component, system, and subsystem levels of procurement, sustainment and support (Geary 
& Vitasek, 2008).   PBL came to the forefront of government procurement because a better 
method was needed.  Therefore, the implementation of PBL was included in September 
2001 in “the Quadrennial Defense Review and initial guidance was issued by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD)” (Aguilar, Estrada & Myers, 2005, p. 13).  The 
implementation of PBL is important because it gives the program manager (PM) the ability to 
improve reliability, reduce the logistical burden, and save money on Total Life Cycle Costs 
(Kim, Cohen & Netessine, 2007). 
Since PBL is relatively new, it had to be successfully integrated into thousands of 
legacy contracts and new programs.  To effectively do this, the idea of Total Life Cycle 
Systems Management was propagated around the service branches (Edwards & Nash, 
2007; Kratz & Buckingham, 2010). “Total Life Cycle Systems Management emphasizes an 
early focus on sustainment in the program management office, making the PM responsible 
for all activities associated with the acquisition, development, production, fielding, 
sustainment, and disposal of a weapon system across its life cycle” (Aguilar et al., 2005, p. 
13).   This is the main difference from older procurement methods because they focused 
solely on the early phases.  PBL is a major jump forward in how government procurement 
and sustainment is done and contract types and incentives need to readapt so they can 
successfully support the contract (Barber, 2008). 
The Department of Defense and the Military Services are transforming from 
traditional methods of logistics support to PBL as a methodology of product support for the 
21st century (Fowler, 2010; Kratz & Buckingham, 2010).  It makes the program managers 
responsible for total life cycle costs (DAU, 2005).  Traditionally, support for MWSs in the 
DoD centered around 10 logistics elements, split between acquisition-related activities at the 
front end of the life cycle and sustainment-related activities at the back end.  Metrics 
focused on the logistics elements themselves and on internal processes often having little 
direct relationship to warfighter requirements.  The shift toward Integrated Logistics Support 
attempted to combine distinct logistics elements into a coordinated approach, but there was 
still the disjointed acquisition versus sustainment-support issue and the lack of a linkage 
between supportability measures and warfighter needs (Vitasek & Murray, 2009).  The 
advent of Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) and performance-based logistics 
(PBL) addressed all of these issues  (DeVries, 2005). 
TLCSM mandated a new focus by PMs toward the entire life cycle, firmly linking 
acquisition and sustainment activities into an integrated process.  This was a significant 
paradigm shift from PMs traditional focus on the early stages (acquisition, development, 
fielding) of the life cycle.  To measure success, PBL required that supportability metrics be 
directly related to performance outcomes for the warfighter.  PBL also offered a choice of 
organic and commercial support providers for picking the right combination in achieving best 
value for the program  (DeVries, 2005). 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified logistics transformation as a 
key transformation pillar. Specifically, the QDR directed logistics enterprise integration, a 
reduction in logistics demand, and a reduction in the cost of logistics.  The 2003 update to 




actually put on the hook to do PBL. One tool the Department of Defense (DoD) identified for 
use in achieving these goals is performance-based logistics (PBL). This tool is an innovative 
acquisition approach that represents a cultural shift away from buying parts to buying 
performance. In practice, application of PBL can be at the system, subsystem, or major 
assembly level.  Executed through long-term incentive based contracts, PBL is a means of 
system sustainment that integrates supplier support and warfighter requirements with the 
objective of improving operational readiness while reducing costs. In today’s environment of 
constrained budgets and reduced manpower, PBL represents a potentially cost-effective 
and efficient method for system sustainment (Lewis, 2005; Mahon, 2007). 
It has been said, “it simply makes good business sense to provide the proper 
contract motivations to encourage high-quality contractor performance.”  It is this notion of 
“good business sense” that we would like to examine further.  Within the construct of 
performance-based logistics (PBL), contracts have been written to try and motivate 
contractors to meet the expectations of the government by constructing incentives that 
greater serve the needs of the contractor.  This implies that if a contractor is performing well, 
then the proper incentives must be in place.  Assuming that is the case, we want to ask the 
following: what were those incentives, what was the methodology (i.e., “best practices”) for 
selecting those incentives, and would a consistent pattern between the types of incentives 
and levels of performance indicate the use (or lack) of “best practices,” when developing 
these incentives had a hand in a firm’s level of performance? (Gilbreth & Hubbard, 2008; 
Graham, 2003; Hildebrandt, 1998). 
The incentives given to a contractor can be either monetary, non-monetary, or both.  
Several metrics exist that allow government contracting officers to objectively evaluate the 
performance of a contractor (Doerr, Lewis & Eaton, 2005).  Monetary incentives could be 
based upon, but are not limited to, the following: material availability, material reliability, and 
life cycle cost, all at the system level.  Delivery schedule incentives focus on getting a 
contractor to meet or exceed minimum delivery requirements.  Under a performance-based 
construct, the parties involved have relative autonomy in negotiating the terms and 
conditions for meeting the target delivery dates.  Performance standards are defined in a 
PBC and the incentives are typically given on the basis of whether the contractor met the 
performance criteria and to what extent they exceeded the standard (Tremaine, 2008).  In 
other words, performance incentives are designed to relate profit to the contractor’s 
achieved results.   
Several types of performance incentives are fee structures, bonuses, and/or shared 
savings, and they can be applied in many different ways for many different reasons; some 
examples of these are as follows:  
– First, an award fee can be given if the government feels that the 
contractor meets or exceeds specified outcomes.  
– Second, an incentive can be given if the contractor appropriately 
controls costs in a cost plus-incentive-fee contract.   
– Third, reliability-based profits allow for increased profits (as in FFP 
contracts), if the contractor can lower their operating costs by meeting 
higher product reliability standards.  So, they can retain at least a 
substantial portion of the profits by making a better product.   
– Fourth, shared savings is another unique type of bonus because both 




from performance enhancements, design improvements, and other 
efficiency improvements (Kirk & DePalma, 2005, p. 40). 
Since PBL is now the preferred procurement and system support program, it is 
important to know how to incentivize contractors to perform consistently at a high level.  
However, this is a unique problem considering that PBL is new and little is known about 
what best practices and incentives should be suggested.  As a result, it is important to look 
at the different types of contracts the government can issue before discussing how 
incentives can be given under PBLs oversight. 
Contract Types 
Fixed-price and cost-plus contracts will elicit different contractor responses based 
upon the inherent nature of the two types.  When a contractor is awarded a fixed-price 
contract, we feel that the contractor is motivated to reduce product support costs because 
the awarded amount is fixed; therefore, every dollar saved through cost reduction is an 
additional dollar of profit contribution.  Knowing this, we argue that firms operating under 
fixed-price contracts should be inherently motivated to reduce costs because the cost of not 
doing so will reduce that firm’s profit potential.  And when firms that operating under an FP 
construct experience cost overruns, we have to consider whether the incentives being 
offered were consistent with performance goals. 
Under a fixed-price construct, there are essentially two widely used incentive-type 
contracts: (1) fixed-price-incentive-fee (FPIF) and (2) fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF).  FPIF 
contracts are based upon a formula that relates final negotiated cost to target cost—these 
targets could be either firm target or successive targets.  The formula used is made up of 
variables that can be objectively determined (i.e., cost, schedule, performance).  
Sometimes, Award Fee elements are in fact things that can be objectively measured, but an 
Award Fee approach is chosen.  Award Fees are easier to administer and allow more 
flexibility on the part of the government. 
Cost reimbursement (or cost-plus) contracts are appropriate and largely used in the 
developmental stages of the product/project life cycle, where costs are essentially 
unpredictable. When a contractor is awarded a cost-plus contract, there is typically too much 
ambiguity in the project to assign a fixed price to the end product; therefore, the cost risk for 
the government is usually greater when cost-plus contracts are used rather than fixed-price.  
This ambiguity is the result of many things, including technological maturity, political 
uncertainty, etc.  Contractors typically enjoy the freedoms associated with cost-plus 
contracts because the cost risk associated with a particular project or program is shifted to 
the government.  It is noteworthy that development costs often exceed production costs 
associated with a product ready for use, even if the product is produced well beyond 
maturity, when per unit product costs drastically decline. 
Taking these thoughts into consideration, we argue that because contractors run a 
greater risk of financial loss (due largely to the uncertainty associated with cost-plus 
contracts), the choosing of incentives should be seen as a much more sensitive and delicate 
process in the eyes of the contractor.  If this proves to be true, then the types of incentives 
used by the government for a particular product could have a significant impact on how 




Incentives for the Government 
The Firm Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is the desired contract for the government, as it 
firmly fixes pricing parameters, shifting the risk of cost overruns to the contractor.  When the 
product life cycle inevitably requires conceptual development and prototyping, the 
government seeks to accelerate the product to maturity so that FFP contracts become 
appropriate. The government is subject to congressional funding and the government must 
show performance to justify funding, which also creates an added incentive to perform 
responsibly.  
Cost-plus contracts are appropriate and largely used in the early developmental 
stages of the product or project life cycle when the costs are unpredictable. This is not the 
desired contact type for the government, but it is necessary to reimburse the contractor for 
unpredictable and volatile costs. The cost-plus contracts shift the risk to the government as 
they are obliged to cover unpredictable developmental costs within contractual guidelines.  It 
is noteworthy that the developmental costs often exceed the productions costs associated 
with a product ready for use, even if the product is produced well beyond maturity, when per 
unit product costs drastically decline. 
This brings to mind the “S-curve,” prominently known in marketing, where the 
product begins as a concept and is then brought to the market seeking adoption; then, the 
product or service is improved and adopted by a large portion of the market; finally, it 
reaches maturity, pending obsolescence.  As shown in Figure 1, the maturity stage 
essentially predicts obsolescence and prompts replacement with a new product (Visitask, 
2010). 
 
Figure 1.  
The government still reserves the right to “terminate for convenience,” which 
absolves the government from future obligation to the contract (GSA, DoD & NASA, 2010).  
It should also be noted that it is paramount to the government to specify parameters of 
contract performance, which shifts the risk to the contractor, because a nebulous contract 
would give too much discretion to the contractor. This situation creates somewhat of a 
dilemma considering that one of the basic tenants of PBL is that the government is to 
basically specify what it wants, while allowing the contractor to determine the means of 




Incentives for Contractors 
Under the PBL strategy, the contractor assumes a greater amount of risk; this, 
however, gives the contractor more latitude in determining and applying its methods 
(KMC/OPI, 2010).  The general consensus, identified through research and personal 
interviews, is that the continuation of a contract is the main incentive.  Continuation simply 
allows more time for the contractor to recoup capital investment expenses and provides 
added stability and continuity of staff, expertise, and equipment (P. Cushman, personal 
communication, October 2009). The general idea derived from the interviews was that a 
contract term should last at least five years to allow time for the contractor to recoup its 
capital investment (D. Wilson, personal communication, October 2009). Incentives can be 
tied to the performance of metrics as they relate to cost, quality, or delivery. For instance, 
under an FFP contract, a contractor may keep at least a portion of dollars saved when 
below budget, and it may receive bonuses for reaching certain metrics stated in the contract. 
This is apparent in cost-plus contracts because the contractor is incentivized to keep 
costs and timeframe to a minimum so that it may win continuation of the contract.  Even if 
the contractor is reimbursed for cost overruns, it runs the risk of congressional scrutiny and 
termination either by convenience or in favor of another contractor, so corporate reputation 
is at stake on every contract (GSA et al, 2010, p. 1). The reputation of a company may be 
the most important factor in contract rewards, and it’s dependent on how they perform in 
every contract (Defense, 2010, p. 1).  For example, Boeing’s poor performance during the 
competition for the Joint Strike Fighter, contrasted by a relatively better performance by, 
undoubtedly influenced other contract awards, as evidenced by the recent proliferation of 
Lockheed contracts (High Stakes, 2010, p. 1).  
Types of PBL Incentives 
In order for a PBL contract to be successful, the contractor has to meet standards 
established in the contract.  To ensure the standards are met, the cost to provide the 
required level of service is estimated to the best of the government’s and the contractor’s 
abilities.  However, complications can arise and levels of achievement can be met that 
warrant additional compensation like bonuses, shared savings, or other forms.  Examples of 
complications are project risks, adjusted product usage, and increases in the price of used 
resources or components.  Aside from that, superior performance levels can be outlined in 
the contract that also warrant an incentive when met.  It is important to have incentives and 
bonuses as a part of PBL contracts because they can increase the probability that the 
contract is fulfilled and the warfighter receives the necessary support on time (High Stakes, 
2010, p. 40).  While the topic of contractor incentives is mentioned in various research 
studies (Beggs, Ertel & Jones, 2005), it is not explored to the extent of developing a 
framework for determining such incentives in specific situations. 
Proposed Framework 
Before moving on, it is important to understand that incentives can be given in many 
different forms, but they fall into three categories: cost-based incentives, time-based 
incentives, and scope-base incentives.  Cost-based incentives focus on contractor profits, 
so monetary awards are a good example of this type of incentives.  Time-based incentives 
are changes in the length of the contract, so the life of the contract is extended for the 
contractor.  Scope-based incentives are changes in the contract that give the contractor 




the most impact on contractor performance, it is important to separate these incentives 
because different types of incentives work better with different types of contracts. 
Cost-based Incentives 
Of all of the incentives that are considered, the most important type of incentive 
considered is the contract type.  This is because contract types vary in their treatment and 
allocation of cost, schedule, and performance risk.  FAR Part 16 defines contracts as being 
one of two types: (1) fixed-price or (2) cost-reimbursement.  When deciding how to match 
incentives with the contractual mechanism being used, the contracting officer needs to look 
at where most of the responsibilities and risk lie.  Under a fixed-price (FP) construct, the 
contractor assumes all responsibility and risk of fulfilling the contract and providing a 
product, whereas under a cost-reimbursement construct (i.e., cost-plus contracts), the 
government reimburses certain allowable and allocable costs, and pays the contractor a fee 
that is in line with the contractual agreement.  The inherent downside in using cost-
reimbursement contracts is the lack of motivation on the part of the contractor to reduce 
costs.  As one might suspect, the type of contract that is appropriate for a particular task 
depends upon several variables, but for the purpose of our research, we want to evaluate 
the types of incentives being used and determine their overall ability to influence the 
behavior of the contractor.   
Because PBL is focused on system availability and performance metrics, it is 
important for the contractor to understand what is expected of them.  An example of metrics 
being linked to profits is how “the TOW-ITAS contract directly links profitability to 
availability—the higher the availability the greater the profit the supplier can earn” (DAU, 
2005, pp. 3-23). In this example, in order to link availability to profitability, the acceptable 
level is determined by the program office and is included in the performance-based 
agreement (PBA).  The first step in meeting the objectives stated in a PBL contract is 
deciding on a cost that will cover the desired support.  Once the PM decides on a cost, it 
needs to be accepted by stakeholders before the PM can enter into a formal agreement with 
the contractor.  Finally, the level of support provided needs to be appropriately covered by 
compensation in order for the contract to be appealing to competent companies.   
The written agreement between the contractor and the government becomes a part 
of the PBL support strategy, and the expectations of the contractor are outlined in the user 
agreement section of the PBA.  The user agreement part of the PBA contains the ranges 
and objectives that the contractor has to meet.  “Typically, the agreement identifies ranges 
of outcome performance with thresholds and objectives, and the target price (cost to the 
user) for each level of PBL capability” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-17). Since the contract is based on 
ranges and objectives, resources will be allocated to the contractor on the basis of what is 
expected from the weapon system or component in a particular year.  It is important to note 
that unique conditions may require performance above normal operations, and the policy will 
adapt to meet these conditions.  For instance, “PBL agreements should be flexible enough 
to address a range of support requirements, so as to accommodate changes in OPTEMPO 
or execution year funding, including surge or contingency requirements to the extent that 
they can be defined” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-18). An example of this is the Shadow Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle contract, which “procures performance using measurable metrics instead of 
buying spares and repairs in the traditional manner.  This example demonstrates the 
establishment of a schedule for the transition from Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) to 
PBL based on lessons learned from operational usage in the user environment” (DAU, 




requirements and ranges that need to be met in the contract and how to deal with wear and 
tear changes, like the Shadow UAV contract. 
When getting involved in a contract with the government, it is important for the 
contractor to understand the level of risk they are being asked to assume.  One of the main 
components of PBLs is that it moves risk away from the government and to the contractor. 
“While DoD can never completely delegate risk for system operational performance, PBL 
strategies move the level of risk away from DoD to the support provider, commensurate with 
the scope of support for which the support provider is responsible” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-20). 
Risk is an important part of performance-based agreements because it affects how the PM 
defines an acceptable level of performance, cost, and incentives.  This means that the 
government will design its PBL contracts in a way that makes assuming risks appealing to 
the contractor.  Properly compensating parties for taking risks is an important part of 
successful PBL contracts, and if it is done correctly, then risk to the government will be 
significantly reduced. 
Time-based Incentives 
PBL incentives are generally tied to the contract type and overall performance, so 
additional compensation is typically given for exceeding the standards as stipulated by the 
contract.  For example, “in most cases, providing incentives for PBL contracts is difficult 
considering the many different types of contracts that may be used” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-19).  
Giving incentives in respect to PBAs means that incentives are given based on meeting the 
metrics set in the contract, but, in general, the PBL wants to tie incentives to overall 
performance (D. Ioasco, personal communication, October 2009).  “The preferred PBL 
contracting approach is the use of long-term contracts with the incentives tied to 
performance” (DAU, 2005, p. 3-19).  This will help the contractor make technological 
investments to improve the system performance, with the hope of making relatively more 
profit in the long-term.  Klevan (2008) reports that most Navy PBL contracts are long-term 
agreements and address availability, obsolescence, reliability, and cost.  He further reports 
that the use of such time-based incentives creates a win-win strategy, incorporates surge 
capability, mitigates risks and ensures an exit strategy.  Such long-term agreements create 
government-contractor partnerships that result in significant improvements in the key 
performance parameters specified in the PBL agreements (Klevan 2008).  It enables the 
government to procure the “end-state” and not the “how-to.”  Thus, using overall 
performance as a basis for rewarding long-term contracts incentivizes the best companies in 
the industry to apply for contracts in hopes that they will receive future business (S. 
Kowerduck, personal communication, October 2009). 
Scope-based Incentives 
While cost-based and time-based incentives are in use, scope-based incentives are 
not much in use, but may provide motivation to the contractor to significantly improve its 
performance under the PBL.  This incentive is based on the assumption that a contractor 
wishes to expand its business with the government.  If the contractor’s performance under a 
PBL contractor exceeds the government’s expectation, then the contractor can be given 
work beyond the scope of the original contract.  For example, if the original PBL contract 
required a contractor to maintain an aircraft engine, then based on a superior performance 
over time, this contractor can be given the additional task of maintaining tires.  Ultimately, 
this contactor may become the system integrator, as it will become responsible for the entire 




provide incentives because the metrics are difficult to define effectively.  However, because 
of current legal restrictions and the need for competitive procurement in government, 
implementation of scope-based incentives is quite difficult, if not impossible. 
Private Sector 
The PBL strategy is formulated with the intent to improve upon older contracting 
methods and provide incentives similar to the private sector.  As a result, “it is not 
uncommon for contractors engaged in PBL contracts to have the majority—or even all—of 
their profit tied to performance-based metrics and dependent on earning the contractual 
incentives included in the contract” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-21). Using incentives to encourage 
better contractor performance is a useful tool, but finding the right incentives and metrics is 
difficult.  For example, a commercial company is going to require different incentives than a 
depot.  One is a for profit and one is trying to breakeven; so, a depot may want the 
incentives to, among other things, reduce operating costs and encourage savings, while a 
commercial company wants profits to please their stockholders and board members.  
Applying commercial style incentives to government contracting or partnerships with the 
depots is a way to encourage the best level of performance, but the optimal incentives are 
needed in order for it to be successful. 
The private sector provides incentives based on performance, and this may improve 
the quality of the product and service provided.  In order for the government to get a better 
product, the government needs to develop a commercial mentality to incentivizing.  The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 is designed to encourage the government to 
move toward using commercial processes and practices.  Incorporating commerciality into 
government procurement under FAR Part 12 can be done at multiple levels in the 
government contractor relationship.  For example, “justification for commerciality does not 
have to be made at the item level; it can be made at the repair process level or at the 
support concept level” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-24). So, incentives should be provided at more 
than just the item level.  Under this regulation, the government can incentivize by methods 
known as the “Power by the Hour (PBH)” concept, a company’s exceptional repair 
capabilities, or a product support system. 
PBL is an important step in the right direction because it allows the government to 
incentivize like a private company by using a pricing arrangement to encourage the 
contractor to reduce costs and increase reliability to make a profit.  One way the government 
can incentivize contractors this way is by PBH.  For instance,  
under PBH, an hourly rate is negotiated and the contractor is paid in advance based 
on the forecasted operational hours for the system.  Actual hours are reconciled with 
projected hours, and overages and shortfalls are either added to or credited from the 
next period’s forecasted amounts.  Since the contractor receives funding 
independent of failures it is then incentivized to overhaul the asset the first time it 
fails so that it stays in operation as long as possible. (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-24) 
This basically encourages the contractor to touch the product as little as possible 
because the less they touch it, the more money they make.  This means that they need to 
have more support structures to reduce their defective product percents.  So, the contractor 
will develop support processes like: 
– repair/replace/overhaul, 




– engineering and logistics support, 
– packaging and shipping, and 
– configuration management. (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-26) 
All of these activities are designed to improve the production and the product’s life 
cycle support.  The private sector incentives its contractors by encouraging them to develop 
processes that will help them meet the goal and metrics in their contracts.  PBH is just one 
example of how the government can use private-company-style incentives to prompt the 
contractor to meet the metrics in the contracts.  In conclusion, FAR Part 12 is the 
government’s guide to applying commercial incentives to its procurement so that the DoD’s 
primary objective can be achieved. 
Contractors Creating Their Own Incentives 
The possibility of contractors creating their own incentives should be taken seriously, 
but it is likely to require fundamental reform of existing contractual vehicles to make it a 
reality. The contractor may propose that if its performance is exemplary that it should be 
considered for future business.  The reputation of an exemplary performer often positively 
influences prospects for follow-on business, but the award process on a government 
contract must adhere to the FAR guidelines for competitive bidding.  The creation of 
incentives is more likely to occur in subcontracting, where the dollar thresholds are lower 
and subject to less government scrutiny.  However, for optimal performance to occur, 
contractors should be more proactive in proposing creative incentives because this is likely 
to leverage organizational competencies to achieve higher performance.  
It should also be noted that a contractor may benefit greatly from using the 
technology gained from the development of one product to produce other related products. 
This is evident in thousands of examples of “spin-off” products. A program called TOCNET 
(Tactical Operation Centre Intercommunication System), which is a wireless encrypted LAN, 
was initially used by the Marines for base communications. Substantial numbers of 
additional, related products were spun-off from this technology, including a commercially 
viable product called the Coal Miner’s Phone, which allows miners to communicate 
wirelessly (Jane’s, 2010). 
Within legal guidelines, a firm is permitted to determine its own cost (managerial) 
accounting methods.  This is an evolving area in which improved metrics and evaluation are 
being developed as a result of pressure from the government and the marketplace.  For 
instance, a firm may find some means to show fewer inventories than actually in the system.  
While such a practice is a direct misrepresentation to the investor, taxpayer, and the 
government, it may be advantageous to the contractor.  Additionally, it may lead to lost 
stock, delayed payments, distortion of stock levels, and the added administrative expense 
associated with reordering.  This is an example of a metric that can be reformed.  A 
company’s discretionary ability to determine its cost accounting methods is endangered to 
some degree, especially given the corporate scandals involving “cooking the books.”  
Recently, a department within a major government contractor came in $35,000 under 
budget for the approaching end of fiscal year.  To discourage the possibility of the 
government (Congress) interpreting the under-budget situation as an over allocation, the 
contractor spent the money on office supplies. This is an example of a situation that requires 





PBL is the latest procurement and sustainment method, and it should be noted that it 
is a result of an evolutionary process.  It has, at the very least, articulated a basic strategy 
for contract performance and has brought about increased analysis and scrutiny of 
contractual performance. The improvement of metrics resulting from advances in technology 
is perhaps the greatest operational mechanism for the contractor to achieve the goals laid 
out by PBL.  The contract itself still dictates the performance and it must adhere to the FAR, 
DFARS, and TINA. Creative methods beyond the scope of the FAR are a highly risky 
proposition for the contractor and would require reform of contractual vehicles and 
regulations.  Applying the appropriate contractual type to the given program is essential 
under the current conditions, and it should reflect the applicable point in the product life 
cycle (Kratz & Buckingham, 2010).   
The deployment of PBL may put the government in the uncomfortable position of 
relinquishing control to the contractor, while still being ultimately responsible for the 
performance of the contract.  Relinquished control on the part of the government leads to 
higher government-born risk: 
Despite its apparent success, there is an inherent conflict that DoD implementers of 
PBL often face: the PBL goal of developing long-term partnerships that encourage 
investment from commercial partners is best achieved through lengthy, guaranteed 
contracts—but such contracts increase the DoD's risk in an environment that is 
intended to transfer more risk to the contractor. (Gardner, 2008) 
As a result, in order for PBL to be successful, the government needs to appropriately 
balance risk with the right level of compensation and incentives. 
While we have provided a progress report of the work done thus far on this project, a 
lot more work needs to be done to complete this framework of contractor incentives in PBL 
environment.  For example, the proposed framework needs to be verified through empirical 
means.  This requires field work to include interviews with DoD and contractor personnel, 
using PBL and focused group discussions to assess the viability and desirability of various 
types of incentives.  Such field work is also essential to identify the behavioral factors that 
result in the success or failure of various contractor incentives in the PBL environment.  This 
information can then be used to develop strategies and tactics to implement appropriate 
incentive schemes.  Subsequently, models need to be developed to identify exact 
mechanisms and algorithms to use in determining the specific levels of contractor incentives 
to use in PBL.  Thus, the topic of performance-based (or outcomes-based) logistics and life 
cycle management and the need to find and use appropriate incentives to maximize 
performance is a fruitful area of future research, both from an academic and practical 
viewpoint. 
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Introduction 
An open architecture is a development methodology that employs published, widely 
accepted standards for defining key interfaces within a system.  Systems that are “open” 
have components that can be provided by different vendors, allowing performance 
improvements and technology refreshments at a faster pace than “closed” systems.  This 
“open” approach for constructing systems can be augmented by acquisition practices that 
leverage these “open” technical attributes to facilitate competition.  This paper gives an 
overview of open architecture acquisition approaches and investigates whether open 
architecture by itself is sufficient to provide the stated goals of rapid fielding, reduced cost, 
and interoperability among systems.  After that, we compare the open architecture approach 
to another acquisition approach for systems, namely the product line approach.  A product 
line is a set of systems that share a common, managed set of features that satisfy the 
specific needs of a particular market segment or mission and that are developed from a 
common set of core assets in a prescribed way (Software Product Lines, n.d.).  Several US 
DoD systems acquisitions are currently taking the product line approach.  We provide an 
overview of a various product-line-based acquisition strategies and discuss the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the product line approach.   We argue that open 
architecture principles are an essential ingredient of the product line approach for the DoD.  
Furthermore, the product line methodology consists of a robust set of practices that will 
generally yield more repeatable results of increased performance and lower risk at minimal 
cost. The combination of the two approaches will deliver more benefits to the acquisition 
organization than either approach alone. Finally, we highlight the challenges associated with 
management of an open product line across multiple providers. 
Open Architecture 
An open architecture is an architecture that employs open standards for key 




to publicly documented, consensus-based standards, any competent supplier can provide 
conforming implementations for any module, allowing the owner of the system to take 
advantage of competitive bids among suppliers who compete to provide each module.   
The following principles characterize a set of business and technical practices that 
will lead to delivery of increased capabilities in a shorter time-to-field at reduced costs: 
 Modular designs with loose coupling and high cohesion that allow for 
independent acquisition of system components, i.e., composability;  
 Continuous design disclosure and appropriate use of intellectual property rights, 
allowing greater visibility into an unfolding design and flexibility in acquisition 
alternatives;  
 Enterprise investment strategies that maximize reuse of system designs and 
reduce total ownership costs;  
 Enhanced transparency of system design through open peer reviews;  
 Competition and collaboration through development of alternative solutions and 
sources; and  
 Analysis to determine which components will provide the best return on 
investment to open, i.e., which components will change most often due to 
technology upgrades or parts obsolescence and have the highest associated 
cost over the lifecycle. 
 
Figure 1. Traditional versus Open Architecture Development Approaches 
The need to change the business environment must be the primary factor that drives 
the technical approach.  Accordingly, there are business case decisions to be made about 
how much investment each principle warrants: 
 The use of open standards for key interfaces is a critical aspect of insulating a 




some degree of vendor independence.  The most important business decisions 
lie in identifying the “key” interfaces.  These typically involve architectural 
elements encapsulating the most important system behaviors and/or business 
segments.  This principle is highly correlated to the practices of modular design 
with loose coupling and high cohesion; these help ensure that upgrades and 
system maintenance can be performed with low cost and schedule risk.  
Economic benefit is accrued on a system with a multi-year lifespan (i.e., not 
prototypes or limited production run systems), and components that need to be 
upgraded or migrated to updated hardware over its lifecycle. 
 Continuous design disclosure is especially important for Government 
acquisitions, even though this was, at one time in the past, looked on as a source 
of development overhead cost challenges.  There are two aspects of design 
disclosure: contract deliverables and access to the evolving design and 
development products.  This allows the program office to review the evolution of 
the critical design elements as they evolve, and the ability to exercise data rights 
on all design related information, even if not a formal deliverable.  One of the 
most common “lessons learned” we have heard is failure to get all the artifacts 
that are needed to support competition. Formal deliverables should be limited to 
those things that require a review-comment process or collaboration to ensure 
design synthesis will yield a result that can be validated against the 
requirements.  All other elements of a system design should be made available 
to the customer to observe throughout the design process. Electronic access to 
the design environment and publishing of design artifacts is very low in cost and 
should not be a cause for cost growth by the developer.  This is especially true 
for systems that will have a long acquisition life, and the design information will 
need to be made available to subsequent bidders, if system upgrades or 
maintenance will be competed on a recurring basis (e.g., every five years). 
 Strategic reuse is fundamental to a product line approach.  Enterprise investment 
strategies need to be formulated to determine the business basis for those reuse 
elements.  It will likely cost more to make something reusable (additional 
documentation, commenting, provision for different boundary conditions, etc.) 
and governing the process of managing collaboratively developed and co-
dependent designs is challenging.  The current state of practice in many DoD 
acquisition domains is to build products in which all design elements are tailor-
made to specific solutions and few, if any, of the associated products are 
required to be built for strategic reuse.  This business practice is based on 
minimum emphasis on enterprise reuse, from sponsoring organizations all the 
way to user communities. 
 The Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook defines a “peer review” as “a 
refereed, open process used to assess technical approaches proposed by or 
being used by vendors. An ‘independent peer review’ includes external 
membership and is structured to achieve a balanced perspective in which no one 
organization is dominant.” This assessment process normally results in findings 
or recommendations presented to the decision-maker with the authority and 
responsibility to select or make the final course of action or decision.  These kind 
of open peer reviews are a technical management construct that has been hard 
to replicate across a broad continuum and requires lots of communication, 
purposeful governance, and oversight.  Exposing peer competitors to the inner 




negotiations in order to get the benefits of peer reviews and create the most 
innovative and capable products and producers while sustaining a robust 
marketplace for innovative solutions.  
 Development of alternative solutions and sources is a noted weakness of the 
DoD’s acquisition pattern of behavior.  A pattern of continuous competition has 
been proven to establish better pricing and performance. In a recent interview, 
Dr. Jacques Gansler,  former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, stated, “By contrast, whenever we’ve had competitive 
sourcing, we get more than a 30 percent cost savings, on average, with higher 
performance, no matter who wins—and the government most often wins. 
Competition really pays” (Gansler, n.d.).  In order to address this, Congress 
made specific provisions for requiring competitive prototyping as a major aspect 
of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Summary, n.d.).  In 
addition, some programs have been able to use a collection of contracting 
vehicles to establish a framework for continuous competition that gives the 
program manager additional acquisition choices.  There are historical cost 
references that can be used to justify establishing a second source, especially at 
the early stages of system development.  Having healthy competitive tension at a 
more granular level throughout the design and integration process has some 
additional positive, but intangible effects on developer behavior.  Most program 
managers get their best cooperation from their incumbents when there is a full-
and-open solicitation on the street.   
The value proposition on the OA principles discussed here includes an analysis of 
how much change will be needed throughout a system lifecycle.  Underlying technologies 
may change faster than others, depending on the market-space from which they come, and 
the potential demand signal for capability changes by the warfighter or customer need to be 
addressed.  These two dimensions of change need to drive a technology refresh strategy 
and a capability evolution strategy. These are two sides of the same coin and need to be 
woven together to form a coherent program plan.  However, many programs bent on 
executing requirements for initial capability fail to address these dynamics.  They must also 
address how their business goals are aligned to the technical architecture, system 
modularity/coupling/cohesion, design disclosure and data rights analysis, strategic reuse 
strategies, transparency of system design, the need for a variety of alternative sources, and 
lifecycle cost models. 
Open Architecture and Acquisition 
The Navy has extended the work of the DoD Open Systems Joint Task Force 
(OSJTF) to more comprehensively achieve the desired goals of open architecture as a part 
of the Naval Open Architecture (NOA) effort.  NOA is defined as the confluence of business 
and technical practices yielding modular, interoperable systems that adhere to open 
standards with published interfaces. It is the goal of the Naval Open Architecture effort to 
“field common, interoperable capabilities more rapidly at reduced costs” (Updated Naval, 
n.d.).   
The Naval acquisition community is working to adopt these principles.  Fully doing so 
will require a change in technical approach, but that is the easy part. Much harder is to 
change the business practices, particularly in cross-stakeholder governance, across a wide 
range of organizations.  Government-to-industry relationships  can be most effectively 




government business behavior is harder, in that the contract between parties is implied or 
weak, sometimes in a Memo of Understanding. 
The number of programs adopting these principles has been based on two things: 
cultural barriers and the practical limits of programmatic and technical constraints.  The level 
of adoption has been highly dependent on the drive by individual senior acquisition leaders 
to change business relationships through steps that break from the long-held pattern of 
behavior that has been employed in the DoD for many years.  Adopting OA principles is a 
transformational challenge of the highest order. 
The Navy and Marine Corps are incorporating OA into selected new-start acquisition 
or upgrades to existing programs.  These programs are implementing open architecture for 
either new-start acquisitions or upgrades to existing programs where there is a clear 
business case for opening up the system acquisition and technical characteristics to gain 
better value and warfighter performance.  For new-start acquisitions, there are compelling 
business cases for ensuring that the design boundaries of the system modules are fully 
disclosed and work to standards-based methods.  
Many programs have adopted aspects of OA behavior, but few have taken a full OA 
plunge.  The Navy Submarine Program has achieved the most compelling example of cost 
improvements and warfighting performance across the DoD .  PEO Subs has spearheaded 
the practices of OA, specifically the Acoustic Rapid Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
Insertion (A-RCI) and incorporated those methodologies into several other warfighting 
acquisitions for combat control, including imaging, radar, and others.  
Product Lines  
A software product line is “a set of software-intensive systems sharing a common, 
managed set of features that satisfy the specific needs of a particular market segment or 
mission and that are developed from a common set of core assets in a prescribed way” 
(Software Product Lines, (n.d.). 
Software product line practice is a proven and practical approach for software 
system development, including DoD systems.  There are dozens of well-documented cases 
showing the significant, even order-of-magnitude improvements achieved in terms of cost, 
time to deployment, and quality (Catalog, n.d.).  In addition, the international Software 
Product Line Conference maintains a “Software Product Line Hall of Fame,” a collection of 
exemplary software product line examples that other organizations can emulate; currently, 
18 members have been inducted (Product Line, n.d.). 
Product lines result when builders and acquirers recognize that few systems are 
unique.  This is true for systems acquired by the DoD, systems built by DoD contractors and 
suppliers, and systems built by industry for private-sector use.  Building these systems 
individually is not good technical or business practice, and in the DoD, it results in expensive 
rework, unnecessary system duplication, failure to achieve interoperability, and delayed and 
diminished operational capability. A product line approach exploits the commonality among 
similar systems, and tremendous cost and schedule improvements and decreased technical 
risk have also resulted. 
At its essence, fielding a product line involves  
1. development or acquisition of core assets, which are software, document, 




1. development or acquisition of products using those re-usable core 
assets; and  
2. management for planning and coordinating core asset and product 
development. 
The development activities can occur in either order (new products are built from 
core assets, or core assets are extracted from existing products). Often, products and core 
assets are built in concert with each other. Core asset development has been traditionally 
called domain engineering. Product development from core assets is often called application 
engineering. The entire effort is staffed, orchestrated, tracked, and coordinated by 
management.  Error! Reference source not found. illustrates this triad of essential 
activities. The interactions among the symbols indicates not only that core assets are used 
to develop products, but that revisions to or even new core assets might, and most often do, 
evolve out of product development. The diagram is neutral about which part of the effort is 
launched first. In some contexts, already existing products are mined for generic assets⎯a 
requirements specification, an architecture, software components, etc.⎯that are then 
migrated into the product line's asset base. In other cases, the core assets may be 
developed or procured for later use in production of products.   
 
Figure 2. The Essential Activities of a Software Product Line 
Product lines employ planned, strategic reuse across a family of products to produce 
savings in the following areas each time a product is ordered: 
 Requirements.  Most of the requirements are common with earlier systems, and 
so can be used. Requirements analysis is saved. Feasibility is assured.  
 Architectural design.  An architecture for a software system represents a large 
investment in the form of time from the organization's most talented engineers.  
The quality goals for a system—its performance, reliability, modifiability, etc.—
are largely allowed or precluded once the architecture is in place.  For a new 
product birthed from the product line, this most important design step is already 
done and need not be repeated. 
 Components.  Not only code can be reused, but also the internal designs for the 




documentation of those designs.  Data structures and algorithms are saved and 
need not be reinvented. 
 Modeling and analysis.  One product line organization reports that one of the 
major headaches associated with the kinds of systems they build—namely, real-
time distributed—has all but vanished. When they field a new product in their 
product line, they have extremely high confidence that the timing problems have 
been worked out, and the bugs associated with distributed computing—
synchronization, network loading,  absence of deadlock—have been eliminated 
because their performance models have been validated across the entire family 
(Bergey & Jones, 2010). 
 Testing.  Test plans, test processes, test cases, test data, test harnesses, and 
the communication paths required to report and fix problems are already 
available.  
 Planning.  Budgets and schedules can be informed or reused from previous 
projects, and they're much more reliable. 
 Processes.  Configuration control boards, configuration management tools and 
procedures, management processes, and the overall software development 
process are in place, have been used before, and are robust, reliable, and 
responsive to the organization's special needs. 
 People.  Because of the commonality of the systems, personnel can be fluidly 
transferred among projects as required. Their expertise is applicable across the 
entire line.  When operational needs call for a rapid deployment of a system, the 
right supplier personnel can be brought to bear immediately. 
 Training materials.  Since systems in a product line have a common look and 
feel, training is simplified and training materials apply across the family. 
These reuse opportunities lead to the advantages touted for a product line approach 
to software system development, which include: 
 Reduced time to deployment.  Turning out a new product in the product line is 
more akin to generation and integration, rather than ground-up coding.   
Cummins, Inc., reports that systems that used to take a year to complete now 
can be turned out in about a week (Clements & Northrop, 2003). 
 Reduced cost.  For example, products in the National Reconnaissance Office’s 
Control Channel Toolkit product line cost approximately 10% of what they 
otherwise would have (Clements, Cohen, Donohoe & Northrop, 2001). 
 Increased productivity.  For example, Cummins estimates that they are now 
turning out fourteen times the number of products they were before, while using 
only two thirds the software resources, for a productivity gain of 2,100% 
(McGregor & Clements, n.d.). 
 Higher quality. Product lines enhance quality. Each new system takes advantage 
of all of the defect elimination in its forebears; developer and customer 
confidence both rise with each new instantiation.  The more complicated the 
system, the higher the payoff for solving the vexing performance, security, and 
availability problems. 
 Simplified training.  Users competent in one member of the product line are 




Product Lines and Acquisition 
Product line practice is gaining more and more traction every year in the DoD, 
gaining a foothold and proving its merits in small systems to high-visibility systems of 
systems.   DoD organizations that have adopted the software product line approach include:  
 the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) 
(Error! Reference source not found.) (Emery, n.d.), 
 the National Reconnaissance Office (Clements et al., 2001), 
 the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) (Cohen, Dunn & Soule, 2002), 
 the Army’s Technical Applications Program Office (TAPO) (Clements & Bergey, 
2005), 
 the Army’s Live Training Transformation effort (Live Training, n.d.),  
 The Navy’s PEO for Submarine’s products from the Submarine Warfare 
Federated Tactical System family of systems (Error! Reference source not 
found.) 
 





Figure 4. PEO Submarines SWFTS Model for Cross-platform Product 
Commonality 
In addition a growing number of commercial DoD contractors are gravitating to 
software product lines.   The Software Engineering Institute maintains a catalog of software 
product line experience reports published in the open literature; that catalog currently 
includes 54 examples (Catalog, n.d.). 
There are three overall product line acquisition approaches (Bergey & Jones, 2010): 
1. The government can commission a supplier to develop a specific product (or 
products) using the supplier’s own proprietary product line.  This strategy 
involves acquiring products directly from a supplier who has an existing 
product line and a demonstrated capability to build products in the domain of 
interest.  An example of this approach is found in Jensen (2007). 
3. The government can commission a government organization to 
develop a product line production capability and build specific 
products.  This strategy involves acquiring a completely government-
owned product line using the in-house capabilities of a designated 
government acquisition organization.  An example of this approach is 
found in Live Training Transformation (LT2) (n.d.). 
4. The government can commission a supplier to develop a product line 
production capability and perform integration of products from other 
vendors into the production line.  This strategy involves acquiring a 
complete product line production capability and developing derivative 
products through contracting with one or more suppliers. An example 
of this approach is found in Clements et al. (2001). 
Major challenges include the fact that the DoD’s acquisition policies and 
infrastructure are still largely predicated on acquiring “one-of-a-kind” stove-piped systems, 




product line across multiple programs. Nevertheless, successful DoD product lines are being 
created by acquisition authorities with vision and foresight enough to overcome the 
difficulties and reap the benefits. 
Comparing Acquisition Approaches 
A product line approach can only be fruitfully applied in the context of building a 
family of systems, whereas an open architecture approach works for even a single system 
that evolves over time.   In a context in which both are applicable, how do they compare? 
Cost.  Both approaches promise lower cost.  Open architecture achieves its cost 
savings by engendering and facilitating competition among suppliers.  However, crafting of a 
competitive market out of a closed and vendor-locked set of business relationships has 
been a major challenge in the past.  Designing an architecture to put into place separately 
acquirable elements requires thorough systems engineering and marketplace awareness.   
The goal is to foment  a true competition in a situation in which there is a high likelihood that 
the incumbent could be the only possible winner by dint of long involvement with the legacy 
system.  Meeting this goal is a business and engineering challenge, but failure amounts to 
leaving in place an unassailable barrier to entry by new suppliers, who may not be able to 
provide the right technical products or (even if they are) not be able to undercut the price at 
all. The product line approach achieves its cost savings by amortizing the cost of the core 
assets across all of the products that use them.  Product line approaches have 
demonstrated repeatable per-product cost savings of 50% (Cohen et al., 2002) to 67% 
(Clements & Bergey, 2005) to 90% (Clements et al., 2001).  The more general open 
architecture approaches have demonstrated savings up at this level, but with lower 
consistency.  For example, the A-RCI program achieved a 5:1 estimated cost savings over a 
ten-year period (Boudreau, 2006).  Savings in an open architecture approach remain 
roughly constant over the number of products, whereas savings in the product line approach 
increase with the number of products.  In product line development, one source of cost 
savings is higher productivity among the developers.  Developer productivity in a product 
line context has been shown to increase by 400% (Toft, Coleman & Ohta, 2000) to 500% 
(Catalog, n.d.) to 2,100% (McGregor & Clements, n.d.). 
Time to delivery.  Open architecture approaches achieve reduced time to delivery 
by fostering enterprise reuse and competition among vendors to bring greater innovation in 
product development methodologies.  Product line approaches achieve reduced time to 
delivery by pre-positioning the core assets required to produce the next product (or next 
version of a product).  The A-RCI project, the ability to take robust solutions from the science 
and technology community and integrate them into tactical sonar system in two years or 
less, a process that would have taken five years or more in the legacy framework.  Product 
line approaches have been shown to reduce time to delivery by 50% (McGregor & 
Clements, n.d.) to 60% (Jensen, 2007) to 67% (Toft et al., 2000) to over 90% (Clements & 
Northrop, 2003; Catalog, n.d.). 
Elimination of duplicate effort.  The DoD suffers from a plethora of almost-alike 
systems, developed in isolation from each other. In the US alone, over 80 companies, 
universities, and government organizations are actively developing one or more of some 
200 UAV designs (UAV Forum, n.d.). In 2004, the General Accounting Office was able to 
identify 2,274 separate DoD business systems (but nobody knows the true number), a 
waste of billions of dollars (FedSmith.com, n.d.). In the vast majority of cases, such systems 
are all developed and maintained separately, with poor or no acquisition interoperability 




commonality of these systems and apply common reusable components or features as a 
standard practice.  Building and maintaining one system at a time, compared to a proven 
product line approach, is a process laden with systemic inefficiency, stretching development 
and sustainment budgets to the limit and leaving little left over to work on imaginative new 
solutions.  New software development reuse efforts, where attempted, are ad hoc, 
repository based, and often devolve into a clone-and-own effort.   Open architecture 
approaches do not directly address the problem of duplication (there may be several open 
but duplicate implementations that are not strategically or financially aligned), whereas the 
product line approach gains its benefits by exploiting situations in which duplication would 
otherwise occur. 
Higher quality.  Higher quality results from an OA approach through technical 
practices such as hardware/software independence, modularity with loose coupling and high 
cohesion, integrability, upgradability and business practices such as strategic reuse, 
especially the healthy pressure of competition for component development as well as for 
system integration.  Higher quality results from the PL approach because errors wrung out 
of one system are automatically wrung out of other systems in the same product line. In 
product line development, defects have been shown to drop by 50% (Pronk, 1999) 90% 
(Clements et al., 2001) to 96% (Toft  et al., 2000).   
Open Architecture and Product Lines Together 
While the two approaches differ in some fundamental ways, happily there is no 
reason why they cannot work together.  In fact, the two in combination might represent a 
“perfect storm” of acquisition leverage that can systematically reduce cost, increase 
performance, and drive down risk. The ideal acquisition occurs when both product lines and 
open approaches are applicable in the same acquisition context.  The focus of combining 
the two approaches lies in the architecture, but the challenge to achieving it lies in the 
governance of the DoD acquisition community. 
The architecture of a product line is one of its most important core assets, providing 
the blueprint for how every product will be assembled and the parts (software components 
and supporting artifacts) it will comprise.  Interfaces of those parts are critical to the success 
of the product line’s architecture, for only by mixing and matching instances of components 
suitable for different products can the product line strategy work.  Hence, product line 
architectures are open architectures, in a strict technical sense:  they have “published, 
accepted interfaces to components “that can be provided by different vendors.”   Whether a 
product line architecture is an open architecture in the business sense (in other words, 
whether the components for core assets and products really do come from different 
vendors) is a matter of business policy within the organization that owns the product line.  
Some certainly are.  For example, Nokia’s product line for mobile phones is open outside 
Nokia, allowing external companies to use Nokia’s core asset base to build their own phone 
products (Van der Linden, Schmid & Rommes, 2007).  Hewlett Packard’s product line for 
computer peripheral devices is open across widely disparate organizations within Hewlett 
Packard (Toft et al., 2000). 
An acquisition combining the two approaches could employ strategy #3 in Section 
, overlaid with a requirement that the architecture be open with publicly defined 
interfaces for the key elements.   Here, the government commissions one or more suppliers 
to develop a product line production capability and build specific products.  The production 




components applicable across the defined scope of the product line would be awarded on 
the basis of open competition. 
Neither approach embodies unsolved technical challenges.  The main hurdle for both 
is in the domain of management and changing the way that organizations (government and 
private) do business.  As Machiavelli said, “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things.”  The Defense Research and Engineering 
“imperatives” (DDR&E Imperatives, n.d.) are as follows:  
 Accelerate delivery of technical capabilities to win the current fight, 
 Prepare for an uncertain future, 
 Reduce the cost, acquisition time and risk of our major defense acquisition 
programs, and 
 Develop world-class science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
capabilities for the DoD and the nation. 
These imperatives speak to a critical need for bold new ways to acquire and field 
systems for the warfighter.  Product line engineering and open architecture together promise 
the kind of outcomes necessary to address DoD needs. 
Product lines, together with open architecture methodologies have great potential in 
the DoD to unlock opportunities for innovation, reduced risk, improve response to warfighter 
needs, and reduce costs. However, this combined approach will require fundamental 
change in program office behavior, acquisition leadership, resource community 
communication, warfighter interaction, and, most importantly, in business practices.  Moving 
out of vendor-locked expensive business relationships to bring access to affordable 
innovation and flexibility requires a fundamentally different technical and business approach. 
The best method to change government-industry business relationships is by writing the 
desired behavior into the contract—a gradual, but achievable change process.  Changing 
internal government to government business behavior is harder, in that the contract between 
parties is implied or weak.  Program officers that do strategic reuse and combine forces with 
another program to improve enterprise business value are making a bold move.  The reward 
mechanisms for acting on the best value for the Enterprise are not well established.  
Coordinating budgets and aligning schedules across different resource sponsor offices is a 
daunting challenge that needs further exploration, new methods, bold leadership, and 
sustained and steady hard work. 
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Abstract 
The role of software ecosystems in the development and evolution of open 
architecture systems has received insufficient consideration.  Such systems are composed 
of heterogeneously licensed components, open source or proprietary or both, in an 
architecture in which evolution can occur by evolving existing components or by replacing 
them. But this may result in possible license conflicts and organizational liability for failure to 
fulfill license obligations. We have developed an approach for understanding and modeling 
software licenses, as well as for analyzing conflicts among groups of licenses in realistic 
system contexts and for guiding the acquisition, integration, or development of systems with 
open-source components in such an environment. This work is based on empirical analysis 
of representative software licenses and heterogeneously licensed systems, and 
collaboration with researchers in the legal world. Our approach provides guidance for 
achieving a “best-of-breed” component strategy while obtaining desired license rights in 
exchange for acceptable obligations. 
Introduction 
A substantial number of development organizations are adopting a strategy in which 
a software-intensive system is developed with an open architecture (OA) (Oreizy, 2000), 
whose components may be open source software (OSS) or proprietary with open 
application programming interfaces (APIs).  Such systems evolve not only through the 




another, possibly from a different producer or under a different license. With this approach, 
the organization becomes an integrator of components largely produced elsewhere that are 
interconnected through open APIs as necessary to achieve the desired result. An OA 
development process results in an ecosystem in which the integrator is influenced from one 
direction by the goals, interfaces, license choices, and release cycles of the component 
producers, and in another direction by the needs of its consumers.  As a result, the software 
components are reused more widely, and the resulting OA systems can achieve reuse 
benefits such as reduced costs, increased reliability, and potentially increased agility in 
evolving to meet changing needs. An emerging challenge is to realize the benefits of this 
approach when the individual components are heterogeneously licensed, each potentially 
with a different license rather than a single OSS license as in uniformly licensed OSS 
projects, or a single proprietary license when acquired from a vendor employing a 
proprietary development scheme. 
This challenge is inevitably entwined with the software ecosystems that arise for OA 
systems. We find that an OA software ecosystem involves not only organizations and 
individuals producing and consuming components, and supply paths from producer to 
consumer, but also: 
 the OA of the system(s) in question, 
 the open interfaces met by the components, 
 the degree of coupling in the evolution of related components, and 
 the rights and obligations resulting from the software licenses under which 
various components are released, that propagate from producers to consumers. 
An example software ecosystem is portrayed in Figure 1. 
In order to most effectively use an OA approach in developing and evolving a 
system, it is essential to consider this OA ecosystem.  An OA system draws on components 
from proprietary vendors and open source projects. Its architecture is made possible by the 
existing general ecosystem of producers, from which the initial components are chosen. The 
choice of a specific OA begins a specialized software ecosystem involving components that 
meet (or can be shimmed to meet) the open interfaces used in the architecture. We do not 
claim this is the best or the only way to reuse components or produce systems, but it is an 
ever more widespread way. In this paper, we build on previous work on heterogeneously 
licensed systems (HLSs) (German & Hassan, 2009; Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2008; Alspaugh, 
Asuncion & Scacchi, 2009a, May) by examining the role of component licenses in OA 
software ecosystems and how OA development affects and is affected by software 
ecosystems. 
A motivating example of this approach is the Unity game development tool, produced 
by Unity Technologies (Unity Technologies, 2008), which can be used to create game-
based virtual worlds for training applications. Its license agreement, which we quote below, 
lists eleven distinct licenses and indicates the tool is produced, apparently using an OA 




Figure 1. An Example of a Software Ecosystem in which OA Systems Are Developed 
1. The Mono Class Library, Copyright 2005-2008 Novell, Inc. 
5. The Mono Runtime Libraries, Copyright 2005-2008 Novell, Inc. 
6. Boo, Copyright 2003-2008 Rodrigo B. Oliveira. 
7. UnityScript, Copyright 2005-2008 Rodrigo B. Oliveira. 
8. OpenAL cross platform audio library, Copyright 1999-2006 by authors. 
9. PhysX physics library. Copyright 2003-2008 by Ageia Technologies, 
Inc. 
10. libvorbis. Copyright (c) 2002-2007 Xiph.org Foundation. 
11. libtheora. Copyright (c) 2002-2007 Xiph.org Foundation. 
12. zlib general purpose compression library.  Copyright (c) 1995-2005 
Jean-loup Gailly and Mark Adler. 




14. jpeglib JPEG library. Copyright (C) 1991-1998, Thomas G. Lane. 
15. Twilight Prophecy SDK, a multi-platform development system for 
virtual reality and multimedia. Copyright 1997-2003 Twilight 3D 
Finland Oy Ltd. 
16. dynamic bitset, Copyright Chuck Allison and Jeremy Siek 2001-2002. 
17. The Mono C# Compiler and Tools, Copyright 2005-2008 Novell, Inc. 
18. libcurl. Copyright (c) 1996-2008, Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>. 
19. PostgreSQL Database Management System. 
20. FreeType. Copyright (c) 2007 The FreeType Project 
(www.freetype.org). 
21. NVIDIA Cg. Copyright (c) 2002-2008 NVIDIA Corp. 
An OA system can evolve by a number of distinct mechanisms, some of which are 
common to all systems and others of which are a result of heterogeneous component 
licenses in a single system.   
By component evolution—One or more components can evolve, altering the overall 
system’s characteristics (for example, upgrading and replacing the Firefox Web browser 
from version 3.5 to 3.6). 
By component replacement—One or more components may be replaced by others 
with different behaviors but the same interface, or with a different interface and the addition 
of shim code to make it match (for example, replacing the AbiWord word processor with 
either Open Office or MS Word). 
By architecture evolution—The OA can evolve, using the same components but in a 
different configuration, altering the system characteristics. For example, as discussed in 
Section 4, changing the configuration in which a component is connected can change how 
its license affects the rights and obligations for the overall system. This could arise when 
replacing email and word processing applications with web services like Google Mail and 
Google Docs. 
By component license evolution—The license under which a component is available 
may change (for example, when the license for the Mozilla core components was changed 
from the Mozilla Public License (MPL) to the current Mozilla Disjunctive Tri-License), or the 
component may be made available under a new version of the same license (for example, 
when the GNU General Public License (GPL) version 3 was released). 
By a change to the desired rights or acceptable obligations—The OA system’s 
integrator or consumers may desire additional license rights (for example, the right to 
sublicense in addition to the right to distribute) or no longer desire specific rights or the set of 
license obligations they find acceptable may change. In either case, the OA system evolves, 
whether by changing components, evolving the architecture, or by other means, to provide 
the desired rights within the scope of the acceptable obligations.  For example, they may no 
longer be willing or able to provide the source code for components within the reciprocality 
scope of a GPL-licensed module. 
The interdependence of integrators and producers results in a co-evolution of 
software within an OA ecosystem. Closely coupled components from different producers 
must evolve in parallel in order for each to provide its services, as evolution in one will 




with a loose coordination among releases, for example like that between the Gnome and 
Mozilla organizations. Each release of a producer component creates a tension through the 
ecosystem relationships with consumers and their releases of OA systems using those 
components, as integrators accommodate the choices of available, supported components 
with their own goals and needs. As discussed in our previous work (Alspaugh et al., 2009a, 
May), license rights and obligations are manifested at each component interface then 
mediated through the OA of the system to entail the rights and corresponding obligations for 
the system as a whole. As a result, integrators must frequently re-evaluate the OA system 
rights and obligations. In contrast to homogeneously licensed systems, license change 
across versions is a characteristic of OA ecosystems, and architects of OA systems require 
tool support for managing the ongoing licensing changes. 
We propose that such support must have several characteristics. It must rest on a 
license structure of rights and obligations (section 5), focusing on obligations that are 
enactable (it can be put into practice) and testable. For example, many OSS licenses 
include an obligation to make a component’s modified code public, and whether a specific 
version of the code is public at a specified Web address is both enactable and testable. In 
contrast, the GPL v.3 provision “No covered work shall be deemed part of an effective 
technological measure under any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article 11 of the 
WIPO copyright treaty” is not enactable in any obvious way, nor is it testable—how can one 
verify what others deem? 
 It must take account of the distinctions between the design-time, build-time, and 
distribution-time architectures (sections 4, 5, 6) and the rights and obligations 
that come into play for each of them. 
 It must distinguish the architectural constructs significant for software licenses 
and embody their effects on rights and obligations (section 4). 
 It must define license architectures (section 6). 
 It must provide an automated environment for creating and managing license 
architectures. We are developing a prototype that manages a license’s 
architecture as a view of its system architecture (Alspaugh et al., 2009a, May).  
 Finally, it must automate calculations on system rights and obligations so that 
they may be done easily and frequently, whenever any of the factors affecting 
rights and obligations may have changed (Section 7). 
In the remainder of this paper, we survey some related work (section 2), provide an 
overview of OSS licenses and projects (section 3), define and examine characteristics of 
open architectures (section 4), introduce a structure for licenses (section 5), outline license 
architectures (section 6), and sketch our approach for license analysis (section 7). We then 
close with a discussion addressing how our software license and analysis scheme relates to 
software products lines and to specification of software system security requirements 
(section 8) before stating our conclusions (section 9). 
Related Work 
It has been typical until recently for each software or information system to be 
designed, built, and distributed under the terms of a single proprietary or OSS license, with 
all its components homogeneously covered by that same license.  The system is distributed 
with sources or executables bearing copyright and license notices, and the license gives 
specific rights while imposing corresponding obligations that system consumers (whether 




commercial law.  Consequently, there has been some very interesting study of the choice of 
OSS license for use in an OSS development project, and its consequences in determining 
the likely success of such a project. 
Brown and Booch (2002) discuss issues that arise in the reuse of OSS components, 
such as interdependence (via component interconnection at design-time or linkage at build-
time or run-time) causing functional changes to propagate and versions of the components 
evolving asynchronously, giving rise to co-evolution of interrelated code in the OSS-based 
systems.  If the components evolve, the OA system itself is evolving. The evolution can also 
include changes to the licenses, and the licenses can change from component version to 
version (cf. Footnote 1). 
Legal scholars have examined OSS licenses and how they interact in the legal 
domain but not in the context of HLSs (Fontana et al., 2008; Rosen, 2005; St. Laurent, 
2004). For example, Rosen surveys eight OSS licenses and creates two new ones written to 
professional legal standards. He examines interactions primarily in terms of the general 
categories of reciprocal and non-reciprocal licenses, rather than in terms of specific licenses. 
However, common to this legal scholarship is an approach that analyzes the interaction 
among licenses on a pair-wise or interlinked components basis. This analysis scheme 
means that if system A has OSS license of type X, system B has a licenses of type Y, and 
system C has license of type Z, then license interaction (matching, subsumption, or 
conflicting constraints) is determined by how A interacts with B, B with C, and A with C. This 
follows from related legal scholarship (e.g., Burk, 1998) that brought attention to problems of 
whether or not intellectual property rights apply depending on how the systems (or 
components) are interlinked (cf., German and Hassan, 2009). We similarly adopt this 
approach in our analysis efforts. 
Stewart, Ammeter, and Maruping (2006) conducted an empirical study to examine 
whether license choice is related to OSS project success, finding a positive association 
following from the selection of business- friendly licenses.  Sen, Subramaniam, and Nelson 
in a series of studies (2007 & 2009) similarly find positive relationships between the choice 
of a OSS license and the likelihood of both successful OSS development and adoption of 
corresponding OSS systems within enterprises.  These studies direct attention to OSS 
projects that adopt and identify their development efforts through use of a single OSS 
license. However, there has been little explicit guidance on how best to develop, deploy, and 
sustain complex software systems when heterogeneously licensed components are 
involved, and thus multiple OSS and proprietary licenses may be involved. Ven and 
Mannaert (2008); Tuunanen, Koskinen, and Karkkainen (2009); and German and Hassan 
(2009) are recent exceptions. 
Ven and Mannaert discuss the challenges faced by independent software vendors 
developing an HLS. They focus on the evolution and maintenance of modified OSS 
components.  Tuunanen, Koskinen, and Karkkainen exemplify most work to date on HLSs, 
in that they focus on reverse engineering and recovery of individual component licenses on 
existing systems, rather than on guiding HLS design to achieve and verify desired license 
outcomes.  Their approach does not support the calculation of HLS virtual licenses. German 
and Hassan model a license as a set of grants, each of which has a set of conjoined 
conditions necessary for the grant to be given. They analyze interactions between pairs of 
licenses in the context of five types of component connection. They also identify twelve 
patterns for avoiding license mismatches, found in an empirical study of a large group of 
OSS projects, and characterize the patterns using their model. Our license model extends 
German and Hassan’s to address semantic connections between obligations and rights we 




Other previous work examined how best to align acquisition, system requirements, 
architectures, and OSS components across different software license regimes to achieve 
the goal of combining OSS with proprietary software that provide open APIs when 
developing a composite “system of systems” (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). This is particularly 
an issue for the US Federal Government in its acquisition of complex software systems 
subject to Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) and military service- specific regulations. 
HLSs give rise to new functional and non-functional requirements that further constrain what 
kinds of systems can be built and deployed, as well as recognizing that acquisition policies 
can effectively exclude certain OA configurations while accommodating others, based on 
how different licensed components may be interconnected. 
Open Source Software 
Traditional proprietary licenses allow a company to retain control of software it 
produces and to restrict the access and rights that outsiders can have. OSS licenses, on the 
other hand, are designed to encourage sharing and reuse of software, and grant access and 
as many rights as possible. OSS licenses are classified as academic or reciprocal.  
Academic OSS licenses such as the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology license, the Apache Software License, and the 
Artistic License grant nearly all rights to components and their source code and impose few 
obligations. Anyone can use the software, create derivative works from it, or include it in 
proprietary projects. Typical academic obligations are simply to not remove the copyright 
and license notices. 
Reciprocal OSS licenses take a more active stance towards sharing and reusing 
software by imposing the obligation that reciprocally licensed software not be combined (for 
various definitions of “combined”) with any software that is not in turn also released under 
the reciprocal license. The goals are to increase the domain of OSS by encouraging 
developers to bring more components under its aegis and to prevent improvements to OSS 
components from vanishing behind proprietary licenses. Example reciprocal licenses are 
GPL, the Mozilla Public License (MPL), and the Common Public License. 
Both proprietary and OSS licenses typically disclaim liability, assert no warranty is 
implied, and obligate licensees to not use the licensor’s name or trademarks. Newer 
licenses often cover patent issues as well, either giving a restricted patent license or 
explicitly excluding patent rights. 
The Mozilla Disjunctive Tri-License licenses the core Mozilla components under any 
one of three licenses (MPL, GPL, or the GNU Lesser General Public License LGPL). OSS 
developers can choose the one that best suits their needs for a particular project and 
component. 
The Open Source Initiative (OSI) maintains a widely respected definition of “open 
source” and gives its approval to licenses that meet it (Open Source Initiative, 2008). OSI 
maintains and publishes a repository of approximately 70 approved OSS licenses. 
Common practice has been for an OSS project to choose a single license under 
which all its products are released and to require developers to contribute their work only 
under conditions compatible with that license.  For example, the Apache Contributor License 
Agreement grants enough of each author’s rights to the Apache Software Foundation for the 
foundation to license the resulting systems under the Apache Software License. This sort of 




the system has a single well-defined OSS license, was the norm in the early days of OSS 
and continues to be practiced. 
Open Architecture 
Open architecture (OA) software is a customization technique introduced by Oreizy 
(2000) that enables third parties to modify a software system through its exposed 
architecture, evolving the system by replacing its components.  Increasingly more software-
intensive systems are developed using an OA strategy, not only with OSS components but 
also proprietary components with open APIs (Unity Technologies, 2008). Using this 
approach can lower development costs and increase reliability and function (Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2008). Composing a system with HLS components, however, increases the 
likelihood of conflicts, liabilities, and no-rights stemming from incompatible licenses. Thus, in 
our work we define an OA system as a software system consisting of components that are 
either open source or proprietary with open API, whose overall system rights at a minimum 
allow its use and redistribution in full or in part. 
It may appear that using a system’s architecture that incorporate OSS components 
and uses open APIs will result in an OA system. But not all such architectures will produce 
an OA, since the (possibly empty) set of available license rights for an OA system depends 
on (a) how and why OSS and open APIs are located within the system architecture, (b) how 
OSS and open APIs are implemented, embedded, or interconnected, and (c) the degree to 
which the licenses of different OSS components encumber all or part of a software system’s 
architecture into which they are integrated (Alspaugh & Anton, n.d.; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 
2008). 
The following kinds of software elements appearing in common software 
architectures can affect whether the resulting systems are open or closed (Bass, Clements 
& Kazman, 2003). 
Software source code components—These can be either (a) standalone programs, 
(b) libraries, frameworks, or middleware, (c) inter-application script code such as C shell 
scripts, or (d) intra-application script code, as for creating Rich Internet Applications using 
domain-specific languages such as XUL for the Firefox Web browser (Feldt, 2007) or 
“mashups” (Nelson & Churchill, 2006). Their source code is available and they can be 




Executable components—These components are in binary form, and the source code may 
not be open for access, review, modification, or possible redistribution (Rosen, 2005). If 
proprietary, they often cannot be redistributed, and so such components will be present in 
the design- and run-time architectures but not in the distribution-time architecture. 
Software services—An appropriate software service can replace a source code or 
executable component. 
Figure 2. A Heterogeneously Licensed System Composed from Multiple 
Systems 
Application programming interfaces/APIs—Availability of externally visible and 
accessible APIs is the minimum requirement for an open system (Meyers & Oberndorf, 
2001). APIs are not and cannot be licensed and can limit the propagation of license 
obligations. 
Software connectors—Software whose intended purpose is to provide a standard or 
reusable way of communication through common interfaces, e.g., High Level Architecture 
(Kuhl, Weatherly & Dahmann, 1999), CORBA, MS.NET, Enterprise Java Beans, and GNU 
Lesser General Public License (LGPL) libraries. Connectors can also limit the propagation 
of license obligations. 
Methods of connection—These include linking as part of a configured subsystem, 
dynamic linking, and client-server connections. Methods of connection affect license 
obligation propagation, with different methods affecting different licenses. 
Configured system or subsystem architectures—These are software systems that 
are used as atomic components of a larger system and whose internal architecture may 




minimize license interaction, a configured system or sub-architecture may be surrounded by 
what we term a license firewall, namely a layer of dynamic links, client-server connections, 
license shims, or other connectors that block the propagation of reciprocal obligations. 
Figure 3 shows a high-level view of a reference architecture that includes all the 
kinds of software elements listed above. This reference architecture has been instantiated in 
a number of configured systems that combine OSS and closed source components. One 
such system handles time sheets and payroll at our university; another implements the web 
portal for a university computer game research laboratory (the updated version now at 
http://cgvw.ics.uci.edu).  





Figure 4. A Build-time Architecture Describing the Version Running in 
Figure 2  
(Note: Components or connectors not visible in Figure 2 are shown in gray.)
Figure 5. Instantiated Build-time Architecture (Figure 4) within ArchStudio
The configured systems consist of software components such as a Mozilla Web 
browser, Gnome Evolution email client, and AbiWord word processor (similar to MS Word), 
all running on a RedHat Fedora Linux operating system accessing file, print, and other 




through a set of software connectors that bridges the interfaces of components and 
combines the provided functionality into the system’s services. 
Software Licenses 
Copyright law is the common basis for software licenses and gives the original 
author of a work certain exclusive rights: the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, 
distribute, sub-license, and sell copies. The author may license these rights, individually or 
in groups, to others; the license may give a right either exclusively or non-exclusively. After a 
period of years, copyright rights enter the public domain. Until then, copyright may only be 
obtained through licensing. 
Licenses typically impose obligations that must be met in order for the licensee to 
realize the assigned rights. Common obligations include the obligation to publish at no cost 
any source code you modify (MPL) or the reciprocal obligation to publish all source code 
included at build-time or statically linked (GPL). The obligations may conflict, as when a 
GPL’d component’s reciprocal obligation to publish source code of other components is 
combined with a proprietary component’s license prohibition of publishing its source code. In 
this case, no rights may be available for the system as a whole, not even the right of use, 
because the two obligations cannot simultaneously be met and thus neither component can 
be used as part of the system. 
The basic relationship between software license rights and obligations can be 
summarized as follows: if the specified obligations are met, then the corresponding rights 
are granted. For example, if you publish your modified source code and sub-licensed 
derived works under MPL, then you get all the MPL rights for both the original and the 
modified code. However, license details are complex, subtle, and difficult to comprehend 
and track. So it is easy to become confused or make mistakes. The challenge is multiplied 
when dealing with configured system architectures that compose a large number of 
components with heterogeneous licenses, so the need for legal counsel begins to seem 
inevitable (Rosen, 2005; Fontana et al., 2008). 
We have developed an approach for expressing software licenses that is more 
formal and less ambiguous than natural language and that allows us to calculate and 
identify conflicts arising from the rights and obligations of two or more component’s licenses. 
Our approach is based on Hohfeld’s classic group of eight fundamental jural relations 
(1913), of which we use right, duty, no-right, and privilege. We start with a tuple <actor, 
operation, action, object> for expressing a right or obligation.  The actor is the “licensee” 
for all the licenses we have examined.  The operation is one of the following: “may,” “must,” 
“must not,” or “need not,” with “may” and “need not” expressing rights and “must” and “must 
not” expressing obligations. Because copyright rights are only available to entities that have 
been granted a sublicense, only the listed rights are available, and the absence of a right 
means that it is not available. The action is a verb or verb phrase describing what may, 
must, must not, or need not be done, with the object completing the description.  A license 
may be expressed as a set of rights, with each right associated with zero or more 
obligations that must be fulfilled in order to enjoy that right. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the 
meta-model we use to express licenses, with the allowed combinations of modality, object, 
















Figure 6. License Meta-model 
HLS designers have developed a number heuristics to guide architectural design 
while avoiding some license conflicts. First, it is possible to use a reciprocally licensed 
component through a license firewall that limits the scope of reciprocal obligations. Rather 
than connecting conflicting components directly through static or other build-time links, the 
connection is made through a dynamic link, client-server protocol, license shim (such as a 
Limited General Public License connector), or run-time plug-ins.  A second approach used 
by a number of large organizations is simply to avoid using any components with reciprocal 
licenses. A third approach is to meet the license obligations (if that is possible) by for 
example retaining copyright and license notices in the source and publishing the source 
code. However, even using design heuristics such as these (and there are many), keeping 
track of license rights and obligations across components that are interconnected in 
complex OAs quickly becomes too cumbersome. Automated support is needed to manage 























Figure 8. The License Architecture Meta-model 
License Architectures 
Our license model forms a basis for effective reasoning about licenses in the context 
of actual systems and calculating the resulting rights and obligations. In order to do so, we 
need a certain amount of information about the system’s configuration at design-, build-, 
distribution-, and run-time.  The needed information comprises the license architecture, an 
abstraction of the system architecture of its: 
1. set of components of the system, 
22. relation mapping each component to its license, 
23. relation mapping each component to its set of sources, and 
24. relation from each component to the set of components in the same 
license scope, for each license for which “scope” is defined (e.g., 
GPL) and from each source to the set of sources of components in 
the scope of its component. 
With this information and definitions of the licenses involved, for example, as seen in 
Figure 9, we calculate rights and obligations for individual components or the entire system 




Figure 9. License Annotation of Gnome Evolution Component 
Figure 10. License Analysis Reports Before (left) and After (right) Replacing a 
Component System 
License Analysis 
Given a specification of a software system’s architecture, we can associate software 
license attributes with the system’s components, connectors, and sub-system architectures, 
resulting in a license architecture for the system, and calculate the copyright rights and 
obligations for the system’s configuration.  Due to the complexity of license architecture 
analysis and the need to re-analyze every time a component evolves, a component’s license 
changes, a component is substituted, or the system architecture changes, OA integrators 
really need an automated license architecture analysis environment. We are developing a 
prototype of such an environment (Alspaugh et al., 2009a, May). 
We use an architectural description language specified in xADL (Institute for 
Software Research, 2009) to describe OAs that can be designed and analyzed with a 




ArchStudio4 (Institute for Software Research, 2006). We have built the Software 
Architecture License Analysis module on top of ArchStudio’s Traceability View (Asuncion & 
Taylor, 2009).  This allows for the specification of licenses as a list of attributes (license 
tuples) using a form-based user interface in ArchStudio4 (Medvidovic, et al., 1999; Institute 
for Software Research, 2006). We analyze rights and obligations as described below 
(Alspaugh et al., 2009a, May) and as shown above in Figures 9 and 10.  
Propagation of Reciprocal Obligations 
We follow the widely accepted interpretation that build-time static linkages propagate 
the reciprocal obligations, but appropriate license firewalls do not.  Analysis begins, 
therefore, by propagating these obligations along all connectors that are not license 
firewalls. 
Obligation Conflicts 
An obligation can conflict with another obligation or with the set of available rights by 
requiring a copyright right that has not been granted. For instance, a proprietary license may 
require that a licensee must not redistribute source code, but GPL states that a licensee 
must redistribute source code. Thus, the conflict appears in the modality of the two 
otherwise identical obligations, “must not” in the proprietary license and “must” in GPL. 
Rights and Obligations Calculations 
The rights available for the entire system (use, copy, modify, etc.) are calculated as 
the intersection of the sets of rights available for each component of the system.  If a conflict 
is found involving the obligations and rights of linked components, it is possible for the 
system architect to consider an alternative linking scheme, e.g., using one or more 
connectors along the paths between the components that act as a license firewall. This 
means that the architecture and the automated environment together can determine what 
OA design best meets the problem at hand with available software components. 
Components with conflicting licenses do not need to be arbitrarily excluded but instead may 
expand the range of possible architectural alternatives if the architect seeks such flexibility 
and choice.  
Discussion 
At least two topics merit discussion following from our approach to semantically 
modeling and analyzing OA systems that are subject to heterogeneous software licenses. 
One is how our results might shed light on software systems whose architectures articulate 
a software product line, while the other is how our approach might be extended to also 
address the semantic modeling and analysis of software system security requirements. 
First, organizing and developing software product lines (SPLs) relies on the 
development and use of explicit software architectures (Bosch, 2000; Clements & Northrop, 
2001). However, the architecture of a SPL is not necessarily an OA—there is no 
requirement for it to be so.  Thus, we are interested in discussing what happens when SPLs 
may conform to an OA, and to an OA that may be subject to heterogeneously licensed SPL 
components.  Three considerations come to mind.  If the SPL is subject to a single 
homogeneous software license, which may often be the case when a single vendor or 
government contractor has developed the SPL, then the license may act to reinforce a 




to avoid such lock-in, whether or not the SPL components have open or standards-
compliant APIs.  Alternatively, if an OA system employs a reference architecture much like 
we have in the design-time architecture depicted in Figure 3, which is then instantiated into 
a specific software product configuration, as suggested in the build-time architecture (shown 
in Figure 4), then such a reference or design-time architecture as we have presented it here 
effectively defines a SPL consisting of possible different system instantiations composed 
from similar components instances (e.g., different but equivalent Web browsers, word 
processors, email, calendaring applications, and relational database management systems). 
Finally, if the SPL is based on an OA that integrates software components from multiple 
vendors or OSS components that are subject to heterogeneous licenses, then we have the 
situation analogous to what we have presented in this paper.  So SPL concepts are 
compatible with OA systems that are composed from heterogeneously licensed 
components. 
Second, as already noted, software licenses represent a collection of rights and 
obligations for what can or cannot be done with a licensed software component. Licenses 
thus denote non-functional requirements that apply to a software systems or system 
components as intellectual property (IP) during their development and deployment.  But 
rights and obligations are not limited to concerns or constraints applicable only to software 
as IP. Instead, they can be written in ways that stipulate non-functional requirements of 
different kinds.  Consider, for example, that desired or necessary software system security 
properties can also be expressed as rights and obligations addressing system 
confidentiality, integrity, accountability, system availability, and assurance (Breaux & Anton, 
2005; 2008).  
Traditionally, developing robust specifications for non-functional software system 
security properties in natural language often produces specifications that are ambiguous, 
misleading, inconsistent across system components, and lacking sufficient details (Yau & 
Chen, 2006). Using a semantic model to formally specify the rights and obligations required 
for a software system or component to be secure (Breaux & Anton, 2005; 2008; Yau & 
Chen, 2006) means that it may be possible to develop both a “security architecture” notation 
and model specification that associates given security rights and obligations across a 
software system or system of systems.  Similarly, it suggests the possibility of developing 
computational tools or interactive architecture development environments that can be used 
to specify, model, and analyze a software system’s security architecture at different times in 
its development—design-time, build-time, and run-time.   
The approach we have been developing for the past few years for modeling and 
analyzing software system license architectures for OA systems (Alspaugh et al., 2009, 
August/September; Alspaugh et al., 2009b, May; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008), may therefore 
be extendable to also being able to address OA systems with heterogeneous “software 
security license” rights and obligations. Furthermore, the idea of common or reusable 
software security licenses may be analogous to the reusable security requirements 
templates proposed by Firesmith (2004) at the Software Engineering Institute.  
Consequently, such an exploration and extension of the semantic software license 
modeling, meta-modeling, and computational analysis tools to also support software system 
security can be recognized as a promising next stage of our research studies. 
Conclusion 
This paper discusses the role of software ecosystems with heterogeneously licensed 




obligations play a key role in how and why an OA system evolves in its ecosystem. We note 
that license changes across versions of components are a characteristic of OA systems and 
software ecosystems with heterogeneously licensed components.  A structure for modeling 
software licenses and the license architecture of a system and automated support for 
calculating its rights and obligations are needed in order to manage a system’s evolution in 
the context of its ecosystem.  We have outlined an approach for achieving these and 
sketched how they further the goal of reusing components in developing software-intensive 
systems.  Much more work remains to be done, but we believe this approach turns a vexing 
problem into one for which workable solutions can be obtained. 
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Abstract 
Many organizations are attracted to the well-documented benefits of a software 
product line approach. However, special challenges surround product line acquisition in the 
Department of Defense. We explain some basics of software product line practice, the 
challenges that make product line acquisition unique, and three basic acquisition strategies.  
We next describe the key contractual tasks a supplier must perform and map these to an 
enterprise view of product line acquisition. Using this context, we explain roles and 
responsibilities for the organizations involved, and describe important activities and 






Do you find yourself continually acquiring software-intensive systems that are similar 
to ones you have paid for in the past? Do you wish you could use your scarce resources to 
buy what is truly new without having to pay for re-development of essentially the same old 
solutions? If so, you should consider a software product line approach.   
A software product line is a set of software-intensive systems sharing a common, 
managed set of features that satisfy the specific needs of a particular market segment or 
mission and that are developed from a common set of core assets in a prescribed way 
(Clements & Northrop, 2002). An increasing number of organizations are building their 
products as product lines in order to achieve large-scale productivity gains, improve time to 
field or market, maintain a market presence, compensate for an inability to hire, leverage 
existing resources, and achieve mass customization. 
Commercial implementations of software product lines have resulted in some 
impressive results (Clements & Northrop, 2002; Schmid & Verlage, 2002). Although there 
has been some successful use of this technology within the Department of Defense (DoD), it 
carries special challenges for both the acquisition office and the supporting development 
contractors.  
This paper addresses software product lines from the perspective of an acquisition 
organization. Product line acquisition involves adopting some new practices and rethinking 
some old practices. To introduce you to this new way of thinking we first provide a brief 
overview of software product line practice.  We then describe the acquisition challenges 
implied by this technology, the basic acquisition strategies you can pursue, and the 
foundational contractual tasks that must be specified for successful product line acquisition. 
Against this background we then explore the structures, roles, and activities that will emerge 
during the lifetime of the product line from an enterprise perspective. We conclude by 
pointing to areas of future work to facilitate adoption of a product line acquisition approach.  
Software Product Line Basics 
An operating software product line organization embodies a core asset development 
activity and a product development activity, all orchestrated by a management activity. 


















The arrows indicate not only that core assets are used to develop products, but also 
that revisions or even new core assets can evolve out of product development. The diagram 
does not specify where the process starts. In some contexts, existing products are mined for 
generic assets that are then migrated into a product line. At other times, the core assets 
may be developed first to produce an envisioned set of products. Core assets include plans, 
requirements, designs, documentation, and tests, as well as software.   
While it is evident that product line practice calls for a new technical approach, new 
non-technical and business practices are equally crucial. There is a constant need for strong 
visionary management to invest the resources in the development of the core assets and to 
nurture the cultural change to view new products in the context of the product line, rather 
than as stand-alone systems.  
In January 1997, the Carnegie Mellon® Software Engineering Institute (SEI) launched 
the Product Line Practice Initiative to help facilitate and accelerate the transition to sound 
software engineering practices using a product line approach. The goal of this initiative is to 
provide organizations with an integrated business and technical approach to systematic 
reuse, so they can produce and maintain similar systems of predictable quality more 
efficiently and at a lower cost.  
A key strategy for achieving this goal has been the creation of the SEI Framework for 
Software Product Line PracticeSM (“the framework”). The framework describes the 
foundational product line concepts and identifies the essential activities and practices that 
an organization must master before it can successfully field a product line of software or 
software-intensive systems. The framework is a living document that is evolving as 
experience with product line practice grows. Version 4.0 is described in the book Software 
Product Lines: Practices and Patterns (Clements & Northrop, 2002), and the latest version is 
available on the SEI Web site (Northrop & Clements, 2009). 
Software Product Line Acquisition Challenges 
Bergey, Fisher, and Jones define acquisition as “The process of obtaining products 
and services through contracting. Contracting includes purchasing, buying, commissioning, 
licensing, leasing, and procuring of designated supplies and services via a formal written 
agreement” (Bergey, Fisher & Jones, 1999).  Contracting works best when tasks are 
precisely defined. Moreover, contracting is best suited to efforts that are 
 based on past experience, including use of familiar practices and processes 
 based on well understood cost history data 
 well bounded—that is, involving a fixed set of tasks and traditional deliverables in 
a well defined context (known requirements, quantity, schedule, and funding) 
 unlikely to involve significant changes or redirection downstream 
In the real world you won’t have these ideal conditions, so typically there are 
challenges to any type of acquisition.  What can make a product line acquisition especially 
challenging is when the acquisition must meet the needs of multiple programs and target 
systems that transcend multiple platforms and developers.  DoD acquisition policies and 
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infrastructure don’t help since they are still largely predicated on acquiring one-of-a-kind, 
stove-piped systems. Other factors that make product line acquisitions more challenging are 
 Planning a family of software products that rely on a common development effort 
is not a traditional DoD acquisition paradigm. 
 There is no institutionalized means for funding the development and sustainment 
of a product line across multiple programs. 
 Typically, neither program offices nor contractors are incentivized to adopt a 
product line approach. 
 Adopting a product line approach may force the government to assume system 
integration responsibility. 
Despite these challenges, many DoD organizations have successfully implemented 
software product lines. Several DoD and Army product line workshops have confirmed that 
programmatic issues—not technical issues—are the main impediments to widespread 
adoption of product line practices in the DoD (Bergey et al., 2003; Bergey, Cohen, Jones & 
Smith, 2004; Bergey, Cohen, Donohoe & Jones, 2005; Bergey & Cohen, 2006; and Bergey 
et al., 2009).       
The essence of product line acquisition is obtaining a software product line through 
contracting. The first step, addressed in the next section, is to address the contracting 
challenges by selecting an appropriate acquisition strategy.  
Basic Acquisition Strategies for Acquiring Software Products 
via a Product Line 
Developing a suitable acquisition strategy is a key consideration in adopting a 
product line approach in the DoD. A program manager (PM) can choose from three basic 
strategies: 
Acquisition Strategy 1: A PM commissions a contractor to develop products using 
the contractor’s proprietary software product line.  This strategy involves acquiring 
products directly from a contractor that has an existing product line. An example is 
the Textron Overwatch Intelligence Center (OIC) product line (Jensen, 2009). 
Acquisition Strategy 2: A PM commissions a government organization to develop a 
software product line. This strategy involves acquiring a government-owned product 
line (production capability and products) using the in-house capabilities8 of a 
designated government acquisition organization. An example is the Army’s 
Advanced Multiplex Test System (AMTS) (Cohen & Capolongo, 2007). 
Acquisition Strategy 3: A PM commissions a contractor to develop a government-
owned software product line. This strategy involves acquiring a government-owned 
product line (production capability and products) from a contractor. An example is the 
Live, Virtual, Constructive Integrating Architecture (LVC-IA) product line of the 
Army’s PEO STRI (Bergey et al., 2009). 
The difficulty in executing these different strategies varies significantly since they 
require different levels of management sophistication and technical skills on the part of the 
                                                





acquisition organization. Related considerations include the data rights to product line 
artifacts, and the risk of a supplier going out of business. Of the three approaches 
presented, the most challenging is Acquisition Strategy 3; the outcome is more 
unpredictable, thus making the risk to the government greater. 
Some of the most successful product line efforts reported to date in government 
acquisitions were based on Strategy 1 (Brownsword & Clements, 1996; Jensen, 2007) and 
Strategy 2 (Cohen, Dunn & Soule, 2002; and Cohen & Capolongo, 2007). Strategy 3 offers 
potentially huge rewards but is the most challenging to execute. However, several success 
stories have been reported (Bergey et al., 2009; Bergey, Cohen, Donohoe & Jones, 2010). 
Contractual Tasks for a Software Product Line Acquisition 
At a high level, a software product line acquisition 
(  
) consists of three contractual tasks that a developer must perform. These tasks are 
1. the development of a product line production capability 
25. the development of a family of software products using that production 
capability 





Figure 2. Three Major Contractual Tasks for a Software Product Line 
Acquisition 
A product line production capability includes the product line core assets, a 
production plan to specify how to build products from the core assets (Chastek & McGregor, 
2002), and the infrastructure to support the production operation. A software development 
plan, a traditional contractual deliverable, can be used to describe and govern the 
development of the product line production capability. Product developers then use the 
production capability to develop specific products within the product line. A product line 
adoption plan describes the approach for initiating the product line, and a product line 
concept of operations describes the approach for managing and operating the product line.  
To operationalize these tasks we must assign specific responsibilities to specific organizational 
units. To help do this, it is useful to consider an enterprise view of the acquisition, described in 
the next section.  
An Enterprise View for Software Product Line Acquisition  
An enterprise view helps to frame the various aspects of a product line initiative. 
Such a view can help clarify important questions such as:  
 How will the effort be organized?   
 What will be the roles and responsibilities of the different organizational units? 
 What deliverables will be produced?  And what groups will be responsible for 
them?   
 How will product line practices, such as product line requirements engineering, 
be implemented from an enterprise perspective? 
Error! Reference source not found. shows an example of an enterprise view that 
corresponds to Acquisition Strategy 3 (described in Section 0). This example captures the 
essence of the major product line activities in an acquisition context and helps ensure that 





Figure 3. Sample Enterprise View of a Product Line Acquisition 
The two primary organizational elements are the parent government organization, 
which is responsible for acquiring the product line, and the prime contractor’s organization, 
which is responsible for implementing and sustaining the product line.  
The subdivision of the prime contractor's product line organization into a 
management team, a core asset team, a product development team, and an operations 
team is just one example of how a developer organization might implement a product line 
approach. In this configuration, the management team, core asset team, and operations 
team are the organizational elements that are responsible for establishing the production 
capability that the product development teams will use.  
The view in Error! Reference source not found. may be expanded to depict details 
of product development (Figure 4). This view shows how a product development team would 
interface with the other teams and use the product line production capability to develop 
products. Each product is an example of strategic reuse of the product line’s core assets. 
This view identifies the contract deliverables that a product development team would 
produce. Since acquisition organizations have a penchant for thinking in terms of contractual 
deliverables, this view facilitates an understanding of how a product line functions and of the 
roles and responsibilities of the various teams.  
Accordingly, this example shows that the product development team is initially 
responsible for producing a product specification. Following this, the team must develop any 
unique software components that are not part of the core assets and create a production 
plan for building the specific product that will satisfy the product specification. Another key 
deliverable is a product test plan that would draw on the existing testing artifacts that are 
also part of the core assets. Of course, this assumes the product team will be responsible 








Figure 4. A View of a Product Development Team Using the Product Line Production 
Capability 
Apart from the product itself, the major deliverable item is the production plan.  It 
includes the process to be used for building a product from the core assets and lays out the 
project details to enable execution and management of the process (e.g., by including such 
details as the schedule, bill of materials, and metrics).  
The importance of carefully specifying all deliverables cannot be overstated. The 
government needs to be proactive in specifying the required deliverables in the 
RFP/contract or the acquisition will be problematic.  
A Customer View of Software Product Line Acquisition  
Error! Reference source not found. depicts a product line acquisition from a 
customer perspective and shows the customer’s interaction with the product line 
operations. While there are several potential customer views, this one depicts the 
simplest case where the program office is also the customer. The program office is 
the customer when the product being developed is for a system under the jurisdiction of 






Figure 5. Simplest Case of Customer Interaction with Product Line 
Developer 
While the program office is ultimately responsible for the product and its targeted 
system, a system prime contractor (under contract to the program office) is the agent that is 
actually responsible for developing and sustaining the target system. This situation 
corresponds to the relationship depicted in Error! Reference source not found. between 
the parent organization and the expanded customer environment. In this context, the arrows 
shown in Error! Reference source not found. depict a scenario that leads to delivering a 
new product (in the product line family) to the customer. The corresponding sequence of 
events in this scenario is described below: 
1. The program office analyzes and specifies the new product requirements (in 
conjunction with its acquisition organization and the contractor responsible for 
the target system). 
27. The program office tasks the product line contractor with developing a 
new product (in accordance with the negotiated product 
requirements). 
28. The product line contractor develops the new product and delivers it 
to the program office. 
29. The program office (in conjunction with its acquisition organization), in 
turn, supplies the product as a government furnished item (GFI) to the 




30. The target system contractor appropriately integrates the product into 
the target system. 
31. The program office or its acquisition organization appropriately 
brokers any problems that arise in deploying the product with the 
product line contractor and the target system contractor. 
An interesting aspect is that if the product line developer were a government 
organization (e.g., an Army Software Engineering Center (SEC)) instead of a system prime 
contractor, it would give the program office more flexibility, since the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) considerations wouldn’t come into play. Contractors would still play be a 
significant role, however, because SEC’s typically contract with many suppliers to acquire 
needed skills, expertise, and resources. Such a situation would correspond to Acquisition 
Strategy 2. Even though this arrangement simplifies things, the enterprise view is still useful 
for clarifying the concepts.  
The ideas here can be extended to the more complicated situation, where the 
customer is not the program office that is responsible for the product line, but is rather a 
different program office that has jurisdiction over other target systems. Exploring that type of 
engagement can be important because it represents the vision of many product line 
advocates. 
Future Considerations 
Among future activities the SEI is pursuing to promote product line acquisitions and 
make them more effective and commonplace in the DoD are  
 providing sample acquisition strategies (e.g., involving a competitive down select) 
that an acquisition organization can use via appropriate tailoring  
 creating a comprehensive work breakdown structure (WBS) for use as a 
management tool to govern a product line initiative  
 creating an acquisition timeline with deliverables and specifying a series of 
contractual events for technically monitoring and evaluating a product line effort  
 creating sample SOW contract language for a acquiring a software product line 
 creating a sample contract data requirements list (CDRL) and data item 
descriptions (DIDs) for key software product line deliverables  
Conclusion 
Developing a suitable acquisition strategy is a key element for any DoD program that 
is considering adopting a product line approach. Moreover, a proactive acquisition approach 
greatly enhances the likelihood that a DoD product line initiative will succeed. In a reactive 
approach, an acquisition organization may not have an effective contractual means for 
managing the product line and performing its technical oversight and contract monitoring 
responsibilities.  
If a program office is going to commission a contractor or government organization to 
develop a product line, the acquisition organization needs to specify the SOW tasks 
carefully to ensure product line aspects are appropriately covered and key deliverables are 
included. Creating a product line-specific WBS and a product line concept of operations 




An enterprise view provides an apt basis for describing a product line initiative from 
an acquisition perspective. This enables stakeholders to have greater insight and 
understanding of what a product line acquisition actually entails; it is useful for  
 determining the division of responsibilities between the program office, 
acquisition organization, and development organization 
 understanding stakeholder interactions and interdependencies and assigning 
specific roles and responsibilities 
 understanding the “contracting realities” of different candidate approaches that 
are typically glossed over and become problematic downstream unless they are 
addressed up front  
 stimulating discussion, analyzing different “acquisition threads,” and answering 
pertinent questions such as 
– How is the product line effort being organized and managed?  
– How do requirements flow from the customer to the core asset team?  
– How does an external developer use the core assets to develop a 
product? 
– What is the information flow for sustaining products that are in the 
field? 
Experience has shown that if a program office is interested in adopting a product line 
approach, a good starting point is to conduct an acquisition-planning workshop with 
stakeholders early in the program-planning phase. 
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Abstract 
In 1986, the military establishment underwent the most sweeping package of 
defense reforms to be enacted in almost 40 years, starting with the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act.  Related reforms followed shortly thereafter, 
including those contained in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, reflecting many 
of the recommendations of the Packard Commission. In the two decades following 
enactment of this legislation, the military establishment has taken numerous steps to 




concerned about the effect of some of these reforms, perceiving a growing divide between a 
military-run requirements process and a civilian-run acquisition process that they regard 
inimical to the efficient and effective support of military forces. 
This study describes analysis done, conclusions drawn and recommendations made 
to the Department of the Navy (DoN) regarding the closer integration of the interests of the 
Chief of Naval Operation (CNO), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), and the Navy acquisition community writ large 
to increase material capabilities and readiness at reduced costs. The effort was pursued 
through an assessment of the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in the 
Department of the Navy and related acquisition reforms. It also includes a comparison of the 
DoN with that of the Air Force and Army. 
Summary 
The House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform: 
Findings & Recommendations, dated March 23, 2010, made the following recommendation 
in its review of DoD acquisition: The Department and Congress should review and clarify the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to 
allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisition 
processes and to encourage enhanced military service chief participation in contract quality 
assurance. 
The Panel is concerned that the divide established in the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
between acquisition and the military service chiefs has become so wide that it hinders both 
the acquisition and requirements process. While the fundamental construct in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly assigned lead responsibility for acquisition to the 
Department’s civilian leaders, the act should be clarified to ensure that the requirements 
process that must coordinate with all categories of the defense acquisition system freely 
interacts with the acquisition process.  The service chiefs should also be given greater 
authority and responsibility to oversee contract quality assurance especially for contracts 
that are highly operational in nature. 
The report addresses how the Department of the Navy approached and later 
instituted the Goldwater-Nichols Act in it Acquisition functions. The hallmark of that was to 
create and increase the divide between those who developed the Departments’ 
requirements and those who went on to procure them.  Starting with the change in the 
officer core that separated officers of the line with acquisition officer and ending with the 
Department’s “Gate" System, the Department has clearly developed parallel processes that 
are marked by division, discord and a lack of cooperation. The military side, building 
requirements, and the civilian side, buying the requirements rarely induced each other’s 
point of view in their internal processes.  As a result, requirements are sometimes 
overstated and unexecutable and the procurements process simply builds upon what is 
directed in the requirements process.  The acquisition boards and committees that make 
decisions are managed by the acquisition executives while the military requirements 
personnel attend at lower levels than flag rank. 
This paper discusses how the Department achieved that position over the years, 
addresses how the Army and Air Force instituted Goldwater-Nichols differently and makes 





The debate over the appropriate roles of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and of 
the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in the material management process stretches back to 
the Civil War era.9 The essence of the debate is the role of uniformed leadership (i.e., the 
CNO) compared with that of the civilian leadership (i.e., the SECNAV) in determining what 
warfighting capabilities are required, what systems will be procured to provide these 
capabilities, how these systems will be supported when introduced into the fleet, and how 
these systems will be funded. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act (US Congress, 1986) weighed in on these roles as a key element in its 
overall reform of defense organization and processes, giving responsibility for defense 
acquisitions to civilian secretaries while strengthening joint uniformed oversight over the 
requirements process.  
In the two decades following enactment of this momentous legislation, the military 
services have taken numerous steps to implement its provisions and to respond to related 
acquisition reforms. However, some senior Navy officials have grown increasingly 
concerned about the unintended consequences of these reforms, perceiving a growing 
divide between a military-run requirements process and a civilian-run acquisition process.  
Objectives and Approaches 
RAND examined (1) the policy issues that drove the passage of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and related acquisition reforms and (2) the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) 
implementation of these reforms, particularly with regard to their influence on military and 
civilian roles in the Navy’s acquisition process.  It describes the context in which the 
acquisition reform occurred and the effects of that reform on acquisition processes, focusing 
largely on the Department of the Navy. Drawing on a series of interviews with several 
officials who were present when the legislation was implemented, it argues that the effect 
was to focus the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations on requirements issues and to 
divorce him from the acquisition process in a way that has been detrimental to the effective 
and efficient acquisition of materiel for the Department of the Navy. It further argues that this 
separation went beyond what the legislation required and that there needs to be closer 
integration of the interests of the Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) with the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) and the 
Navy acquisition community to increase material capabilities and readiness at reduced 
costs.  
The authors note that this paper deals with more than the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation and considers several other influences such as the troubled history of the armed 
forces in coordinating joint operations and influential commissions such as the Packard 
Commission. These other influences all coalesced in the mid-1980s and created an 
environment—a perfect storm—that both made the passage of Goldwater-Nichols possible 
and colored its implementation. In essence, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation stands as a 
proxy for these other influences. 
To understand the policy issues behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act and related 
acquisition reforms, RAND reviewed literature on the political and economic environment 
                                                




leading up to these initiatives as well as analyses of Defense acquisition problems.10 To 
understand how the DoN implemented acquisition reforms and the effect of this 
implementation, Navy implementation guidance was reviewed (such as SECNAV Instruction 
5400.15C) as well as DoD guidance (DoD 5000.2), and both former and current DoN 
officials were interviewed, including officials outside of the DoN deeply involved in 
implementing Goldwater-Nichols and related reforms, including the following individuals: two 
Secretaries of the Navy, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy/Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), Chief of Naval Operations, a Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations/Logistics, a Navy General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel, a Vice 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, two Undersecretaries for Defense/Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), Systems Commanders (NAVAIR and NAVSEA), Program 
Executive Officers (Ships, Tactical Air, and Submarines), and Program Managers.  
RAND also interviewed former US Army and US Air Force senior uniformed and 
civilian officials to compare their implementation of Goldwater-Nichols in those services and 
the effect of other reform influences with that of the DoN’s. A synthesis of their views are 
captured and presented. 
There is an inherent limitation in this approach: in terms of sheer numbers, as not 
very many people were interviewed, and those interviewed provided their recollections of 
events that happened more than 20 years ago. That said, those that were interviewed were 
key players during the implementation and are reporting first-hand experiences. Also, 
because they were interviewed them separately, the authors were able to crosscheck one 
account with another. Furthermore, much of our discussion with them revolved around the 
effect of that implementation, and those interviewed are uniquely qualified to analyze the 
effect of the legislation on the processes and the implications of the divide between the 
requirements and the acquisition processes. 
The Context of Goldwater-Nichols 
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated in 1986—the result of 
operational, organizational and fiscal pressures that had been building for a number of years 
and, indeed, continued after the act was passed. These pre- and post-enactment events are 
important because they provide the context in which legislation was passed and 
implemented in the Department of Defense and the military services. This chapter briefly 
describes these forces and their significance in the crafting, passage, and implementation of 
the legislation. 
Timeline 
Figure 1 portrays the timeline of events that occurred before, during, and after the 
passage of Goldwater-Nichols. The timeline underscores several points. First, the forces 
that eventually called Goldwater-Nichols into being began decades before the act was 
passed. Second, these forces manifested themselves in quite different venues: operational 
performance of US military forces, the performance of the system that governed the 
acquisition of military weapons and weapons systems, and the behavior and practices of 
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Report (2006), and assessments conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and 




those who operated in that system. Third, a remarkable number of important events 
occurred in a five-year period, 1985-1990, that built an almost unstoppable momentum to 
ensure that long-standing issues would finally be dealt with in a systematic way. In this case, 
the effect of the whole far exceeded that of the parts. The sections below briefly describe the 





























Figure 6. Events Contributing to the Context of Goldwater Nichols 
The Context in Summary 
The operational problems of the US military impelled Congress to change how the 
services selected personnel for assignment to joint duty and to change the entire military 
command structure. Poor acquisition outcomes and instances of fraud hardened 
congressional resolve to take steps in that arena as well. No single event necessarily led to 
the creation and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, the combination of them, 
especially the ones that occurred in close succession in the latter half of the 1980s, 
contributed to the construction and passage of various legislation, the internal approaches 
regulation and to implementing that legislation and, subsequently, to the continuing resolve 
to ensure continual implementation of these various legislative provisions and regulations 
even in the face of emerging, unforeseen consequences. The next chapter describes how 
military acquisition was done before and after Goldwater-Nichols to provide a way to assess 
the nature of scope of the changes that legislation directed. 
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The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1987 
This chapter briefly describes the main players in the enactment of Goldwater-
Nichols and the key provisions of the act.  It also discusses the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1987. 
Key Players 
In 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Samuel Nunn brought many of the issues 
described in Chapter 2 to the attention of the Congress in a series of energetic floor 
speeches designed to garner political support for reform. An interesting and important 
perspective on staff roles was articulated in views expressed by Senator Goldwater. Nunn 
and Goldwater were joined in their efforts by Representative William F. Nichols in the House 
of Representatives. In Senate floor speeches, Senator Goldwater addressed what he 
perceived as the misguided financial focus of the military: “Our professional officer corps 
frequently behaves more like business managers than warriors.”  He also expounded on the 
issue of the civilian control in the military establishment: “[A] major problem created by the 
functional structure of OSD is that it encourages micromanagement of Service programs . . . 
it has the tendency to get over-involved in details that could be better managed by the 
Services.”  Two major points reflective of earlier reports on military operations were the 
following: 
 First, there was the lack of true unity of command, and second, there was 
inadequate cooperation among US military services when called upon to perform 
joint operations (Anno & Einspahr, 1988).  
 The preferred advice [from the Joint staff] is generally irrelevant, normally unread 
and almost always disregarded (US Congress, 1986). 
Senator Nunn expanded on the issue of structural alignment: “The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense is focused exclusively on functional areas, such as manpower, 
research and development, and installations and logistics. This functional structure serves to 
inhibit integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, and thereby, hinders achieving 
DoD’s principal organization goal of mission integration” (“Defense Organization,” 1985).  
Key Provisions of Goldwater-Nichols 
The two Senators led the effort to draft the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was signed 
into law in 1986; it made major changes in four broad areas: the chain of command and 
provision of military advice to the civilian leadership, the interaction of the military services, 
the personnel management of officers, and the acquisition of military equipment. The bill 
passed with wide bipartisan support, passing the House of Representatives, 383-27, and the 
Senate, 95-0. It was signed into law by President Reagan on October 1, 1986 (Goldwater-
Nichols Act, 2010).  
Each of the several key aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed below had 
important ramifications for the DoD writ large, but their implementation in the DoN had 
consequences not fully understood at the time and as are more fully discussed in Chapter 5, 





The Chain of Command and Provision of Military Advice to the Civilian 
Leadership 
In a key provision, military advice to civilian authority was streamlined and 
centralized in the person of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who became 
the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the 
Secretary of Defense. Previously, the chiefs of the individual services performed many of 
these roles. The CNO, for example, was the advisor to the President for naval matters. 
Further, the act established the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, and increased the 
ability of the Chairman to direct overall strategy, while providing greater command authority 
to "unified" and "specified" field commanders.12  
Interaction of the Military Services  
The act also effected a sea change in service interactions by diminishing the role of 
the service chiefs and restricting the military services’ operational control over forces, 
emphasizing their responsibility to support the Military Department secretaries in their Title 
10 vote to "organize, train and equip" military forces for use by the combatant commanders. 
The services became “force providers” to the unified commanders (called the CINCs for 
Commanders in Chief). Their mission was to provide suitably trained and equipped forces to 
the CINC, which he requested through the Joint Staff. The CINC could be from any service, 
but he had authority to request assets from any service through the joint system (Nardulli, 
Perry, Pirnie, Gordon, & McGinn, 2002).13  
These first two unraveled relationships, at least within the DoN, had developed and 
evolved for over 50 years. That is not to say that change is impermissible, but in this case, 
there was no clear sense of the nature of the new role to be played by the Service Chief; it 
was rather a product of what he wasn’t to do. 
The latter two went to the heart of the opportunity for operational personnel (officers 
of the line) to participate in acquisition matters and frankly, even if they desired to play a 
role. In Chapter 5, RAND will address the cultural manifestations of these changes. 
Personnel Management of Officers 
Another significant but more subtle change was the direction that an officer could not 
receive promotion to flag rank without having had a joint duty assignment.14  Underlying this 
requirement was the perception on the part of lawmakers that the services were reluctant to 
send their best officers to joint duty assignments, preferring to keep them in their own ranks. 
Indeed, a joint duty assignment was perceived by many as a backwater and an indication 
that an individual’s military career was not progressing well. Officers resisted going to such 
                                                
12 Unified commanders had geographical responsibilities, e.g., the Pacific area. Specified 
commanders had functional responsibilities, e.g., Strategic Air Command. 
13 CINC (now COCOM) requests go to the Joint Staff, which then coordinates the delivery of 
requested assets with the relevant service. Requests are not automatically approved, as the case of 
CINCEUCOM’s request for Apache helicopters during the military operations in Kosovo during the 
effort to topple Serbia’s Milosovic illustrate. All four services did not concur with the request, which 
was ultimately approved by the Secretary of Defense.  
14 Flag rank refers to generals in the Army, Air Force or Marine Corps or admirals in the Navy, so 
called because those achieving that rank are authorized a flag with the number of stars on it denoting 




assignments and, if assigned to a joint billet, tried to leave them as soon as they could. 
Stipulating that promotion to flag rank could not occur without a joint duty assignment 
ensured that the services would be willing to assign their best officers to such billets. 
Acquisition of Military Equipment 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act also specifically addressed acquisition issues, giving sole 
responsibility for acquisition (as part of the assignment of several “functional” areas of 
responsibility) to the Secretary of each military department. For example, as it pertained to 
the DoN, Section 1045 stated: 
(C) (1) The Office of the Secretary of the Navy shall have sole responsibility within 
the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
and the Headquarters, Marine Corps, for the following functions: (A) Acquisition; (B) 
Auditing; (C) Comptroller (including financial management); (D) Information 
management; (E) Inspector General; (F) Legislative affairs; (G) Public affairs. (US 
Congress, 1986, 100 Stat. 1045) 
As noted in this chapter, many of these functional responsibilities were already being 
performed by elements of the DoN Secretariat, unlike the situation in the other military 
departments. The word “sole” was to contribute to some interpretation of what was meant by 
the change. The act further stipulated that the Secretary designate a single organization 
within the Secretary’s office—that is, a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)— to manage the 
function of acquisition.  
It is noteworthy that even after the legislative changes had been passed, Senator 
Nunn continued to debate the balance of service and civilian command and control. 
Relevant to the goal of this project in investigating the role of the Chief of Naval Operations 
is Senator Nunn’s concern over barriers between the Military Department Secretary and 
Service Chief:   
Another area that was of concern is in the consolidation of the military and civilian 
staffs in the military departments. The conference agreed to consolidate several 
functions, such as acquisition, comptroller, inspector general, and legislative liaison, 
under the Secretaries of the military departments and directed that the service chiefs 
not set up competing bureaucracies within their staffs. In the conference, I was 
concerned that we not create an impenetrable wall between the staffs of the Service 
Secretary and the Service Chief. (“Defense Organization,” 1985)  
National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 (US Congress, 1987) attempted to 
fill several policy concerns not addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. For example, it 
addressed the problem of the excessive number of briefings program managers were 
required to give to get program approval, decreasing them to two: one to the Program 
Executive Officer and one to either of the DoD or Service Acquisition Executive (depending 
upon the acquisition approval threshold of the program). It also addressed the need for a 
streamlined reporting chain from PMs to PEOs to the Senior Acquisition Executive. These 
and other provisions both in this act and in legislation enacted in succeeding years—the 
latest being the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)—give people proof that 
we are proceeding in a piece-meal fashion, patching together solutions episodically to 





Acquisition Before and After Goldwater-Nichols 
The primary focus of this paper falls on the Navy. However,  changes that occurred 
in the Army and Air Force are evaluated as well because, in some instances, they 
responded to the legislation in ways that differed from the Navy (for purposes discussion of 
the Marine Corps, it falls under the DoN regulations applicable for the Navy), and those 
differences are illuminating.  We first briefly viewed of the processes at the DoD level, and 
then follow with discussions about the Navy, Army and Air Force. In each of the latter cases, 
the discussion is guided by the change in service acquisition regulations, which is 
summarized in tabular form for each service.  
OSD 
Before the implementation of late 1980s acquisition reforms and the subsequent 
streamlining that resulted, each military department had an acquisition organization that 
included more stakeholders and more steps in the process. The DoD individual with 
responsibility for most functions that currently reside with the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) was the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering. Before 1986, the Secretary of Defense had overall responsibility 
for DoD Acquisitions. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
presided over milestone decisions (DoDD 5000.1, 1986) similar to those that the current 
“Defense Acquisition Executive” or DAE is responsible for. Following the Goldwater-Nichols 
reforms, the most significant changes for the DoD-level acquisition were that many of the 
Secretary of Defense’s acquisition decision authorities were delegated to the USD for 
Acquisitions (USD(A)) and the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 
now reported to the office of USD(A).  Specifically, the USD(A) was designated as the 
Defense Acquisition Executive. This position is “the principal advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense on all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense Acquisition System” (DoDD 
5000.1, 1987). Before the Deputy Secretary and various under secretaries (Research and 
Engineering, Policy), assistant secretaries (Acquisition and Logistics, Force Management 
and Personnel, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, and Comptroller), 
and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation were responsible for different aspects of 
the acquisition process. In response to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, DoDD 5000.1 
(1987) also restricted the number of “management tiers” between the program manager 
(PM) and the DAE. These management tiers were designated as the Program Executive 
Officer (PEO) and the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE).  
The Navy 
Navy History and Culture 
Each service has its own history and culture, and these profoundly influence how the 
services operate. In the case of the Navy, one of the signal differences appears in the titles 
of the chiefs of service. Both the Army and the Air Force are headed by an individual 
designated as the Chief of Staff, which implies an individual who oversees the workings of a 
staff and is himself a staff officer. The head of the Navy, however, is designated the Chief of 
Naval Operations, which implies an individual with operational command, and, indeed, this 
aspect of the CNO’s office is deeply embedded in Navy history and practice. Of these three 
service chiefs, only the CNO held a position in which he was both heavily involved in service 




ultimately served as the principal advisor to the President on such matters. The point is that 
the CNO historically focused on operational matters. 
Up until 1966, the Navy was often informally referred to as “bi-linear,” reflecting the 
fact that the CNO focused on the operational issues of the Navy with the Secretary of the 
Navy wholly responsible for the materiel component, including research and acquisition 
elements. The tension between the military and civilian leadership of the Department of the 
Navy over materiel matters was longstanding, and historically CNOs had pushed for a 
greater role in acquisition matters, to include lobbying the President.15  Organizationally, the 
chiefs of the Navy’s materiel bureaus reported to the Secretary of the Navy for all materiel 
matters. In 1966, the Secretary established the Navy Materiel Command (NMC), which was 
commanded by a senior admiral with extensive operational experience and who reported 
also to the CNO. This was a major change (one of the tectonic shifts alluded to above), 
because it placed the CNO directly in the line of materiel—including acquisition—issues. 
What was bi-linear had become uni-linear in that now both the CNO and the Secretary of the 
Navy had direct roles in the oversight of those organizations pursuing acquisition matters.16 
Before the Storm 
Acquisition before the passage of Goldwater-Nichols was governed by SECNAV 
Instruction 4200.29A, dated May 24, 1985, and entitled Procurement Executives. The 
wording in that instruction made the Secretary of the Navy the de facto “acquisition 
executive” referred to in subsequent legislation and regulation. It recognized his decision 
authority for acquisition matters pertaining to the Navy. The instruction designated the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN (S&L)) as the senior 
procurement executive and held him responsible for the performance of systems and for 
managing the career acquisition workforce. He was designated as the focal point for 
procurement and the logistical systems necessary to support the systems the Navy 
procured. 
The instruction directed the CNO to support the ASN (S&L) in carrying out his duties. 
During this period, the three major warfare branches of the Navy—air, surface, and 
submarine—were each represented by a three-star admiral on the OPNAV staff who had 
direct contact with the systems commanders for material in their warfare area. Each had 
program officers who maintained liaison with the program managers reporting to the system 
commanders.  
The CNO played directly in the procurement process in multiple ways. His most 
direct role was reviewing all programs going to the Secretary of the Navy for decision. The 
mechanism for this review was the CNO’s Executive Board (CEB, pronounced “KEB”), on 
which the Vice Chief Naval Office also sat. But, as is discussed below, the system 
                                                
15 In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated March 2, 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt, 
himself a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, said: 
In my judgment he [the President] would too greatly delegate this power [control of Naval 
Administration] if he delegated to the Chief of Naval Operations the duty of issuing direct 
orders to the bureaus and offices. . . . By this, I mean that the Chief of Naval Operations 
should coordinate to [sic] all repairs and alterations to vessels, etc., by retaining constant and 
frequent touch with the heads of bureaus and offices. But at the same time, the orders to 
Bureaus and offices should come from the Secretary of the Navy. 
16 The CNO always had influence in this area by virtue of his control over promotions and 




commanders also reported to him through the CEB, giving the CNO another opportunity to 
engage in materiel management.  
While the Systems Commanders reported directly to the four-star commander of the 
NMC, they also had reporting responsibilities to the CNO and two ASNs (S&L and RE&S) in 
their areas of responsibility, while coordinating matters through the NMC. The three warfare 
branch vice admirals on the CNO’s staff identified above did the planning and programming 
for their individual warfare area systems and coordinated with the NMC and the Systems 
Commands. Programming reviews were carried out through a CNO chartered board. The 
program managers reported to the Systems Commanders through their functional flag 







































Figure 7. Navy Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols  
Although not codified in Navy instructions until later, in 1985, the Secretary of the 
Navy abolished the NMC, which was another of the tectonic shifts that occurred in Navy 
acquisition. The Chief of the Naval Material Command was a four-star officer of the line who 
brought senior level credibility to the materiel establishment and buffered the materiel 
community when needed. The disestablishment of the NMC eliminated this buffer and 
started the erosion of the operational credentials of the materiel community that occurred 
over time and the bona fides of decisions proposed by them. It has been argued that this 
very ability to argue for differing perspectives was also the proximate cause for the 
disestablishment of the NMC as was the fact that the NMC comprised another management 
layer, slowed the decision process, and ran counter to the views expressed by the Packard 
Commission on lines of authority. 
Acquisition in the Aftermath of the Storm  
The DoN implemented Goldwater-Nichols in two steps. First, it designated the 
Secretary of the Navy as Acquisition Executive. Second, it attempted to use as many of the 
existing processes as possible to accomplish the act’s intent. Both steps drew fire from the 
Comptroller General (Conahan, 1989). The DoN’s implementing instruction did incorporate 
language from the Goldwater-Nichols Act regarding establishment of a single organization 




instruction stated that the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps “will execute their 
responsibilities through the resource allocation process and their input to the acquisition 
decision-making process.”     
Implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act imposed important changes on the Navy’s 
acquisition process. In the view of a former Secretary of the Navy, the law simply allowed 
too much latitude in implementation. For example, a former General Counsel for the Navy 
and a former ASN RDA interpreted the provision that assigned authority for the acquisition 
process to the service secretaries as entirely excluding the service chiefs from the 
acquisition process. However, the first CNO to operate under the new provision said that he 
had been unclear about his role in the acquisition process. He added that he had been 
advised not to get involved in acquisition decision-making, but felt that he had to, and had 
ignored the advice because he was being held “accountable” by the Congress for 
acquisition failures, such as the A-12 aircraft program.17   
Different interpretations are also reflected in the different forms that implementation 
took among the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Each of the military departments implemented 
the law differently and all came under fire from the Comptroller General for various reasons. 
The common theme of these attacks was that each service had PEOs (Program Executive 
Officers) reporting to the applicable military Systems Command structure. Following the 
GAO report, each severed the PEO structure from the Systems Commands.18 
Following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Navy issued a new instruction, 
5430.96, dated August 4, 1987 (and a companion instruction dated August 5, 1987). The 
instruction designated the Secretary of the Navy as acquisition executive for the Navy. Thus, 
he held not only program decision authority, but, as Acquisition Executive, he was also 
responsible for the acquisition process. In support of the Secretary in that role, the ASN 
(S&L) reported directly to him for acquisition matters. The ASN (S&L) was charged with 
responsibility for supplying, equipping, servicing, maintaining the Navy’s equipment. He had 
responsibility for acquisition production and support for the Navy and the Marine Corps and 
to “provide such staff support as the CNO and [the Commandant] each consider necessary.” 
The second instruction, 5430.95 and dated one day after 5430.96, pertained to the ASN 
(R,E&S). He was responsible for all DoN acquisition except shipbuilding and conversion. He 
also had responsibility for matters related to research and development. In this role, the 
Chief of Naval Research reported to him. These instructions also codified the elimination of 
the Naval Materiel Command. 
The most significant change occurred in the role of the CNO. The new instruction 
divested him of acquisition responsibilities. Rather, 5430.96 charged him with supplying, 
servicing, maintaining, outfitting and logistic functions. And 5430.95 directed him to 
formalize and prioritize requirements, conduct test and evaluation, prioritize research, 
development, test and evaluation, and directed him to provide advice and support to the 
Secretary. Thus, he became responsible for determining what equipment the Navy needed 
but not acquiring it. That function was now located wholly in the Secretariat.  
                                                
17 The CNO had to deal with the consequences of the unraveling of the A-12 program. In our 
interview with him, he expressed the view that Congress was demanding answers from him on a 
range of issues with regard to the A-12 replacement program, the F-18 E/F and that given what had 
occurred in the A-12, he had to be aware and involved in aspects of program decision-making, both 
to represent Navy interests and concerns before Congress and to be able to defend Navy resources. 
18 The Army and the Air Force later gained permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 




Under the provisions of 5430.96, the Systems Commanders now reported to the 
DoN Acquisition Executive for all PEO matters under the direction of the ASN (S&L). 
Similarly, the PEOs also reported to the ASN (S&L).  
Figure 3 depicts these changes. The bar and circle symbol indicates eliminations, in 
this case the Naval Materiel Command and the dotted line between the systems command 
and the CEB, which still existed but had lost any approval authority. Note also that the PEOs 
no longer report to the System Commanders. They now report directly to the AE, the 









































Figure 8. Navy Acquisition in 1987 
Passage of Goldwater-Nichols did not lay to rest all acquisition issues nor were all 
applicable organizational and process changes implemented immediately. As indicated 
above, John Lehman, who was Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, designated 
himself as the Acquisition Executive. In the view of the Secretary of Defense, that did not 
accord with the intent of the legislation, and the Secretary and his Deputy pressed the DoN 
to designate an individual Assistant Secretary as the Acquisition Executive, eventually 
directing the DoN to make that change. An August 1991 instruction (5400.15), codified the 
Secretary of Defense’s direction, providing that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN RD&A) had the full-time role in development 
and procurement of systems, ensuring that operational requirements were transformed into 
executable processes. This change was another major shift in the Navy’s acquisition 
processes 
The 1991 instruction underscored the CNO’s role in determining requirements and 
establishing a relative priority among them. It also indicated that he might be assigned 
responsibility for research and development matters and for operational test and evaluation, 
but it was clear that he could not assign himself a role in those areas. This instruction also 
codified the elimination of the “warfare branch admirals,” and their relationships with the 
material establishment of the Department. 
The instruction charged the systems commanders with the management of programs 




PEOs. For their part, the PEOs were directed to report to the ASN (RD&A), and the 
instruction directed program managers to report to the PEOs. The reporting line from the 
PEOs now runs directly to the newly named ASN (RD&A) rather than to the Secretary of the 
Navy. The Secretary retains his approval powers, but not the direct management of the 
process, for those decisions he is empowered to make.19  Figure 4 shows this continuing 
evolution of the Navy acquisition procedures. Key changes shown in the figure include both 
the changes shown in Figure 3 (elimination of Navy Materiel Command, the reduced role of 
the CEB, and the formal designation of the Secretary of the Navy as the AE) as well as 
some additional ones. A key one is that the AE is now the ASN (RD&A), and the PEOs 
report to him rather than to the Secretary. The position of the ASN (S&L) has been 
eliminated, as have the warfare branch admirals on the CNO’s staff (again, shown by the 
bar and circle symbol). The chain of acquisition approval flows directly to the ASA (RD&A) 












































Figure 9. Subsequent Changes to Navy Acquisition Procedures 
Three instructions were published subsequent to 5400.15 in 1991: 5400.15A in 
1995, 5400.15B in 2005, and 5400.15C in 2007. None changed the major responsibilities of 
the Secretary, the CNO or the Acquisition Executive, although they elaborated on some of 
the functions. For example, 5400.15B designated the CNO as the principal advisor to the 
Secretary in the allocation of resources to meet programming and budget processes. In 
essence, the instruction conferred on the CNO the responsibility to advise the Secretary on 
what programmatic priorities to assign to the requirements, the development of which was 
his primary responsibility. He still stood outside the procurement process. Instruction 
5400.15C charged the CNO to analyze alternatives in conjunction with the ASN (RD&A) 
before the development phase of a weapon system. 
                                                
19 Decisions about programs that cross certain thresholds in terms of dollars for research and 
development and procurement must be made at the Department of Defense level. These are referred 
to as ACAT 1 decisions. 
20 For a relatively few years, the Undersecretary of the Navy was designated as the AE, but the duties 




Instructions after 1991 also elaborated on the responsibility of the Systems 
Commanders and the PEOs. For example, 5400.15A stipulated that the Systems 
Commanders would exercise the authority of the Acquisition Executive to supervise 
acquisition programs directly and, notably, reporting to the CNO for execution of programs 
that were not development or acquisition projects. Thus, the wall between the CNO and the 
procurement process remained intact. PEOs were authorized to act for and exercise the 
authority of the Acquisition Executive with respect to their assigned programs and maintain 
oversight of the cost and schedule performance.  
Summary of Key Changes in Navy Acquisition 
The process of acquiring Navy equipment changed dramatically between 1966 and 
1991. Some changes were more gradual than others. The creation of the “uni-linear” Navy 
took decades, and crystallized with the establishment of Navy Materiel Command in 1966. 
Its subsequent dissolution in 1985 marked an equally significant shift. However, most key 
changes occurred as part of the perfect storm of events that centered on the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation. While the effects of that legislation rippled beyond the procurement 
process and within the process itself, the most critical ones were the roles defined for the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries, and the CNO. The effect on the CNO was, 
arguably, the greatest, since the result was his defined exclusion from the procurement 
process. The Secretary retained his approval power but was forced to delegate 
responsibility for the process to one of his Assistant Secretaries and subordinate elements 
of the Systems Commands. The ASN (RD&A) assumed responsibilities previously carried 
out by the Secretary, even though, as one of the Secretaries of the Navy interviewed 
opined, only the Secretary had the responsibility and gravitas in all elements of the decision 
process (requirements, resources and politics) to be able to perform the job well. The 
creation of the PEOs elevated their importance and visibility in the process while eliminating 
much technical senior oversight. 
The Army 
Before the Storm 
The Secretary of the Army is responsible for all activities occurring within the 
department, including acquisition. Indeed, Army acquisition policy (AR 70-1) was either 
signed directly by the Secretary of the Army or “by order” of the Secretary. Before 
implementation of Goldwater-Nichols and the 1987 Defense Authorization Act provisions, 
the Secretary was supported by an assistant secretary who was almost always designated 
as the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). In 1984 before the acts, the role of the AAE had 
been assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition (ASA (RD&A)). At the time, this individual served as an advisor to the Secretary, 
chaired the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), and decided whether 
acquisition programs were ready to progress past key milestones. It appears, however, that 
the ASA (RD&A) did not directly supervise acquisition programs or personnel, as is currently 
the case. That duty resided with a uniformed officer on the Army staff, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (DSCRDA). Program reviews, officer 
assignments and program management assignments all emanated from the DSCRDA. This 
three-star general had the staff to manage the acquisition process and worked with the ASA 
(RD&A), who had a very small staff. 
The executing authority for acquisition programs resided with the Development and 




systems commands, worked for the DARCOM (DARCOM’s successor is the Army Materiel 
Command or AMC). DARCOM’s Commanding General reported to the Chief of Staff of the 
Army (CSA) and the Secretary of the Army. Figure 5 depicts these relationships. Thus, even 
though the Secretary of the Army was the acquisition decision-maker and he had an 
assistant secretary who oversaw the acquisition system, by practice, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, through DCSRDA and DARCOM, had the greatest influence over acquisition 
decisions. The Army’s ASARC was the body that performed the highest level review function 
before a Secretary of Army decision (or recommendation in the case of a decision on a 
given program being made by the Secretary of Defense). The ASA (RD&A) and the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army co-chaired this council. 
 
Figure 10. Army Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols 
After the Storm 
Following the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms, the Army reissued its acquisition 
regulations four times (in 1988, 1993, 1997, and 2003). In 1988, the DCSRDA position was 
eliminated and the ASA (RD&A) was designated as the “Deputy Army Acquisition Executive 
and provided ‘principal secretariat support’ to the Acquisition Executive” (the Secretary of 
the Army). The regulations issued in 1993 implemented the first round of structural changes 
that are most representative of the changes that have endured to the present day. Because 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act required streamlined acquisition chains of command and limited 
“outside” influence over acquisition activities, the acquisition chains of command were 
shortened to three levels for service-managed acquisitions. As mentioned earlier, the 
Secretary of the Army exercised overall responsibility for activities within the department. 
This revision to Army Regulations saw the delegation of AAE responsibilities to the Assistant 
Secretary level. The AAE role was initially assigned to the ASA (RD&A), and later the name 
was changed to the ASA (AL&T) (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). Following the 
reforms, the AAE was more centrally positioned in the Army’s acquisition process. One key 
aspect of that involved managing and supervising PEOs and PMs, a function that before 
Goldwater-Nichols had been performed by the DCSRDA. 
Also, as was the case with the Navy, the service chief and the deputy chiefs of staff 
were no longer directly engaged in the acquisition process. They retained their 
responsibilities to produce requirements for the acquisition of new materiel and to develop 
the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), which allocated funding to the priorities set by 




acquisition management functions, their tasking was only to state requirements and support 
the PEOs and PMs. The one exception to this was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army who, 
continued to co-chair the ASARC with the ASA (RD&A). In this role, the Vice Chief was able 
to represent the operational Army throughout the materiel acquisition process. Other 
commands and individuals such as the DCSOPS and TRADOC, now, the Army Materiel 
Command, which had replaced the DARCOM continued to report to the Army Chief of Staff. 
However, the principal acquisition functions that they once managed were reorganized into 
a different chain of command. Figure 6 depicts these changes. 
 
Figure 11. Army Acquisition in 1993 
Summary of Key Changes in Army Acquisition 
As with the Navy, the primary effects of the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms were to 
remove the Chief of Staff of the Army and his supporting organizations such as deputy 
chiefs and the Army Materiel Command and subordinate materiel commands from playing a 
direct role in the acquisition process. As will be seen in the next section, a similar pattern 
emerged in the Air Force. 
The Air Force 
Before the Storm 
The evolution of responsibilities for the acquisition of major systems and components 
within the Air Force is similar to that of the Army’s. 
As was true with the other military departments, the Secretary of the Air Force is 
responsible for all activities occurring within the department, including acquisition. 
Throughout the period under examination, the Secretary was supported by an assistant 
secretary who was designated as the Air Force Acquisition Executive (AFAE). In 1986, this 
was the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Logistics (SAF/AL). Later, the 
role of the AFAE was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
(SAF/AQ). The Assistant Secretary also chaired the Air Force Systems Acquisition Review 
Council (AFSARC), which was the principal board that advised the Secretary. (According to 
the 1986 instruction, the Secretary did not delegate his role as the milestone decision 
authority.)  Several members of the Air Force Chief of Staff’s general staff were also 
assigned as members of the AFSARC. These members were the Vice Chief of Staff, Deputy 




(RD&A). It is interesting to note that HQ USAF issued Program Management Directives 
(PMDs) that define the scope of the program being procured, and provide program direction 
and guidance. However, the implementing command appears to have had great leeway. 
The executing authority for acquisition programs resided with the “implementing 
command,” which was designated on a program-by-program basis by the AF Headquarters 
acquisition staff. One of the implementing commands named directly within the 1986 
regulation was the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). In its role as an implementing 
command, it was responsible for accomplishing program executive supervision in much the 
same way that PEOs do currently, albeit over a much larger set of programs. AF REG 800-
2, dated September 16, 1985, stated that the “designated Line Authority for major decisions 
during the acquisition of weapon systems typically include the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Commander, Air Force Systems Command.”  However, it 
also stated that, under “Responsibilities of the HQ USAF”, that HQ issued Program 
Management Directives that established programs, provided program guidance and 
direction, designated implementing commands and issued the Justification of a Major 
System New Start (JMSNS) to begin the acquisition process. 
 
Figure 12. Air Force Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols  
After the Storm 
Following the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms, the Air Force reissued its acquisition 
regulations five times (in 1990, 1993, 1994, 2005 and 2009). The 1994 instruction was the 
first to mention of the AFAE as directly managing acquisition programs and personnel. 
These post Goldwater-Nichols instructions make no mention of acquisition responsibilities 
within the AFHQ general staff until the 2009 reissues, when the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations, Plans, and Requirements (HQ AF/A3/5) is tasked with “collaboratively work[ing] 
with the acquirer, tester, sustainer, and other key stakeholders in developing operational 
capabilities requirements documents.” 
With regard to the materiel commands, after 1994, the instructions task the Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC), (AFMC was the successor command, which absorbed in 1994 
both the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Force Logistics Command, eliminating 
one four-star position) with formally and informally advising and assisting the AFAE, PEOs, 





Figure 13. Air Force Acquisition in 1994DCS Plans & Operations, DCS 
Programs & Resources 
A Comparison of the Before and After by Department 
As stated earlier, the Navy’s culture differed significantly from that of her sister 
services and was reflected in the organization of the DoN and its management structure. 
The CNO viewed the landscape in operational terms befitting his title of Chief of Naval 
Operations. That is, the original creation of the bi-linear Navy did not engage the CNO 
immediately in the administration of the various material “bureaus” that handled the 
acquisition and logistical functions supporting the Navy. The Bureaus of Ships, Ordnance, 
Aeronautics and Supply and Accounts were some of the bureaus that handled such 
functions and reported to the Secretary of the Navy. In 1966, with the creation of the Chief of 
Naval Material, subsequent CNOs played a greater role in the management of and 
production by the material establishment. Even so, for individual CNOs who had grown up in 
the operational world and particularly those without significant Washington, DC, experience, 
dealing with material (including acquisition) matters was somewhat foreign. Furthermore, 
because the DoN included two services, the Navy and the Marine Corps, the DoN 
Secretariat tended to act in greater scope from those of the Army and Air Force.  
The term “Chief of Staff” meant chief of staff to the Secretary of the Army and 
Secretary of the Air Force. As no such office existed in the DoN, and its Secretariat was 
responsible for a broader set of functions, which in the other Military Departments were 
performed in the service headquarters staffs. A couple of examples in central departmental 
management functions (finance and contracts) are illustrative. First, the Department of the 
Navy’s budget function reported to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial 
Management (ASN (FM)), not to either service chief. In its functions, that budget office 
excited ecumenical control the finances of the two DoN sister services and clearly worked 
for the Secretary. While in the planning and programming processes, the two services built 
their POM for the Secretary to approve, the subsequent budget fell under the management 
of the Secretary through the ASN (FM). In a second example, contract award approvals 
were managed by another DoN Assistant Secretary, depending on the item being procured. 
The contract award justification, called the Determination and Findings (D&F), had to be 
reviewed and approved by the appropriate office in the Navy Secretariat before contracts 
were awarded, which meant they played a major role in acquisition.21  A last point is that the 
                                                
21 The D&Fs are written, signed, legally binding statements, submitted by an employee, to 
explain/justify the method and logic that he/she used to select material, services, or suppliers when 




DoN Secretariat was staffed to perform these regulatory and statutory functions and, as a 
result, was larger than those found in the other military departments. For example, the ASN 
(FM) staff, including the Comptroller, at times exceeded several hundred people. 
A second major difference between the Navy and her sister services was the manner 
in which the staffs were structured for decision-making. The other services tended to look 
upon issues through functional ions. That is, when those services addressed issues, their 
reviews occurred at the functional level of manpower, logistics, modernization, etc. In the 
Navy, responsibility was held by three-star admirals who controlled surface, submarine and 
aviation portfolios. These three-star admirals also had a major voice in the requirements 
determination and acquisition processes before Goldwater-Nichols and had direct 
relationships with their three-star counterparts in the Navy’s systems commands. Issues that 
arose between statement of requirements and the ability to develop acquisition programs 
could be resolved at this three-star level. Concurrent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act (but for 
reasons different from the passage of the act) and its movement of the acquisition function 
more fully into the DoN Secretariat, the Navy abolished those three-star billets and reduced 
the functions they performed to the two star level, impeding discussions with the systems 
commanders (who concurrently were removed from the acquisition chain because the new 
PEOs reported directly to the ASN (RD&A)). The Army and Air Force did not have those 
concurrent changes in their structures although the removal of the PEOs from the Systems 
Commanders also occurred in those Departments. It is interesting to note that both the Army 
and Air Force later requested and received waivers to allow the PEOs to report to what was 
in essence the equivalent to the Navy’ Systems Commanders. 
Another major distinction was that while the Army and Air Force had Systems 
Acquisition Review Councils (both before and after Goldwater-Nichols) the Navy did not. 
Programs wound their way through a set of systems command reviews, two-star review in 
the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and then through the CNO-chaired CEB meeting 
and, finally, on to the Secretary of the Navy for decision. 
The ASARC and AFSARC boards were co-chaired by the service vice chiefs, both 
before and after Goldwater-Nichols. Thus, the service chief had an important representative 
in councils dealing with acquisition decisions. Furthermore, based upon our interviews with 
Air Force and Army retired three-stars, the principal deputy position was generally filled by a 
senior uniformed executive (typically a three-star General) in each of the secretariat 
acquisition offices and played major roles in both the selection of acquisition personnel 
(including the management of the acquisition workforce) as well as the distinct function of 
briefing the Service Chief on all matters of acquisition interest prior to his attendance in any 
structured meeting with the Department’s Secretary on such matters. 
With the passage and eventual implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the Navy 
acquisition programs no longer went through the following: systems commanders, two-star 
CNO staff board, and CNO Executive Board. 
In its place, a Navy Program Decision Meeting (known at the NPDM) was created 
and chaired by the ASN (RD&A). While CNO staff flags were invited to the meetings, they 
were held at the behest and schedule of the ASN (RD&A), and our interviews indicated that 
they were poorly attend by Navy flag officers. This led to the perception of isolation of the 
service chief and his staff from those functions. 
Thus, as shown above, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the subsequent changes in 




How Navy Implementation Affected Acquisition 
This chapter describes what we see as four major consequences that resulted from 
the manner in which the Department of the Navy implemented the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
The first is the exclusive civilian control of the acquisition process with military 
disenfranchisement. The second is the loss of blended workforce. The third is the separation 
of the “line” (naval officers who have operational assignments that lead to their promotion 
and success in the Navy). The fourth is the continuing search for rebalance and the 
unintended consequences of the manner in which the current DoN leadership has chosen to 
attempt to re-integrate the operation naval officers (line) into the acquisition process. 
Increasing Civilian Control over the Acquisition Process: Constructing an 
Impenetrable Wall 
Senator Nunn stated during the conference leading up to enactment of Goldwater-
Nichols that he had been “concerned that we not create an impenetrable wall between the 
staffs of the Service Secretary and the Service Chief” (Nunn, 1985, S12651). In our 
interviews with senior Navy and OSD officials directly involved in implementing the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act,22 most had been concerned about this possibility or they became 
concerned after its passage. In fact, of the twenty-five former and current civilian and 
uniformed officials (including those in the Air Force and Army) interviewed, all but two had 
no doubt that a wall had, in fact, been created between operational officers and acquisition 
officials.  
In terms of our senior-level interviewees, only one—a former USD AT&L—believed 
that a minimal amount of separation between military and civilian leadership resulted from 
implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. Moreover, he believed this separation had been 
constructive, contributing to creative tension and leading to a more efficient use of 
resources. In short, he believed the service chiefs could still influence acquisition decisions. 
However, the remaining interviewees were much less sanguine about the outcome. 
Similarly, an Air Force civilian executive with a rich background in acquisition matters did not 
believe that the military leadership was disadvantaged by the separation of the military 
requirements community from their acquisition brethren. 
According to a former Principal Deputy ASN (RD&A), the acquisition community 
eliminated roles in the acquisition process traditionally filled from the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff. A former CNO reported that he himself felt excluded from 
the acquisition process, as did all senior officers of all ranks and career fields who were 
interviewed. One former USD AT&L, who came to believe that the service chiefs and 
combatant commanders were now too far removed from the entire acquisition process, 
thought it essential that Service Chiefs become more involved in procurement planning, 
especially in helping to set realistic performance requirements and to make trade-off 
decisions during program development. Both Under Secretaries of Defense (AT&L) 
interviewed believed that establishing a four-star Vice Chief as co-chair of the Service 
Acquisition Board could overcome the growing divide between a military-based 
requirements process and a civilian-based acquisition process. In this scenario, the Vice 
                                                
22 In this instance, interviewees included a former CNO, a former Secretary of the Navy, a former 
Navy General Counsel, a former Asst. Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and 




Chief’s role would be similar to that of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in his role as 
co-chair of the Defense Acquisition Board.  
The DoN leadership is not blind to this problem. It has attempted to breakdown the 
barriers between the CNO’s staff and the Secretariat with regard to requirements and 
acquisition. The Navy Gate System is the latest effort to link the acquisition process and 
requirements process, initiated in a SECNAV Notice 5000 in February 2008. The system 
established a six-gate process (the circled numbers in the Navy/USMC level) in which each 
gate represents a formal decision point at which the costs and benefits of a particular 
weapon system program are evaluated (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 14. Navy Gate System 




As seen on the chart, a vertical dotted line separates the first three decision gates 
from the last three. The first three gates are supposed to be managed on the requirements 
side23 and the following three gates are managed on the acquisition side.24  That the dotted 
line reinforces the notion of separation in Senator Nunn’s “impenetrable wall.” 
Blended Workforce and the Engagement of Operational Officers in the 
Business of Acquisition 
A principal motive of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to improve our military’s ability 
to fight in a more joint manner; consequently, not only weapon systems, but also officer 
experience and training must now include joint duty and considerations. All of the senior-
level officials we interviewed reported that they had, at the time Goldwater-Nichols was 
implemented, believed there was a need for better communication among the military 
departments and more joint collaboration in operations. However, an unintended 
consequence of requiring officers to serve in a joint duty assignment to achieve flag or 
general officers rank was the migration of line officers away from the acquisition process 
because of the pressure of satisfying additional demands during a career whose length did 
not expand to accommodate the additional demands. 
This migration became a particular concern in the Department of the Navy as it had 
maintained over time a blended workforce in its acquisition processes. Before Goldwater-
Nichols, there existed a blend of naval and marine officers along with technically-oriented 
civilians worked across the material establishment. Program offices, systems commands, 
laboratories and field activities were generally managed by military officers who rotated into 
the material establishment from operational billets and brought with them a wealth of real-
world fleet experience. Coupled with them were a group of highly skilled engineers and 
scientists who, working together developed and procured the nation’s naval weapons 
systems. 
Upon the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the creation of an acquisition 
workforce resulted in a formulaic career path for those whose intent was to work in 
acquisition. While it created certain incentives for the civilian element of the workforce, it 
also created significant differences between civilian and uniformed workforces. First, the 
civilians involved in acquisition and the uniformed personnel involved in acquisition had 
completely different chains of command and, consequently, a different performance 
evaluation and promotion structure. The new workforce structure also demanded new 
educational mechanisms, to prepare individuals for careers in the acquisition workforce. The 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) was established with a heavy civilianized structure 
and outlook. The agility of acquisition was slowed by this new institutional training and the 
demand for military personnel to participate in the DAU courses heavily affected military 
career assignment and rotation.  
Exacerbating the “civilianization” of the workforce was an unintended consequence 
of Goldwater-Nichols emphasis on joint warfighting to satisfy promotion requirements. 
Before Goldwater-Nichols, officers had more time to rotate through positions related to both 
the operational realm and the material management process, giving those officers a deeper 
                                                
23 Specifically, they are managed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, for Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources (DCNO (N8))/DC and DC&I, CNO/Commandant, Marine Corps (CMC) in 
OPNAV/ Headquarters, US Marine Corps (HQMC).  




understanding of the civilian side of the acquisition process. With the rigid requirement of 
joint duty service, however, officers no longer had time to rotate between operational duty 
assignments and material management assignments if they wanted to achieve flag or 
general officer rank in an operational role. Furthermore, those who now chose to devote 
their energies to acquisition saw their operational experience decline in comparison to the 
counterparts who served only in line assignments, which meant they lost some of their 
credibility when it came to weighing in on the value of a particular performance requirement, 
for example. As the number of officers serving in acquisition roles decreased, a sense 
emerged of the acquisition process “belonging” to the largely civilian material establishment, 
not the operations line community. Our interviews with senior Army and Air Force officers 
echoed these observations about their own services. Almost to a person, our interviewees 
remarked on the need to create an incentive for senior line officers to serve in acquisition 
roles. That is not to say that there is not a role for engineering restricted duty officers in the 
acquisition workforce. However, a blended workforce should contain officers with warfighting 
training and perspective to ensure a rich mix of talent is available to the acquisition 
leadership. 
Unintended Consequences 
In this chapter, the Navy Gate System is described. In that example, a large 
structured set of meetings and briefings needed to be established because the DoN’s 
acquisition instructions explicitly left the uniformed Navy out of the processes.  That said, it 
still stands. It should be noted that given Senator Nunn’s explicit concern over such an 
outcome, this is also no unintended consequence. 
In SECNAV INST. 5400, the applicable reference to the CNO and CMC is that the 
ASN (RD&A) “shall provide such staff support each consider necessary to perform his duties 
and responsibilities.”  There is no mention of any other responsibility for the service chiefs. 
When the act was passed, our interviewees indicated that the uniform Navy offered a three-
star deputy to the ASN (RD&A), but that was refused and a senior executive was installed in 
that position. Throughout the ensuing twenty years, a mix of SESs and officers from one-to-
three star rank have filled that position. But the DoN acquisition decision boards never had 
the uniformed Navy in any leadership position. In both the Army and Air Force, as evidenced 
from our interviews, the Vice Chiefs of each service at one time either chaired their 
acquisition decision boards, or, in more recent times, co-chaired those boards. The reason 
this is important is that the co-chairmanship gives the senior leadership an opportunity to 
demand and get information from the acquisition chain of command, starting with the 
program manager and going up to the PEO. That information flow is important to the 
decision process because it provides an understanding of what is happening in the program. 
This insight also allowed the uniformed Navy to see the consequences of its “requirements” 
process and the effect of changes made in various portions of the PPBE process. With this 
knowledge comes a shared responsibility for the end product, a most desired effect. Another 
consequence to knowledge is the loss of operational officers who understood the acquisition 
process. The result is that many of the flag officers who work in the office of the CNO have 
little to no experience with or understanding of the issues facing acquisition programs. 
Therefore, the requirements process sometimes imposes unreasonable demands and the 
PPBE process removes funding at critical times. In some of our interviews, some PEOs 




Conclusions, Recommendations, and Issues that Warrant 
Further Study 
Changes that affect the culture and processes of large bureaucratic organizations 
are always difficult to achieve. The notion of the need for and acceptance of the reality of a 
“burning platform” as enunciated by Gerstner at IBM is exactly for that reason. Military 
establishments because of their organization and the existential nature of their purpose are 
the most difficult to change, certainly to change quickly. In the case of the defense 
establishment in the ‘80s and ‘90s, it was change imposed by legislation that focused on 
“fixing” a myriad of both absurd and preserved problems without a clear understanding of 
the consequences that these fixes would being about. Legislated change in large 
enterprises has that effect, and it is noteworthy that the senior congressional protagonists 
were wary of unintended consequences but were driven to make changes because of the 
problems they had observed for well over a decade. In retrospect, it would appear that many 
of the interrelationships were not well understood. At each turn over the ensuing quarter 
century, many changes have been made in both statute and regulation to deal with “just one 
score” problem overlooked by previous attempts. It would be interesting to engage in time 
travel to see what the protagonists in the mid-‘80s would have done if they were given a 
glimpse of the results. But that is not a particularly useful exercise because the problems 
were real and no one is contemplating reversing what has been done. Rather we must sift 
through the results of actions taken over time and see what may be practically done to 
address the concerns that were laid out by a previous CNO and form the core of our inquiry. 
Just as the various statutes that were passed reflected the perception of members of 
Congress of the nature of the problems being experienced by the DoD, both operational, 
and in stewarding the public monies and trust, so perceptions of intent governed the 
promulgation of regulations to effect that legislation. The testimony we received strongly 
suggests that the intent was not clearly understood and there was a significant amount of 
interpretation, some of it self-serving, in promulgation of Instructions, Directives and 
Regulations. What appears to be a clear pattern is that many folks had reservations, not 
unlike Senator Nunn, but pressed forward anyway because the mandate for change at least 
was clear. What also became apparent is that the DoN, as a result of earlier resistance, was 
directed to proceed by higher authority an even more literal interpretation then necessary 
and did so. This “letter of the law” approach, taken even though there were reservations 
among the leadership, had the result of an implementation in the DoN different than those in 
the other military departments.  
Clearly, Senator Nunn did not intend a rigid divide between civilian and military 
leaderships. Equally clearly, the Departments of the Army and Air Force have managed to 
avoid it to a certain degree under the same statutory and directive constraints that face the 
DoN.  That leads us to conclude that the approach taken by the DoN is more malleable than 
believed.  The authors would also conclude that the de facto exclusion of offices with an 
operational focus from the acquisition/material management process is not healthy.  Finally, 
it is concluded that to achieve the results of the process improvements discussed in the 
recently issued Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, it is necessary that our best 
minds working together to solve problems, not sequentially engaging issues through 
choreographed organizational engagements. 
Accordingly, a small number of specific recommendations are made  and suggest 





1. Make changes to applicable DoN Directives to undo the isolation conveyed 
by the Navy Gates Process and articulate a coherent and continuing role for 
the Service Chiefs across the range of the acquisition process, more like 
those of the other military departments. 
2. Make changes to applicable DoN Directives to create and acquisition 
oversight body co-chaired by the ASN (RD&A) and the VCNO (and the 
ACMC for the discussion of Marine Corps systems of priority interest). 
3. Create career opportunities for officers of the line in the material 
establishment. 
Areas of Further Study 
1. Best principles and approaches to expand and rebalance the acquisition 
workforce to enable informed collaboration in the requirements and resources 
processes. 
32. The granting of “joint-duty” credit for officers in large acquisition 
programs as suggested by the QDR for “recognizing joint experience 
whenever and wherever it occurs.” 
33. Appropriate changes to DOPMA to create enhanced Senior Officer 
opportunities in acquisition. 
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Abstract 
The author discusses the current basis of the DoD’s management and oversight of 
MDAPs (i.e., their dollar value) and proposes a new paradigm in which the level of 
management and oversight would be based on the level of risk an MDAP represents.  The 
author also examines the extent to which the DoD is prepared to assess the following 
categories of risk: technical, system integration, design, production, and business. Finally, 
the author makes recommendations to improve the DoD’s ability to assess these risks. 
Preface  
Today’s defense environment is placing growing pressure on defense policymakers 
to be nimble and adaptive, particularly with respect to acquisition systems and processes. 
This occasional paper is one in a series drawing upon the expertise of core RAND 
Corporation staff to explore issues and offer suggestions on topics that are likely to be of 
critical importance to the new leadership: the use of competition, development of novel 
systems, prototyping, risk management, organizational and management issues, and the 
acquisition workforce. The papers are designed to inform new initiatives for markedly 
improving the cost, timeliness, and innovativeness of weapon systems that the Department 
of Defense (DoD) intends to acquire.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires review of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs and decisions by senior officials on the basis of a program’s dollar 
value, irrespective of risk. In this paper, we propose a new paradigm in which the level of 
management and oversight would be based on the level of risk a program represents, 
including technical, system integration, design, production, and business innovation risk. We 
also examine the extent to which the DoD is prepared to assess these categories of risk and 
identify descriptive levels that could be used to assess and categorize design and business 
process risk.  
This study was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) and conducted within the Acquisition 
and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally 




Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, 
the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.  
For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, contact 
the Director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by e-mail at atpc-director@rand.org; by phone 
at 310-393-0411, extension 7798; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, 
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org.  
Introduction  
Currently, acquisition programs are grouped and then managed at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) by dollar value— depending on the dollar value, the OSD 
provides different levels of oversight and different management processes. This approach 
has been constantly refined over the years, without having produced any noticeable 
improvement in terms of reducing the cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance 
shortfalls that continue to plague the acquisition of weapon system programs. This paper 
argues for a different paradigm: The level of overall risk inherent in a program should be the 
main basis for determining the process and level of review a project should receive.25  
Drawing upon examples from warship acquisition programs, this paper also argues 
that inadequate assessment and management of various discrete program risks results in 
adverse cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. We examine existing scales for 
assessing some of these discrete program risks and make recommendations to better 
assess and manage several programs within the Defense Acquisition Management System.  
Managing by Risk Level versus Dollar Value  
Currently, the OSD requires review of acquisition programs and decisions by senior 
officials on the basis of a program’s dollar value, irrespective of risk, as shown in Table 1.  
However, some very costly projects might have significantly less risk than projects of 
similar cost, and thus should require less oversight as well as the use of different criteria at 
milestone reviews.26  Conversely, projects may cost little but have a lot of risk because they 
tend to push the state of the art in technology and may also involve novel business or 
design processes that may require more comprehensive oversight than just dollar value 
would otherwise indicate. An excellent example of this type of program—the Advanced 
SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)—was discussed in a May 2007 report by the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). The ASDS is a Special Operations Forces’ 
battery-powered submersible, carried to a deployment area by a submarine. The operating 
parameters for the submersible required development of batteries that would push the state 
of the art in that technology. The initial design, construct, and deliver contract was awarded 
for $70 million in 1994 for delivery in 1997; because of the dollar value, Milestone Decision 
                                                
25 Cost is a factor that must be considered when determining the level of review. A multibillion dollar 
program requires high-level review because even a small amount of cost growth involves large dollar 
amounts. 
26 For example, the Navy is about to restart construction of two DDG 51-class destroyers at a cost in 
excess of several billion dollars. Over 60 destroyers of this class have already been delivered or are 
in the final stages of construction. Because of this track record, restarting construction of two new 
DDG 51s will no doubt expose the Navy to a far less risk of adverse cost, schedule, and performance 
outcomes than construction of three multibillion DDG 1000-class ships, which are now being 




Authority (MDA) resided with the Navy, which ultimately accepted delivery of ASDS in 2003 
in “as is” condition at a cost in excess of $340 million. The GAO concluded that “Had the 
original business case for ASDS been properly assessed as an under-resourced, concurrent 
technology, design, and construction effort led by an inexperienced contractor, DoD might 
have adopted an alternative solution or strategy” (GAO, 2007, p. 13). 
Table 1. Basis and Level of Program Oversight 
(USD(AT&L), 2008)  
Program Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) 
Basis for ACAT 
Designation Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA)  
Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) 
I Estimated total expenditure 
for research, development, 
test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) of more than $365 
million or for procurement of 
more than $2.190 billion 
ACAT ID: Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisitions, 
Technology, and Logistics 
ACAT IC: Head of DoD 
Component (e.g., Secretary 
of the Navy) or, if delegated, 
DoD component acquisition 
executive (e.g., Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and 
Acquisition)  
II Estimated total expenditure 
for RDT&E of more than 
$140 million or for 
procurement of more than 
$660 million 
DoD component acquisition 
executive or designate (e.g., 
program executive officer)  
III Does not meet criteria for 
ACAT II or above; less than 
an MAIS program ACAT ID: 
Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics 
Designated by DoD 
component acquisition 
executive at the lowest level 
appropriate (e.g., program 
manager)  
NOTE: Estimated expenditures are in FY 2000 constant dollars.  
Focusing on Causes Rather than Consequences  
Risk, or the exposure to the chance of failure, is a word heard frequently in the 
acquisition community. All acquisition programs face risk of some form or another. Arguably, 
any new major weapon system that could be developed, produced, and fielded with no risk 
involved is probably not worth acquiring.  
Overtly or otherwise, much of a program manager’s time is spent managing risk. 
After all, the Defense Acquisition Management System, shown in Figure 1, is, in essence, a 
risk-management process designed to ensure success in the timely delivery of weapon 





Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management System 
(USD(AT&L), 2008) 
The risks most frequently mentioned by defense acquisition officials are cost growth, 
schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls. This is not surprising as cost, schedule, and 
performance are the primary attributes by which programs are assessed for success or 
failure. Moreover, the Defense Acquisition University (n.d., p. 2) teaches that cost, or 
performance schedule, and performance are the risk factors that program managers must 
assess and manage “to ensure that DoD is acquiring optimum systems that meet all 
capability needs.”  
Assessment of cost, schedule, and performance is clearly a management task, and a 
good program manager assesses these risks using periodic data accumulated into 
management reports to identify problems, regain lost ground, and then stay on track. 
However, these are broad measures of risk. A better program manager proactively manages 
by using discrete program risks and submeasures that allow him or her to look ahead and 
act to avoid adverse cost, schedule, and/or performance trends and outcomes. In other 
words, managing by cost, schedule, and performance measures is akin to driving a car 
while looking solely in the rearview mirror—it is possible, but only if the road stays straight. A 
better driver looks mostly out the windshield, with only an occasional look in the mirror; this 
driver anticipates and easily handles curves in the road.  
In this paper, we focus on five discrete programmatic risk categories:  
 technical,  
 system integration, 
 design,  
 production, and  
 business.  
Taken together, these risk categories portray overall acquisition program risk.27  They 
interact in numerous ways to affect a project’s cost, schedule, and/or performance 
outcomes: Obviously, technologies that do not work affect performance, but so can poor 
business decisions that increase cost and lead to features being deleted from the weapon 
system to remain within budget.  
                                                
27 For simplicity, risks involved in fielding, operating, and maintaining the weapon system are not 




The Defense Acquisition Management System appears to adequately recognize that 
incorporation of new technologies into a weapon system presents risk, providing metrics to 
systematically assess this type of risk. Time is also provided in the acquisition process for 
system integration matters to be identified and resolved, although there is room for 
improvement. However, as will be discussed in subsequent examples, new approaches in 
design, production, and business areas of acquisition programs do not appear to receive the 
same skepticism and comprehensive oversight that new technologies and systems receive. 
 Well-Defined Process for Assessing Technical Risk Is in Place  
“Technical risk” is exposure to the chance that development of critical technologies 
will not meet program objectives within cost and schedule constraints. In assessing 
technical risk, program managers must address the uncertainty in their estimates about how 
much time and effort it will take to make new technologies work. The importance of technical 
risk is well understood in the acquisition community. For example, DoD guidance states that 
“the management and mitigation of technology risk…is a crucial part of overall program 
management and is especially relevant to meeting cost and schedule goals” (USD(AT&L), 
2008, para. 3.7.2.2).  
Technical risk is also extensively addressed in the Defense Acquisition Management 
System. The system recognizes evolutionary acquisition as the preferred DoD strategy for 
rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. One purpose of evolutionary acquisition 
(i.e., delivering capability in increments through spiral or incremental development) is to 
provide time to better manage technology risk and avoid adverse cost and schedule 
outcomes that often result from trying to achieve difficult requirements in one step.  
The DoD has also established a well-defined process based on Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) to categorize technical risk and help ensure that key decision-
makers understand the risk of incorporating different technologies into weapon system 
acquisition programs (the TRLs are described in Table 2). Using this process, program 
offices conduct a technology readiness assessment under the auspices of the DoD 
Component Science and Technology (S&T) Executive; the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (S&T) evaluates the technology readiness assessment and forwards findings to the 
Overarching Integrated Product Team leader and Defense Acquisition Board.  
The TRLs are a good proxy measurement for technical risk: The lower the readiness 
level, the more development needed to incorporate the technology into a weapon system; 
and the more development needed, the greater the risk. Overall, technology risk has been 
handled fairly well in warship acquisition programs, which tend not to push the state of the 
art in technology as far as do weapons and sensors. A recent example is the USS Virginia, 
which incorporates various new technologies28 and was still delivered within four months of 
the original schedule established a decade earlier (Casey, 2007). 
                                                
28 For example, a nonpenetrating photonics mast versus a periscope, a DC electric system, 




Table 2. Technology Readiness Levels 
(DUSD(S&T), 2005) 
Technology Readiness Levels 
1. Basic principles observed and reported  
1. Technology concept and/or application formulated  
2. Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof 
of concept  
3. Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment  
4. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment  
5. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
environment  
6. System prototype demonstration in an operational environment  
7. Actual system completed and qualified through test and 
demonstration  
8. Actual system proven through successful mission operations  
NOTE: See Mankins (1995).  
System Integration Risk Is Assessed, But at Later Stages  
The acquisition community also assesses system integration risk, but it lacks 
effective tools to measure and categorize this risk early in a program’s life cycle. “System 
integration risk” is exposure to the chance that new and existing technologies being 
employed in a weapon system may not work together and/or interact with operators and 
maintainers to meet program objectives within cost and schedule constraints. System 
integration can be an issue within an individual acquisition program (e.g., when subsystems 
fail to interact). It can also be an issue between acquisition programs: Many programs 
develop capabilities that are a component of a larger warfighting capability; individually, the 
component programs might appear to be a low or moderate risk, but in combination with 
other programs, the overall risk might be much higher due to coordination and integration 
issues. A classic example occurred during the Grenada invasion when Army and Navy 
communications systems did not interact well during the joint operation.  
System integration risk is extensively treated after Milestone B, during the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, at which time a program should 
demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility (USD(AT&L), 2008, para. 
3.7.1.1). While appropriate attention is given to system integration risk during this phase, 
this assessment occurs after the second of three milestones in the process, when programs 
have typically built up so much momentum that they are difficult to stop, regardless of 
performance or progress. Early consideration of system integration risk—at Milestone A—by 
senior decision-makers could result in developing and funding integration-risk mitigation 




Combat systems in warships provide an example of the problems that arise when 
decisions are made without adequate consideration of system integration risk.29 For 
example, early decisions on systems architecture and processing approaches made without 
adequate consideration of risk led to cost, schedule, and performance problems with 
submarine combat systems for the SSN 688I, SEAWOLF, and Australian Collins-class 
submarines. According to a report for the Parliament of Australia discussing the Collins-
class submarine,  
Of the early decisions in the Collins program, the one which was to have the most 
public effect was that concerning the nature of the vessels’ Combat Data System 
(CDS). It has been the subsequent failure of this system to meet its design 
requirements that has left the submarines with a severely impaired combat capability.  
By the end of 1982…[the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)] had decided that the 
electronic combat systems of the new boats would be fully integrated. Instead of the 
then standard central computer performing all data analysis, the new submarine CDS 
would use a data bus to distribute information to a number of smaller computer work 
stations. (Woolner, 2001) 
The report then goes on to discuss the lack of appreciation for the risk of switching to 
the new integrated architecture for combat systems.  
The RAN was not alone in its “grand folly.”… The Australian information technology 
(IT) industry assured the RAN of both the feasibility and inherent advantages of a 
fully integrated combat system and of its ability to contribute to such a program.  
Moreover, the RAN was not the only navy to think that the future of combat data 
processing lay with fully integrated systems. The USN [U.S. Navy] specified the 
same concept for its [BSY-2] Integrated Combat System for the U.S. Navy’s Seawolf 
class nuclear attack submarines. This was an even more costly failure than the 
Collins CDS, absorbing…$1.5 billion [in U.S. dollars] before it was cancelled.30  
Tools for assessing system-integration maturity earlier on have been proposed. For 
example, Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez, Magnaye, and Tan (2008) have proposed a System 
Readiness Level (SRL) index that would incorporate the current TRL scale as well as an 
Integration Readiness Level (IRL) scale. The IRL scale they describe would use nine levels, 
which appear compatible with the widely used TRLs and appear to be a good proxy 
measurement of system integration risk. The proposed IRLs are listed in Table 3.  
The Risks of Design Process Management Are Not Well 
Understood  
“Design risk” is exposure to the chance that the weapon system’s design will not 
result in effective operation or be easy to produce. It is axiomatic that a good design is 
essential to a weapon system’s performance, but the impact of design on a weapon 
system’s production cost and schedule outcome is not as well appreciated. However, deci-
sions made early in the design process quickly establish not only the performance but also 
the ease of manufacture and resultant cost of the weapon system. While the ability of the 
                                                
29 A combat system integrates information from sensors, synthesizes this information for combat 
commanders, and provides fire control solutions and guidance to weapons. 




design to operate effectively can be considered a subset of technical risk, a more holistic 
approach is for a program manager to assess the chance that the design process to be 
employed for the weapon system will generate an effective, easy-to-produce weapon.  
Table 3. Integration Readiness Levels 
(Sauser et al., 2008) 
Integration Readiness Levels 
1. An interface between technologies is identified with sufficient detail to allow 
characterization of the relationship.  
1. There is some level of specificity to characterize the interaction (i.e., 
ability to influence) between technologies through their interface.  
2. There is compatibility (i.e., a common language) between 
technologies to orderly and efficiently integrate and interact.  
3. There is sufficient detail in the quality and assurance of the integration 
between technologies.  
4. There is sufficient control between technologies necessary to 
establish, manage, and terminate the integration.  
5. The integrating technologies can accept, translate, and structure 
information for their intended application.  
6. The integration of technologies is verified and validated with sufficient 
detail to be actionable.  
7. Actual integration is completed and mission qualified through test and 
demonstration in the system environment.  
8. Integration is mission proven through successful mission operations.  
The design process necessary for an effective and producible weapon system 
involves complex interactions between designers, suppliers, production experts, planners, 
and estimators. Design process complexity has also increased with the availability of more 
sophisticated design tools such as electronic product models and computational techniques 
(e.g., finite element analysis).  
Outcomes from two current acquisition programs—the United Kingdom’s ASTUTE-
class submarine and the US Navy’s LPD 17-class of amphibious transport dock ships—
demonstrate why senior decision-makers in the OSD acquisition process need to better 
understand the risks new design processes and tools present.  The ASTUTE was the first 
UK submarine to be designed through use of an electronic, three-dimensional computer 
product model.  The prime contractor’s inability to manage this new process resulted in 
extensive delays when design products needed to build the ship were late. General 
Dynamics ultimately had to be hired to augment and manage the final stages of the sub-
marine’s detail design process. Because of design and other problems, the ASTUTE 
program has overrun cost greatly and is years behind schedule.  
With LPD 17, the US Navy competed the design and production of the first three 
ships of the class using as major evaluation and award criteria (1) the plans for 
accomplishing detail design and other functions, (2) Integrated Product Data Environment 




price (Comptroller General of the United States, 1997). The then-Avondale Shipyard in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, partnered with a firm that was developing a new ship design IPDE tool 
and won the competition. Subsequently, the LPD 17 experienced considerable cost growth 
(about 70%) and schedule delays (CRS, 2008, p. 12). The GAO attributed much of this cost 
growth to the new design tool:  
In the LPD 17 program, the Navy’s reliance on an immature design tool led to 
problems that affected all aspects of the lead ship’s design. Without a stable design, 
work was often delayed from early in the building cycle to later, during integration of 
the hull. Shipbuilders stated that doing the work at this stage could cost up to five 
times the original cost. The lead ship in the LPD class was delivered to the warfighter 
incomplete and with numerous mechanical failures. (GAO, 2007) 
Senior decision-makers should require a program manager proposing to use new 
design processes, tools, or organizations to design a weapon system to justify selection of 
the new process, tool, or organization and develop an appropriate risk mitigation plan. An 
example of a design process mitigation plan comes from the VIRGINIA-class submarine 
program. Prior to VIRGINIA-class construction using a new Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) approach, Electric Boat stated,  
a representative section of the ship about a year early with a portion of that section 
started about two years early. This early, controlled, closely monitored ship 
construction effort ensured thorough preparation for full-ship application and high 
confidence in the new process. (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002, p. 33)  
Evaluation of Production Risks Lacks Rigor  
An earlier and more rigorous evaluation of production risks could save the DoD much 
difficulty and taxpayers a lot of money. “Production risk” is exposure to the chance that the 
facility, labor, manufacturing processes, and procedures will fail to produce the weapon 
system within time and cost constraints. Producibility—or “production capability”—is a func-
tion of the design; production facilities; management skills, processes, and experience; and 
workforce skills and experience. The DoD requires assessment of contractors’ production 
capability before production contract award in the production and deployment phase, but 
this may be too late because, at this point, production may be locked in by the organization 
that won the design contract. Moreover, in the authors’ experience, and as exemplified in 
the LPD 17 source-selection criteria discussed earlier, the production category of risk does 
not receive the same emphasis in selecting a shipbuilder as other factors, such as design 
concepts, past performance, and estimated cost.  
The Navy’s DD 963-class of destroyers and LHA 1-class of amphibious assault ships 
are classic examples of programs in which the DoD considered design and production risk 
acceptable when awarding contracts, but which went on to experience about the worst of 
every production factor possible. These ships presented little technical and system 
integration risk, but ended up far behind schedule and over cost, due in part to identifiable 
production risks. Contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder, Litton Industries, which 
owned the Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. In the late 1960s, Litton Industries 
decided to invest in an expansion of design and production facilities for warships, building a 
new shipyard on the west bank of the Pascagoula River, across from its existing shipyard. 
The new shipyard was designed to be operated with a new production control system using 




After the award of the LHA- and DD 963-class contracts to Ingalls for nine LHAs and 
30 DD 963s in the late 1960s, Ingalls’ management decided to shift construction of some 
commercial container ships from the old, conventional yard to the new facility (Northrup 
Grumman, 2008). The expectation was that doing so would allow the new facility to start up 
and have any problems worked out while the LHA and DD 963 were being designed. 
However, production of the container ships using the new control system led to delays; 
consequently, the ships were occupying facilities and using manpower needed to start 
production of the LHAs and DD 963s. Production of the LHAs and DD 963s fell far behind 
and, in combination with other problems (design-related issues, inflation, etc.), the costs 
were overrun substantially and the ships were late (GlobalSecurity.org, 2008).  
A greater emphasis on evaluating production risks could have saved an enormous 
amount of time and money, but the promised cost savings resulting from construction in a 
new, state-of-the-art ship fabrication and assembly facility proved too good to be true. The 
assessment that the facility would be derisked by building container ships first turned out to 
be wrong, and, meanwhile, two entire classes of ships had been priced and placed under 
contract.  
A promising approach, initiated by the Missile Defense Agency, may provide 
program offices across the DoD with better insight about production risk. The agency 
extended the notion of TRLs to engineering and manufacturing by developing Engineering 
and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRLs) to assess the maturity of a program’s design, 
related materials, tooling, test equipment, manufacturing, quality, and reliability levels. There 
are five EMRLs, as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels 
(DUSD(S&T), 2005)  
Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels 
1. System, component, or item validation in laboratory environment or initial 
relevant engineering application or breadboard, brass-board development.  
1. System or components in prototype demonstration beyond 
breadboard, brass-board development.  
2. System, component, or item in advanced development. Ready for 
low-rate initial production.  
3. Similar system, component, or item previously produced or in 
production. System, component, or item in low-rate initial production. 
Ready for full-rate production.  
4. Identical system, component, or item previously produced or in 
production. System, component, or item in full-rate production.  
The Risk of Early Business Decisions Is Not Fully Appreciated  
Business decisions made early in a program’s life can significantly affect cost, 
schedule, and performance outcomes. “Business risk” is exposure to the chance that the 
overall acquisition strategy for a program will not result in the desired cost, schedule, and/or 
performance outcomes. Decisions about the process to select who will build the weapon 
system, the standards to which it will be built, and the schedules for designing and building it 




managers should assess the following: (1) the extent to which the acquisition strategy can 
result in selection of the most effective, efficient design and most effective, efficient 
production entities; (2) whether cost estimates and schedules are valid; (3) whether proper 
government oversight organizations are in place; and (4) whether project personnel with 
proper training and experience are available.  
A good example of early business decisions gone bad is the Navy’s Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) Program. The lead ship, USS Freedom (LCS 1), was recently delivered after 
experiencing substantial cost overruns and delivery delays. In congressional testimony 
given to explain these outcomes, the US Navy (2007) identified the following tenets of the 
new business model used to acquire the LCS:  
 Construction of LCS seaframes in midtier shipyards that “perform predominately 
commercial work, maintaining business processes and overhead structures that 
keep them competitive in the world market” (i.e., little warship experience).31  
 “A rapid 24-month build cycle for each seaframe, as opposed to the five or more 
years that have become the norm in naval shipbuilding.”  
 “The LM lead ship detail design and construction effort was initiated 
simultaneously and the lead ship commenced construction only seven months 
after the start of final design (i.e., concurrent design/build).”  
 “In order to address the challenges of technical authority under this environment 
(reduction in NAVSEA technical personnel), in February 2003, NAVSEA and 
PEO Ships made two joint decisions. The first was to work with the American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to develop a set of standards (Naval Vessel Rules) 
that could be applied to non-nuclear naval combatant ships. The second was to 
utilize ABS to class32 both LCS and DDG 1000 using the new rules.”  
No doubt there were good arguments for these individual program tenets. However, 
the cumulative effect of the risks involved in building a new design warship in small 
commercial shipyards with little warship experience during a rapid, concurrent design/build 
process and to a set of technical standards themselves under development appears to have 
been greatly underappreciated. In that same congressional testimony, the Navy identified 
cost drivers for LCS 1 as “concurrent design-and-build while incorporating Naval Vessel 
Rules (NVR), reduction gear delays created by a manufacturing error, and insufficient 
program oversight” (US Navy, 2007). The risks inherent in utilizing an entirely new business 
model to acquire warships were obviously neither adequately assessed nor managed.  
One way to avoid such risk would be to require program managers proposing new 
and/or radical business models to fully justify why the new model is superior to past practice, 
recommend more frequent assessment points than now required by the Defense Acquisition 
Management System, and incorporate exit strategies in contracts for the government to use 
if the program fails to meet expectations.  
                                                
31 To better understand the differences between military and commercial shipbuilding, see Birkler et 
al. (2005). 
32  The American Bureau of Ships is known in the commercial shipping industry as a “classification 
society,” which is an organization that sets standards for design and construction of vessels and 





The Defense Acquisition System Framework has sufficient tools and allows time for 
proper assessment and management of technical risk and, to some extent, of system 
integration risk. However, design, production, and business risks are not always adequately 
assessed and managed. As shown in this discussion, scales exist that represent good proxy 
measurements of technical, systems integration, engineering, and production risks; what is 
missing are descriptive levels that could be used to assess and categorize design and 
business process risk. We recommend that the DoD explore establishing such levels and, in 
Tables 5 and 6, offer starting points for doing so (based on the authors’ experience), which 
may help program managers more carefully consider these risks.  
In addition, we recommend the following actions to better assess and manage 
program risk overall:  
 Assess, categorize, and individually review each technical, system, design, 
production, and business risk of a program at each milestone in the Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework.  
 Require program managers to justify new or radical approaches to design, 
production, or business processes and develop and implement risk mitigation 
plans and/or contract off -ramps.  
Table 5. Proposed Design Process Levels 
Design Processes 
1. New, unproven processes. New design tools under development. 
New design organization.  
2. Large expansion of existing design organization. Many new designers 
and supervisors unfamiliar with design tools and processes.  
3. Existing design organization using radically changed design tools, 
processes, and/or technologies.  
4. Experienced design organization using new design tools with proven 
processes.  





Table 6. Proposed Business Process Levels 
Business Processes  
1. Using a new, unproven approach to source selection. Encouraging new 
sources of supply. Acquiring new technologies without well-established cost-
estimating relationships. Requiring new government and/or contractor 
organizations to be formed.  
1. Using new procurement process in established industry. Cost-
estimating relationships only at high levels. Requires expansion of 
government and contractor organizations.  
2. Evolutionary change from prior acquisition strategies. Good cost-
estimating relationships. Existing government and contractor 
organizations can easily adapt to changes.  
3. Using same approach to buying similar products. Well-established 
cost-estimating relationships exist. Experienced government and 
contractor organizations involved.  
4. Acquiring more of what has been successfully bought before. Using 
the same contractor and government organizations.  
Although such tools would enhance the ability of program offices to assess and 
manage risk, the DoD should also consider changes in oversight. As stated at the outset of 
this paper, the current acquisition system requires review and decisions by senior officials 
on the basis of a program’s dollar value, irrespective of risk. A better use of their limited time 
may be to focus on programs with high risks, letting less-senior officials deal with lower-risk 
programs, regardless of dollar value. For example, the DoD could  
 lower the MDA level for future milestones down  
– —two levels for programs with low risk in all risk categories33 
– —one level for programs with moderate risk in all risk categories.34 
 continue to follow the patterns for decision authority as established in the 
Defense Acquisition Management System for any program with greater than 
moderate risk in any of the five categories of program risk.  
In this way, senior decision-makers might be able to better concentrate their limited 
time on the real potential problem areas in a program before problems occur, and direct 
actions to be taken to avoid and/or mitigate potential problems.  
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Test and Evaluation at the Speed of Need 
Steven J. Hutchison—Dr. Steven J. Hutchison assumed duties as Test and Evaluation Executive, 
Defense Information Systems Agency in August 2005.  Dr. Hutchison supervises the Joint 
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During this past year, Congress passed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act, which made several changes to DoD acquisition organizations and processes.  More 
recently, Congress passed, and the President signed, the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY2010, becoming Public Law 111-84, directing changes in DoD acquisition of 
information technologies (IT).  The law requires the DoD to base the new acquisition 
process on recommendations in the March 2009 Report of the Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 
Technology (hereafter DSB-IT).  The report recommends an agile model for acquiring 
information technologies (IT) similar to successful commercial practices (see 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm).  A second DSB report, also issued in March 2009, 
the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Achieving Interoperability in a Net 
Centric Environment (DSB-NC), made recommendations to ensure that IT acquisition 
delivers information-assured, interoperable capabilities essential to modern warfighting.  
Together, the reports provide a foundation on which to build the new model for acquisition 
and testing of IT; this paper attempts to connect them and fill the remaining gaps necessary 
to truly transform to agile processes that foster rapid acquisition of enhanced IT capabilities 
for the warfighter. 
Test and Evaluation at the Speed of Need 
Department of Defense acquisition is always under the watchful eye of the Congress.  
During this past year, Congress passed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 
which made several changes to DoD acquisition organizations and processes.  More 
recently, Congress passed, and the President signed, the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY2010, becoming Public Law 111-84, directing long overdue changes in DoD 
acquisition of information technologies (IT).  According to section 804, “The Secretary of 
Defense shall develop and implement a new acquisition process for information technology 
systems.”  The law requires the DoD to base the new acquisition process on 
recommendations in the March 2009 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 
Technology (hereafter DSB-IT).  The report recommends an agile model for acquiring 
information technologies (IT) similar to successful commercial practices (see 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm).  Interestingly, a second DSB report, also issued in 




Interoperability in a Net Centric Environment (DSB-NC), made recommendations to ensure 
that IT acquisition delivers information-assured, interoperable capabilities essential to 
modern warfighting.  Together, the two reports should be used as the foundation on which to 
build the new model for acquisition and testing of IT; this paper attempts to connect them 
and fill the remaining gaps necessary to truly transform to agile processes that foster rapid 
acquisition of enhanced IT capabilities for the warfighter.     
Acquisition and Testing of Information Technologies in the 
DoD 
The DoD acquires IT using the same acquisition model as tanks and ships and 
planes.   Figure 1 is the familiar Defense Acquisition Management System taken from DoD 
Instruction 5000.02.  This system essentially makes no distinction between major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP) and major automated information systems (MAIS); program 
managers for IT capabilities manage the same set of milestones and decision points and are 
subject to the same governance processes and oversight.  Make no mistake; this system 
has produced the best military equipment in the world, but in recognizing this fact, it is 
important to realize that the process works well when there is a loooooooooong time 
between user need definition (far left of chart) and declaration of Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) (subsequent to the final decision point on the chart).  Therein lies the 
problem for IT: the fundamental reason this model does not work well for IT capabilities is 
that we typically want a very short time between user need definition and IOC. 
T 
Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management System 
The DSB-IT describes the current DoD IT acquisition process as a “big bang 
approach,” meaning we try to get everything in the first increment.  The report describes the 
approach as one that “begins with an analysis phase followed by an equally long 
development phase that culminates in a single test and evaluation event.”  The DSB-IT cited 
an analysis conducted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration (ASD(NII)) of 32 major automated information systems, which showed that the 
average time to deliver an initial capability is 91 months!  Figure 2, taken from the DSB-IT 
report, summarizes the length of time spent in each phase of the acquisition system, 
according to the ASD(NII) analysis.  The DSB-IT concludes, “The conventional DoD 
acquisition process is too long and cumbersome to fit the needs of the many systems that 





Figure 2. DoD IT Acquisition Timeline 
(OUSD(AT&L), 2009a) 
The DSB-IT reached the conclusion that current acquisition policies and processes 
(as defined in the DoD 5000 series directive and instruction) “do not address the 
fundamental challenges of acquiring information technology for its range of uses in DoD.  
Instead, a new acquisition approach is needed that is consistent with rapid IT development 
cycles and software-dominated acquisitions.”  The DSB-IT proposed a new model for 
acquisition of IT, depicted in Figure 3.  The proposed model is agile, based on successful 
commercial practices, and intended to deliver capability in “release” cycles of approximately 
18 months or less.  Releases are divided into “iterations” (nominally three iterations per 
release).  Lastly, the model highlights integrated developmental test (DT) and operational 
test (OT). 
 





Test and evaluation (T&E) is an essential part of the DoD acquisition system.  Test 
and evaluation typically begins with early prototypes, and then becomes increasingly 
complex, as testing progresses from individual components to systems, then the “system of 
systems.”  Likewise, test conditions generally evolve from benign, low stress, lab 
environments through early operational assessments with a limited user base, to full scale, 
formal OT&E on production representative systems with trained users.  Figure 4 depicts the 
flow of test events, all of which are found on the right side of the “systems engineering V” 
diagram, as shown in the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Life 
Cycle Management System chart (DAU, 2009).  Despite the increased emphasis on 
“integrated testing” today, test, evaluation, and certification (TE&C) activities still concentrate 
at the end of development.  Moreover, the DoD version of the V, as depicted in the figure, 
does not connect the early test activities to the IOT&E or interoperability testing.  In an 
acquisition model designed for IT, we have to transform the traditional “one way” V into an 
iterative process; likewise, testing should be early and often (parallel versus integrated) and 
always with a mission focus. 
 
Figure 4. T&E in the Systems Engineering "V" 
One of the concerns with the process depicted in Figure 4 is that programs engage 
different test organizations at different times, or change them mid-stream.  This is 
particularly evident in the transition from the developmental tester to the independent 
operational test agent and may explain the disconnect noted above.  For IT capabilities, the 
interoperability tester and the security (information assurance) tester conduct assessments 
and report results for separate decision-making (certification) purposes.  This separation of 
test organizations and activities may have the effect of parsing information to different 
decision-makers as opposed to fusing results into a comprehensive evaluation.  As we 
develop a new IT acquisition model, we should consider a TE&C model that synchronizes 
the efforts of all test organizations towards improving capability and providing 
comprehensive information to decision-makers.   
Test and evaluation has its own “big bang” in the DoD acquisition system.  The Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), shown in Figure 1, is the culminating event in a 
T&E strategy and is necessary to achieve a fielding decision.  Title 10 USC, §139, mandates 




weapons, equipment, or munitions for use in combat by typical military users”; the DoD 5000 
applies this requirement to MAIS.  The IOT&E is a complex endeavor; it takes a long time to 
plan, requires a test unit (sometimes hard to come by in a Department at war), time to train 
the test unit and the testers, a support system, extensive data collection and analysis, and 
time to prepare reports for decision-makers.  The National Research Council observed, the 
“DoD is fast approaching a period in which a single all-encompassing large-scale 
operational test, as currently practiced, will cease to be feasible” (NRC, 2006).  For 
warfighting platforms that have long developmental timelines, an IOT&E is likely to be a 
small proportion of the total program cost and short relative to the total program schedule.  
This is another factor to consider in development of an IT acquisition model.  For IT 
capabilities following agile development, the current approach to IOT&E could have 
significant cost and schedule impact.  The question is, therefore, how to reduce the impact 
without loss in rigor and objectivity.   
Test, Evaluation, and Certification of DoD IT 
Test, evaluation, and certification for IT has several facets.  Figure 5 portrays a high-
level view of the IOT&E “test execution window” for IT capabilities.  Depicted in the figure 
are the various TE&C and supporting activities to satisfy the three decision-making 
processes necessary to field new IT capabilities:  
 joint interoperability certification from the Joint Staff J6 (JS J6),  
 information assurance certification and accreditation (IA C&A) from the 
Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA), and  
 the acquisition decision from the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).   
There are likely to be several DT activities, such as integration and acceptance 
testing, which may occur prior to or within the window.  Time must be allocated to train users 
and testers, and the programs have to implement support systems, such as the help desk, 
as intended to support the fielded system.  The IA C&A typically precedes OT to obtain an 
authority to test, while interoperability testing may be a separate activity or in conjunction 
with the OT.  All of these events set the stage for OT to confirm that the capability is ready 
for fielding.   
The timeline in Figure 5 depicts a mix of both policy and practice.  For example, 
policy requires a test concept brief 120 days prior to OT, and test plan approval 60 days 
prior, for programs on the T&E oversight list.  In practice, OT duration varies by system; 
some tests can exceed what is shown by months.  Likewise, final evaluation report 
preparation varies; the 60 days shown is probably conservative.  Hence, the IOT&E test 
execution window can exceed 6 months.  Figure 5 is not intended to imply that either 
interoperability or information assurance certification occurs within the time blocks shown, 
merely that these activities form an essential part of the IT T&E strategy and must be 





Figure 5. Test Execution Window 
 As stated above, effectiveness and suitability are not the only considerations for IT 
capabilities; information systems must also be interoperable and secure.  Interoperability 
certification and the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DIACAP) are governed separately from the DoD acquisition system through various DoD 
and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and instructions.  Separate governance 
processes can be disadvantageous in an acquisition system for IT; for example, it is 
possible today for the milestone decision authority to make a decision to buy the new 
capability for the department, while the DAA may deny operation on their network.  In a new 
IT acquisition system, interoperability and information assurance processes should be 
integrated, not separate elements, and the testing activities associated with these 
certification processes should form an integral part of the IT T&E strategy. 
Interoperability 
One of the major complaints from the field today is lack of interoperability among the 
countless information systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  In any new 
IT acquisition system, it seems clear that we are going to have to treat interoperability 
differently—elevate its place in the decision-making process and establish meaningful 
accountability.  The DoDI 5000.02 is weak in describing interoperability considerations and 
offers very little guidance on interoperability testing.  Rather than being overseen by the 
milestone decision authority, interoperability is managed through a separate decision-
making process governed by the DoD 4630 directive and instruction and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.  As a result, joint interoperability testing is not well 
integrated into the overall T&E strategy of a system; for example, is the PM responsible for 
interoperability testing or is the operational test agent (OTA)? ... Who approves the 
interoperability test plan? ... Should the JS J6 sign the T&E Master Plan (TEMP)?   
Interoperability is a key performance parameter (KPP), referred to today as the Net-
Ready KPP (NR-KPP).  The Glossary of Defense Acquisition Terms defines a KPP as a 
system characteristic “considered critical or essential to the development of an effective 
military capability.”  The interoperability KPP has not been a stable element of the 
requirements system, however, and the final report of the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) Project referred to the interoperability KPP as one “for which there is 
no method of testing.”  From August 1999 to the present, the interoperability KPP has been 
defined and redefined four times.   
The Interoperability KPP (I-KPP) was first introduced in the Requirements 




methodology for assessing the I-KPP based on “information exchange requirements” (IERs) 
followed in the May 2000 CJCSI 6212.01B.  The Joint Staff canceled the RGS in June 2003 
and implemented the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) in 
CJCSI 3170.01C, then in November 2003, the Joint Staff replaced the I-KPP with the NR-
KPP in CJCSI 6212.01C.  The NR-KPP moved away from measurable and testable IERs to 
technical compliance attributes such as the “Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference 
Model (NCOW-RM),” “key interface profiles,” and “integrated architecture products”—none 
of which were particularly well suited to “hands-on” testing.  In the March 2006 CJCSI 
6212.01D, the NR-KPP statement changed to read in more operationally meaningful terms, 
but the threshold and objective requirements retained the same technical attributes.  In 
December 2008, the NR-KPP changed again; the CJCSI 6212.01E replaced “key interface 
profiles” with the "Technical Standards/Interfaces" element, deleted the NCOW-RM, and 
introduced GIG Enterprise Service Profiles (GESPs)—again, not readily “hands-on” testable.  
Despite the continuous revisions, the NR-KPP remains arguably the least measurable and 
testable of all the required KPPs.  An operationally meaningful, measurable, and testable 
interoperability KPP will be an essential element of a new IT acquisition system. 
Information Assurance 
Information assurance (IA) is another critical element in IT acquisition and requires 
security testing.  Like interoperability, the DoDI 5000.02 is weak in describing IA 
considerations and offers little guidance on security testing.  Instead of being overseen by 
the milestone decision authority, information assurance is governed through the DoD 8500 
series and the CJCSI 6510.  The DoDI 8580.1, Information Assurance in the Defense 
Acquisition System, does link the two governance processes though.  Security T&E is 
another category of testing for which we do not have a standard approach in developing the 
overall T&E strategy; for example, who approves the security test plan? ... Should the DAA 
sign the TEMP?     
The DoD implemented IA C&A in December 1997 with the release of the DoDI 
5200.40, DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DITSCAP).  In November 2003, as threats to DoD information systems and networks were 
becoming increasingly apparent, the CJCSI 6212.01C included IA as an element of the 
newly defined NR KPP.  In July 2006, the ASD(NII) canceled DITSCAP, issued interim 
guidance, and then, in November 2007, DIACAP became the process of record with the 
release of DoDI 8510.01.  Completion of the DITSCAP or DIACAP process has essentially 
equated to satisfying the IA element of the NR KPP.  Completing the DITSCAP or DIACAP 
process, however, has never been completely satisfying in the overall T&E strategy.   
In November 1999, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) issued 
the Policy for Operational Test and Evaluation of Information Assurance.  The policy 
required the independent OTAs to assess IA as part of the system evaluation, while 
leveraging to the extent possible other IA testing, such as DITSCAP security T&E, to reduce 
duplication.  In some cases, the policy required “field penetration testing by a Red Team” as 
part of IOT&E.  Inclusion of red teams in IOT&E adds a new level of complexity into the 
already challenging and resource intensive undertaking discussed earlier.   
Unlike joint interoperability certification, which has a single process owner and single 
tester (although a recent change to the CJCSI 6212 permits testing within the components 
for designated programs), IA has many owners and many testers.  In our current IA C&A 
process, each information system has a DAA appointed by the component head or the 




to accredit, and may authorize or deny operation or testing of their assigned information 
systems.  The combined effect of multiple decision authorities and multiple test 
organizations is likely to contribute more to delay and inconsistency than efficiency and 
standardization.  The Defense Science Board Task Force on Achieving Interoperability in a 
Net Centric Environment (DSB-NC) described the problem in these terms: 
Multiple certification processes and inconsistent retest processes exist, often 
resulting in the delivery of obsolete products or products that are no longer 
supported.  Current test, evaluation, and certification (TE&C) processes take months 
and often years.  In a wartime environment where information and technical 
capability is becoming more and more critical to the warfighter, a delay of months or 
years for redundant testing to deliver a new capability is unacceptable. 
The DSB-NC observed that one cause of redundant testing is “Testing, evaluation, 
and certification that are performed by one Service or one agency are most often not 
accepted by other Services or agencies.”  The DSB-NC, therefore, recommended a new 
mandate: “test by one, accept by all.”  Recently, DoD PAAs signed a policy for reciprocity to 
accept each other’s security assessments (DoD, 2009).  This policy is a very positive step 
toward reducing redundancy and streamlining capability delivery to the enterprise. 
As stated, the DSB-IT recommended a new, agile IT acquisition system.  To its 
credit, the DSB-IT described the capability at each iteration as “tested and potentially 
deployable,” and highlighted “integrated DT/OT” (refer back to Figure 3).  Unfortunately, the 
DSB-IT retained an essentially status quo T&E approach, writing: “Following the nominal 
completion of three iterations, an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) is 
accomplished prior to operationally fielding a release.”  This may not be the most efficient 
model; for example, capability developed and tested in early iterations is likely to be tested 
again in IOT&E.  Moreover, if we conduct the IOT&E as we do it today (six months of TE&C 
activities), then the desired 18-month release cycle may in reality approach 24 months.  
More importantly, however, potentially deployable capability may be withheld from fielding 
until completion of the release and IOT&E.  While this approach has the well-intentioned 
effect of reducing the churn of multiple fieldings on the operational force, it is not agile.  
Therefore, we might consider a model in which the decision to field, whether at iteration or 
release, is at the discretion of the gaining commander.  Regardless of whether we test 
iteration or release, we are going to need a new T&E model that is responsive to agile IT 
programs.   
Towards an Agile IT Acquisition and TE&C System 
The preceding sections have made the case that acquisition of information 
technology in the DoD consists of multiple processes that do not necessarily share the goal 
of rapid delivery of enhanced capabilities to the warfighter.  We lack an overarching process 
specifically designed for fielding IT capabilities to the enterprise.  Likewise, we have 
challenges to overcome to create truly integrated TE&C processes that ensure capabilities 
are effective, suitable, interoperable, and secure. 
From beginning to end—requirements definition, capability development, TE&C, 
governance, and operations—the department lacks agile processes designed for IT.  An 
agile IT acquisition model must begin with agility in the requirements system; thus, one 
consideration (beyond the scope of this article) would be to develop a “JCIDS-light” 
requirements system for IT.  An agile IT requirements system must shift from the current big 




in a series of little bangs.  Additionally, we need operationally meaningful KPPs for 
interoperability and security. 
An agile IT acquisition model requires agile oversight, so management and 
governance processes must be redesigned to foster rapid development and fielding cycles.  
DoD business IT systems have already moved to a “business capability lifecycle” (BCL) 
management process intended to be more flexible.  The BCL “merges three major DoD 
processes [JCIDS, the DoD 5000 Acquisition System, and the Investment Review Board 
(IRB)/Defense Business System Management Committee (DBSMC) governance bodies] to 
provide a single governance and decision support framework to enable faster delivery of 
business capabilities” (http://www.bta.mil/products/bcl.html).  The BCL leverages the 
Enterprise Risk Assessment Methodology (ERAM) “to reduce systemic risk and support 
informed decision making” (http://www.bta.mil/products/eram.html).  Similar governance 
approaches could be adopted within the warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise information 
environment portfolios as well. 
As requirements processes become more agile, programs will shift to design-build 
cycles based on prioritized requirements.  Whereas the traditional systems engineering “V” 
model has the perception of being a one-way path, the agile development lifecycle is more 
iterative, less sequential.  The TE&C community must be ready to engage agile programs 
through equally agile processes; the six-month test execution window that occurs at the end 
of an increment today has to be shortened and moved well left in the schedule, to focus on 
the development iterations.  A key element of tester agility will be formation of a capability 
test team to merge the traditional DT, OT, interoperability, and security test activities into a 
comprehensive TE&C strategy. 
Our objective in T&E should be mission-focused agility: rapidly composable mission-
oriented test plans that permit objective assessments of technical and operational 
capabilities and limitations in each iteration.  Likewise, we need agile DIACAP and 
interoperability certification, where “test by one, accept by all” is the norm.  For capabilities 
developed in six-month iterations, the capability test team should be able to complete the 
entire test execution window—plan, execute, report—in six-weeks or less.  Figure 6 depicts 
the TE&C paradigm shift.  This can be accomplished only through a highly collaborative 
process that is responsive to changing requirements priorities and developer agility.  
Essential to this approach will be early and continuous involvement from the user 
community.  In this model, the overarching theme is “build a little, test a little (learn a lot), 
field a little.”  Then, as capabilities are deployed, the fielding paradigm should be “start 
small, scale rapidly,” while continuously monitoring to ensure the capability performs as 





Figure 6. Agile T&E 
Summary 
Information technologies evolve rapidly, as is abundantly evident in the commercial 
sector.  As the DoD acquires IT to enhance warfighting capabilities, we need to become 
more agile. Agility cannot just occur in capability development either; all aspects of the IT 
acquisition system must be redesigned for agility.  To be responsive to operational 
requirements, and to ensure the capabilities work as intended, test, evaluation, and 
certification must move at the speed of need.  The Defense Science Board reports provide a 
good starting point from which to build a new model for acquisition of IT; now, let’s take the 
next bold step to implement agile processes that deliver enhanced IT capabilities for the 
warfighter.     
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 Bridging System T&E from DT to OT 
 Strengthening Early Developmental Testing Rapid Acquisition T&E 
The foundation for future, successful, project-level, Defense T&E, especially in a Net-
Centric environment, will be the early creation of an Integrated T&E Team (ITT).  This 
presentation delineates a model for the successful development of a project-level ITT.  
Included are recommendations about how to maximize the use of  the ITT throughout the 
System Development Life Cycle.  The model describes methods to enhance the product’s 
acceptability to the users and helps apply a better use of limited testing resources. When 
applied, the model will help with the design and implementation of an ITT.  
Topic Addressed  
The presentation specifically looks at how to improve the quality of the product while 
helping to shorten the time to market. The model focuses on the inter-relationships of the 
four members of the T&E community—Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E), 
Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E), Interoperability (IOP), and Information Assurance 
(IA)—and outlines techniques for eliminating or reducing the effects of  the current “Silo” 
testing methodology.  
New DoD systems architectures and hardware have made it intuitively clear that 
testing must be seriously updated and replaced with an agile, streamlined tactic for Net-
Centric systems that will help assure that the warfighters have the critical information they 
need to perform their mission successfully.    
Relevance to Conference Theme  
DoD T&E must advance into the integrated world in order to be successful in all the 
facets of a Net-Centric environment. New technological designs, including Family of 
Systems and Service-Oriented Architecture, require a more flexible T&E. The ITT concept 
comprises a series of progressive system verification and qualification processes that are 




Panel #8 – Bid Protests: Considerations for 
Prevention and Resolution 
 
Wednesday, May 12, 2010 
1:45 p.m. – 
3:15 p.m. Chair: Lenn Vincent, RADM, USN, (Ret.), Industry Chair, Defense Acquisition University 
Understanding and Mitigating Protests of Major Defense System 
Acquisition Contracts   
Steven Maser and G. Frederick Thompson, Willamette University 
Innovations in Defense Acquisition: Bid Protests 
Peter Coughlan and Bill Gates, Naval Postgraduate School 
Better Acquisition Management Through ADR and Other Practices for 
Preventing and Resolving Bid Protests  







Understanding and Mitigating Protests of Major 
Defense System Acquisition Contracts 
Steven Maser—Steven Maser is a Professor of Public Management and Public Policy at Willamette 
University’s Atkinson Graduate School of Management. His courses are about public policy, business 
and government relationships, negotiation, and conflict management. He has served on numerous 
boards and commissions, most recently chairing Portland’s citizens’ task force on bringing 
professional soccer to the City. Professor Maser, who holds degrees in Political Science from MIT 
and from the University of Rochester, has been a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, the Olin School 
of Business at Washington University in St. Louis, and the Hatfield School of Government at Portland 
State University. His academic research has appeared in journals such as the Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy; the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; the Journal of Law and 
Economics; the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, the Journal of Politics, and the 
American Journal of Political Science. He is on the editorial board of Rationality and Society. Maser 
has consulted on organizational design and conflict management for energy and construction 
engineering companies. 
Fred Thompson—Fred Thompson is the founding editor of International Public Management 
Journal. He is the author of Responsibility Budgeting at the Air Force Materiel Command, Public 
Administration Review (Jan/Feb 2006, with Michael Barzelay), Reinventing the Pentagon (1994, with 
LR Jones), Digital State at the Leading Edge (2007, with Sandy Borins, Ken Kernaghan, David 
Brown, Nick Bontis, and Perri 6) and over a hundred other books and articles in journals such as the 
Academy of Management Review, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Public Choice, and 
the American Political Science Review.  
Mr. Thompson has served as a contributing editor to Policy Sciences and Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis, and on more than a dozen other editorial boards, currently including, Public Money 
and Management and Public Budgeting & Finance. He is the recipient of PAR’s Mosher Award, the 
NASPAA-ASPA Distinguished Research Award, and ABFM’s Aaron B. Wildavsky Award for lifetime 
contributions to the field of public budgeting and finance. He recently served on the NRC-NIM’s 
Committee on Accelerating the Research, Development, and Acquisition of Medical 
Countermeasures against Biological Warfare Agents and as a member of the United Nations 
Development Program’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Macedonia. He has consulted on Treasury 
practice and policy in Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. 
Mr. Thompson is the Grace and Elmer Goudy Professor of Public Management and Policy, Geo. M. 
Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon. During his most 
recent sabbatical, he was a visiting professor in the Department of Management and senior fellow in 
the Centre for Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics. 
Abstract 
The proposed research explores whether features of the source solicitation 
process—from the identification of need through contract award and potential protest—
trigger bid protests. Building upon concepts drawn from transaction cost economics and 
dispute systems design, we explore patterns and elements in GAO-digested decisions 
posted during 2001-2009. We interviewed over 25 decision-makers spread across three 
contracting commands, three prime contractors, bid protest attorneys, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Senate staff, industry trade associations, and the GAO.  
The research treats the source solicitation process—contracting and protests—as a 




(e.g., knowledge, skills and aptitudes), structure, and monitoring elements (e.g., 
performance measures). Misalignments can set the stage for errors that trigger protests.   
Preliminary analyses are consistent with implications from our conceptual approach. 
We find no significant differences in protests and sustains as a function of weapon vs. 
nonweapon acquisitions. However, the bulk of the protests are small- to medium-sized, 
rejected offerors protesting small- to medium-sized awardees, particularly for contracts of 
long duration and high uncertainty in which evaluation is particularly difficult. Large 
companies with substantial knowledge and resources tend to be more successful in 
protesting, regardless of the size of the awardee.  Analysis of the interview data suggests 
there exist management practices that expose source selections to higher risks of error that 
could generate protests. The paper concludes with recommendations, some of which are 
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The research will explore bid protests from the contractor’s viewpoint. To accomplish 
this, we must first ask, "what are the contractor’s goals and objectives in protesting?" The 
answer is likely “profit maximization” (i.e., a return to shareholders). We must also ask "what 
constrains the contractor’s behavior?" Economists assume contractors are rational players 
(constrained by shareholder/owners) and are likely to engage in a benefit-cost analysis to 
determine whether or not to protest, where the benefit from protesting is the expected value 
of winning (probability of winning $x payoff), and the cost includes the cost of filing the 
protest and any additional costs (reputation effects, etc.). In deciding whether or not to 
protest, a company will weigh the discounted present value (or option value) of their 
expected benefits against the costs. This research stream will develop a split procurement 
model in which the contractor’s share of the final contract depends on the contractor’s 
relative procurement costs; the closer the relative costs, the more equal the procurement 
shares. Splitting the procurement lowers the contractor’s probability of profits from winning 
the protest; at the same time, it may increase the DoD's procurement costs. This model 
examines the tradeoff between expected profits from a contract protest and the DoD's 
procurement costs. Research Issue Develop is a procurement model that generates testable 
hypotheses about the DoD's Return on Investment (ROI) of using a split procurement to 




Simulation results examine the tradeoff between the contractor's expected profits from a bid 
protest and the DoD's procurement costs. 
This model is part of a technical report expected in December 2009 as the 
deliverable from our FY2009 funded research project. The presentation will summarize 
completed research.  
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Executive Summary 
Recently, defense leadership and Congress have expressed concerns over costs 
and delays from bid protests of procurement contracts.  This paper addresses these 
concerns by examining how well the buying agencies, particularly military agencies, manage 
the bid protest process to save time and taxpayers’ dollars.  Specifically, the paper 
examines the extent to which the buying agencies utilize all strategies authorized for 




manageable part of the acquisition process—an approach fundamentally different from the 
typical implicit treatment of bid protests as a legal process controlled by legal nuances and 
not generally susceptible to management.   
Successful resolutions of protests depends on a number of factors, including 
government and private-sector protest management and litigation strategies, Alternate 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) policies of federal agencies, legal and regulatory requirements, 
and remedies available to contractors.  The paper examines these factors in five ways.  
First, the paper converts legal rules and procedural milestones into an acquisition manager’s 
guide to managing bid protests at various stages of the procurement process and in various 
legal forums.  This guide identifies key decision points in the protest process and enables 
managers to make informed trade-offs between time, cost, and positional advantages 
offered by the various prevention, resolution, and defense strategies.   To that end, the 
paper identifies and analyzes best ADR practices and other remedies and preventions for 
resolving bid protests.  Areas examined include processes and remedies utilized by selected 
federal agencies and obstacles to improved cooperation between industry and government 
that may preclude win-win resolutions to bid protests.  Guidance on the most efficient 
strategies in terms of delay and cost reduction is offered.    
Second, the paper contains a survey of acquisition and legal professionals regarding 
their perceptions, opinions, and recommendations on bid protest practices and the use of 
ADR procedures.   Survey objectives were to identify ADR and other process improvement 
recommendations that are crucial to effective contracting and support the government’s 
efforts to improve adjudicative forums for resolution of contract disputes and bid protests.  
Research suggests that agencies can mitigate protest expenses and interruptions by 
managing the protest process in a systematic, business-like way.  At the present time, 
agencies rarely use most procedural tools that are required or authorized under federal laws 
and regulations to reduce time delays and costs from bid protests.   
Third, the paper examines some common objections to the use of ADR practices and 
other protest time- and cost-mitigation strategies. 
Fourth, the paper applies the bid protest management paradigm to selected actual 
procurements and highlights where the agencies could have achieved lower costs or faster 
procurements with different protest management strategies.    
Fifth, the paper makes recommendations for buying agencies and procurement 
policymakers.  Among other things, the paper recommends energetic agency approaches to 
preventing disputes (e.g., quality debriefings), and dealing with disputes (e.g., formal cost-
benefit analysis of agency defense strategies, strong defense of agency actions, and full use 
of ADR methods).  The paper also recommends measures to ensure ADR as the default 
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Abstract   
The reuse of software and related artifacts is a key tenant of DoD acquisition 
improvement initiatives, including the Naval Open Architecture program.  While there are 
many inhibitors of reuse, software repositories are considered enablers in that they provide 
a central store of artifacts as well as capabilities for search, retrieval, and reconfiguration of 
existing components into newly developed systems.  However, current software repositories 
lack robust search and discovery capabilities and are thus limited enablers.   
This research expands on previous efforts to reform the organizational approach to 
software repositories by using ontologies as the framework of repository information.  By 
combining metadata with domain, architectural, and other information, more sophisticated 
search techniques are enabled.  In this paper, we describe the approach and demonstrate, 
through a use case, a new type of search that takes advantage of the context provided by 
the ontologies and emphasizes human interaction.  New navigation techniques will be 
employed that guide human users, offering suggestions based on projected needs. The 
improved search capability will encourage developers to consider reuse and improve the 
software reuse enabling power of software repositories. 
Introduction 
Architectural and other information about software systems may be captured in a 
domain-specific ontological framework for a software repository to enable new types of 
searches.  The relations in the ontology are used to determine associations between 
repository artifacts to facilitate intuitive navigation.  A fisheye graph view enables 
visualization of artifacts within a contextual framework that provides suggestions based on 
users’ actions.  The emphasis is to provide a rich human interface that maximizes the 
combined knowledge of both the community of human users and the computer-based 
repository system.  Capturing ontologies in standard formats results in an extensible 
framework, which can easily be shared between multiple repositories using XML-based 
technologies, thereby improving interoperability.   
The initial target of the research is the US Navy’s Software, Hardware Asset Reuse 
Enterprise (SHARE) repository.   In 2007, researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) were tasked to develop a component specification and ontology for the SHARE 




ontology provide a rich structural and semantic framework for SHARE that enables multiple 
kinds of search and discovery techniques.  Follow on work was assigned to develop designs 
for a software repository tool that will fully utilize the repository framework to improve the 
usefulness of SHARE.  This paper captures the results of the effort with the intention of 
illustrating how the approach can be extended to additional applications and domains. 
Current State of the Art 
Improvements to the current state of the art for software reuse repositories are 
required (Shiva & Shala, 2007).  Current software reuse repositories such as SourceForge 
(http://sourceforge.net) and Comprehensive Perl Archive Network (CPAN) 
(http://www.cpan.org) typically enable search and discovery of software artifacts through 
keyword searches over metadata or browsing through metadata via broad categories of 
artifacts (i.e., faceted classification) (Guo & Luqi, 2000).  This approach is only effective in 
relatively small repositories or in situations where the users are well familiar with the 
contents of the repository.  This is because successful discovery depends on the searchers’ 
ability to express the desired results in the same vocabulary used by the artifact submitter or 
repository manager.  In other words, if you know exactly what you are looking for, and how 
to ask for it, you will find it. 
Search tools are not designed to aid users that do not already know the desired 
outcome of the search.  A repository interface should guide searchers through the discovery 
process based on the users’ context, suggesting search threads and recommending items 
for retrieval.  However, current repositories do not support this type of repository navigation.   
Current repositories in general do not relate artifacts to any context other than 
characterizations identified within the metadata.  These typical characterizations enable a 
list-type search result, similar to the popular children’s card game “Go Fish.”  Users can 
request, “Give me all of your artifacts of type xyz.”  Unfortunately, if you don’t know what you 
want, you cannot ask for it.  If you ask for artifacts of type xyz and there are no artifacts 
labeled as such in the repository, the search ends (go fish).  Without contextual linkages 
between artifacts in the repository, guided searches are not possible.  But, with a guided 
search, the system can recommend other potential solutions based on a given context.    
Proposed Improvements  
This research aims to produce a new kind of software repository that addresses the 
current shortfalls.  There are four design characteristics that constitute the novelty of the 
approach.   
First we take a broad view of reuse.  Although reusable software artifacts are often 
defined to include any product related to the development of software, typical software 
repositories enable only the reuse of code or executable files and maybe some architecture 
and design products.  We consider all types of artifacts from the software engineering life 
cycle—including requirements, test scripts, etc.—and plan for them in the design.   
Second, we propose the use of ontologies to provide the contextual framework for 
the repository.  We will show how these ontologies can be used to guide users to discover 
artifacts that they may find useful.   
Third, we will exploit the use of domain-specific information in our repository design.  
By narrowing the reuse efforts to a particular domain, we increase our likelihood of 
developing a repository that will be relevant to the user group.  In the same way that 




line development approach, a reuse repository is likely to be most successfully employed if it 
embodies, and is limited to, the domain knowledge base.   
Finally, we propose the use of multiple views that will allow the user to view the 
repository contents in a comfortable visual arrangement for their particular use, depending 
on the experience of the user.  The multiple views approach is analogous to Kruchten’s 
multiple views of software architecture as depicted in his famous “4+1” paper (Kruchten, 
1995).   
Paper Organization 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section two, we describe the 
proposed repository system.  In section three, we provide a use case demonstration of the 
repository functionality.  Sections four and five provide discussions of relevant related work, 
a summary, and suggested related future work. 
A New Repository Tool 
We propose the development of a new software repository tool that will encourage 
improved (increased and more effective) reuse of software artifacts by presenting 
information about the contents of the repository to the user in ways that allow the user to 
project their individual context onto the repository.  Here we consider the user’s context to 
include their instantaneous progress in the development process at the time of search, the 
system modeling paradigms with which they are comfortable (e.g., UML or DODAF), and 
their understanding of the particular domain for which they are developing systems.  
In this section we will present the key features of the new repository tool, including 
an explanation of what is meant by the guided search and descriptions of the proposed 
ontology-based repository framework and envisioned visualization techniques.  
Guided Search 
The tool will support the human user by enabling smart navigation of the repository 
contents based on information collected.  It is important to note that we can never 
completely automate the search process if we intend to incorporate unique user situations 
into the search algorithms.  Therefore, the tool we suggest will guide the user through a 
search but cannot complete the search on its own.  This is an important claim since the 
resulting necessary interaction between human and machine is an essential feature of the 
tool. 
We envision a graphical “point and click” user interface that enables navigation of 
repository contents reflecting user interests.  This requires an interface that allows users to 
project their context onto the search mechanisms.  In other words, the users bring particular 
information needs and goals based on the problem they are trying to solve.  For example, 
users may seek particular functionality best obtained through a functional organization of the 
information in the repository; they may seek particular artifacts best obtained through a 
document resource organization of the information; or, they may seek information on certain 
testing methodologies that have been applied so that a work activity organization of the 
information would best apply.  
In our approach, relationships among assets and artifacts are recorded in the 
repository ontology framework, allowing users to navigate to and select artifacts based on 




initiate and direct the search at key moments.  The items that are shown most prevalently to 
the user are determined by a prioritization scheme that takes into account previous user 
actions.  Additionally, the user has the ability to “turn off” the relationships that are not 
helpful for the current search objectives.  These capabilities are demonstrated in more detail 
for the SHARE repository in section three. 
Repository Framework 
In this section, we describe the framework for the repository that enables the 
functionality described.  In (Johnson & Blais,  2008), we proposed two major aspects for this 
framework: a component specification and ontology. The component specification is a 
description or model of the items in the repository and consists of both typical metadata and 
a behavioral model of the component.  The ontology describes concepts and relationships to 
create various perspectives or contexts for examining the contents of the repository. These 
aspects of the framework are discussed further below. 
Component Specification—Metadata 
The metadata for each artifact should incorporate all necessary data for discovery 
and implementation.  The metadata will aid repository users in determining if the item is 
suited for their use and will provide information about how to use the asset when it is 
retrieved.  We refer to the “standard” or “typical” metadata since there are many existing 
examples of metadata similar in concept to that developed for the SHARE repository.  The 
intent of the metadata is to describe artifacts and assets contained in the repository in 
sufficient detail to aid the repository user in determining if the item is worth retrieving for a 
particular use. 
To be clear, we must provide our definition of two terms.  The Navy Open 
Architecture (OA) program has adopted similar definitions for asset and artifact as those 
used in the Object Management Group (OMG) Reusable Asset Specification (RAS).  In the 
RAS, artifacts are defined as “any work products from the software development lifecycle,” 
and assets are a grouping of artifacts that “provide a solution to a problem for a given 
context” (Object Management Group, 2005).  Accordingly, the RAS describes an approach 
for packaging artifacts into an asset.  This is consistent with the current SHARE approach 
and remains consistent in the proposed metadata XML schema described here.  Artifacts 
are described individually and the asset description consists of the listing of artifacts 
included for that asset along with some descriptive information (see Figure 1). 
The artifacts schema is designed to be flexible in its implementation.  All elements, 
types, and attributes in the schema are defined globally to facilitate reuse. The root element, 
Artifacts, is simply a container for any number of artifacts contained in a single instance of 
the schema.  A specific artifact can be incorporated into the file in one of three ways—by 
providing the full artifact description or by reference, either to a physical location or by URL. 
The guts of the artifact metadata are captured in the ArtifactDescription sub-element 
of the full artifact description.  The information necessary to describe the artifacts differs 
depending on whether the artifact is software code or some other type.  Therefore, the 
schema allows a choice between two types of artifact descriptions as shown in Figure 2. 
The NonCodeDescription element applies to any artifact not considered software code.  The 
group of elements contained therein (shown in Figure 3) is also required for artifacts that fall 
under the CodeDescription element category, but additional elements are required for code 




Detailed descriptions of each element of the SHARE metadata schema are available in 
(Johnson & Blais, 2008). 
While much of the metadata described is lacking in novelty, a subset of the elements 
identified as part of the NonCodeDescription element begins to reveal the unique approach 
we have developed.  First, the ArtifactType, ApplicableSystems, and 
ObjectiveArchitectureTags all serve the specific purpose of relating individual repository 
artifacts to the ontological framework described later in the section.  Second, the 
SoftwareBehaviorDescription element is a specific focus of the design.  Since this piece of 
the component specification is not commonly incorporated into repositories in a 
standardized manner, we feel it is a specific focus area to identify the appropriate 
representation mechanisms for software behavior in the repository context. 
 
 
Figure 1. Asset Element35 
                                                
35 Diagrams of the XML structures have been 
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Figure 3. NonCodeDescription Element 
 
Component Specification—Software Behavior Description 
One of the loftier goals of a software repository is to support automatic composition 
of systems from reusable components.  This is a difficult problem, which many have tried to 
solve.36  It is especially difficult if the components were not originally designed for reuse.  As 
a necessary first step towards more sophisticated uses of a repository, behavioral 
descriptions must be machine readable in order to support automated search and discovery.  
Furthermore, the behavior descriptions must be formalized and consistently applied to each 
item in the repository if the intent is to automatically compose them into a larger functioning 
system. 
The array of contributors to SHARE and non-homogeneity of the repository contents 
requires caution in dictating standards that impact the development processes of the asset 
developers.  It would not, for example, make sense to insist on a specific component 
technology across all Navy software programs in order to standardize the interface 
protocols. Yet, this is the type of precision required to truly enable software composition from 
reusable components.  Recognizing that we fall short of this goal for this phase of the effort, 
                                                
36 The proceedings from the International Symposium on Software Composition, an annual event, provide 
examples of research into the breadth of research topics currently being pursued in the area of software 




we have sought a balance between method robustness and ease of implementation in our 
software behavior specification.   
In our approach, component behavior is potentially captured in two ways (as shown 
in Figure 4).  First, the functionality of the software related to the artifact is identified by a list 
of functions selected from the Navy’s Common System Function List (CSFL).  The Navy’s 
CSFL is a listing of functions that are performed by Navy systems.  It provides a 
standardized taxonomy for the functionality found in this application domain.  We have 
converted the CSFL into an ontology expressed in the Web Ontology Language (OWL), and 
acceptable entries for the CommonSystemFunction metadata element are validated against 
this ontology.  If we require asset submitters to state the functionality of the components in 
these terms, we can then build the tools to guide users in selecting desired behavior in the 
same terms. 
 
Figure 4. SoftwareBehaviorDescription Element 
Second, the interface information may be captured as a Web Service Description 
Language (WSDL) document.  In this research, we explored characterization of software 
interfaces based on current and emerging Web Services (e.g., WSDL) and Semantic Web 
Services (e.g., WS-BPEL, OWL-S) approaches. The work is preliminary, and it will be 
necessary to adopt a more precise description of code artifacts to introduce these 
techniques. As a start, we included the option of inserting a WSDL description of software 
services in the SoftwareBehaviorDescription element.   
As the DoD moves toward Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), services may 
become a more frequent part of the SHARE repository. In that case, the WSDL describing 
those services (often automatically generated by the software development or execution 
environment of modern software systems) can be directly utilized in the repository to provide 
a detailed view of the service interfaces and operations. For software that is not developed 
and deployed as services, it is still feasible for public methods within the software to be 
parsed automatically to create WSDL-like descriptions. These may be incomplete 
descriptions with respect to full compliance to WSDL structures, but could still provide a 
well-defined way to describe the software for search and discovery. 
Ontology Framework 
The ontology framework provides contextual semantics  that describe relationships 
among items in the repository to aid in associating artifacts with users’ needs.  It includes 
descriptions of the relationships of the components to form a contextual model of the 
repository items.   
The taxonomies/ontologies we developed for SHARE are based on several types of 
relationships between the items in the repository, as well as with relevant domain 




software engineering lifecycle, its architectural fit in its original system, its architectural fit in 
any system in which it was subsequently used, and identification of the component’s fit in 
the Surface Navy Objective Architecture.  Each of these ontologies is described in this 
section.  
Software Lifecycle-Artifact Ontology 
The software lifecycle-artifact ontology relates software artifacts to activities in the 
software engineering lifecycle.  Aside from the “has subclass” relationship that exists in the 
software artifacts and lifecycle activities taxonomies, there are four additional properties that 
link these class structures: 
 mayProduceArtifact—For each lifecycle activity, identifies which artifacts are 
most commonly produced as a result of that activity.  The inverse property is 
oftenDevelopedDuring.  The property maps items in the LifecyclePhases class 
(domain of the property) to the SoftwareArtifact class (range of the property). 
 oftenDevelopedDuring—For each artifact, identifies the activity or activities that 
most commonly produce it.  The inverse property is mayProduceArtifact.  The 
property maps items in the SoftwareArtifact class (domain) to the 
LifecyclePhases class (range). 
 mayRequireUseOf—For each lifecycle activity, identifies the most commonly 
needed artifacts.  The inverse property is oftenUsedDuring.  The property maps 
items in the LifecyclePhases class (domain) to the SoftwareArtifact class (range). 
 oftenUsedDuring—For each artifact, identifies the activity or activities in which it 
is most commonly needed.  The inverse property is mayRequireUseOf.  The 
property maps items in the SoftwareArtifact class (domain) to the 
LifecyclePhases class (range). 
To demonstrate, a diagram showing the relations captured for the 
RequirementsSpecification and RequirementsDatabase classes of the software artifact 






Figure 5. Properties Assigned to RequirementsSpecification and 
RequirementsDatabase Classes (developed using Jambalaya tab in Protégé)37 
Objective Architecture Taxonomy 
This taxonomy represents the decomposition of the common architecture for Navy 
combat systems, and was built directly from the already existing Surface Combat System 
Top-Level Objective Architecture.  The taxonomy enables the repository system to correlate 
artifacts that have similar relationships based on commonality within the architecture to 
suggest them as possible items for retrieval.   
System-SubSystem Ontologies 
Here we provide one example (Figure 6) of how systems/subsystems and their 
interfaces can be captured as an ontology to complement the repository framework.  Our 
recommendation is that ontologies be developed to capture each of the systems contained 
in the repository.  As mentioned previously, the system/subsystem taxonomies would be 
used to verify the entries for the System and Subsystem elements in the metadata in order 
to assign artifacts to classes and subclasses (as individuals) within the ontology.  Once 
these are assigned, the repository application could derive interface and other relationships 
from the ontology.   
Each piece of the repository framework enhances the search capabilities in different 
ways.  The basic metadata in the XML schemas provide search criteria for finding 
components of interest in the repository as well as specific information about the artifacts to 
determine if they are appropriate for retrieval. OWL taxonomies and ontologies enable 
identification of functionality and associated resources that may be beneficial to users. In 
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short, the metadata is evaluated to enable retrieval decisions, the software behavior 
representations enable searches based on functionality, and the ontologies point the user to 
helpful artifacts that they may not have initially considered.  
 
Figure 6. System Ontology Example (Aegis) (Jambalaya Graphic in 
Protégé) 
Visualization 
The tool must provide visualization techniques that will exploit the contextual 
information captured in the ontology and enable guided search capabilities.  We suggest 
that multiple visualization tools be made available so that users can view the repository 
context and contents in a familiar setting. 
One example of the type of tool that will be supported by the framework is a fish-eye 
graph. Fish-eye graphs display objects of interest to users, along with the relationships the 
objects have with other items. As the relationships interesting to users are explored, the 
graph highlights the item and brings it to the front of the display. Users can then weed out 
uninteresting items by removing from view the relationships that are not important. The 
results are a single or small grouping of items that users have found interesting with 
supporting information available by the click of a mouse. 
Since domain information is captured in the repository framework, other architectural 
views may be used to present the repository contents in a display that is familiar to the user.  
For example, various views from the Department of Defense Architectural Framework 
(DoDAF) may be used as the backdrop to artifact nodes in order to provide a frame of 




groupings may also be represented as UML diagrams to allow for easy interpretation by 
software developers.   
 
 
Figure 7. Screen Template 
Use Case Demonstration 
Here we describe, omitting some details, a use case scenario for the new tool to 
bring to light how each of the major features of the repository framework comes into play.  
This represents one possible scenario of interaction between a user and the repository 
system.  The system reactions are described in terms of the individual windows on the 
screen that will update based on human-driven events.  These windows include the 
Navigation Pane, Results Pane, User Blogs, Frequently Asked Questions, and Helpful 
Links, as shown in Figure 7. 
In this scenario, the users need to build a replacement for a particular subsystem of 
the Aegis combat system, generically termed “Submodule B.”  They consult the SHARE 
repository to find artifacts that will help in the development of the requirements for the new 
subsystem.  Potentially, there are requirements for an existing system that can be reused.  
There may also be additional artifacts to be discovered that may be helpful in the 
requirements development process.  When the tool is first initiated, an initial (home) screen 









The initial navigation pane includes a short welcome and some guidance for how to 
get started.  There is a list of initial questions that helps the system orient the view 
specifically for the user.  These questions are intended to provide a starting point for the 
guided search by “anchoring” the initial search results appropriately within the ontologies 
based on relevant information provided by answering simple questions.  If the user does not 
care to answer the questions, the guided search can begin immediately by pressing the 
SEARCH button.  Tips are provided as popup windows that can be opened by left-clicking 
the hyperlink if the user is not sure how to get going, or if he is unsure about how to answer 
specific questions.  The most often retrieved artifacts are presented as the default “results” 
in the result pane.  Blogs that pertain to the repository system as a whole are presented 
(those with the most activity listed first) in the user blogs pane.  The most often asked 
questions are provided, with a link to additional questions, in the FAQ pane.  The questions 
displayed pertain to the entire repository.  Finally, links to general information about the 
repository, related repositories identified by stakeholders, and other locations relevant to the 
content of the repository (Navy Open Architecture) are displayed in the helpful links pane. 
The available answers in the drop down menus for each of the initial questions are 
dependent on the ontologies represented in the repository framework.  As the questions are 
answered, each of the panes is updated to reflect each choice.  A priority scheme is applied 
after each user selection, and items ranked highest according to the scheme may appear in 
the display if applicable.  After a user has answered all questions in this scenario, the 
individual panes may appear as in Figure 9.  The chosen answers appear in the drop down 
windows of the navigation pane.  All other panes have been updated to reflect the choices 
made by the user to this point.  The results, user blogs, FAQs, and helpful links panes all 
show reprioritized items that are associated with the requirements activity, the surface 
domain, the Aegis system, and Submodule B, where applicable.  Additionally, items that are 
not specifically tagged to each of these selections may be listed based on the graphical 
distance captured through the use of the ontology relations. 
 




Once the user has selected the appropriate answers to each question, the SEARCH 
button is pressed.  Since the default view was chosen, the navigation pane switches to the 
fisheye view of the repository contents (Figure 10).  The fisheye view presents the artifacts 
of the repository as a graph that centers on the most relevant items.  The positioning and 
size of the artifacts in the fisheye graph are determined by the prioritization scheme applied 
after certain user actions.  The connectors between artifacts are the relations captured in the 
ontologies.  Each of the types of relations is listed in an interactive menu that allows the user 
to turn the relations off and on depending on interest.  
Additional features of the fisheye navigation include: 
 Pop-up windows for artifacts and relations—Activated by mouse-scrolling 
actions, the artifact pop-up window contains a subset of the metadata for the 
artifact (see  
 ).  The relation pop-up window describes how the two connected artifacts are 
related. 
 Artifact detail page—Left-clicking on an artifact node opens an artifact detail 
page, which provides more of the artifact metadata. 
 Action window—Right-clicking on an artifact node opens a drop-down action 
window that allows the user to open more information about the artifact or add it 
to the retrieval listing. 
 





Figure 11. Artifact Pop-Up Window 
Users can also add an item to their retrieval listing by selecting the option from the 
results pane.  Each time the user selects an item for retrieval, the prioritization scheme is 
reapplied and each of the panes is updated to reflect the highest priority items.   
After choosing all interesting items, the user selects Retrieval->Retrieve Items from 
the navigation pane drop down menu.  A separate window is provided that contains the 
user’s choices to this point, as shown in Figure 12.  Select metadata is presented in addition 
to the names of artifacts to help the user review the list.  The user can modify the list by 
deleting anything deemed irrelevant at this point.  When the user is satisfied that the list of 
desired items is complete, the user presses the RETRIEVE button. 
 
Figure 12. Retrieval List 
Information is provided to assist the user in requesting and retrieving the items.  Any 
items available for immediate download are made available using appropriate hyperlinks.  
Items that require request/approval processes are also enabled through a step-by-step 




intellectual property limitations, such as the SHARE repository.  If the Ontology Based 
Software Reuse Repository System is developed for an open source repository, it should be 
possible to simply provide links to the artifacts themselves.  In this case, it would be 
desirable to replace the “Retrieve” column in the results pane with a “Download” column, 
and to add a menu option for downloading the artifact when the user right-clicks on an item 
in the navigation pane.  
Related Work 
Sugumaran and Storey propose the use of domain knowledge in repositories to aid 
in the natural language processing of queries for component retrieval (Sugumaran & Storey, 
2003).  In their prototype system, the ontology captures synonyms and relations between 
objects in the domain.  The system enables the user to enter queries using natural 
language, and the ontology enables more coverage in the returned items by including items 
that contain the relations captured in the ontology.   
This work is closely related to the system proposed herein, since they both address 
some limitations of traditional keyword and faceted classification-based searches.  However, 
there are several key differences.  First, the Sugumaran et al. ontology is limited to a single 
view of the typical objects and terms within a specific application domain; whereas our 
approach includes multiple views as described.  Second, the visualization enabled by the 
ontology is vastly different.  In the Sugumaran et al. approach, syntactic analysis is 
conducted on a query entered through a free text interface, resulting in lists of processes, 
actions, and matching or related components that the user can then choose to view in more 
detail.  Our approach enables the user to navigate the repository contents in a more 
interactive way.  Finally, the use of the ontology to provide a lexicon for matching terms is 
extended in our approach since artifacts in the repository are captured as individual items in 
the ontology classes.  This approach provides wider use of the ontology in representation of 
repository contents and user interaction.   
Yao and Etzkom also focus on the use of ontologies for enhancing search retrieval 
based on natural language queries.  They extend the idea by suggesting the use of 
Semantic Web technologies such as RDFS/DAML+OIL to apply the methodology to the 
World Wide Web as a large software repository  (Yao & Etzkorn, 2004).   
Summary and Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented an ontology-based approach for the development 
of a software reuse repository.  Our claim is that the knowledge captured by the ontologies 
enables new ways of discovering desired software artifacts based on computer aided 
navigation rather than the more traditional query/response discovery.  We described the 
repository framework that provides the contextual depth to support such navigation and 
demonstrated the approach using a use case.   
Throughout the project we have identified several areas for future work.  First, we 
recognize a need to investigate the automated population of artifact metadata.  A significant 
challenge will be the generation of XML metadata from existing reusable resources and help 
for users in describing future submissions to the repository. Current approaches for 
automatic generation of metadata from content libraries should be explored for potential 
application to the ontology-based repository and more specifically for the SHARE metadata 




Second, providing a practical software behavior representation remains a 
challenging area for continued exploration. The current work provides an identification of 
principal functionality of an artifact through the CSFL and possible description of operations 
and input/output messages from a service perspective using WSDL. The work is admittedly 
preliminary. Research into related areas of Semantic Web Services, Business Process 
Execution Language, and others continues to hold promise for this aspect of the repository 
framework. 
Third, additional user views may be desirable other than those we have described 
here.  Some investigation into the feasibility of translating the ontological information 
between various model types is warranted. 
Finally, in addition to the Navy’s CSFL, similar lists have been developed for 
operational activities (COAL) and for information elements (CIEL). It would be interesting to 
express these taxonomies in OWL, as was done with CSFL, and then to create 
interrelationships across the classes, for example, to determine what information elements 
are generally employed in performing certain system functions, or what information elements 
are generally produced by performing certain system functions.  Further exploration with 
subject matter experts (SMEs) is needed to determine potential benefit from such 
approaches.  
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Abstract 
The growth, complexity, and reliance on software (SW) as part of the Department of 
Defense and Navy (DoD/Navy) warfare systems is continuing to increase. This increase in 
SW complexity and reliance has been accompanied by an increase in well documented SW 
intensive system acquisition cost, schedule and technical performance failures. The 
DoD/Navy is not consistently performing as a smart buyer of software intensive systems. 
The government and private industry have not been successful in applying the latest 
software methodologies and technologies nor consistently providing high quality and reliable 
systems that are delivered on schedule and within budget.  The typical acquisition approach 
utilized over the past several decades of relying  primarily on private industry for 
architecting, designing and implementing SW intensive systems has resulted in the loss of 
government in-house applied SW expertise necessary to achieve truly open architected 
systems and systems-of-systems. 
The key enablers for improving SW intensive system acquisition are the 
reconstitution and utilization of government in-house software subject matter experts 
(SMES) that can lead and work with industry SW engineers as part of an integrated SW 















Current State: SW Technical Challenges 
There are numerous technical challenges associated with the growth and reliance on 
software within the DoD/Navy’s mission critical warfare systems such as: 
 Designing and implementing truly Open Architected systems that fully meet the 
goals of standardized interfaces, scalability, reliability, portability, modularity and 
reusability; and thereby lead to higher system quality while also reducing cost 
and schedule.   
 Assessing, successfully utilizing, and rapidly integrating the most advanced 
software technologies and methodologies such as Model Driven Architectures, 
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), multi-core parallel processing, automated 
code generation, cloud computing, next generation programming languages, and 
agile development processes. 
  Integrating the mix of legacy SW components, new Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) SW components and DoD/Navy developed highly specialized and 
unique SW components to provide integrated net-centric systems composed of 
hundreds-of-millions (possibly billions) of lines of code that can execute as 
systems-of-systems and fully meet mission level objectives and Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPS).   
 Achieving Information Assurance (IA) and protection against SW-based Cyber-
Attacks while trying to maximize COTS utilization and Net-Centric 
communications.  
 Maintaining government corporate knowledge of the system architecture, design 
and technology utilization as the responsibility for system and software 
development transitions among different private industry organizations during the 
program lifecycle.   
In order to address the SW engineering and development technical challenges listed 
above, as well as many not listed here, it is imperative that the government maintain the 
applied software technical experts that can serve as both leaders and team-mates with peer 
industry software engineers.  
Current State: Acquisition Approach 
Figures 2 and 3 provide high level models with a rough indication of the relative 
involvement of government versus industry technical experts and the typical acquisition 
approach utilized for SW Intensive system acquisition and development. Government 
engineers are primarily used during the initial system concept, system level requirement 
phase, and system validation phase of the acquisition process. In the initial stage of system 
acquisition, the government system engineers define the capability need and the associated 
highest level system requirements and key performance parameters (KPPs).  During the 
initial phase, government system engineers may work with multiple Industry organizations to 
perform Technical Assessment of Alternatives (AoA) where industry provide prototypes or 
advanced technology demonstrations (often proprietary) advertised to fully meet the system 
capability needs and can be developed in a timely and cost effective manner.   
The government then relies almost entirely on Industry technical experts for the 
detailed system and software architecting, designing, coding and software level integration 




almost entirely by Industry.  Government insight into the detailed software architecture and 
design is primarily via the utilization of milestone reviews (System Requirement Reviews 
(SRRs), Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs), etc.). The government then takes the lead for 
System Integration, Testing and Certification. And as described in the next section, this 
























Figure 3. Current Acquisition Approach 
Current State: Results 
The increase in DoD/Navy SW intensive warfare system cost, schedule, and 
technical performance failures over the past 20 years are well documented in numerous 
reports and studies from organizations such as the Defense Science Board (DSB), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Crosstalk, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). Figure 4 summarizes some of the key 
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The November 2002 Report of the DSB Task Force on Defense Software reported:  
 Only 16% of programs are completed on schedule and within budget 
 Up to 31% of programs are cancelled and the remaining 53% have cost growth 
greater than 89% 
 The average final product includes only 61% of the original intended features. 
 
Figure 4. DoD Software System Acquisition Report Findings 
In 2004, the GAO reported that the DoD spent 40% of its software development 
budget reworking software because of quality related issues (GAO, 2004). In 2008 the DSB 
reported that the majority of DoD weapons systems are failing Initial Operational Testing. In 
2008, the ASN/RDA SPII SAM focus team published a report that documented the following 
critical problems that apply to the vast majority of DoD/Navy SW program acquisition offices:  
 Lack of effective management. 
 Immature acquirer (program offices). 
 Ineffective requirements management. 
 High personnel turnover. 
 Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates. 
 Ineffective utilization of Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) for SW. 
 Failure to utilize of lessons learned. 
In 2009, Senator Carl Levin reported that since 2006 nearly half of the DoD’s largest 
acquisition programs have exceeded Nun-McCurdy, and that 95 major defense programs 
4
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 (1) “Over time, in-house offices of subject matter experts were drastically reduced, and in some cases, disestablished”; (2) “Finally, there 
  was a loss of a large number of the most experienced management and technical personnel in Government and industry  without an   
3.   adequate replacement pipeline”; (3) “Many IOT&E failures have been due to lack of operational suitability.”    

















have had their acquisition costs grow by an average of 26% and have experienced an 
average schedule delay of almost 2 years.  
The DoD has lost the ability and expertise required to consistently successfully team 
with industry to acquire SW intensive weapon systems on time and within budget.
Current State: The Devil Is in the Details 
Although software has evolved into one of the most complex and critical elements of 
mission critical systems, the typical DoD/Navy acquisition strategy tends to treat the 
software components as black boxes with the internal software architecture and design 
development (and understanding) left almost entirely in the hands of private industry 
software engineers. As shown in Figure 5, a typical SW system may include: 
 Hundreds to thousands of system level requirements, 
 Thousands to tens-of thousands software level requirements, 
 Tens to hundreds of external system interfaces, 
 Hundreds to tens of thousands computer software components (CSCs), 
 Thousands-to tens of thousands internal software interfaces and interactions,  
 Millions to hundreds of millions of logic threads, 
 Millions to hundreds of millions of source lines of code (SLOC), and 
 Billions of software characters. 
And note that all it takes is for single erroneous character within the millions of lines 
of SW to cause a total system failure. 
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One of the most significant challenges facing the DoD/Navy’s complex software 
intensive system acquisition is the rapid rate of change associated with software 
technologies, methodologies, processes, processors, and tools.  In order for program office 
leadership to successfully maintain existing software systems, and acquire new software 
systems, it is imperative that they have access to in-house technical experts that have 
applied expertise with both the older software environments and the latest cutting edge 
software technologies and environments.  
In addition to having experience working with the latest software technologies, 
Government in-house software engineers must also be able to apply these technologies to 
the unique, complex, and challenging context of Navy system functional requirements (e.g., 
time critical processing, real-time processing, numerous external and internal hardware and 
software interfaces, complex algorithms, safety critical, and nuclear critical).  The current 
typical acquisition approach limits the government’s technical understanding to a few pages 
of high level system and software architecture diagrams, and understanding and 
“controlling” the interfaces between the software components only at the highest level of 
system abstraction, the Government is not able to maintain corporate technical expertise 
required to successfully acquire software intensive systems. 
The allocation of all the software architecture, design, code, and test responsibility to 
private industry is causing the government to lose the applied SW development experience 
and expertise to consistently successfully perform all of the following critical software system 
intensive acquisition activities: 
 Maintain awareness and expertise in modern SW technologies and 
methodologies necessary to understand when/if/how these new technologies 
should be utilized; 
 Assess industry’s technical approaches, and also provide government developed 
technical approaches; 
 Evaluate industry’s technical cost and schedule estimates; 
 Ensure Open Architecture (OA) design and verify that the OA design is actually 
implemented in the SW code; 
 Fully understand the technical, cost, and schedule impacts of requirement 
changes 
 Define and manage SW EVMS; 
 Define and utilize SW metrics-based control processes; and 
 Identify and manage software risks. 
Architecting and designing only at the higher levels of system abstraction (i.e., 
segment, component, and functional domain) is not sufficient for the government to maintain 
applied SW expertise. The amount of required expertise, experience, and effort required to 
successfully architect and design the software components increases at each lower level of 
system decomposition. An applied in-depth understanding of software technologies and 
methodologies is necessary to architect, design, and implement the software components at 
the CSCI level and below.  The government must understand the sub-component SW 
elements to successfully address the following technical challenges: 
 Asynchronous real-time event processing, 




 Safety Critical requirements, 
 Anti-Tampering and Information Assurance protection, 
 Data Security/Classification protection and segregation, 
 24/7 system reliability and system accessibility, and 
 Protection against Cyber-Attacks. 
The typical acquisition approach of Milestone reviews provide too little insight and 
occur too late in the acquisition schedule as the damage has already been done. Many 
“design” reviews now focus more on compliance to SW processes versus actually providing 
an in-depth review of the SW architecture/design/code. Even if private industry provides a 
detailed and thorough presentation of their software architecture and design at the milestone 
reviews, the government typically, except for a few rare cases, lacks the applied in-house 
software experience and expertise to ensure the software components meet all OA 
objectives including modularity, scalability, reliability, maintainability, and quality; and ensure 
the implementation artifacts (code) and design artifacts remain consistent with each other.  If 
the government identifies any significant technical software architecture or design issues 
during the milestone review, the contractor typically responds with such severe cost and 
schedule impacts that often the only option left is to trade-off planned new capabilities for 
significant architecture and design corrections. 
 Some software intensive programs utilize government in-house software 
engineers to participate with industry during software development. This participation is 
typically via peer-review during design and code activities. This approach assumes that 
Government software engineers will be willing to review other engineer’s work rather than 
being responsible for designing and coding software components themselves. The 
government cannot attract the best talent, nor sustain highly motivated and high quality 
software SMEs by limiting their tasking to looking-over-the-shoulders of industry software 
engineers. Government SW engineers must have hands-on development responsibility in 
order to maintain expertise. 
Future State: SW Acquisition Goals 
The primary goal is to improve the DoD/Navy’s ability to consistently deliver high 
quality SW intensive weapon systems that fully meet the warfighters’ needs, while also 
delivering these systems in both a timely and cost effective manner.   
A second major goal, as shown in Figure 6, is to achieve truly Open Architected 
systems and move from stove-pipe, proprietary, redundant and non-common systems 
towards product line multi-platform non-proprietary common reusable systems and software 
components. Achieving truly OA systems will improve system quality, promote competition 



















Figure 6. Open Architecture Goal 
Future State: Team-Based SW Acquisition Approach 
In order to achieve these major goals, the DoD/Navy must reconstitute and maintain 
a sufficient level of SW expertise with the applied experience required to team with Industry 
and address the numerous SW development technical challenges.  Figures 7 and 8 
comprise a high-level model of an alternative SW acquisition approach that enables the 
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Figure 8. Government SW Development 
The key differences between this SW acquisition approach and the typical approach 
is that the government SW engineers are responsible for developing and delivering a subset 
of the mission critical tactical system and software components. Government in-house SW 
engineers are responsible for developing and delivering the associated technical artifacts for 
their SW components, including requirements specifications, architecture and design 
documents, code, and test procedures.  Note that Industry will still develop the vast majority 
of the SW components and artifacts.  
The government SW engineers are also responsible for providing the critical 
management products as well including development process documents, metrics, 
schedules, cost/schedule progress (EVMS), interdependencies, and risks. This is required to 
develop and maintain in-house SW SMEs with the applied experience required to be able to 
successfully architect, design, and manage (accurately estimate and track cost, schedule, 
and risk) the software development effort at all levels of software intensive system 
decomposition (Functional Domain, Component, Segment, CSCI, and down to the CSCI 
sub-component Object and Class level). 
The government SW engineers are given the opportunity to provide SW prototypes 
and advanced technology and methodology approaches during the pre-milestone A and B 
acquisition phases. 
The SW artifacts (requirement specs, design documents, code, etc.) are developed 
by Integrated Government and Industry SW development teams that utilize cross 
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Maintaining Navy in-house SW expertise requires that 
an appropriate subset of critical SW be developed in-
house. There is no well defined criteria or process for 
assigning sw development to in-house engineers.
Challenge 2
Maintaining Navy in-house S  expertise requires that 
an appropriate subset of critical S  be developed in-
house. There is no well defined criteria or process for 








organizational design/code peer reviews to ensure high quality products and conformance to 
best-practices.  
The government SW Development engineers have the same expectations and 
requirements relative to cost, schedule and technical performance as their industry peers. 
System testing is performed by an independent government team with a separate 
management chain of command from the government SW team. 
By assigning actual SW development responsibility to in-house engineers, the 
government can reconstitute and maintain the SW expertise pipe-line as shown in figure 9, 
and thereby develop the senior level SW expertise required to perform as peer level team-
mates with Industry. This approach will provide in-house software SMEs that maintain 
applied experience and corporate knowledge (as the system evolves and as some of the 
component development is conducted by different industry organizations over time) with: 
 Complex system and software functional requirements such as: Safety critical, 
Mission critical, Complex external and internal interfaces, Real-time processing 
Security sensitive data processing, and Complex algorithms; 
 Latest software technologies and methodologies; and  
 Applied open architecture (modular, scalable, reusable, maintainable, and 














                                       
Figure 9. SW Expertise Pipeline Future State: Success Examples 
The alternative government and industry SW development team acquisition 
approach described in the previous section has been successfully utilized for over 50 years 
by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for various strategic and 
tactical weapon and fire control missile and gun systems. For example, NSWCDD 
government software engineers have been, and still are, responsible for the architecting, 
designing, coding and testing of many of the most critical and complex (e.g., safety critical,  




components for programs such as the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System 
(TTWCS).  
The government SW engineers have successfully worked with private industry SW 
engineers as an integrated SW development team. The cost, schedule, and technical 
performance of these SW IPTs have been consistently exceptional over multiple decades as 
compared to the vast majority of complex weapon system programs that have relied 
primarily on industry for the SW development and have failed (per the references and 
metrics provided previously). The TTWCS SW IPT has been consistently successful in 
meeting the SW technical challenges and future state goals as previously described in this 
paper. Some specific examples are provided in the following paragraphs. 
Over the past several decades, the TTWCS  SW IPT has consistently successfully 
delivered software upgraded  to incorporate and integrate the latest SW technologies; 
evolving from Mil-spec processors (ROLM 1666) to modern processors (HP744, X86); from 
mil-spec operating system (RMX/RDOS) to open system OS (LINUX); from first generation 
programming languages (Assembly, Fortran) to modern languages (Ada, Java, C, C++). 
The SW IPT has successfully incorporated new SW development methodologies; 
transitioning from functional design to object-oriented design, from waterfall development to 
spiral/increment development; from human-only generated coding to graphic-user-interface 
and auto-code generation tools; from point-to-point interfaces to FDDI/ETHERNET H/W and 
SOA-based SW interfaces.  
The TTWCS IP has achieved and demonstrated Open Architecture design and 
implementation. As shown in Figure 10, the TTWCS SW engineers utilized object-oriented 
design to achieve scalability and reusability with regards to the goal of easily interfacing with 
multiple platforms and their unique launching systems. The TTWCS System has been easily 
upgraded to support not just US Surface Ship Vertical Launching Systems, but also US 
Submarine and United Kingdom Royal Navy Submarine platforms. When the TTWC system 
was recently upgraded to interface with the SSGN platform, within less than a year the 
government SW engineers were able to define the SW req’s, document the design 
modifications, implement and test the associated new Launcher Interface code changes. In 
addition, SW Components were reused from the TTWCS SW within the SSGN Launching 
System software which resulted in a faster than usual successful integration of the two 
systems. 
The TTWCS system has successfully met interdependency deliveries with the 
Tomahawk missile segment upgrades and passed the vast majority of its Initial Operational 
Test Events.  
The resulting quality of the TTWCS SW has been consistently high with the 
integrated SW meeting all KPPs and with SW quality consistently averaging little over 1 
Defect/KSLOC. And more importantly, the TTWCS software developed by the government 
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Open Architecture Achieved at 
The CSCI / Object Level.
•Must maintain Gov’t 
SME expertise at this level
 
Figure 10. Open Architecture Design 
In addition to working for the large (multi-million source lines of code), multi-year 
TTWCS development effort; the industry and government SW team approach has also been 
demonstrated to also work well for rapid development efforts. Government engineers have 
teamed with industry to utilize agile SW development methodology to successfully deliver 
the integrated sensor and weapon capabilities for marine/army vehicles such as Gunslinger, 
Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), and Wolfpack. This integrated agile development 
team has also been utilized for the Naval Expeditionary Overwatch (NEO) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. These rapid development efforts were 
lead by government engineers that quickly assessed and integrated multi-vendor hardware 
and software technologies to provide the deployed warfighters with much needed 
capabilities that met emergent mission critical needs. 
Future State: Team-Based SW Development Benefits 
As demonstrated by the consistent success of the TTWCS, SLBM, and Rapid 
Development weapon programs highlighted in the previous section, the government and 
industry SW development team model is not just a theory. There are many benefits to 
utilizing this SW acquisition approach. The senior level government SW engineers are 
capable of working with industry to address the significant SW challenges that include: 
 Designing and implementing truly Open Architected systems that fully meet the 
goals of standardized interfaces, scalability, reliability, portability, modularity and reusability; 




 Successfully assessing and rapidly integrating the most advanced software 
technologies and methodologies into the SW development processes, 
environments and systems.  
 Successfully integrating the complex mix of legacy SW components, new 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) SW and hardware components and 
DoD/Navy developed highly specialized SW components to provide integrated 
net-centric systems that can execute as systems-of-systems and fully meet 
mission level objectives and KPPs. 
 Delivering systems with demonstrated Information Assurance (IA) and protection 
against SW-based Cyber-Attacks, while maximizing the utilization of COTS and 
Net-Centric architectures. 
In addition to addressing the technical challenges above, the reconstitution of in-
house SW expertise will also enable mitigation of the following key problems identified in the 
ASN/RDA SPII SAM AS-IS and T0-BE State Reports.   
 The Program Offices will have access to in-house SW experts with the technical 
and acquisition process experience to aid the program offices in managing the 
industry development teams. 
 The in-house experts will have the applied knowledge to assess industry 
technical approaches and also their SW development processes. This includes 
having in-house experience and metrics from SW cost and schedule estimates 
and thereby be able to provide support for independent cost and schedule 
assessments. 
 The in-house SW experts will have applied experience with developing and 
implementing system requirements at all levels, and this will enable them to 
support requirement management and volatility risk reduction.  
 The government SW engineers will have in-depth knowledge of various weapon 
system architectures and maintain the corporate knowledge required to mitigate 
the risk of program office leadership and personnel turnover. 
 The in-house SW engineers will have applied experience with EVMS and can aid 
the program offices in setting up realistic and meaningful SW-based EVMS 
processes and tools. 
 By maintaining SW engineers with applied experience in both previous and 
current complex SW development efforts, the program offices will have a source 
of objective lessons learned and metrics that can be applied to future SW 
development process improvement.    
Another challenge of relying on private industry for 100% of the software 
development is that it leaves the program office with no leverage over the contractor; and 
with very few schedule, cost or performance risk mitigation strategies when the private 
contractor is failing to meet the program needs. By the time the program office realizes the 
contractor has significant problems, the program is in “too deep” with that company to have 
any other choice than to continue funding the poor performing contractor and hope for the 
best.  
Firing the contractor and transferring the work to another private industry contractor 





 Significantly increasing funding 
 Significantly delaying the schedule 
 Significantly reducing or eliminating planned capabilities 
 Canceling the program 
By establishing and maintaining integrated SW development teams, the program 
office leadership will have the option to augment the contractor SW team with on-site 
government SW engineers, or transfer the responsibility for SW component development 
from the contractor to the Government. This can be accomplished easily as the Government 
software engineers are part of the software development team from the beginning.   There 
will be no need to perform a costly re-competition to assign the work to another private 
industry team that would be unfamiliar with the program requirements and plan. Under the 
proposed new software acquisition strategy, the Government would have contracts in place 
that specify all developed system artifacts become the property of the US Government. This 
mitigation technique only accelerates the delivery. There is of course still some added 
schedule risk as the in-house team must work with the contractor to transfer all necessary 
artifacts to assume full development responsibility. If the program office and development 
items established an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) however, this transfer of 
artifact responsibility is relatively easy. 
Program offices will also have the option of directing the Government in-house 
software experts to provide onsite support to aid the contractor in recovering schedule 
progress or resolving technical problems.  Given the DoD approach for rotating the military 
leaders to gain a wide range of experiences, it is common for a software intensive system to 
have acquisition program leadership personnel that have no significant training or, more 
importantly, any applied experience in software engineering. A closely related challenge is 
that acquisition program office leadership transition may occur at any point during the 
system development effort.  
A single Program manager may not manage the system acquisition and 
development program from the beginning (version content definition) completely through to 
the end (through IOC). The development organizations are faced with the challenge of still 
meeting the previously defined development milestones and delivery dates, while 
simultaneously changing organizational structures, reporting chain of commands, tasking 
priority changes, funding reallocation, and development process changes directed by the 
new leadership.  Maintaining an experienced Government SW development organization 
mitigates the impact of frequent senior leadership changes. The experienced SW 
development team can provide the following benefits to the acquisition office’s new 
leadership: 
 Maintain critical system functional, architectural, and design corporate knowledge 
 Aid the new leadership in quickly coming up to speed on the history of the 
program, the system’s architecture and functionality, the various development 
organization’s roles and responsibilities, current development process, and 
status of the current development efforts (schedule, progress, and risk) 
 Provide impact assessment for proposed organizational and/or process changes 
 Perform the Technical Authority responsibilities for those leaders without 




Future State: Establishing the Pipe-Line 
The DoD/Navy must re-assume leadership of software architecture and design. 
Government software architecture and technical authority must be demonstrated not just at 
the highest system composition level (i.e., Objective Architecture Functional Domain level), 
but must extend down into lower critical sub-component levels as well as illustrated in Figure 
10.  In-house software SMEs should serve as the software technical authority and the 
software architects, and lead critical software sub-element development IPTs.  
The DoD/Navy must develop and document a software acquisition improvement 
vision with a quantifiable goal. Critical weapon and warfare system program offices should 
work with the in-house software development organizations to develop transition plans to 
achieve the vision goals.  This software expertise pipeline must be continually fed and 
maintained. In order to attract and keep the best and brightest software engineers, the 
Government must offer: 
 Challenging software development and leadership responsibilities 
 Opportunities of architecting, designing and implementing solutions to the most 
complex types of system functional capabilities and problems 
 Opportunities to utilize the latest software technologies, methodologies, 
processes, tools 
Government engineers should not be limited to developing tactical software only 
(where tactical software is defined as software utilized with delivered warfighting systems 
with strategic or tactical mission critical requirements). They must stay abreast and have 
applied expertise with all the latest software technologies.  In addition to performing tactical 
SW development, another way to achieve this goal is to assign non-tactical (e.g., system or 
architecture modeling software, simulation software, testing software, media generation 
software, data distribution software) to in-house engineers.  It is often possible to use the 
latest software development technologies and methodologies for non-tactical software as 
the acquisition cycle may be much shorter and the certification process less stringent than 
for tactical systems 
Development of non-tactical and non-critical software components can serve as a 
test bed and as a cost, schedule, and technical performance risk mitigation strategy for 
determining if new software technology is of sufficient maturity and capability to be 
incorporated into the current or next version of critical tactical system(s).  The two key 
questions that must be addressed when determining what software should be assigned to a 
Government software development organization are:  
1. Will this assignment help maintain the software expertise pipeline? 
5. Will this assignment maintain corporate expertise and mitigate the 
cost, schedule, and/or technical performance risks of existing or future 
systems?   
As directed in the 2008 Mr. Donald Winter SECDEF memo: "This combination of 
personnel reductions and reduced RDT&E has seriously eroded the Department's domain 
knowledge and produced an over-reliance on contractors to perform core in-house technical 
functions. This environment has lead to outsourcing the "hands-on" work that is needed in-
house, to acquire the Nations best science and engineering talent and to equip them to 




weapons systems in a responsible manner, it is imperative the DoN maintain technical 
domain expertise at all levels of the acquisition infrastructure." 
The current undefined, undocumented, non-standardized, and non-disciplined “ad 
hoc” assignment of SW development to in-house SW development organizations is 
insufficient to achieve and maintain the much needed SW expertise pipe-line. The 
DoD/Navy should develop a well defined and documented software development 
assessment and assignment process and criteria. This process and criteria will be utilized by 
software intensive system acquisition program offices to assign software development 
responsibility to integrated government and software development teams.  
References 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). (2007, 
2008). Chief Engineer, Software Process Initiative Software Acquisition Management 
Focus Team. As-is and to-be state reports. 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). (2009, 
July). Department of the Navy (DoN) software measurement policy for software 
intensive systems. ASN/RDA Memorandum.   
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). (2008, 
December). Strategy to balance acquisition in-house and contractor support 
capabilities. ASN/RDA Memorandum.   
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). (2008, 
November). Meeting of the Navy laboratory/center competency group. ASN/RDA 
Memorandum.   
GAO. (2004, March). GAO-04-393. Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, February). Report to Congressional committees best practices. 
Levin, C. (2009, March). US Senate Committee of Armed Services. Press Release. 
OUSD(AT&L). (2000, November). Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) task force on 
defense software. 
OUSD(AT&L). (2008, May). Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) task force on 
developmental test and evaluation. 





On Open and Collaborative Software Development 
in the DoD  
Scott Hissam—Scott Hissam is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff for the Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute, where he conducts research on component-based software 
engineering, open source software, and multicore.  Mr. Hissam is a founding member and secretary 
of the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) Working Group 2.13 on Open Source 
Software and co-organizer of its annual conference. His publications include two books (Building 
Systems from Commercial Components and Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software), 
papers published in international journals, and numerous technical reports. He has a BS in Computer 
Science from West Virginia University. 
Scott A. Hissam 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
4500 5th Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA, 15213 USA 
+1.412.268.6526 
shissam@sei.cmu.edu 
Charles B. Weinstock—Charles B. Weinstock is in the Research, Technology, and System 
Solutions Program at the Software Engineering Institute. His main interest is in dependable 
computing. For the last several years, he has been developing assurance case technology. He is also 
active in the open source software community. Previously, Weinstock worked at Tartan Laboratories 
and SRI International. Weinstock has a PhD in Computer Science, an MS in Industrial Administration 
(MBA), and a BS in Mathematics, all from Carnegie Mellon. He is a Senior Member of the IEEE and a 
member of IFIP Working Group 10.4 on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance. 
Charles B. Weinstock 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
4500 5th Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA, 15213 USA 
+1.412.268.7719 
weinstock@sei.cmu.edu 
Len Bass—Len Bass is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at the Software Engineering 
Institute. He has authored two award-winning books in software architecture and several other books 
and papers in various computer science and software engineering areas. He has been a keynote 
speaker or a distinguished lecturer on six continents. He is currently working on techniques for the 
methodical design of software architectures, supporting usability through software architecture, and to 
understand the relationship between software architecture and global software development 
practices. He has worked in the development of numerous software systems, ranging in a multitude 
of domains. 
Len Bass 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
4500 5th Avenue 









The US Department of Defense (specifically, but not limited to, the DoD CIO's 
Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software, DISA's launch of Forge.mil and 
OSD's Open Technology Development Roadmap Plan) has called for increased use of open 
source software and the adoption of best practices from the free/open source software 
(F/OSS) community to foster greater reuse and innovation between programs in the DoD. In 
our paper, we examine some key aspects of open and collaborative software development 
inspired by the success of the F/OSS movement as it might manifest itself within the US 
DoD. This examination is made from two perspectives: the reuse potential among DoD 
programs sharing software and the incentives, strategies and policies that will be required to 
foster a culture of collaboration needed to achieve the benefits indicative of F/OSS. Our 
conclusion is that to achieve predictable and expected reuse, not only are technical 
infrastructures needed, but also a shift to the business practices in the software 
development and delivery pattern seen in the traditional acquisition lifecycle is needed. 
Thus, there is potential to overcome the challenges discussed within this paper to engender 
a culture of openness and community collaboration to support the DoD mission. 
Keywords: Open source software, software engineering, reuse, collaborative 
development 
Introduction 
Free and open source software (F/OSS) has been available, in one form or another, 
for several decades. Successful F/OSS projects benefit from the efforts of a large, usually 
diverse set of developers. For such projects, the software developed is often as good as or 
better than the best commercially available software. An even larger community is able to 
make use of and reap the benefits of this software. The DoD (US Department of Defense) 
would like to capitalize on this success and adopt an F/OSS model to exploit both reuse 
among DoD programs and collaboration to improve quality, spark innovation, and reduce 
time and cost. 
The Open Technology Development (OTD) Roadmap Plan prepared for Ms. Sue 
Payton, Deputy Under Secretary for Defense, Advance Systems and Concepts, identified 
the following advantages sought from adopting OSS development methodologies (Herz, 
Lucas & Scott, 2006): 
 Encourages software re-use [sic], 
 Can increase code quality and security, 
 Potentially subject to scrutiny by many eyes, 
 Decreases vendor lock-in, 
 Reduces cost of acquisition, 
 Increases customizability, and 
 Meritocratic community. 
Most recently, Dan Risacher, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), 
Networks and Information Integration (NII), was quoted by Government Computing News 




By using open-source software, the services can update their software as soon as a 
vulnerability is found or an update is needed, rather than wait for the vendor to 
supply a patch. Open source also promises faster prototyping of systems, and lower 
barriers to exit. And if a government-written application is released into open source, 
outside developers could work to fix the problem, lowering maintenance costs of 
software. 
This office is in the process of updating the Stenbit memorandum clarifying the use 
of F/OSS in DoD programs (Stenbit, 2003). 
What is important about these two data points is that they illustrate the level of 
expectation that is driving the push for the adoption of the F/OSS model of open and 
collaborative software development in the DoD software community. 
This paper explores the idea of adapting the F/OSS model to the DoD software 
community. While there are a number of other significant concerns mentioned, this paper 
concentrates on addressing two that are of interest. The first is reasoning how an open and 
collaborate approach would need to operate in the DoD community, assuming that 
community was motivated to behave in the same manner as seen in the public F/OSS 
community. The second focuses on this assumption and reasons as to how to incentivize 
the DoD community to make use of, and contribute to, such a resource. 
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 looks at the progressive 
movement towards F/OSS and some of the software reuse repositories (and their 
challenges) that proceeded today’s F/OSS movement. Section 3 takes an abstract view of a 
project’s operation in SourceForge.net as a means for understanding how such resources 
support the F/OSS community and what they do not do to illustrate a gap that is needed to 
be filled to support reuse across the DoD community. Section 3 then instantiates this 
abstract view for use in the DoD to consider the ways in which a DoD-specific resource 
would compare to that seen in the F/OSS community. Section 4 addresses the prior 
assumption about behavior expected by the DoD community to consider the incentives 
necessary to create a healthy and collaborative DoD OSS community. Sections 5 and 6 
provide final thoughts on points not yet addressed (perhaps motivating further discussion) 
and summarize the positions stated in this paper. 
The following closely related and relevant topics are beyond the scope of this 
immediate paper: data rights/licensing issues (commercial, F/OSS, or otherwise); security 
classifications; various software lifecycle stages beyond IOC (initial operational capability), 
i.e., pre-RFP (request for proposal) tensions; maintenance of fielded system; field upgrade 
(new capability); and new systems reusing or proposing to reuse from prior systems. 
History of Collaboration and Reuse 
There are a number of papers, articles, and publications on the history of F/OSS, 
some tracing their beginnings to SHARE and the SHARE library in 1955, “to help scientific 
users grapple with the problems of IBM’s first major commercial mainframe” (Gardner, 
2005). Others trace to the earlier PACT (Project for the Advancement of Coding 
Techniques) initiative in 1953, a collaboration between the military and aviation industries 
(Melahn, 1956; Feller & Fitzgerald, 2001). Feller and Fitzgerald’s book provides a nice 
treatise on the history of F/OSS from these beginnings through the Berkeley Software 
Distribution, TEX, the creation of the Free Software Foundation (FSF) and GNU (GNU is Not 
Unix) and, eventually, to the creation of the Open Source Initiative (OSI). With the advent of 




software repositories began to appear; the most popular included SIMTEL20, originally 
hosted at MIT (Granoff, 2002), as well as tools to aid in searching these repositories, such 
as Archie and gopher (Howe, 2009). 
With the ever-growing increase in the availability of F/OSS, the benefits of software 
reuse was also gaining traction within the DoD. In the late 80s (particularly with the DoD’s 
adoption of the Ada programming language) and early 90s, various software reuse efforts 
within the DoD emerged, including STARS, STARS SCAI, ASSET, CARDS, PRISM, DSRS, 
ELSA, DSSA ADAGE, and RICC (Department of the United States Air Force [USAF], 1996). 
Although differences did exist among these repositories with respect to artifact management 
philosophies, some adopted a generally common theme centered on repositories of 
reusable software artifacts (code, documentation, etc.) having domain- and/or application-
specific classifications, taxonomies, and software architectures all supported by techniques 
and methods embracing reuse in software development—essentially advocating the 
concepts that are among the underpinnings of software product lines (SPL) (Clements & 
Northrop, 2001). 
Many of these repositories listed above are no longer in existence, even though their 
concepts are (in the authors’ opinion) sound. Although a case study to completely 
understand why these efforts ceased would be nice—not the purpose of this paper—we will 
briefly touch on some of the technical challenges that faced some of the efforts. These 
include: 
 Quality Arbitration: The administrative function of deciding what is and what is 
not included in the repository. This ranges from accepting everything (perhaps 
resulting in a junk yard or flea market) to a decisive selection (an inventory of few 
precious selections). Deciding which is the most appropriate is challenging. For 
the latter, repository customers have higher confidence in artifacts extracted at a 
higher cost of upfront qualification and an administrative bottleneck in populating 
the repository. This philosophical difference resulted in two camps: managed and 
unmanaged repositories. 
 Search and Browse: At the time of these repositories, free text search and 
retrieval was a serious resource and computational problem. Free text was not 
practical; search was a matter of defining a well-crafted database schema, 
typically relational. There were two approaches. In one, a general purpose 
schema was defined; in another, domain analysis was used to identify domain 
specific concepts and terminology. Frakes demonstrated, however, that there 
was no substantial gain in user search performance obtained by the extra cost 
and effort of domain analysis (Frakes & Nejmeh, 1987). With time and advances, 
such free text search capabilities are now more common place (e.g., Google) 
and no longer presents a major hurdle. 
 Beyond Search and Browse: Some argued that critiquing domain analysis with 
respect to retrieval of single reuse items missed the point. Capturing the 
(sometimes complex) relationships among domain concepts, spanning 
requirements, algorithms, architecture, code, test, and other artifacts was what 
was important. The CARDS repository (Wallnau, 1992), for example, used the 
KL-ONE (Brachman & Schmolze, 1985) semantic network formalism to capture 
these relations, and use them to support reuse of large-scale domain structures. 
Today's work in Web Ontologies also uses a descendant of KL-ONE, and for 




Altogether, this history lesson is worth remembering. In comparison, we believe that 
the infrastructures supporting the F/OSS community are superior for collaborative 
development for the projects they service—something that past reuse repositories never 
imagined. For the larger F/OSS community, these infrastructures are similar to past 
unmanaged reuse repositories capable of great (seemingly effortless) free text search 
suitable for opportunistic reuse. We examine this position in more detail below. 
Infrastructures for Reuse and Collaboration 
There are a number of resources available to the F/OSS community for F/OSS 
projects including SourceForge.net, RubyForge, JavaForge, Tigris.org, and freshmeat.net, 
only to name a few. An abstract view of SourceForge.net is created here for the purpose of 
understanding what such resources commonly do to support the F/OSS community and also 
what they don’t do as a means to illustrate gaps in what is needed to support reuse across 
the DoD community as well as what would be needed in the DoD to support open and 
collaborative software development. 
SourceForge.net® 
SourceForge.net, owned and operated by SourceForge, Inc. (SourceForge, 2009a), 
is by all accounts one of the most successful source code repositories in the last decade, 
now boasting over 180,000 projects and nearly 2 million registered users (SourceForge, 
2009b). However, simply referring to SourceForge.net as a (software reuse) repository is a 
great misnomer. Yes, SourceForge.net contains software source code (some of which is 
reused everyday), but SourceForge.net provides a wealth of other IT-related (hosting and 
backup) services to the F/OSS community as well as collaborative software engineering and 
project management tools. 
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SourceForge.net can best be thought of as a collection of self-contained projects. 
Each project is administered and owned by a project owner(s) who arbitrates (and 
delegates) ultimate control over what is committed into the project’s code (or artifact) base, 
what software features are added or removed (over time), and the priorities upon which work 
progresses. The project’s ownership determines the degree of control that is asserted over 
the project. The project owner is depicted as a crown in Error! Reference source not 
found. as a means to connote the “power” those arbitrators have over the project. 
As work progresses, those arbitrators are continuously making collaborative 
decisions about what is to be done next. For simplicity, the focus for this discussion is on 
changes offered from the project specific community (on the left of Error! Reference 
source not found.) to the projects artifacts. By balancing their priorities and plans, the 
arbitrator make decisions on how to merge the interests of this community and the larger 
F/OSS communities to make changes (and commit those changes) to the artifact base. This 
churning effect (represented by the cyclic, thick arrows in Error! Reference source not 
found.) is an important and vital aspect of F/OSS collaborative software development. 
Succinctly, it is this churning and frequent updates (i.e., "release early, release often") to the 
artifacts that spark innovation through incremental improvements to early and emerging 
design and source code artifacts given that such updates are open and observable by all in 
the F/OSS community (Goldman & Gabriel, 2005). This is a continuous, open, and insightful 
process that is not driven by some external calendar, fiscal boundaries or legal/acquisition 
milestones. 
Lastly, others are free to download software artifacts from the project’s repository 
codebase. This group (in the lower right of Error! Reference source not found.) is 
separated from the project specific community to the left as a means to indicate others38 that 
have tangentially “stumbled” upon the project (by whatever means—by search, by 
reputation, etc.). This group serves a useful purpose in this paper to illustrate another crucial 
point—that is Eric Raymond’s caution in The Cathedral and the Bazaar, caveat emptor—“let 
the buyer beware” (Raymond, 2001). This is represented by the large measuring tape in 
Error! Reference source not found.. 
Like the earlier users of SIMTEL20, Archie, and gopher, the onus is on this group to 
determine the degree of fit between artifacts retrieved from the project’s codebase and their 
own needs. One aspect of this determination is partially driven by the need to ascertain if a 
search actually returned a relevant hit. That is, did the search terms find that which was 
sought? This is something that was recognized early and many of the DoD software reuse 
repositories tried to address this with various approaches to classifications and data 
definitions, for instance ASSET’s approach was a faceted classification schema (USAF, 
1996; Kempe, 1998) in which CARDS’s approach was a domain-specific repository 
(software for a specific application domain, e.g., command centers). SourceForge.net’s 
classification scheme for projects themselves is limited to broad project categories (for 
example, Games/Entertainment, Scientific/Engineering, and Security) and subcategories as 
well as filters allowing other search criteria such as language, operating system, and even 
licensing. SourceForge.net also provides mechanisms to search across projects (limited to 
free text searches of project’s names and descriptions), to conduct searches within a project 
(for example within its documentation, forums, bugs, mailing lists, and configured download 
                                                
38 Such individuals may become part of the F/OSS community for a project through a variety of 




packages), and find published files (but not within CVS or SVN—two popular version control 
systems). 
Another important aspect is determining the quality of the artifacts found. If quality is 
assumed by reputation (e.g., Apache, MySQL, and a host of other reputable F/OSS 
offerings), this may be no more difficult than in the past with the reputable software of that 
era (e.g., wuftpd, X, and many of the popular GNU offerings). However, putting reputation 
aside, quality of the software artifact is at the sole discretion of the project owner—and this 
has to be discovered in effort expended by the “buyer” through learning, inspection, trial, 
and testing. 
Perhaps the most important aspect is determining if the artifact can actually be 
reused in the context of the “buyer’s” need. The software found may be relevant, and it may 
be of high quality (by reputation), but may be architected and designed with assumptions 
that are inconsistent with the context in which it is intended to be reused. One example the 
authors experienced was to discover that a highly relevant and reputable MP3 
encoder/decoder library could not be reused due to the fact that the decoder was 
implemented in a manner that was not thread safe, even though the encoder portion was. 
This resulted in an architectural mismatch that prevented reuse in this case. The CARDS 
and STARS SCAI (USAF, 1996) were some of the earliest DoD software reuse repositories 
that recognized the need to minimize this mismatch by adopting architecture-centric 
approaches as a means for qualifying software for reuse within a specific domain. 
To summarize key points taken from this abstract view: 
 These F/OSS resources (such as SourceForge.net) are for IT-related services 
housing F/OSS projects and their artifacts with facilities supporting open and 
collaborative development. 
 Project artifacts themselves are managed by a project owner(s) having sole 
arbitration over the entire project. 
 Artifacts are frequently updated and churned over by the F/OSS community, 
resulting in better quality and innovation. 
 It is up to others expending real effort to find, inspect, and assess project artifacts 
for reuse within their context. 
DoDSF 
The idea of creating a “SourceForge.net” within the US Government or US 
Department of Defense, i.e., a “SourceForge.mil” was not invented by us. We credit 
Schaefer (2005) for the name. Furthermore, the OTD Roadmap called for “an internal DoD 
collaborative code repository” (Herz et al., 2006). So rather than conflate our analysis with 
any intent others may have with this idea (either in the past, present or future), we 
instantiate our thinking by using the term “DoDSF” (a DoD SourceForge).  
Like SourceForge.net, DoDSF could also support the IT-related (hosting and backup) 
services to the DoD community as well as the collaborative software engineering and project 
management tools, but cast in the setting of a DoD program acquisition.39 Using Error! 
                                                
39 This is not intended to be narrow, as we recognize that post deployment maintenance and long-
term support would also have to benefit from open, collaborative and continuous software 




Reference source not found. as a basis for DoDSF, Error! Reference source not found. 
illustrates a number of similarities and differences that can immediately be teased out. 
Working left to right in Error! Reference source not found., the project specific 
community is the first difference. In this case, the project specific community is not identical 
to the wider F/OSS community served by F/OSS collaborative resources on the Internet. In 
the case of DoDSF, it is likely and expected that DoDSF will be gated in some manner, thus 
losing the ‘F/O’ as in F/OSS. The reality is that there will be classified software that the DoD 
hopes and expects to be reused and to evolve in a collaborative sense. Therefore, the 
openness assumed and intended for DoDSF will be as open as it can be for those in the 
gated community. This is not unprecedented; over the last decade, many private 
corporations—also wanting to reap the benefits of open and collaborative software 
development—have adapted F/OSS ideals. Such initiatives have been labeled using the 
terms corporate source (Dinkelacker, & Garg, 2001), progressive open source (Melian, 
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caveat venditor (“let the seller beware”)





























































































Figure 2. Abstract View of a DoDSF Project’s Operation 
The other difference in this community is its mix (as denoted by the shading of some 
of the characters in Error! Reference source not found.). Some from the community will 
likely be employees of private companies under contract to the DoD and under the oversight 
of a government program office—it is not assumed that these are the same private 
companies, contracts or government offices; it is only assumed that they share common 
needs and concerns. This too, is not unprecedented. In the F/OSS community, an 
increasing number of private companies allocate resources to F/OSS projects and some 
companies even sponsor F/OSS projects, for example, MySQL, IBM for Eclipse, and Sun 
Microsystems for OpenOffice.org. 
Moving further to the right in Error! Reference source not found., the next 
significant difference is the introduction of an additional commit and arbitration step and a 




the SourceForge.net abstraction discussed earlier regarding caveat emptor and the burden 
that is placed on the larger community having to assess a project artifact’s degree of fit. As 
in F/OSS projects, it is expected that projects will continue to have “project owner(s)” that 
arbitrate (and delegate) ultimate control over what is committed into the project’s code (or 
artifact) base, what software features are added or removed (over time), and the priorities 
upon which work progresses. 
What is different with the introduction of the additional step is that these project 
owners are not the sole arbitrator as to what (specifically) from the project’s codebase is 
actually committed to DoDSF. This additional arbitration step is needed to ensure that which 
is being submitted to DoDSF is consistent with the domain- or application-specific nature 
reflected onto DoDSF—in other words, the project’s artifact is consistent with the 
architecture and variation mechanisms expected and needed for effective reuse of artifacts 
contained within DoDSF (Bachmann & Clements, 2005). How and who conducts that 
additional arbitration certainly would need to be addressed. Some software reuse 
repositories discussed earlier, specifically STARS SCAI and CARDS, used domain 
engineering approaches (i.e., domain managers) reflective of software product lines (i.e., 
product line manager) to oversee such consistency (USAF, 1996; Clements & Northrop, 
2001). This, in effect, would empower the administrators or arbitrators (the second crown) of 
DoDSF with a role in quality arbitration not seen in SourceForge.net and reminiscent of 
earlier software reuse repositories, thereby affording the opportunity for a software product 
line approach.40 
Given this additional step, the intent would be to reduce the real effort expended by 
others who find and assess artifacts downloaded from DoDSF for fitness for use and to 
increase the likelihood that those artifacts can be reused within their context (denoted by the 
smaller size of the measuring tape in Error! Reference source not found.). This 
represents a fundamental shift from the model in the F/OSS community of caveat emptor 
with the onus on the “buyer” to caveat venditor, or “let the seller beware,” as the onus would 
shift to the product line managers to ensure that the artifacts committed to DoDSF are fit for 
(re-)use. 
Continuing on the journey around Error! Reference source not found., the next 
visual clue introduced is that in the lower right, depicting the group separate from the project 
specific group. This group is the same as that served in the F/OSS abstraction discussed 
earlier—a group that has come to DoDSF to find and reuse artifacts suitable for their 
context. However, this group has the foreknowledge that artifacts within DoDSF have been 
developed following product line practices. That would mean that DoDSF could have 
domain- and/or application-specific classifications, taxonomies, and software architectures 
that are meaningful to the DoD community and commonality across similar projects. 
Like Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found. 
also includes cyclic, thick arrows to represent, in this case, a need for frequent updates to 
artifacts contained within DoDSF. Like the F/OSS community, the DoD community should 
also be continuous in its endeavor to improve the quality of its software through open and 
collaborative development. And, like its F/OSS counterpart, updates of artifacts to DoDSF 
should not be bound exclusively by fixed or planned milestones, as traditionally thought in 
contracted software acquisition. Rather, here, updates are driven by the DoD community.  
                                                
40 Additional opportunities for collaboration are possible with the “project owners,” including the 




Without this cyclic churning, for example, a project artifact is only submitted to 
DoDSF at or near the “completion” of a project; there then is no opportunity for DoD 
community feedback and participation in the open and collaborative process that is 
expected to improve quality or spark innovation. Inclusion of this cyclic churning is a 
significant break from the software development delivery pattern seen in the traditional DoD 
software acquisition lifecycle. To summarize key points taken from this DoDSF view: 
 Like SourceForge.net, DoDSF would be a resource for IT-related services 
housing artifacts from DoD projects supporting open and collaborative 
development. 
 Although the “project owner” has purview over the DoD project itself, the artifacts 
that are committed to DoDSF are arbitrated in a manner that is consistent with a 
product line approach. 
 The DoD community here is a gated community similar to the F/OSS 
collaborative model adapted by private companies. 
 The mantra of “release early, release often,” indicative of F/OSS, is necessary to 
stimulate collaboration and spark innovation, as it does in the F/OSS community. 
Throughout this discussion of DoDSF, it was assumed that the DoD community was 
motivated to behave in a manner that was consistent with the behavior often exhibited by 
the F/OSS community. We now turn our attention to this assumption. 
Incentivizing a Culture of Collaboration, Innovation and Reuse 
There is one final visual in Error! Reference source not found. to be discussed, 
that is the overarching “umbrella” of culture, incentives, policies, and strategies that must 
exist to engender the DoD community to behave in a manner that is indicative of openness 
and collaboration. The intent of this “umbrella” is to achieve the goals of reuse, quality and 
innovation coveted of the F/OSS community. Returning again to the OTD Roadmap, which 
recognized that their Roadmap “entails a parallel shift in acquisition methodologies and 
corporate attitude to facilitate discovery and re-use of software code across DoD.” The 
Roadmap goes on to explain that today’s acquisition model treats “DoD-developed software 
code as a physical good, DoD is limiting and restricting the ability of the market to compete 
for the provision of new and innovative solutions and capabilities.” So any reformulation of 
today’s acquisition model will fundamentally have to change the laws, policies and even 
thinking of the software code, not so much as a product, but more as means to mission 
capabilities and perhaps services. This is understandably a daunting task (white paper or 
not). 
F/OSS Collaboration, Innovation and Reuse 
Raymond’s comprehensive insight into the motivation of the F/OSS community is 
foundational (Raymond, 2001). For some, necessity is the only impetus—a simple need for 
something. And, fortunately, many in the F/OSS community have the ability to fulfill that 
need through coding. And when their ability is outstripped by the realities of the problem, 
they create an F/OSS project and hope that others having the skills join (the birth of a 
project community). Such people that lend their helping hands often do with the greatest of 
intentions perhaps motivated by the same need or simply just feel the need to do some 




Sometimes that “need” can already be satisfied by product offerings from the 
commercial marketplace (i.e., the Cathedral) but the desire is to make a better alternative to 
that offering, one that is free and open to all. Many F/OSS projects started this way. 













Figure 3. Culture of Collaboration in the F/OSS Community 
As touched upon briefly above in Section 3, there is precedence for business models 
based on F/OSS projects. Many new projects have come and are coming into existence 
through software contributions en masse (e.g., Netscape’s Mozilla, Sun’s Java, IBM’s 
Eclipse, MySQL) as business opportunities appear from ancillary services through the 
contribution of these codebases and through their use. However, this in and of itself is not 
an answer, but it certainly presents evidence to the behavior that is desirable in the DoD 
community. The Ultra-Large-Scale Systems (ULS) study called for research in Social and 
Economic Foundations for Non-Competitive Social Collaboration as inspired, in part, by the 
F/OSS movement; “as pure self-interest is supplanted by altruistic motivations and the 
desire to be perceived as productive and intelligent” while at the same time recognizing the 
need for incentive structures encouraging the community to cooperate (Feiler et al., 2006). 
It is also important to recognize those that are motivated to voluntarily offer their time 
and contribute to F/OSS projects.  Some of the motivations just discussed apply to these 
individuals as well (i.e., altruism, itching, etc.), but further extend to the meritocratic—that is 
to (socially and in governance)—rise in the community to which they serve. Further, some 
see F/OSS projects as venues to show off their prowess, to develop skills that make them 
more employable, or to network with others (a social phenomenon). And practically, others 
need (not just want) to see that their modifications, enhancements, and features find there 
way back into the mainstream product. Otherwise, if the F/OSS community does not accept 
such changes, the only recourse is to reincorporate those changes into all future versions 
(i.e., rework) (Hissam & Weinstock, 2001). 
Reasoning about DoDSF (Section 3) based on resources like SourceForge.net show 
DoDSF must differ if there is to be effective reuse for the DoD. For one, a DoD project is not 
likely to be incorporated in its entirety within some other DoD project. The projects are 
simply too big. However, there are certainly subsystems or modules of those overall projects 
that lend themselves to the DoDSF model. An example might be a subsystem that develops 
a common operational picture from a series of incoming tracks. To be able to reuse such a 
subsystem will require commonality at many levels, including mission needs, requirements, 





Practically all of the Linux distributions (Debian, Fedora, Ubuntu, etc.) reuse the 
Linux kernel (www.kernel.org), which itself (Linux) has been ported to a wide variety of 
hardware architectures. In those distributions, other F/OSS applications are included (a list 
which is simply too long to even begin to enumerate). At the same time, like the Linux 
distributions, there are other POSIX-based distributions that are Linux-free, for example, 
Apple’s Mac OS X, which is based on the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) of The Open 
Group’s UNIX. And those same applications available to the Linux distributions are mostly 
available to Mac OS X. For the F/OSS community; the reasons for this are obvious: the 
underlying operating system, its architecture, interfaces (both for applications and device 
drivers), and interdependencies are openly specified, architected and, when necessary, 
debated. This leads to a shared understanding and context. 
Baldwin and Clark (2006) argued that the architecture of F/OSS projects is a critical 
factor of the open and collaborative software development process in that it is the modularity 
of those architectures and the option values stemming from such modular architectures that 
contribute to collaboration and innovation. They noted that codebases that are more 
modular have more option value, thus attracting volunteers. That is the more modular and 
option rich, the more active and larger the innovator community is likely to be. Furthermore, 
it is these innovators that are incentivized to form voluntary, collective groups for the 
purpose of sharing and improving ideas. This, in and of itself, increases the likelihood of 
future variations and experimentation. Finally, the ULS report identified modularity as key to 
managing the complexity of software and to producing software systems amenable to 
change and to concurrent development—something that is clearly indicative of F/OSS 
collaborative development. 
Looking again to some of the F/OSS “poster children,” specifically Linux, Apache, 
and now Firefox (direct descendent of Netscape), those projects did not start out with 
wonderfully modular architectures. They only became modular after the complexity of 
features, project management, distributed development became too overwhelming and had 
to adapt. Chastek, McGregor, and Northrop (2007) identified Eclipse’s plug-in (modular) 
architecture as one of the project’s most valuable core assets, providing for multiple forms of 
variation including extension points of various types and (in the authors’ opinion) learning 
from the lessons from past F/OSS projects. 
To summarize key points taken from this F/OSS view: 
 Some of the incentives that motivate individuals, groups, and companies to 
participate and collaborate in the F/OSS community can be explained, but more 
study is warranted. 
 Some private companies have moved from treating software source code as a 
physical good and have found market opportunity in services from the use of the 
software. 
 Modularity of an architecture not only promotes reuse, but is a key factor in 
spurring innovation in collaborative communities. 
 Like F/OSS projects, software emanating from DoD projects will have to have 
architectures and interfaces that promote modularity and option value. 
DoDSF Collaboration, Innovation and Reuse 
Taking the key points from the previous sections, the “big money” question is how do 




civilian and military personnel, along with employees of private companies under contract to 
the DoD and under the oversight of a government program office having common needs 
and concerns)? Furthermore, what needs to be done to change acquisition policy and 
strategy and to establish the incentives that will enable a culture and behavior similar to that 
seen in the F/OSS community? 
As daunting as these questions may be, we humbly offer a few suggestions. 
Recognize Product Line Practices are Not Free 
Creating modularized subsystems and components that are consistent with the 
architecture and variability expected and needed for effective reuse will cost development 
dollars with payoff that may not be realized until the reuse of the component can be 
amortized. Strategically, this should be expected and not avoided. Furthermore, and 
before new components are created (or existing components are refactored), resources will 
have to be expended to identify product-line-wide architectures that are suitable for DoDSF 
and against which project artifacts are assessed before commitment to DoDSF. Such 
activities will likely require planning and development that are beyond any one project, yet 
are necessary for the projects themselves. Such planning includes mission objectives, 
product strategies, requirements analysis, architecture and design modifications, extra 
documentation, and packaging. Incentivizing the program managers that oversee these 
projects would require some combination of providing extra funding and making 
performance evaluation dependant on contributions to DoDSF. 
Incentivize the “Churn” 
If effort is to be expended to create a product-line-wide architecture for the DoDSF, 
and individuals across the DoD-wide enterprise are empowered as product line managers, 
the DoDSF has to be more than a “field of dreams” followed by the often cursing mantra “If 
you build it, they will come.” Recognize that reuse is not free and that reuse does not come 
easily or by happenstance (Tracz, 1995). If the desired behavior of the DoD community is to 
use the DoDSF for finding project artifacts, then those artifacts have to be meaningful, 
relevant, and, by reputation, sound. Recall, the desire is to unburden the “buyer” from 
assessing the component’s degree of fit—as expected in software product lines. By 
reducing this burden as a significant barrier to reuse, incentives may be necessary to 
bootstrap or kick start reciprocating contributions, feedback, improvements, and otherwise 
collaborative behaviors—but observations from the F/OSS community would lead to the 
belief that such incentives would not be necessary. But this is not entirely clear in the gated 
DoD community. Talented, willing and able civilian and military personnel may be more likely 
to behave in this manner. Employees of private companies—while on contract—might also 
behave in this manner. Again, there is precedent in the F/OSS community for private 
companies to commit resources to F/OSS projects. Following this model, perhaps there are 
incentives for contracting companies that are successful in getting subsystems and 
components into DoDSF—that being negotiated service contracts, thereby allowing for 
continued involvement servicing the DoD community. 
There are good reasons (perhaps un-incentivized) that a new DoD project would 
prefer to see bidders propose using proven artifacts from DoDSF. Such includes less risk to 
the project—a subsystem taken from DoDSF is already a known quantity, and lower 
development costs allowing valuable program dollars to be used elsewhere in the program. 
A possible disincentive (or opportunity, perspective is everything) is that it may be viewed by 




DoDSF; the program office may be given less money to get the job done, which may be 
viewed as a negative outcome by some. 
A supplier bidding on a project really has only two incentives to use an artifact 
contained in DoDSF. If the program office has indicated that the use of such artifacts will be 
a determining factor in a successful proposal, then there is a strong incentive to do so. In the 
absence of such a requirement, the supplier may be incentivized to reuse an artifact to 
enable it to be the lowest bidder. 
Incentivize Software as a Non-Rivalrous Good 
Treating source code as if it were a physical good is a mentality that inhibits 
collaboration. Rivalry should be encouraged between competing subsystems or components 
for the same role in a produce-line-wide architecture (i.e., let the stronger or better prevail). 
But the source code itself should serve as the source of inspiration, innovation and 
improvements for that “better” subsystem—rather than the opaque enigma requiring 
resources to be expended to re-engineer from scratch (or worse, reverse-engineer because 
the source code is long forgotten and lost). 
Last Thoughts 
Governance 
Reminiscent of reuse repositories discussed in Section 2, great care has to be given 
in governance of DoDSF. The DoD must have a vested interest in seeing that the artifacts in 
DoDSF can be reused in subsequent projects. It has invested in them and would like to see 
a payback in terms of reduced development time, risk, and cost in the future. Thus, there is 
an upfront quality requirement for items to be placed into DoDSF. For SourceForge.net, the 
evaluation is ultimately done by the F/OSS community (using or not using) the project. For 
DoDSF there is presumably a contractual requirement regarding the subsystem. Someone 
has to evaluate the subsystem and its suitability for reuse, which needs to be a part of the 
original development contract. Otherwise there is every incentive for the supplier to place 
something into DoDSF that is ultimately unusable by anyone other than the original supplier. 
Who does this evaluation? In the body of this paper, we placed the onus on the 
“seller” (caveat venditor), which, in this case, was tagged as the product line manager or the 
“second crown.” In reality, that role will come down to real people in the DoD community. 
Determining just who exactly those individuals are is beyond the scope of this white paper, 
but it is certainly something that will have to be decided. 
Security 
In this white paper, we acknowledge that classification of project artifacts in DoDSF 
is a reality. This presents a challenge for DoDSF. If an artifact is from a top-secret project, 
then it may be difficult to declassify it for contribution to a DoDSF that does not respect 
security issues. But allowing DoDSF to embrace a multi-level security model raises 
concerns. Here’s one example. Is a top secret project able to use an artifact classified at a 
lower level? If so, how does it trust it? If it makes modifications (even a bug fix) what 
happens to the security classification of the artifact when the modification is given back to 
DoDSF? Does this result in a security-level fork? There are many such questions that could 





The number of references that were used in the preparation of this white paper was 
far more than any of the authors expected. This simply illustrates, in our opinion, the tip of a 
very large iceberg on the topic of reuse and F/OSS openness and collaboration coming from 
various disciplines. 
Perhaps the most relevant reference that we came across for this paper was the 
Open Technology Development Roadmap Plan (Herz et al., 2006). Those interested in 
following up on some of the discussion covered in this paper should consider getting the 
latest progress on the actions called for within that Roadmap Plan. That plan called for very 
specific actions with respect to changing the traditional acquisition lifecycle. Most interesting 
was the recommendation: “Evaluate the potential use of the Defense Acquisition Challenge 
(DAC) program to demonstrate Open Technology alternatives to projects or programs that 
have implementation issues; e.g., make application of open source based products or 
development methodologies a specific interest item for DAC.” 
On the topic of product lines, it is worth noting that there are case studies that show 
how product line approaches can be effective and successful in industry and government 
ventures (USAF, 1996; Clements & Northrop, 2001; Jensen, 2007; Mebane & Ohta, 2007). 
Furthermore, there are efforts and thinking happening now to merge F/OSS models with 
software product lines (Chastek et al., 2007) and (van Gurp, Prehofer & Bosch, 2010) along 
with three international workshops on Open Source Software and Product Lines (specifically 
OSSPL 2006, OSSPL 2007, and OSSPL 2008). 
F/OSS works today because of the culture, environment, and motivation touched 
upon in this white paper. It is important to note that this F/OSS culture was not planned at 
all, but is founded by a loose set of principles and rules (some of which are formalized 
through F/OSS licenses) that guide the behavior to achieve freely available, lightly controlled 
software developed in a collaborative manner. This behavior is informed by centuries of 
human populations and communities creating new knowledge and building off each other’s 
work. 
The question the readers should ask themselves (and we would not have done our 
job if you didn’t ask yourself) is what would such principles and rules look like in a gated 
DoD community, a community itself informed by approximately 200 years of contracting, 
procurement and competition? Additionally, what is needed to foster the behavior the DoD 
wants to engender? What can the DoD control and what control must the DoD relinquish? 
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Though consistently noted as critical to successful system design and 
implementation, the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) artifact appears to be underutilized. 
This report demystifies the CONOPs artifact.  It delves into the barriers that prevent optimal 
use of CONOPs and presents a framework for incorporating an “integrated” CONOPs into 
the Defense Acquisition Lifecycle.  
Introduction 
The ability of development programs to avoid challenges associated with schedule, 
budget, and technical performance has been consistently poor (Turner, Verma & 
Weitekamp, 2009, p. 7). A recent FAA sponsored study noted that in order to avoid these 
pitfalls, “one of the most significant artifacts is the creation of a CONOPs” (Turner, et. al., 
2009, p. 27). The report further noted the need to have “alignment between the evolving 
CONOPs, the [Enterprise Architecture],41 and the governance system” (Turner et al., 2009, 
                                                
41 An enterprise architecture (EA) describes the “fundamental organization of a complex program…as a 
minimum, the EA relates the requirements, resourcing (funding), acquisition system and the program office 




p. 32). The Manual for the Operation of The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS, 2009) provides an illustration of the alignment of the enterprise architecture 
and the governance system by connecting JCIDS activities with milestone decisions.  While 
important, this illustration is missing the alignment of a critical system success component, 
the CONOPs document.  In order to encourage successful system development and 
acquisition we must understand the context of the CONOPs as it relates to the larger total 
acquisition lifecycle.  
Research Goals and Objectives 
This research informs the acquisition development lifecycle process by articulating 
the importance of the CONOPs–Acquisition relationship and by illustrating how various 
CONOPs documents are introduced at critical points in the JCIDS development timeline to 
create a more robust and integrated concept of operations.  
Goals of the research include: 
  Define the various CONOP types   
  Explain the relationship of system-level CONOPs to acquisition activities 
 Assess the current alignment of CONOPs and CONOPs-related documents with 
DoD acquisition governance and enterprise architecture processes  
 Explore the maturity phases of CONOPs documents 
 Document the relationship of each instantiation of the CONOPs to acquisition-
related activities  
 Assess the use of CONOPs and the disconnect, if any, between the perceived 
importance of CONOPs and the actual utilization of CONOPs.  
Methodology 
This research was conducted by combining traditional research methods with 
systems thinking tools and practices. Traditional analysis included literature review, data 
analysis, and comparative analysis. The Conceptagon42 framework for systems thinking was 
applied to the research data. This framework encourages holistic system analysis by 
providing a series of seven “triplets” related to specific system characteristics.  Use of the 
Conceptagon provided insight into interior and exterior boundaries, information flows, 
hierarchies, and other relevant system characteristics. Though the individual sets of triplets 
are not explicitly discussed in this paper, each of the seven triplets served as a cornerstone 
for consideration of system characteristics throughout this research.  
Literature Review.  A literature review of documents related to the role of 
CONOPs was  conducted. This review included documents published in industry, in 
professional journals, acquisition journals, and in Department of Defense (DoD) regulations, 
instructions, and publications.  The literature review also included the Defense Acquisition 
University Website which provided access to publications, communities of interest, and ask 
a professor question and answer forums.   
                                                
42 The Conceptagon is a systems thinking framework introduced by Boardman and Sauser (2008). For 
additional information on the Conceptagon as a systems thinking tool, reference Systems Thinking: A Primer 




In addition to existing literature, a questionnaire related to the use and usefulness of 
CONOPs was developed and distributed (see Appendix A). The pool of survey respondents 
was too small to enable the extraction of valid conclusions. To overcome the lack of 
respondents, results of the survey were compared to a similar survey43 on the same subject. 
Data Analysis.  Information collected during the literature review was assessed for:   
 Terms used 
 Purpose 
 Relationship to acquisition activities 
 Relationship to integrated CONOPs 
This assessment was instrumental in establishing a baseline for the CONOPS 
artifact and its use within the development and larger acquisition process. 
 Terms Used and Purpose of the Document. For the first assessment, a broad 
search of terms used synonymously with CONOPs was conducted. The initial assessment 
covered an array of CONOPs documents, looking at CONOPs that describe the actions of a 
military force or organization as well as CONOPs that detail characteristics of a system from 
an operator’s point of view. The intent of this assessment was to determine consistency of 
the meaning and purpose of the term CONOPs and to identify terms used in place of 
“CONOPs.” Once a set of recurring terminology was identified, the intended purpose of each 
document was recorded. This allowed us to assess similarities and variances associated 
with each of the terms. This assessment also gave us insight into role of CONOPs, if any, in 
acquisition activities as well as any barriers to the use of CONOPs. 
 Relationship to Acquisition Activities. Variances among purpose and meaning were 
detected in the initial assessment. To account for the variance, each CONOPs-related 
document was plotted on a JCIDS-Acquisition relationship diagram.  This enabled us to 
visualize different points of input and influence of each of the identified CONOPs-related 
documents. Using this assessment we further identified three distinct phases of CONOPs 
development that directly correspond to acquisition related activities.   
 Relationship to Integrated CONOPs.  Appearance of CONOPs-related documents in 
the JCIDS-Acquisition timeline revealed that CONOPs, either in an integrated form or in 
several smaller instantiations, occurred across the entire acquisition lifecycle. These 
documents (some termed “CONOPs,” others operating under a different name) were then 
assessed for their similarity to an integrated ConOps document spanning the full acquisition 
lifecycle.44  
Systems Thinking.  Analyzing system characteristics by use of the Conceptagon 
provided a comprehensive view of the acquisition lifecycle. Each set of triplets was 
considered as we looked at each aspect of the project. To illustrate, as we looked at the 
                                                
43 The Roberts survey, conducted in 2008, inquired about the use, usefulness and upkeep of CONOPs. Roberts’ 
survey had a larger pool of respondents numbering 108 responses from 18 different companies. This pool 
significantly outnumbered the 6 responses gained from our own survey.  Unlike the Roberts survey which was 
sent to engineers, and was composed of system engineers, lead system engineers, test engineers, design 
engineers, and project managers (Roberts, 2008), our pool of respondents included members of the user 
community, which offered an additional perspective to data gained from the Roberts survey.  
44 For the purpose of this paper, the IEEE format for ConOps (IEEE, 1998) is representative of an integrated 




landscape of the system (i.e. governance, enterprise architecture, and CONOPs) we 
considered the triplet of wholes, parts, relationships. The larger acquisition system which 
included all three primary elements of the landscape was the whole, individual processes 
and inputs to the processes were considered parts, and the purpose of each input, and its 
effect on the whole constituted the relationships.  
 The Value of a CONOPs to System Development.  The value of a CONOPs 
to system development is multi-faceted wherein the CONOPs plays a role across the entire 
life-cycle: from need identification, to system inception and development, to system 
disposition and disposal. Our research of literature, standards, and instructions indicates a 
number of ways in which the CONOPs adds value to acquisition and system development 
processes. Some of the key ways in which a CONOPs adds value are provided in Table 1.   












Under-Utilization of the CONOPs 
Despite its value, the CONOPs, at least in its full form, is not consistently used in 
system development. In fact, a recent survey showed that 1/3 of all programs queried did 
not have a CONOPs (Roberts, 2008, p. 39).  Similarly, in a series of interviews and surveys 
conducted for this research, the majority of respondents indicated that a CONOPs was 
“critical” to the system’s success but was under-utilized.  Comparable studies on CONOPs 
have pointed out that even when a CONOPs is written it is often after the system is 
developed and done so in an effort to satisfy a Milestone Decision requirement; this “box-
checking” activity strips the CONOPs of its intended role in the creative process (Nelson, 
2007, pp. 5-6). Our survey results appear to support this, with our respondents indicating 
that a concept for how the system will be employed is usually written, but it is written after 
the system is developed. This means the CONOPs is based on the requirements as 
opposed to the requirements being based on the CONOPs. Similarly, in the Roberts survey, 
18% of respondents said that CONOPs on programs they worked “were not completed until 
after the requirements were complete” (Roberts, 2008, p. 28). With the CONOPs document 
seen as critical to defining and employing a proposed system, why is it that the CONOPs is 
often missing or developed as an afterthought? 
Barriers to Effective CONOPs Use 
Our research indicates that there are four barriers to the use of CONOPs throughout 
the acquisition lifecycle. These barriers include: 
CONOPs Value 
Helps scope the problem & solution 
Bridges where we are and want to be 
Illustrates how a system will function 
Facilitates communications among 
stakeholders 
Provides a logic trail of capability  
Provides baseline for measuring system 
efficacy 




1. Definition and Purpose. There is variance in the term used to describe a 
CONOPs document, as well as an inconsistent application of the term. Often, 
this results in misunderstanding of what a CONOPs is, how it is used, and 
what type of information it should contain.   
1. Targeted Audience. Closely tied to the variance in definition and use, 
the intended audience of the CONOPs document is unclear.  
2. Timing and Placement in the Acquisition Development Lifecycle. 
There is confusion regarding to what phase of development a 
CONOPs applies.   
3. Comprehensive View and Consistent Involvement by Stakeholders.  
Many forms of the CONOPs document are just a small subset of what 
system development really needs– these subsets do not incorporate a 
complete view of the system.  Additionally, many of these CONOPs 
are by various authors using different stakeholder sets.   
Definition and Purpose.  Our study detected considerable variance in the 
application of the term “CONOPs.” As a result of the variance, misunderstanding and 
purpose are major barriers to the use of CONOPs. This variance makes it unclear what a 
CONOPs is, how it should be used, by whom it should be used, and when it should be used.  
 Military Concepts and System-Level CONOPs. Within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) there are higher-order and lower-order CONOPs. Higher-order CONOPs, include 
Capstone, Institutional, Operating, Functional, and Integrating concepts, which, in 
descending order, become more narrow in scope and more detailed by applying to a smaller 
mission set (for clarity we will term higher-order CONOPs “military concepts” for the 
remainder of this document). These concepts “describe the conduct of military action at the 
operational level of war” (Schmitt, 2006, p.1). Military concepts are derived directly from 
military strategy and provide a premise for the future capabilities the military will need. 
According to Joint Publication 1-02, these CONOPs are a “verbal or graphic statement that 
clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and 
how it will be done using available resources” (JP1-02, p. 114).  
The materiel capabilities needed to achieve the goals of the military concepts are 
described in lower-order, system-level CONOPs. The system-level CONOPs band includes 
capability- specific CONOPs. According to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), these CONOPs are a “user-oriented document that describes system 
characteristics for a proposed system from the user’s viewpoint” (IEEE, 1998, p. i). 
Additional CONOPS Variance. Within both military concepts and system-level 
CONOPs there are several types of documents–all of which are called either “CONOPs” or 
some variation of the term “CONOPs.”  Joint Service and Component Service publications45 
have already defined and documented the different types of military concepts (i.e., 
institutional, operating, etc). However, the different types of system-level CONOPs are less 
                                                
45 Types of military concepts are defined in publications such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 3010.02 “Joint Operations Concept Development System”; the Air Force Policy Directive 10-28 
“Air Force Concept Development”;  CONOPs TO DOCTRINE: Shaping the Force From Idea Through 




well defined and vary from publication to publication. Adding to the confusion is the fact that 
each CONOPs document may include similar or dissimilar information.46   
The Perceived Purpose of the CONOPs Document. As discussed above, the 
purpose of a CONOPs can range from describing aspects of a military operation (military 
concept) to describing characteristics of a specific system (system-level CONOPs). But even 
within system-level CONOPs, the purpose can range from describing all system attributes, 
system stakeholders, and system tasks, to focusing solely on the employment of the system. 
Examples of different CONOPs document names and associated purposes are provided in 
Table 2.   
Table 2. Perceived Purposes of CONOPs 
Term Purpose Reference 
User 
CONOPs 
[Defines] basic system requirements. [It] 
describes what the user wants the system to 
achieve and the context in which the system 





[Defines] how the system will actually be used 
and provides insight into the total system 
solution for both short-term and long-term 
requirements. Similar to ANSI/AIAA47 OCD 
Companion & 
Mortimer, n.d.  
ConOps Provides the user community a vehicle for 
describing their operational needs that must be 
satisfied by the system under development 
Jost, 2007, p. 14 
CONOPs Provides “a capability description (what an 
operational unit does) or a prescription of what 
should be done.”  
Nelson, 2007, p. 2 
ConOps “[Transforms] the allocated what to the how 
and so completes a chain all the way to an 
instantiation…of the system that enables 
capabilities.” 
Nelson, 2007, p. 2 
Concept of 
Employment 
Description of “how a weapon system will be 
[used] in a combat environment” 
Ask a Professor 
(AAP, 2009 
CONOPs [Provides] the vision and intent for how the 
system should work within an operational 
environment in an easy to read format.  
Daniels & Bahill, 
2004, p. 306, sec 4.1 
Use-Case 
Scenarios 
Similar to a CONOPs (see preceding CONOPs 
definition) but less ambiguous and therefore 
can be used directly for extracting 
requirements in an unambiguous way. 
Daniels & Bahill, 
2004, p. 307, sec 4.1 
                                                
46 Daniels and Bahill (2004) point out that “CONOPs documents are rarely consistent in content, detail, and 
format” (para. 4, p. 307).  
47 ANSI/AIAA is an abbreviation for the American National Standards Institute/American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics. ANSI/AIAA standard G-043-1992, Guide for the Preparation of Operational 
Concept Documents, discusses information that relates to system operational concepts and describes “which 
types of information are most relevant, their purpose, and who should participate in the effort” (ANSI/AIAA, 




Targeted Audience.  Just as the name for and content of a CONOPs document 
varies, so may the intended audience. Currently the audience is dependent on who is writing 
the CONOPs, what type of CONOPs is being written, and its intended placement within the 
acquisition timeline. The CONOPs can be written to speak to all communities or can focus 
on individual communities, such as engineers, customers, test agencies, or decision 
authorities. A CONOPs that only speaks to a specific community may be problematic in its 
potential to lack sufficient detail required by the unaddressed audience.  
Timing and Placement in the Acquisition Lifecycle.  The placement of the 
CONOPs refers to the insertion point of the CONOPs into the larger acquisition activity.  The 
“input” of the CONOPs into the acquisition process is dependent upon the identified purpose 
of the CONOPs document.  For instance, a military concept will occur earlier in the 
acquisition lifecycle than a system-level CONOPs. 
With the relative importance of the CONOPs widely understood (see Table 1), it is 
difficult to envision proceeding through the acquisition lifecycle without some form of the 
CONOPs document. To that end, we believe that although not necessarily called a 
CONOPs, and not in a neat and integrated package, critical elements of the CONOPs are 
occurring in an ad-hoc manner across the acquisition timeline. Nelson echoes this belief, 
stating that, “[the] main reason we overlook the central role and scaling of the ConOps is 
that we give different names to the same thing at different scales” (Nelson, 2007, p. 9). 
CONOPs Placement According to Official Literature. In DoD acquisition documents, 
such as the DoD 5000 series and JCIDS documents, CONOPs are identified as an input to 
a larger acquisition process.  In these documents the term “CONOPs” on its own usually 
refers to a military concept.  As such, it is placed as a precursor to system concept selection. 
Figure 1 provides an organizational construct for the position of the military concept to the 
JCIDS timeline. This construct depicts the hierarchy of military concepts as a linear 
progression from broad to most narrow focus (left to right). These military concepts then 












Figure 1. Relationship of the Military Concept to JCIDS-Acquisition  





The Manual for the Operation of JCIDS references at least two more “types” of 
CONOPs. The first of these is found in Enclosure B of the JCIDS Manual. Here, the 
reference is to a “sustainment CONOPs” (JCIDS, 2009, p. B-B-5).  The manual states that 
as a sustainment key performance parameter (KPP) metric, the sustainment CONOPs 
should be traceable to the system’s Initial Capability Document (ICD) and Capability 
Development Document (CDD). This implies that the sustainment CONOPs is an input to 
the acquisition lifecycle process after the ICD and CDD have been written48.  
 A second reference to CONOPs is made later in Enclosure B. This time, the 
reference is to a “CONOPs… for the system”.  Contextually, this CONOPs for the system, or 
System CONOPs, provides documentation of “a comprehensive analysis of the system and 
its planned use, including the planned operating environment, operating tempo, reliability 
alternatives, maintenance approaches, and supply chain solutions”  (JCIDS, 2009, p. B-B-
6). Based on this description the JCIDS System CONOPs is similar to the latter half of the 
IEEE ConOps. This System CONOPs is an input to the JCIDS process post Milestone B, 
upon program initiation.  
JCIDS also acknowledges the analysis of alternatives (AoA) that is part of the larger 
acquisition process. The AoA is a precursor to the Milestone A decision. The analysis of 
alternatives, though likely more detailed than what is included in the CONOPs, corresponds 
to the IEEE ConOps Alternatives section, which discusses system alternatives considered 
but not selected.  Figure 2 provides a rough illustration of the relationship of these 
documents (to include the concept of employment (COE), which is recognized by DAU as an 











Figure 2. Relationship of Official CONOPs-Related Documents to JCIDS-Acquisition 
Activity
                                                
48 Though not explicitly defined in the manual, contextually the sustainment CONOPs is a concept of operations 
specific to maintenance approaches and supply chain solutions. This definition makes the implied position of 
the sustainment CONOPs somewhat confusing, because maintenance and sustainment concepts communicate 
desired sustainment instructions that inform system design and planning.  The sustainment CONOPs will likely 
be more detailed post milestone B and C, but per the IEEE format, should be written, if even in an immature 





Figure 3. Relationship of Unofficial CONOP-Related Documents to JCIDS-
Acquisition Activities 
In addition to documents described in the JCIDS manual, our research revealed that 
there are many other documents in use that serve as inputs to the acquisition process. Such 
inputs include ConOps (described by Nelson), use-cases (as described by Daniels & Bahill, 
2004), user CONOPs, and system concepts (see Table 2). The relationship of these inputs 
to the JCIDS-Acquisition timeline is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 This mapping of CONOPs documents to the acquisition lifecycle suggests that 
CONOPs documents are developed throughout the acquisition lifecycle. 
Comprehensive View and Consistent Involvement by Stakeholders.  As 
illustrated above, many separate CONOPs documents are written. A risk to proper use of 
these CONOPs is that these various CONOPs are independently authored by various 
individuals or groups that may have different perspectives on the system and on system 
objectives. Without a single, integrated, system-level CONOPs to draw from, requirements 
may be unintentionally derived from multiple sources that may or may not include a 
complete understanding of system uses. This can create “[different] and potentially 
conflicting views of system use [that] will result in a system that only partially meets the 
user’s expectations” (IEEE, 2008, para. 3.3.3, p. 23).   
Additionally, breaking the CONOPs into smaller non-integrated documents runs the 
risk of reducing stakeholder coordination. This practice also reduces the 
comprehensiveness of the stakeholder input, which in-turn degrades the completeness of 
perspectives and resulting system requirements. 
Key to Effective Use of CONOPS in the Acquisition Life Cycle: 
The Integrated CONOPs 
Despite the occurrence of the various types of CONOPs documents, Nelson (2007) 




ConOps49 and it is the ConOps described in the IEEE50 standard 1362-1998. Nelson goes 
on to state that the power of the IEEE ConOps comes from its comprehensive assessment 
of both the “what” (system identification) and the “how” (system employment). In our 
assessment, the IEEE format also includes the “why” in its section titled Justification. 
Traceability to the why, or justification, is an important factor in maintaining system validity 
and verification.51  Unique to the IEEE format is its emphasis on describing not only the 
desired capability and end-state, but also the current capability and situation. This end-to-
end emphasis provides a logic trail from original need to capabilities pursued.  
Integration of Individual Inputs  
Because the many types of CONOPs-related documents appear to span the entire 
lifecycle of the system, we wondered how these individual CONOPs would relate to the 
IEEE ConOps. To find out, we delineated the relationship of the individual CONOPs 
documents to sections of the IEEE ConOps (Figure 4). To conduct this assessment, the 
content of each of the CONOPs documents used as an input to the acquisition process was 
analyzed. This content was then compared to the content in each section of the IEEE 
ConOps to identify similarities. Arrows are provided from CONOPs documents to applicable 
IEEE ConOps sections to show a relationship between the content. 
Figure 4. Relationship of CONOPs Documents to IEEE 
An Example of a CONOPs Document–IEEE ConOps Relationship. The 
guiding military concept provides insight into the operational environment, the scope of the 
mission set, and the need for the system. Although this concept does not provide an 
exhaustive list of system user classes, it will provide insight into an initial group of potential 
                                                
49 Nelson uses the IEEE abbreviation for ConOps to distinguish it from other forms of concept of operations 
documents, which are often abbreviated as “CONOPs” (Nelson, 2007). 
50 IEEE, pronounced (I-triple –E) IEEE is recognized as a leading institution in systems and system standards. 
Their format for ConOps documents (IEEE, 1362-1998) is comprehensive and is used by many agencies/ 
organizations. 
51 In their paper on famous failures, Bahill and Henderson note that “[system] validation requires consideration 




system stakeholders. Therefore a relationship is shown between the military concept and 
the IEEE sections: Current Situation, Background and Scope, Policies and Constraints 
related to the current situation, User Classes, and Justification for Change.  
Identification of these relationships confirmed that, while not necessarily an 
integrated ConOps such as IEEE, elements of the IEEE ConOps are being utilized in the 
acquisition process via the many, currently occurring CONOPs documents. All IEEE 
ConOps sections are addressed in the currently occurring CONOPs-related documents with 
the exception of a detailed explanation of the modes of operation for the current system (this 
would include modes for legacy systems currently in place) and administrative sections such 
as referenced documents and document overview. This means there may be an opportunity 
to integrate elements of each of these documents into an integrated CONOPs, such as the 
IEEE ConOps.52  
The Value of an Integrated CONOPs over the Current Way of 
Business 
Although already occurring independently across the lifecycle, integrating individual 
CONOPs documents into a single CONOPs document has potential to increase both 
traceability and continuity.  
Traceability. According to IEEE, traceability is “a key tool for ensuring that the 
system developed fully meets the needs and requirements defined by the user” (IEEE, 
2008, para. 4.2, p. 38).  An integrated system-level CONOPs resolves, or at least mitigates, 
the problem of conflicting system views and partially met requirements by using the same 
resources to create a more complete view of the problem, the proposed solution, the user 
community, and the intended uses. This pooling of information allows stakeholders an 
opportunity to recognize requirement needs and contradictions that are otherwise 
overlooked.53 
Continuity. Both IEEE and ANSI identify a purpose of the CONOPs as a means by 
which to communicate system characteristics in such a way that is understandable by all 
system stakeholders.54 Continuity is an enabler of the required communication and 
stakeholder involvement. Similar to what is seen with traceability, continuity suffers when the 
integrated system-level CONOPs is broken out into multiple documents.  
                                                
52 Integrating each of these inputs into a comprehensive CONOPs document does not preclude the use of, or 
independent improvement of, particular sections. Products, such as an AoA, can continue to stand-alone; in fact 
AoAs can inform later iterations of the CONOPs document. The point of the integrated CONOPs is not to 
enforce a rule set–but rather to serve as a means for conducting holistic problem and solution space exploration 
and for providing a document owned by all stakeholders that clearly and logically expresses the system’s 
characteristics. In this way, the CONOPs serves as the baseline document to which all subsequent documents 
are loyal.    
53 According to the INCOSE SE Handbook, version 2a (2004) one use of a CONOPs is “[t]o validate 
requirements at all levels and to discover implicit requirements overlooked in the source documents” (para. 8.2 
f, p. 104).  
54 “The CONOPs document is used to communicate overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to 
the user, buyer, developer, and other organizational elements”  (IEEE, 1362-1998, p. 1).  The CONOPs 
document “facilitate[s] understanding of the overall system goals with users…, buyers, implementers, 




The Relationship of the Integrated CONOPs to the Acquisition 
Lifecycle 
Current literature provides an illustration of the relationship of military concepts to 
JCIDS-Acquisition activities (Figure 5). This is in line with our assessment of the relationship 
of military concepts to acquisition activities (see Figure 1). What appears to be missing 
though is an illustration of the relationship of the system-level CONOPs to the acquisition 
lifecycle. If we integrate the many CONOPs documents into a single integrated CONOPs 
document, what will its relationship to the acquisition lifecycle look like?  
 
Figure 5. Requirements and Acquisition Process Flow 
(Modified from USD(AT&L), 2008) 
The streamlined CONOPs-Acquisition lifecycle relationship, or CONOPS continuum, 
is most easily depicted by building upon a baseline graphic (Figure 6) and gradually adding 
in additional relationships.  Initially this illustration depicts two major inputs to the JCIDS-
Acquisition process. The first of these is the higher order military concept which is a basis for 
a CBA and identifies the context in which the proposed system will operate. System-level 
CONOPs emerge when the CBA process identifies capability gaps for which a materiel 
solution is the preferred solution. This results in a relationship between higher-order military 
concepts and acquisition and between higher-order military concepts and system-level 
CONOPs (which we will term simply “CONOPs”). As illustrated in Figure 6, military concepts 
drive CBAs and Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) changes and are the context for CONOPs, which must always support the 






Figure 6. Concept-CONOPs-JCIDS-Acquisition Relationships (CONOPs 
Continuum)
Higher-order military concepts are the basis from which CBAs and systems in 
development are derived. As such it is imperative that the vision, mission, and goals of 
military concepts are valid. Invalid or inaccurately assessed military concepts can result in 
faulty CONOPs and ineffective systems. Therefore, the exercise and evaluation process that 
validates the military concept is an equally essential part of successful CONOPs 
development and, ultimately, of successful system development. Figure 7 depicts the 
relationship of experimentation to military concepts, with military concepts driving 
experimentation, which informs or validates the military concept. Military concepts that are 
invalidated should be changed and retested. Once validated, the military concepts then 
















Because CONOPs are the basis for system requirements, they also interact with the 
JCIDS-Acquisition processes. Initially, the CONOPs informs the ICD. As the system 
progresses through the acquisition lifecycle, events in system develop should inform the 
CONOPs. This process of revisiting and updating the CONOPS will help ensure it remains 
relevant.  This ongoing cycle of informing and updating is illustrated in Figure 8.55 The 
importance of the figure resides in its simplistic illustration of the interconnectedness of 
many activities. The picture now shows a series of ongoing interconnected processes each 
reliant on and influencing the other, versus strict swim lanes of disparate processes. 
 
Figure 8. Interconnectedness of CONOPs and Acquisition Activities
                                                
55 The figure also shows the independent role of the AoA. The AoA informs both the higher and system-level 
concepts.  The AoA has potential to influence DOTMLPF solutions that impact the way a Service fights, trains, 
and equips. The AoA informs the system-level CONOPs section on alternatives considered.  
 
CONOPs Maturation and Phases 
Ideally, the CONOPs should be updated throughout the acquisition lifecycle, such 
that as the system matures, the CONOPs increases in specificity. We have identified 
specific phases of CONOPs maturity each of which coincides with events in the acquisition 
lifecycle.   
CONOPs (Initial Phase).  Initially, the CONOPs describes the proposed system 
as a ‘black box’ and in its most ideal form (i.e., all user desired capabilities). This initial 
phase of the CONOPs will be used to guide the development of the ICD and serves as a 





 CONOPs (Discovery Phase). The suggested update cycle is triggered by 
specific events in the acquisition lifecycle.  Initially, the CONOPs informs the Technology 
Development56 (TD) phase by communicating desired capabilities, for which technology 
must be developed. Likewise, the TD process informs the CONOPs, by revealing actual 
technological possibilities. As TD progresses and technological possibilities become more 
evident, the CONOPs document should be updated to reflect actual capability. This activity 
will ensure that the user gets the system expected and that the system, though not as 
initially envisioned, still meets the operational need(s) described in the military concepts.  
The updated CONOPs and the ICD are the foundation for the CDD requirements 
generation process. Following the CDD and Milestone B, the system enters the Engineering, 
Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase.57 Results from the EMD activities bring 
additional clarity to the system’s operational limitations and advances. Therefore, EMD 
results should further inform the CONOPs such that it can again be updated to reflect actual 
system capability. Again, the updated CONOPs will be used as the basis for the 
requirements captured in the Capability Production Document (CPD). As with previous 
updates, the updating process will continue to maintain traceability between the user’s 
expectations and the operational mission the system supports.  
CONOPs (Employment Phase). Shortly after Milestone C system prototypes 
enter into low rate initial production (LRIP). LRIP models will generate user feedback, which 
will further inform the CONOPs. LRIP feedback provides the information needed to fully 
understand how the final system can and will be used. This feedback should be 
incorporated into a final version of the CONOPs. Throughout the updating cycle, the 
CONOPs must be compared to the higher order military concept(s) it supports to determine 
that it still supports the goals, missions and activities of the military concepts. The 
continuous review of the military concepts and CONOPs relationship is particularly important 
in long-lead time acquisition programs; over time introduction of new systems, new threats, 
and new political environments can change the battle field to the point that the system no 
longer serves a valid mission set.58  
The CONOPs maturity phases align with major phases of the acquisition cycle (i.e. 
MDD, TD, EMD, and deployment and employment). This results in three distinct phases of 
the CONOPs document. We have termed these phases: Initial, Discovery, and Employment, 
the names of which correspond to the level of system understanding discussed above. A 
graphical representation of these phases as they relate to the JCIDS-Acquisition timeline is 
provided in Figure 9. 
                                                
56 During the technology development phase, “technologies are developed, matured, and tested” (Schwartz, 
2009, p. 9) 
57 During the EMD phase “various subsystems are integrated into one system and a development model or 
prototype is produced” (Schwartz, 2009, p. 10). 
58 Although we have identified specific drivers of a CONOPs review, the idea of updating CONOPs is not new. 
Most guiding documents agree that the CONOPs is a “living document” (ANSI/AIAA, 1993; IEEE Standards, 
1998; Daniels & Bahill, 2004). Even still, in a survey of systems engineers and lead systems integrators, 
respondents indicated that “[over] 50% of [CONOPs] were not updated throughout the entire program lifecycle 













Figure 9. CONOPs Phases as Related to JCIDS-Acquisition 
The integrated, maturing CONOPs provides a mechanism for tracing system 
elements, such as requirements, perspectives, decisions, and solutions. 
Summary 
Undeniably, the system-level CONOPs has the ability to influence the success of 
activities across the entire acquisition lifecycle. To fully realize the benefit of these CONOPs 
we must first resolve outstanding issues related to barriers of the CONOPs use. First, we 
must work as a community to promulgate a single, agreed-upon definition for the term 
CONOPs. Secondly, we must work to combine existing CONOPs documents into an 
integrated and comprehensive document that speaks to many audiences. The integrated 
CONOPs will reduce the risks of inconsistent and unmet requirements by ensuring effective 
collaboration by stakeholders throughout the development life cycle. Once the CONOPs is 
created, we must remember its alignment with military concepts and acquisition activities 
and the influence each of these has on the other.  Finally, we must remember to revisit the 
CONOPs and allow it to mature over time. Although a potentially demanding and lengthy 
process, use of CONOPs will amplify the rapid and cost effective delivery of usable systems 
that meet warfighter needs.  
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Appendix A.  Survey 
Questionnaire 
The following questionnaire is issued to gain insight into current acquisition 
processes and to understand perceived shortcomings (if any) and suitable fixes to the 
identified shortcomings.  The ultimate goal of this research is to contribute to efforts to 
provide the warfighter with needed capabilities in a timely and cost-efficient manner.  
Answers to this questionnaire are non attributable, meaning answers provided will 
not be credited to any particular respondent. Furthermore, prior to being included in any 
published document, any/all answers will be generalized such that specific programs, 
offices, and/or systems under development will not be identifiable. Your honest answers are 
greatly appreciated. Respondents who would like a copy of our research end product can 
request so by emailing me at jaime.frittman@anser.org. 
1a.  In how many programs of record do you currently participate, or have you 
previously participated (an estimate is “ok”)? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
1b. What is or has been your role in these programs? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
2.  How do you define the term concept of operations (CONOPs)? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
3. In your personal opinion, what is the role/purpose of a CONOPs? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
4a. Have you ever written a CONOPs? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
4b.  If so, what type of content did you include in the CONOPs?  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
4c. Did you use a certain standard or prescribed template? If so, which one? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
4d. Was the CONOPs updated throughout the development cycle? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 






5. How important do you think a CONOPs is to the successful development and 
employment of the system to which it applies? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
6. Off the top of your head, can you think of any shortcomings related to CONOPs as 
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Acquisition policy and, even more so, acquisition practice today presumes that 
certainty is key to success, and that uncertainty or delays in achieving certainty regarding 
user needs or solution approach will necessarily impede progress. This means that when 
uncertainty arises during an acquisition effort, the natural response is to make decisions that 
resolve this uncertainty. Uncertainties arise for various reasons, such as poorly understood, 
conflicting, or changing needs. If, under pressure to maintain progress, an acquisition effort 
makes decisions to resolve these uncertainties without sufficient information, expertise, or 
deliberation, they are really only creating an illusion of certainty; in a practical sense, the 
uncertainty still exists. This artificial certainty then leads to flaws such as insufficient detail 
concerning specific needs or premature limiting of solution options. A new approach to 
acquisition is needed that recognizes that hiding uncertainty is detrimental to success. 
Systematically exposing uncertainties will be beneficial toward making acquisitions more 
flexible, cost-effective, and responsive to changing needs. 
The Requirements Challenge in Acquisition 
The purpose of the acquisition system is to acquire products that provide users in an 
enterprise (e.g., warfighters) with capabilities needed to perform their mission effectively and 
efficiently. To this end, user needs must be understood in terms of opportunities for 
improving the enterprise’s operational systems. Based on this understanding, a product 
must then be conceived/identified, acquired/developed (engineered and manufactured), 
deployed, and sustained/evolved. As long experience has shown, many challenges arise in 
trying to determine actual user needs and achieve a satisfactory product that properly 
addresses those needs. The essence of those challenges is achieving a balance among 
needed capabilities, enabling technology, cost, and timeliness in providing a product. 
The beginning of the acquisition life cycle is the identification of user needs and 
technology opportunities that suggest the potential for improved capabilities. These needs 
are progressively refined, elaborated, and reviewed to create specifications of requirements 
in increasing levels of detail, feeding into efforts that interpret those requirements to create a 




permit acquisition of a product that meets those needs is a significant challenge, but, further, 
needs to be met by a product are not static but continue to change. Future sustainability and 
improvement requires an acquirer and developer of a product to understand not only 
existing needs and technologies but how those needs and technologies are likely to evolve 
in the future. 
What experience and numerous studies over the years by the Department of 
Defense, Office of Management and Budget, Government Accountability Office, National 
Academies, and industry groups, have suggested is that properly determining needs and 
expressing these as requirements for product acquisition is difficult and prone to inflexibility 
and error. For example, quoting from the Defense Science Board Report (2009): “Today, 
‘requirements’ are used to define capability needs, implying that nothing less than a 
specified set of criteria is sufficient. Instead, a more prudent answer is to buy the best 
capability affordable, in the quantity desired, and fielded in as timely a manner as possible.” 
However, even this opinion fails to fully address how the acquisition approach could be 
improved so that products would better address both current and future needs. The 
following discussion proposes the notion that premature decision making, leading to only an 
illusion of certainty, is a factor in the requirements problem and that a greater awareness 
and explicit accommodation of uncertainty throughout the acquisition process would be 
beneficial. 
Understanding the Concept of Requirements 
“Requirements” is a term that everyone understands on an intuitive level but it can 
specifically mean many different things. In acquisition policy (USD (AT&L), 2008) 
requirements is used variously to mean: 
 Capabilities needed by a community of users (e.g., mission, user, or capability 
requirements) 
 Rules that must be followed in performing acquisition activities (e.g., statutory 
and regulatory requirements) 
 Criteria against which the acceptability of a product development effort will be 
evaluated (e.g., program requirements) 
 A specification of the expected behavior of a product being acquired (e.g., 
product, operational, or system requirements) (i.e., the guidance that product 
developers are given to know what to build or to describe what has been built) 
In a general sense, all of these uses are consistent but the practical implications of 
each for acquisition differ substantially. In particular, user requirements, program 
requirements, and system requirements are all different expressions of the single notion that 
a product is needed that will allow users to perform their mission more effectively. For an 
acquisition to be successful, all of these expressions must be consistent. 
In fact, however, this presents a dilemma: acquisition rules require that an acquisition 
program can proceed only after its requirements have been approved. Program 
requirements are derived based on user requirements and are the basis for defining product 
requirements. With respect to an envisioned or existing product, its requirements can be 
thought of as a model of the observable behavior that the product must exhibit to provide the 
capabilities needed by users. If user requirements are inaccurate, this will undermine 
program and product requirements unless there is a means for modifying them during the 




What the experience of many people suggests, supported by recurring government 
and industry studies, is that requirements at any level of detail are often flawed: incomplete, 
inaccurate, misunderstood, and prone to unforeseen change. The best means we have for 
mitigating these flaws is systematic iteration through all aspects of product development, 
allowing for the progressive refinement of a shared understanding of needs, constraints, 
potential solutions, and tradeoffs. If acquisition policy or practice dictates that requirements 
at some point early in the acquisition process must be viewed as complete and immutable, it 
is likely that resulting products will both embody difficult-to-correct flaws and fail to keep up 
with changing needs. 
The acquisition system today seems to encourage, and practitioners conform to, the 
idea that a proper acquisition depends on achieving certainty, in requirements and in the 
cascade of subsequent decisions that flow through the acquisition process. What they 
actually achieve is the appearance of certainty but such certainty can in fact be an illusion 
built upon premature, inadequately reasoned decisions, inadequate understanding of needs, 
and failure to account for changing needs, technology, and operational context. Explicit 
recognition and accommodation of uncertainties is a way around this dilemma that will help 
programs avoid commonly experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, and product 
defects, while supporting concerns for proper accountability. 
Causes of Uncertainty in Requirements 
In thinking about the nature of requirements, we can easily identify several potential 
sources of uncertainty. To properly understand and specify requirements, these need to be 
exposed, analyzed, and documented with rationale: 
 Incomplete knowledge. User needs are usually specified by people who are 
knowledgeable in the mission of the enterprise and how it currently works. 
However, they often have only limited knowledge of how those needs may be 
realized in solution products, how different aspects may interact in a solution, or 
how new solutions could change the way the enterprise works; as a result, they 
may express needs in ways that unintentionally seem to limit the potential 
solution. Furthermore, there are usually aspects of user needs about which even 
experts disagree. Because no one can have complete knowledge of all aspects 
of any endeavor, it is likely that any description of user needs will mask areas of 
uncertainty or disagreement. Customers may recognize that this uncertainty 
exists but, lacking a proper awareness of the need and means to communicate 
the variety of alternatives that they see, they may instead make a reasoned but 
ultimately arbitrary choice. 
 Imprecise understanding of needs. While customers may be competent to define 
user needs, developers are likely to lack the same depth of understanding. 
Experts in a field may share assumptions, concepts, and terminology that enable 
them to describe needs in simpler terms that acquisition agents or developers 
with less of that expertise may misinterpret. It may not be apparent that 
developers have a different understanding until a product exists and its behavior 
can be observed in use. Needs are often better understood after potential 
solutions have been developed and comparatively evaluated, preferably with 
exposure to knowledgeable users, leading then to being able to define better 
requirements. 
 Differing needs among users. Users doing similar jobs may in fact legitimately 




similar jobs as having the same needs, the developer may create a product that 
properly meets the needs of only some users. A product that imposes a particular 
viewpoint on all such users will make some of those users less effective. 
 Changing needs. Needs change over time because of changes in mission, 
operational context, and technology. Defining needs only from the perspective of 
a single point in time ensures that these are inaccurate with respect to other 
times. Framing needs as fixed without consideration of potential change over 
time imposes uncertainty on what is potentially predictable change that may be 
better accommodated by developers if known. 
Why Apparent Certainty in Requirements May Be an Illusion 
By the time a product is deployed, its actual (“as-built”) requirements have been 
effectively determined. Still, although in a practical sense there can be no actual 
uncertainties about the behavior of a deployed product, there may not be a complete and 
accurate specification of what those requirements are. In that sense, there may be no one 
who can be certain about all aspects of the product’s behavior. 
Although acceptance of a product depends on compliance with acceptance criteria 
usually expressed in the form of requirements, the same problem can exist for those: there 
may be unacknowledged uncertainties that have been improperly resolved. In a process in 
which encountered uncertainties are simply decided away, without proper identification and 
systematic analysis of factors and tradeoffs, and not documented with rationale, it is likely 
that some uncertainty still exists relative to actual current or future needs. This same 
argument applies as the reasoning behind particular requirements is traced back through 
acquisition decision making. 
Uncertainty can exist at any level of requirements. The fundamental uncertainty is 
how does someone determine and communicate what they want or need. That phrase itself 
reveals a basic issue: how do we distinguish aspects that we must have from what we might 
like to have from what we would accept. The essence of engineering is identifying and 
weighing tradeoffs among alternatives but the nature of defining requirements is not only to 
make a definitive statement about what a customer needs but in doing that to also eliminate 
unsuitable solutions. When this is done without full knowledge of actual possibilities, 
potential solutions can be prematurely constrained. 
In looking at how requirements are determined, there are many factors that can lead 
to the various kinds of uncertainty: 
 No individual or collection of people will have complete knowledge of all aspects 
of an existing system and its operational context; requirements are inevitably only 
a partial description that requires particular expertise for correct understanding. 
 It is not possible to communicate all that an individual or collection of people 
know about a system or how it might be improved; a complete description of 
what is known would require years to produce and years to consume. 
 Among a collection of people, even with similar spans and depths of knowledge 
in an area, there will be disagreements, some that can be resolved and some 
that are fundamental; the conventional answer is to insist on achieving 
agreement, even though the substance of the disagreement may itself provide 





 Even if people are able to correctly characterize needs at a point in time, needs 
as well as enabling technologies change over time; requirements that only 
describe what is needed currently will be incorrect at other times in the future. 
 Both natural language and graphical notations are frequently understood 
differently by different people, particularly when lacking similar expertise; two 
examples of gaps in communications are between users and developers and 
between systems engineers and software engineers. 
There are other factors in the nature of requirements that can also lead to 
uncertainties about the needed product: 
 Users typically view their needs in terms of being able to accomplish their job and 
new or improved capabilities that would enhance this; this view is often 
constrained by inaccurate assumptions about what is possible and what can and 
cannot be changed. 
 When a product built to address users’ needs is deployed, it often changes the 
users’ perceptions not only of what their needs are but also of what is possible, 
leading to their needs “changing” yet again. 
 Requirements being only approximate descriptions of needs and constraints on 
potential solutions may in fact omit information that the customer knows and 
assumes but that the product developer does not. 
 Requirements are frequently not limited to what is absolutely needed but also 
reflects the customer’s perception of what is desirable without distinguishing 
between these; this in fact often precludes options that would allow the developer 
to make better tradeoffs in creating a product that is a best fit to purpose within 
given cost and schedule constraints. 
Using Uncertainty in Writing Better Requirements 
Parnas and Clements (1986) argue for the ideal of a rational process for the design 
and building of (software) products. As part of this, they characterize requirements as a 
definition of the expected observable behavior of a needed product, sufficient to answer 
developer questions about what is to be built. A way to understand this is to recognize that 
requirements constitute a model of a needed product. From this perspective, requirements 
should define the capabilities that a product needs to enable for its users. 
However, it is not enough to describe a product at a fixed point in time and with 
uncertainties hidden. In fact, Parnas and Clements argued that a rational process is not 
usual practice because of incomplete and inaccurate information in documentation caused 
by underlying issues in how documents are written (e.g., poorly organized, stream of 
consciousness exposition, poorly and inconsistently written by multiple authors, dispersed 
repetition of related or conflicting information, confusing and inconsistent terminology, 
narrowly conceived). In fact, these problems still exist and are often symptoms of false 
certainty. Authors must produce requirements that appear certain even if uncertainty has not 
been properly resolved. No means is given to indicate areas of uncertainty, doubt, or likely 
change that are left to be resolved. 
A common effect of resolving uncertainty with arbitrary decisions is to prematurely 
limit solution options. Not having a means of specifying requirements so as to permit 
alternative solutions, the customer may instead resort to describing a particular solution that 




analysis, the developer may be forced to adopt the described solution rather than having the 
option of developing and evaluating other potentially more appropriate solutions. 
A factor in being able to evolve a product as user needs change is the ability to 
recover the rationale for why requirements are what they are. Some products today include 
obsolete capabilities and are difficult to change simply because no one is sure why the 
product does all that it does, why it is built the way it is, and whether any aspects of what it 
does are no longer needed by users. A natural by-product of focusing on and explicitly 
analyzing uncertainties is that the rationale for the resolution actually chosen will be 
documented. By capturing this rationale, we have at least a partial characterization for the 
product not only as it finally exists but also as it might have been differently done, giving a 
basis from which to revise the product when needs change. 
An Existing Approach for Limited Accommodation of 
Uncertainty 
Some experience already exists with building products with a focus on uncertainty. 
When an organization has a need to build multiple products, in support of customers having 
similar but not identical needs, a product line approach provides a process for building a set 
of similar products from a common base of reusable software, documentation, and test 
assets (Campbell, Faulk & Weiss, 1990; Clements & Northrop, 2002). This approach 
depends on identifying precisely the ways in which the needed products will be alike 
(commonalities) and the ways in which they will differ (variabilities). The techniques for 
identifying how products will differ and in resolving those differences to create a specific 
product is similar to the model proposed for identifying and resolving requirements 
uncertainties in general. 
With a product line approach, not all types of uncertainty are addressed but only 
those related to customers’ changing or diverse needs. Uncertainties related to potential 
changes in customer needs or to needs that differ among customers are systematically 
identified and formulated as decisions that will be resolved late in the production of each 
specific product in consultation with the individual customer for that product. The ability to 
resolve these uncertainties in different ways is systematically engineered as production 
options. This provides the means to deliver a customized product to each customer and to 
deliver a revised product to each customer as their needs change. Identifying decisions that 
encapsulate the implications of diverse and changing customer needs on product 
requirements for a set of customized products is integral to the concept of a product line. 
This approach also provides the means to rapidly build alternative solutions to particular 
customer needs as a means to helping the customer find the best fit to their needs. 
A Strategy for Comprehensively Accommodating Uncertainty 
A recent National Academies study (Achieving Effective, 2009) has recommended 
that system requirements (“big R”) for IT systems be defined strictly and fixed at the mission 
capabilities level and that more detailed requirements (“little r”) continue to be developed 
and refined throughout the acquisition process. Consistent with the challenges of 
uncertainty, this study advised that requirements evolve progressively through ongoing 
interactions with end users and assessments of available technologies. The study alluded to 





Uncertainty in requirements is not a “problem” to be eliminated. Recognizing and 
properly exposing uncertainty is an aid to communicating more effectively about needs and 
potential solutions. Some uncertainties, once recognized as such, can be resolved through 
an analysis of alternatives and tradeoffs during the development process; others are 
inherent aspects of the problem being addressed and require different resolutions over time 
or for different customers. From experience with product lines, there are good techniques for 
expressing uncertainty which can guide developers in providing needed flexibility with 
mechanisms for tailoring and product customization to better accommodate the needs of 
customers over time. 
A strategy comprising three elements will give the means to better expose and 
resolve or accommodate uncertainties in requirements: 
 View product development as a process whose ancillary purpose is the 
elaboration, refinement, and correction of requirements as initially defined. 
 Document all differences and their implications when domain experts have 
differing views on any aspect of requirements. 
 For any aspect of requirements for which there are alternatives, that are the 
subject of tradeoffs, or that may change in the future, document the rationale for 
its current realization in comparison with identified alternatives. 
These elements together are meant both to improve the requirements as a 
description of the product being acquired and also to provide the basis for revising those 
requirements as understanding of needs improve or when needs or technology change in 
the future. When uncertainties exist and are resolved, capturing the rationale provides 
valuable insight to future developers. When needs change, this rationale provides a basis 
for understanding the implications of having to differently resolve those previous 
uncertainties in order to revise the product. To build a product, all requirements’ 
uncertainties have to be resolved in some way to finally build a product, but the goal is to not 
resolve an uncertainty prematurely or for all time. 
A key focus suggested in a proposed roadmap for improving software producibility 
was bridging the conceptual gap between customers and product developers, based on 
recognizing that there are alternative ways of expressing any problem and many potential 
solutions that can result (Campbell, 2008). With this perspective, no specific expression of 
requirements is the “right” one; rather different expressions may be suitable for different 
purposes. However, underlying all valid expressions are a set of assumptions about 
certainty, which aspects of needs and associated potential solutions are intrinsic and fixed 
and which are tradable and changeable. In product lines, these assumptions, of 
commonality and variability, provide a framework in which true certainties provide a 
framework within which uncertainties are identified as choices that customers and 
developers must make through an ongoing process of evaluation and refinement over the 
life of a needed product. 
As is true for product lines, a shift to uncertainty-based acquisition does not require 
major changes in acquisition policy but rather a change in the level at which programs are 
required to establish binding requirements (Campbell, 2002). These should be at the level of 
observable mission-enabling capabilities to be achieved through an iterative process of 
learning and refinement rather than with a premature over-constrained specification of a 
specific top-down solution to narrowly conceived needs. This will require changes in the 




uncertainties, builds a stronger foundation for the efficient, predictable delivery of correct 
and effective capabilities needed by customers. 
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Abstract 
DoD acquisition is an extremely complex system, comprised of myriad stakeholders, 
processes, people, activities, and organizations in an effort to provide the most useful 
capabilities to warfighters at the best possible value to the government.  This effort is being 
accomplished by acquisition analysts who despite years of experience are encumbered by 
mountains of available data.  To assist the analyst, we consider that the cognitive interface 
between decision-makers and a complex system may be expressed in a range of terms or 
“features,” i.e., specific vocabulary to describe attributes.  This offers the opportunity to more 
easily compare two competing technologies, which, in turn, may be compared to the Navy 
warfighter requirements.  This effort can allow decision-makers to become aware of what 
programs, systems, and specific features are available for acquisition and how well they 
match warfighter’s needs and requirements with greater effect and immediacy—possibly in 
real-time.  We present a data-driven automation method, namely, Lexical Link Analysis 
(LLA), to facilitate and automate acquisition system self-awareness. 
Introduction 
DoD acquisition is an extremely complex system, comprised of myriad stakeholders, 
processes, people, activities, and organizations in an effort to provide the most useful 
capabilities to warfighters at the best possible value to the government.  According to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction for Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) (J-8 CJCSI 3170.01G) (JCIDS, 2009), there are three key 
processes in the DoD that must work in concert to deliver the capabilities required by the 
warfighter: the requirements process; the acquisition process; and the Planning, 
Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process. In particular, the requirements 
process is implemented in a process called Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), as shown in Figure 1. JCIDS plays a key role in identifying the capabilities 
required by the warfighters to support the National Defense Strategy, the National Military 
Strategy, and the National Strategy for Homeland Defense. The Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS) looks on enterprise asset acquisition based on JCIDS requirements, and PPBE is 
focused on the management of financial resources in accomplishing enterprise asset 
creation, sustainment and reuse.  The leadership and decision-makers constantly contend 
with two major questions: 
1. Are we responding to strategic guidance and joint capability needs? 
1. Are we getting the best value for taxpayers? 
As shown in Figure 1, JCIDS alone produces a large amount of detailed documents 
(e.g., Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Formal Capability Development Document (CDD), 




personnel, or facilities (DOTMLPF), Change Recommendations (DCR) for non-material 
solutions, and Capability Production Document (CPD)).  Each involves diversified 
stakeholders such as sponsors, program managers, developers, the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 
 
 
Figure 1. JCIDS Process and Acquisition Decisions 
(JCIDS, 2009) 
Warfighters’ requirements are documented in Universal Joint Task List (UJTLs) or 
Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), which are collections of required capabilities functionally 
grouped to support mission analysis, capability analysis, strategy development, investment 
decision-making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force 







Figure 2. Portfolio Analytic Capability 
(Appleton, 2009) 
In summary, the major challenges in the current process can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. To make optimal investment decisions, acquisition managers must analyze a 
full spectrum of data, including data that encompasses capability 
requirements, planning, development, integration, testing, architecture, 
standards, cost and schedules. This can be a daunting, if not impossible, 
task. 
2. The pace of technology change also requires agile decision-making 
and challenges program management to maintain constant 
awareness of what is available for acquisition. 
3. When considering an overall demand and supply in the trade space 
management of the Department of Defense, as shown in Figure 2, 
decision-makers require advanced portfolio analytic capability that can 
intercept all three business processes of requirements, acquisition 




contexts of many factors, such as systems versus capabilities, 
investment versus capabilities, highly dependent programs, etc., in 
order to maximize Return of Management (ROM) and Yield on Cost 
(YOC) (Appleton, 2009). 
4. The information produced in the process is too voluminous and 
unformatted to lend itself to analysis on a large scale. Decision-
makers require large-scale automation and discovery tools that can 
speed up the analysis quickly in response to the pace of technology 
change, therefore adapting DoD program development and 
associated funding mechanisms in an agile manner. The decision-
makers also require a much more fine-grained level of analysis for 
program-to-program and program-to-program elements analysis using 
the unstructured documents directly. This is a big leap that is not 
provided by the current analysis capabilities. 
One method to reduce unknown performance measures is through participation in 
annual large-scale field experimentation exercises as part of the Research, Development, 
Test & Evaluation (RDT&E).  These experiments can provide close interaction among users, 
developers, the test community, and decision-makers.  At Distributed Information Systems 
Experimentation (DISE) laboratory at NPS, we collect and analyze data, help the Navy learn 
and manage information and knowledge resulting from large-scale annual experimentation 
(e.g., Trident Warrior and Empire Challenge).  We believe this experiential data, together 
with Lexical Link Analysis methods, will produce deepened awareness of current program 
effectiveness for acquisition decision-makers. 
Methods 
Program Self-awareness 
Here we consider that the cognitive interface between decision-makers and a 
complex system may be expressed in a range of terms or “features,” i.e., specific vocabulary 
or lexicon, to describe attributes and the surrounding environment of a system.  This 
process is similar or can be modeled using human cognitive processes, where the simplest 
form of such a model is relationships between noun/verb. In math, the model becomes 
variable/function; in engineering it becomes operand/operator; in information technology, it 
becomes data/process or description/procedure. We have borrowed from notions of 
“awareness,” and implement the term self-awareness of a complex system as the collective 
and integrated understanding of system features.  A related term, “situational awareness” is 
used in military operations and carries with it a sense of immediacy and cognitive 
understanding of the warfighting situation.  Here, system self-awareness, or program 
awareness (Gallup, MacKinnon, Zhao, Robey & Odel, 2009), allows decision-makers to be 
aware of what systems, programs, and products are available for acquisition, how they 
match warfighters’ needs and requirements, recognize relationships among them, improve 
efficiency of available collaboration, reduce duplication of effort, and re-use components to 
support cost effective management—with greater immediacy, possibly in real-time.   
Through our research, we present a data-driven automation method, namely, a 
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) for program self-awareness. This methodology is demonstrated 
by extracting realistic sample data related to systems and programs included in 
experimentation programs, Urgent Needs Statements (UNS), and CENTCOM/NAVCENT 




Acquisition Programs (DMAP) and Acquisition Category II (ACATII) weapon systems and 
their RDT&E documentations.  
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) 
Data mining includes analytic tools that may be applied to both structured and 
unstructured data to confirm previously determined patterns, or to discover new patterns 
that are yet unknown.  Text mining is the application of data mining to unstructured or less 
structured text files.  Text mining represents an emerging field with a wide range of software 
implementing innovative visualization and navigation techniques.  These techniques 
graphically represent networks of documentation that are related conceptually.  Visualization 
of relationships enables concept discovery, automated classification, and understandable 
categorization of unstructured documents. 
Lexical Analysis (LA, 2010) is a form of text mining in which word meanings are 
developed from the context from which they are derived.  Lexical Analysis (LA) can also be 
used in a learning mode, where such words and context associations are initially unknown 
and are constantly being “learned,” updated, and improved as more data become available.   
Link analysis, a subset of network analysis that explores associations between objects, 
reveals the crucial relationships between objects when collected data may not be complete.  
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) is an extended lexical analysis and link analysis enabled in a 





Figure 3. A Word Hub Showing the Detail on the Linkage in Figure 3 
This approach clusters words and then correlates words with their textual contexts 
(co-occurrence), and produces a data-driven and dynamic word network. This approach is 




(Dumais et al., 1998), advanced search engine (Foltz, 2002), key word analysis and tagging 
technology (Gerber, 2005), and intelligence analysis ontology for cognitive assistants 
(Tecuci et al., 2007).  What results from this process is a learning model—like an 
ethnographic code book (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999)—containing descriptions 
of both patterns and anomalies, generated using encountered terms.  As an example shown 
in Figures 3 and 4, we applied our approach to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
technologies that were evaluated in Trident Warrior 08.  Figure 3 shows a visualization of 
LLA with connected keywords or concepts extracted from the documents of MDA 
technologies.  Words are linked as word pairs that appear next to each other in the original 
documents.  Different colors indicate different clusters of centralization among word groups.  
They are produced using a link analysis method, a social network grouping method (Girvan 
& Newman, 2001): words are connected as shown in one color as if they are in a social 
community.  A “hub” is a word centered with a list of other words (“fan-out” words) centered 
around other words.  For instance, in Figure 4, the word “behavior” is centered with 
“suspicious, bad, dangerous, abnormal, usual, and anomalous,” etc., showing the ways to 
describe “behavior” in the MDA area.   
Figures 5 and 6 show a visualization of lexical links between Systems 1 and 2. Each 
node is a feature, or word hub; each color refers to the collection of lexicon (features) to 
describe a system, the overlapping area nodes refer to lexical links between systems.  The 
nodes toward the two ends of the links represent the unique features related to each 
system. 
  





Figure 5. Visualization of Lexical Links 
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Figure 6. Overlapping Terms or Lexical Links, Shown in the Middle of Two Word 
Networks as the Result of the LLA Analysis 
In summary, LLA provides a methodology and tools to address the following specific 
areas that can impact acquisition decision-making: 
 LLA provides a metric to link warfighters’ needs with the capabilities by directly 
comparing the documents that resulted from the business process—for example, 
linking “programs,” specifically MDAPs, to operational capabilities.  The number 
of lexical links, extracted to reflect the meaning of the documents between two 
systems or programs, can be a measure of consensus or synergy between the 




management, for example, to answer the questions: What are the programs 
(e.g., MDAPs) related to a given capability?  What are the gaps of warfighter 
requirements not addressed by current programs?  Currently, human analysts 
are responsible to answer these questions manually.  Automation is needed to 
facilitate human analysis and to process large volumes of data quickly. 
 LLA visualization is also important for acquisition decision-making.  Producing a 
picture illustrating where the needs are met and where the overlapping efforts 
and gaps are will allow decision-makers to become aware of the overall situation, 
thus allowing them to see trends in a larger, broader scale and in a longer 
timeframe. For example, combining the analyses of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force from RDT&E and procurement documents might show the linkages within 
and among programs, as they mature from development to production.  Modified 
programs can be illustrated to show the trend toward (or deviation away from) 
warfighters’ needs during the program’s life span.  One may also visually see the 
resource sharing (or wasting) practices and note opportunities for growth when 
all the data can be summarized in a discernable picture. 
 LLA discovers latent, implicit, or second-order relationships by examining the 
detailed budget justification documents. In general, programs retain their 
identities from development to production, yet may change their names or be re-
designated, resulting from a milestone decision or other action.  The "New Attack 
Sub" or "NSSN" during development, for instance, was referred to as the 
"Virginia Class Sub" in production.  The "Joint Strike Fighter" and "F-35" are also 
synonymous.  The official "decoder" for these transformations is the DAMIR 
system.  We note that the mapping of MDAPs to their predecessors, successors, 
constituents, or dependent partners is non-trivial and is, in fact, one of the 
fundamental challenges for acquisition analysts.  
 LLA could affect the fundamentals of acquisition processes through automation 
and discovery.  In the defense acquisition community, decision-makers are 
interested in determining the costs of these programs relative to their predicted 
baselines (e.g., Milestone B or C).  They must also determine why costs change 
over time.  Historically, acquisition researchers only considered endogenous 
factors (e.g., poor program management skills) as drivers of cost changes.  The 
notion of interdependence as a potential driver of cost may be determined by 
LLA.  It may also help determine whether this interdependence among programs 
may be manifested in the sharing of resources among programs, as described by 
the budget artifacts.  Budget artifact data are voluminous, and unstructured, 
which make empirical analysis extremely difficult—if not humanly impractical.  
Previous research has been done in this area using manually identified program 
interdependencies (M. Brown, personal communication, 2010) and has made 
great progress in establishing that interdependence exists and how they might be 
correlated with the program costs.  LLA could automate this process of 
identifying interdependencies and, thus, reveal aspects of interdependence that 





The LLA Analysis 
We began at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) by using Collaborative Learning 
Agents (CLA) (QI, 2009) and expanded to other tools, including AutoMap (AutoMap, 2009) 
for improved visualizations.  Results from these efforts arose from leveraging intelligent 
agent technology via an educational license with Quantum Intelligence, Inc.  CLA is a 
computer-based learning agent or agent collaboration, capable of ingesting and processing 
data sources.  Each CLA is capable of revealing patterns that occur frequently and 
anomalies that occur rarely.  Anomalies that might be interesting are thus revealed so that 
human analysts are alerted and can further investigate them.  The CLA is able to separate 
the patterns from anomalies using the “patterns and anomalies separation” algorithm in 
each CLA to select feature-like word pairs for the LLA method.   
The following are the steps for the LLA analysis: 
1. Read two documents into the CLA (e.g., Urgent Needs Statement (UNS)) and 
a targeted technology document set (e.g., Trident Warrior 2010 (TW10).  
5. Select feature-like word pairs based on clusters using the CLA 
anomaly search method (Zhao & Zhou, 2008). 
6. Apply social network algorithm to group the word pairs into word 
categories. 
7. Apply AutoMap to visualize the associations of the requirement 
document set (UNS) and targeted technologies (TW10) document 
sets, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
8. Generate lexical link matrices used for further analyses, as shown in 
Figures 8, 9, and 10. 
When mining text data or performing lexical analysis, we also apply entity extraction, 
known as Named Entity Recognition (NER), (NER, 2010; Nadeau, Turney & Matwin, 2006), 
which recognizes named entities such as persons, organizations, locations, expressions of 
times, quantities, monetary values and percentages in context.  The extracted entities could 
also be examined separately.  Excluding these modifiers from the terms resulting from 
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) can provide an improved comparison by focusing on term 
semantics. 
In some applications, differentiating nouns from verbs and adjectives, or having the 
ability to parse the syntax into nouns, verbs, subjects, and objects, could be helpful to 
acquisition managers to develop understanding.  We also use a Part-of-Speech 
(POS) tagger as pre- or post-processing filters for this purpose.  A POS tagger is a piece of 
software that reads text in some language and assigns parts of speech to each word, such 
as a noun, verb, adjective, etc.  We have chosen the Stanford Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) tool (Toutanova, Klein, Manning & Singer, 2003; Stanford NLP, 2009) to perform this 
task.  The POS taggers are usually language dependent.  Our method is statistically based 
and can, therefore, employ NER and POS as pre- or post-processing filters.  
Data Sets  
We report a case study using LLA comparing US Navy Urgent Need Statements 




data sets, the first one is an Excel file (UNS.xls) representing Urgent Need Statements 
collected from C4I users.  Each urgent need is listed as a statement. The UNS.xls is 
classified; therefore, details of this document set are not reported in this paper.  The second 
data set is called “Focus Area Assignment TW 10.xls,” also in an Excel format.  It includes 
information from each selected technology in Trident Warrior 10.   
Trident Warrior (TW) is an annual Navy FORCEnet operational experiment.  At the 
Distributed Information Systems Experimentation (DISE) laboratory at NPS, we collect and 
analyze data from this and other experimentation venues to help the Navy learn and 
manage information and knowledge resulting from large field experiments such as Trident 
Warrior to provide a basis for DoD acquisition of systems and technologies.  The technology 
information includes each technology’s objective(s) for the experimentation, including 
Concept of Operations (e.g., how a warfighter will utilize it), and what each technology 
provider intends to learn from the experimentation (e.g., decrease timeline, standardized 
process, and/or reduced workload, etc.).  TW data also includes decisions that may affect 
experimentation findings. 
Result Presentation and Visualization Tools 
Figure 7 illustrates a result summary revealing terms or word pairs combined into 
word categories, displayed in a radial graph.  The categories with radius = 2 represent 
overlapping word categories that are found in both requirements (UNS) and technologies 
(TW10).  The categories with radius = 1 indicate where gaps exist, i.e., terms that show in 
the UNS but not in the TW10 technologies or vice versa.  We determine that there is 
between a 60% and 70% match overlap of technology correlations between UNS and TW 
10 technologies.  For example, 42 of 67 (62%) of the UNS word categories matched (were 
served by) with TW10 technologies. 
In addition, word network views of lexical links are produced using a network tool, 
AutoMap.  We also developed several outputs to view the detailed LLA analysis results as 
shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10.  Figure 8 shows an Excel document output, including a few 
columns of information as follows: 
 Terms: Matching terms or word categories discovered automatically via the LLA 
method. 
 UNS: Values can be 0, 1, 2, specifically: 
o 0: terms not found in UNS,  
o 1: terms only found in UNS, and  
o 2: terms found in both UNS and TW10. 
 UNS IDS: UNS documents in which the terms can be found. 
 TW10:  Values can be 0, 1, 2.  
o 0: terms not found in TW10, 
o 1: terms only found in UNS, and 
o 2: terms found in both UNS and TW10. 
 TW10 IDS: TW10 documents in which the terms can be found. 




 As one scrolls down, if there is “0” in the TW10 column, then it indicates a gap 
area for TW10.  Similarly, in scrolling further, if there is a “0” in the UNS column, 
then this indicates a gap in UNS.  
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Numbers show how many word categories linking the 
corresponding technology and UNS. The hyperlinks under 
the numbers provide original documents for the linked words 
in the server in NPS Secure Technology Battle Lab (STBL)
UNS ID
Technology ID
Figure 9. The Matrix View of the LLA Analysis 
Figure 9 shows a matrix view of UNS to TW 10 technologies.  Where numbers are 
seen indicates a numerical reference to the number of the "concepts" (terms or word 
categories) included between UNS and technologies that are being satisfied.  Usually, there 
are multiple concepts within a UNS statement and a tech description. Each number is also a 
hyperlink back to the original document in a server where it is stored, e.g., the server in the 
NPS Secure Technology Battle Lab (STBL) for classified documents. 
These results can be increasingly focused as the Intelligent Agent (IA) becomes 
“tuned,” or learns what it is that the researcher is attempting to understand.  This effort can 
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Figure 10. Frequency Count and Document References 
Figure 10 shows a summary spreadsheet listing the terms and number of files in 
which the terms appear. This output can be used to discover concepts (terms) that are 
cross-validated by at least two documents in a document set.  The terms are sorted by the 
number of "fan out" (the words connected to a word hub), showing the critical concepts 
being addressed across multiple documents.  The top few sorted word groups, e.g., “data” 
and “information” in this case, are the key requirements that result in substantial consensus 
across different levels of requirement generation mechanisms—for example, Joint 
Integrating Concept (JIC), Joint Capability Areas (JCA), the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 
and user communities such as US Northern Command, US Pacific Command, and sponsors 
that are interested in Interagency Investment Strategies (IISs). 
Validity  
Several methods are being investigated to validate LLA methods.  Currently, we 
have shown these proof-of-concept results to Subject-matter Experts (SME) from various 
organizations (e.g., Joint Force Development and Integration, the J-7 Staff) for evaluation 
and comment.  One MDA expert has commented on the summary spreadsheet by saying, “it 
is very useful, particularly the frequency count and the documented reference.”  Other SMEs 
comment that “LLA has great potential to help us link the UNS with the technology and 
further fill in the gaps that are out there.” “This would be highly useful and has great potential 
to help us in the larger N9/Sea Trial construct and spoke further of the possibility of using 
LLA at the Joint Warfighter Challenges level.” We will consider quantitative content 
validation methods between SMEs and LLA, such as correlation and inter-rater reliability 
scores (Cohen's Kappa; Kerlinger & Lee, 1992), as well as large-scale correlation 
calculation used in sections below. 




Towards a Large-Scale Example of Program Self-Awareness 
We have worked with OUSD(AT&L)/ARA/EI  on the broader data sets and a large-
scale application of program self-awareness via LLA. 
Data Sets 
Figure 11. DoD Budget Documentation 
 
Figure 12. Research, Development Test 
& Evaluation (RDT&E) 
 
Figure 13. Program Element RDT&E Budget Justification 
1. We have obtained program element (PE) data, which are used for DoD 
budget justification each year, as shown in Figure 11. One PE component is 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, which is the budget estimation, 
allocation and justification used for programs in the earlier stages of 
development. The procurement of PE components is the counterpart used for 




(http://asafm.army.mil/Document.aspx?OfficeCode=1200) and Navy 
(http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/11pres/BOOKS.htm) websites.  
9. The Weapon Book (Weapon, 2008), which summarizes weapons and 
their basic functions and missions, combined total cost from RDT& 
and procurement.    
10. MMT databases contain cost and schedule information for each 
program.  They consist of MDAPs and weapon systems.  MMT 
databases also contain various program interdependencies identified 
by human analysts that can be used for validation.  MMT databases 
also contain JCAs and UJTLs mapped to programs that are 
handmade by human experts.   
According to program managers Data (1) and (2) are so voluminous, unformatted 
and unstructured that traditional analysis methods are difficult to apply on this scale; 
therefore, they are the major focuses of the analysis for LLA.  There are about ~500 PEs 
and ~80 weapon systems extracted from data sets (1) and (2), with a total size about 
~200M. Data (3) is unstructured and various previous research has been conducted on this 
data and, therefore, can be used to validate the LLA method against human analyses.  
LLA Analysis 
The focus of this paper is to show that the LLA method is capable of improving 
system self-awareness.  LLA is able to produce this by providing an improved methodology 
and toolset for automation and discovery of patterns and anomalies within structured and 
unstructured data.  This discovery can be used to produce graphics illustrating gaps and 
overlaps existing between systems and the needs of the DoD by basing comparisons on the 
features of each system.  This methodology can have the effect of improved savings for the 





Figure 14. An Example of LLA Matrices of Program Elements (PE) against 
UJTLs 
First, we want to show how LLA provides a new metric to measure how warfighters’ 
needs are matched with resources and products that are being considered.  Figure 14 
shows an LLA matrix result using program elements as columns and UJTLs as rows.  The 
number in each cell is a match score generated from the LLA method. Next to the score are 
word hubs that indicate which term is matched.  Sorting this matrix according to the matched 
scores vertically and horizontally answers the following questions: 
 Which programs (e.g., MDAPS) are related to a given capability?  Which PEs are 
related to a given capability?   
 How is the acquisition process responding to expressed capability needs? How 
much of the weapon systems acquisition budget is being allocated to any given 
operational need (e.g., UJTL).  
Note that this LLA matrix can be generated for any pair of document collections that 
are desired for comparison, e.g., PEs versus UJTLs, weapon systems versus UJTLs and 
weapon systems versus weapon systems. When applied to weapon systems (MDAPs) 
versus UJTLs, we can answer the following question by sorting the LLA matching scores:  
 Which capability(ies) does any given MDAP support?  How much does the 
MDAP contribute to this capability? 
The LLA matrices may also help to reconcile the gaps between the final products 
and what warfighters need after the long process of design and development. Furthermore, 
they may also provide new prospective for portfolio analysis.  A conventional treatment of 
portfolio analysis is that it is typically expressed as a simple correlation between an MDAP 
and a capability. This simple correlation ignores the fact that no individual program (system, 
platform, etc.) can contribute to any capability unless other programs/systems/capabilities 
are in place.  The analogy is that a fighter jet is useless unless it has all the supporting 
capabilities/infrastructure (airfield, ammo, fuel, personnel, etc.), and complementary systems 
(e.g., GPS, C2, satellite imagery, mission planning, etc.) to enable it to operate effectively.  
Considering a single MDAP in terms of how much it contributes to a given capability without 
considering its linkages to other systems/programs/capabilities might be counterproductive, 
and would likely drive bad decisions.  The better approach is to consider a program in the 
context of its interdependencies with respect to their collective contribution to a specific 
capability.  The interdependencies should be identified from operational needs, engineering 
constructions and programmatic budget justifications. Therefore, the combinations of the 
LLA matrices—for example, PEs versus UJTLs, weapon systems versus UJTLs and 
weapon systems versus weapon systems may also help to redefine portfolios and improve 
portfolio management. 
Validity 
In order to realize the potential of the LLA method, an important first step is to 
establish the validity of the method in the context of realistic large-scale data sets. For that, 
we used the matrix generated from PEs versus PEs, compared with what human analysts 
have identified previously. As shown in Figure 15, in each program element artifact, another 
program element might be referenced, indicted as precedent or directionally linked program 
elements.  A backward link is usually a stronger indicator of importance of a PE than a 
forward link. This is similar to the information retrieval or page ranking in a search engine 




identified by human analysts, as the attributes to validate the LLA method.  For example, 
Figure 15, PE 0604602F references PE 0605011F, in which we define it as a forward link, 
for PE 0604602F; while PE 0605011F is referenced by PE 0604602F, which we define as a 
backward link, for PE 0605011F.  As shown in Figure 16, the top yellow row contains the 
total number of unique word hubs for a PE, matched with all PEs other than itself; and the 
bottom yellow row contains the total number of forward and backward links for the same PE.  
The Pearson correlation of the two rows is 0.39, with a p-value < 0.0000001 (bi-directional t-
test with a sample size N=461). This indicates that the positive correlation between the LLA-
identified links and human-analyst-identified links is statistically significant and, therefore, is 
a validation for the LLA method. 
 











Acquisition Decision-making  
To support effective decision-making, we need to form a full understanding of a 
program in context; we need to understand the linkages and interdependencies across the 
operational, constructive, and programmatic domains.   
An LLA matrix using programs such as weapon systems as rows as well as columns 
is shown in Figure 17.  The lexical links output from this view show the relationships among 
weapon systems, therefore representing a constructive view of programs in context.  The 
hypothesis is that more lexical links among programs may be correlated with the overall 
higher program total costs.  The correlation between the overall LLA match score and the 
program total cost found in the weapon data—which includes RDT&E and procurement 
costs together—is 0.21, with a  p-value < 0.032.  This indicates there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the number of lexical links as an interdependency measures 
among programs and total cost of programs. 
Similarly, a programmatic view of an LLA matrix can be generated by using weapon 
systems as columns and program elements as rows.  The correlation between the overall 
LLA match scores and total program costs is 0.13 with a p-value < 0.12.  This indicates that 
this correlation is not statistically significant based on the analyzed data.  
An operational view of the LLA matrix was generated by using weapon systems as 
columns and UJTLs as rows.  The correlation between the overall LLA match scores and 
total program costs is 0.086, with a p-value < 0.12, indicating that this correlation is not 
statistically significant. 
From an acquisition management and resource analysis perspective, we conclude 
that  
 Major programs are interdependent on one another.  Interdependence can be 
shown by their lexical links in budget documentations in constructive, 
programmatic and operational views. The degree that programs are 
interdependent can be measured by the number of lexical links.   
 Highly interconnected programs in a constructive view are statistically 
significantly and more expensive than less-interconnected programs (correlation 
0.21, p-value < 0.032).  The word hubs selected from LLA suggest the “threads” 
that link a portfolio of programs through shared resources. As an example, in 
Figure 18 ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM) and 
AIR INTERCEPT MISSILE – 9X (AIM-9X) are connected through 





Figure 17. A Constructive View: An LLA Matrix Weapon Systems versus Weapon 
Systems  
(Note: The correlation between the LLA overall match scores and total program costs 
is statistically significant.) 
 






Figure 19. An Operational View: Weapon Systems versus UJTLS 
Our near-term plan is to apply the method jointly with the unstructured data with the 
MMT databases to illustrate if the LLA method can be used to address the following 
questions: 
1. The narrative sections reference program–to-program interdependencies 
(e.g., Wideband Gapfiller System flies on an EELV launch vehicle). How 
could this be compared with program interdependence information from the 
DAES, or the ISP from our data set? 
11. Are these programs more or less likely to incur cost growth relative to 
their milestone B baselines?  Are they more or less likely to breach 
their cost/schedule/performance baselines? 
12. How do we determine the correlation using metrics that fundamentally 
affect acquisition decision-making? For example, total program cost 
and cost growth relative to the Milestone B baseline cost.  (To do that, 
we would need to capture the total program cost (development, 
procurement, and the two combined) estimated at milestone B, and 
compare that with these values at milestone C.  These data are in the 
MMT data set.) 
13. Can LLA of budget documentation provide an aggregate dollar figure 
that describes the value/magnitude of resources being shared among 
these entities?  Is this a reasonable proxy for the degree or 
significance of interdependence?  
14. Is there additional latent risk to programs that share resources?  Is 
there potential for unanticipated “ripple effect” that could magnify 
budget perturbations?  Can these effects be modeled or predicted?  





Large-scale and Real-time Consideration 
A large number of CLA agents work together in a parallel fashion. This allows the 
LLA method to scale up to distributed, large-scale and real-time data sources. At the time of 
this printing, we have prototyped a multi-agent network of ~10 to 100 agents in the NPS 
High Performance Computing Center (HPC) in the Hamming Linux Cluster (HLC), which 
provides the requisite supercomputing for the visualization of the results.  Servers are also 
being built in the NPS Secure Technology Battle Lab (STBL) to process classified data. 
Conclusion 
We show in this paper how to use the Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) to match system 
features with those defined in the original requirements, discover relationships among 
systems, and identify gaps with respect to warfighters’ needs.  We initially validate the LLA 
method and show results by correlating program interdependencies resulted from the LLA 
method with those from subject-matter experts. The Pearson correlation for a sample of 461 
program elements (PEs) is 0.39 with a p-value < 0.0000001.  This indicates the positive 
correlation between the LLA identified links as compared to human-analyst-identified links 
and that they are reasonably correlated with statistical significance. We also found that 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP’s) are interdependent from one another 
and that such interdependence can be shown by their lexical links in documentations in 
constructive, programmatic, and operational views.  The number of lexical links can be used 
as a metric to measure interdependencies among new technologies.  Highly interconnected 
programs in a constructive view are statistically significantly and more expensive than the 
less-interconnected programs (correlation 0.21, p-value < 0.032).  Ultimately, in this vein, we 
seek to use the LLA method to automate and improve program self-awareness and make it 
feasible for acquisition decision-makers to analyze and dynamically monitor large-
scale acquisition documents. The resulting system analyses will facilitate real-time program 
awareness and can reduce the workload of decision-makers who would otherwise perform 
the relations-building task manually, thus making a profound impact on the agility and 
perhaps the long-term success of acquisition strategies. 
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In the article Achieving Outcomes-Based Life Cycle Management (Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal, Vol. 17, January 2009), the authors traced the history of DoD 
acquisition reform efforts and highlighted the dramatic geo-political changes that impact the 
acquisition process.  The authors provided three recommendations to enhance US life cycle 
agility and affordability to posture the DoD life cycle processes to meet the demands of the 




 Effects-based requirements, 
 Commercially driven research and development, and 
 Outcome-based partnership life cycle product support. 
Since that effort, the DoD and Congress have moved forward with several policy-
level efforts, directed towards enhancing accountability and agility over the life cycle, 
including: 
 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act implementation, 
 Insourcing, 
 Product Support Assessment Team, 
 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 805, and  
 HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform 
This paper reviews those recent policy efforts and assesses the potential impact of 
those efforts on the inherent, structural incentives that are embedded in DoD life cycle 
processes.  The paper provides several recommendations for policy implementation to 
further enable life cycle agility and affordability. 
Introduction & Background 
In the article Achieving Outcomes-Based Life Cycle Management, the authors 
summarized 60 years of acquisition reform efforts and concluded that incremental reform 
efforts are insufficient to enable the agility and efficiency required by the current national 
security environment.  The geo-political environment of the 21st century is dramatically 
different than the post-World War II environment (that enabled the current acquisition 
process), as summarized in Table 1.  Those differences required a fundamental re-




Table 1. Prior Acquisition Reform Efforts 
 Acquisition and Logistics Characteristics 
Acquisition and Logistics 
Outcomes 
Reform Effort Strengths Weaknesses Capability Agility Efficiency
Packard Commission Attention to acquisition 
streamlining 
Expensive, lengthy 
acquisitions continue YES NO NO 
Specs/Stds Reform Best commercial 
practices 
Modernization "death 
spiral" YES NO NO 
JCIDS Capabilities based on 
joint warfighter needs 
Disconnect between born 
joint and employed joint YES NO NO 
The Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 




- Improved DoD 
workforce 
-No inherent performance 
incentive 
-“Inspect in” Program 
Stability 








- Extended BCA Process 
-Extended Peer Review 
-Shortened Contract length 









YES NO NO 
2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review 




commercial dual use 
technology use 
-Further reviews = 
Increased oversight 
-review process includes 
parties with “no skin in the 
game” 




Innovation and industry 









with DoD providers 
  YES YES YES 
Those core differences were noted by Secretary Gates: 
What we need is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across 
the widest possible spectrum of conflict.  As a result, we must change the way we 
think and the way we plan, and fundamentally reform the way we do business and 
buy weapons.  It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design 
and buy, as we have for the last 60 years, only the most technologically advanced 
weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary, especially 
one that imploded nearly a generation ago. (Gates, 2009) 
Based upon those differences, the authors concluded that the DoD required life cycle 
management processes that built upon inherent incentives and competition and enabled for 
greater agility and efficiency (affordability).  The authors proposed three fundamental 
reforms: 




 Commercially driven research and development, and 
 Outcome-based partnership life cycle product support. 
Since that publication, the DoD and Congress have initiated several reform efforts. 
The question to be assessed is, “Do current reform efforts enhance agility and affordability?”  
Key criteria to address that question include: 
 Recognition and migration to a warfighter driven, effects-based requirements 
process; 
 Enablement of a more commercial-like R&D model, where industry has a vested 
interest in moving through product development quickly; 
 Outcomes-based sustainment models that provides required readiness at 
reduced costs; 
 Competitive industrial base that naturally fosters innovation and agility; and 
 Life cycle workforce that includes the appropriate core competencies in sufficient 
strength. 
  
The authors reviewed ongoing reform efforts against those key criteria.  Ongoing 
efforts included: 
 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 
 Insourcing, 
 Product Support Assessment Team, 
 FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 805, and 
 HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform (Interim Findings and 
Recommendation). 
These major reform efforts are summarized below. 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) 
On May 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Weapon System Acquisition Reform 
Act, marking an important step in the procurement reform process. The objective of the 
2009 Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act is to eliminate some of the waste and 
inefficiency in defense projects. The Reform Act targeted improving the DoD’s ability to 
efficiently and effectively provide the warfighter with necessary weapons and equipment 
through the following provisions (Levin, 2009): 
 
 Assessing the extent to which the Department has in place the systems 
engineering capabilities needed to ensure that key acquisition decisions are 
supported by a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering process. 





 Require the DoD to reestablish the position of Director of Developmental Test 
and Evaluation. 
 Require the military departments to assess their developmental testing 
organizations and personnel, and address any shortcomings in such 
organizations and personnel, making it the responsibility of the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to periodically review and assess 
the technological maturity of critical technologies used in MDAPs. The DDR&E’s 
determinations would serve as a basis for determining whether a program is 
ready to enter the acquisition process. 
 Establish a Director of Independent Cost Assessment to ensure that cost 
estimates for major defense acquisition programs are fair, reliable, and unbiased.  
 Require the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek and consider 
input from the commanders of the combatant commands in identifying joint 
military requirements.  
 Require consultation between the budget, requirements and acquisition 
stovepipes—including consultation in the joint requirements process—to ensure 
the consideration of trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance early in 
the process of developing major weapon systems.  
 Require the completion of a PDR and a formal post-PDR assessment before a 
major defense acquisition program receives Milestone B approval to ensure a 
sufficient knowledge base as well as to ensure technological maturity and avoid 
“a long cycle of instability, budget and requirements changes, costly delays and 
repeated re-base lining.”  
 Require the Department of Defense to implement competitive prototyping, dual-
sourcing, funding of a second source for next generation technology, utilization of 
open architectures to ensure competition for upgrades, periodic competitions for 
subsystem upgrades, licensing of additional suppliers, government oversight of 
make-or-buy decisions—to maximize competition throughout the life of a 
program, periodic program reviews, and requirement of added competition at the 
subcontract level.  
 Enhance the use of Nunn-McCurdy as a management tool by requiring MDAPs 
that experience critical cost growth: (a) be terminated unless the Secretary 
certifies (with reasons and supporting documentation) that continuing the 
program is essential to the national security and the program can be modified to 
proceed in a cost-effective manner; and (b) receive a new Milestone Approval 
(and associated certification) prior to the award of any new contract or contract 
modification extending the scope of the program.  
 Prohibit systems engineering contractors from participating in the development or 
construction of the major weapon systems on which they are advising the 
Department of Defense. 
 Require tightened oversight of organizational conflicts of interests by contractors 
in the acquisition of major weapon systems.  
 Establish an annual awards program—modeled on the Department’s successful 
environmental awards program—to recognize individuals and teams who make 
significant contributions to the improved cost, schedule, and performance of 




Congress intended to build on and strengthen its previous reform efforts by 
tightening regulations designed to foster competition and by requiring termination of 
programs that run over-budget and attempt to change how major defense acquisition 
programs are acquired. Congress and the administration heralded the legislation as a much-
needed fix to the Pentagon’s acquisition process. 
The DoD is moving forward with WSARA implementation.  As those efforts unfold, 
some suggest that WSARA may exacerbate some of the problems the act was intended to 
rectify by duplicating existing regulations with additional layers of bureaucracy and an 
oversight that could slow even further a system that already lacks agility and 
responsiveness (Erwin, 2010). 
Furthermore, the act appears to increase the probability that weapons programs that 
breach Nunn-McCurdy legislation will be terminated when they exceed their projected costs 
by 25%. Missing from the act is any acknowledgment of the DoD’s role in making changes 
to programs, adding requirements, and/or demanding additional conditions on the 
development of the weapons system that caused costs to rise (Goure, 2009). 
The above concerns may be valid, but with only a year of implementation, little 
empirical evidence exists to ascertain the effectiveness of WSARA in enhancing agility and 
affordability.  The act does provide guidance concerning COCOM engagement with the 
requirements process, broader competition (and enablers) for system development and 
upgrades, and enhanced acquisition workforce. The potential benefits of the structural 
aspects of the act may be illuminated by comparing the DoD’s recent efforts on the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and the ongoing Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV) program. 
In February 2005, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) identified an urgent 
operational need in Iraq and Afghanistan for armored tactical vehicles to increase crew 
protection and mobility of Marines operating in areas containing improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire (Sullivan, 2008).  The 
ensuing MRAP acquisition program established minimal operational requirements and relied 
heavily on commercially available products (Sullivan, 2008). The development of MRAP 
significantly reduced the IED threat to United States ground forces operating in Iraq, swiftly 
and effectively. Within two years of program start, more than 16,000 vehicles were produced 
at rates occasionally exceeding 1,000 vehicles per month (Sullivan, 2008). 
In comparison, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program was developed in response 
to similar threats and was intended to be the successor to the 11 different versions of the 
High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HUMMWV) (Feickert, 2009). In late 2006, the DoD 
launched a major procurement initiative.  Seven industry teams conducted initial design 
efforts: AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems, BAE Systems, Cadillac Gage, 
Force Protection, Lockheed Martin, Oshkosh and Protected Vehicles.  The program 
acquisition strategy employed competitive prototyping, which resulted in three teams 
brought forward into a prototype phase (as contracted to the MRAP that were immediately 
procured). 
As MRAP was fielded and the JLTV prototypes emerged, military leaders refined 
their requirements for JLTV, requesting a tactical mobile vehicle with traditional combat 
capabilities. The extended prototype phase afforded the Services the opportunity to exert 
requirements creep.  As a result, payload requirements have increased for most of the Army 
variants, including the utility vehicle, up 200 pounds to 5,500; the command vehicle, up 880 
pounds to 5, 100; and the ground maneuver vehicle, up 400 pounds to 6, 700 (Osborn, 




 Make 30 kilowatts of electricity, 
 Tow a trailer with ammunition and supplies, 
 Carry more ammo, 
 Increase fuel efficiency to 90 ton-miles per gallon at maximum gross vehicle 
weight, 
 Be equipped with the A-kit armor and add on option to add a B-kit that includes a 
gunner's protective shield, and 
 Be able to run on two flat tires and keep going after a small-arms attack.  
Unlike the MRAP program, the JLTV program did not integrate the available 
components and COTS subsystems early in the process.  The Services continue to modify 
subsystems to meet additional requirements or develop new technologies and lengthen the 
system’s acquisition schedule.  This contrast in approaches to requirements determination 
and acquisition strategy results in the development timelines shown in Figure 1. 



























Figure 1. MRAP & JLTV Program Timelines 
The extended development timeline for JLTV results in additional requirements for 
the Army to reset/recapitalize HMMWVs returning from Iraq as a gap filler.  The recent 
HASC Panel on Acquisition Reform chided the DoD on its extended development timeline; 
however, the DoD and Congress need to evaluate and rationalize their desires for rapid 
acquisition and competitive prototyping. 
The USMC Unmanned Aerial Re-supply (UAR) effort may provide an illustrative 




response to an urgent operational requirement to provide vertical supply distribution in Iraq 
with requirements focused on lift capability and endurance.  The program will become a 
force multiplier and lessen casualties by reducing USMC ground convoy logistics 
requirements.  The USMC awarded a competitive fly-off of existing capabilities in 2009, 
which will be followed by industry proposals.  The USMC intends to select a UAR vehicle by 
late 2010 and obtain industry-provided service capability by early 2011.  From requirements 
to capability, a total time of approximately 28-30 months is achievable.  Naval Air Systems 
Command is assessing acquisition strategy alternatives that include a traditional 
development and production options.  Such an approach would delay fielding existing 
capabilities. 
Insourcing 
By the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the United States Congress 
reversed two decades of acquisition workforce reduction. The act includes explicit 
requirements to “strengthen the DoD program management, systems engineering, cost 
analysis, and contract administration workforce.”  The act also requires the DoD to 
“insource” program management and acquisition support functions that had been previously 
contracted out. 
To fulfill the requirements of the act, the DoD resourced 20,000 additional acquisition 
positions in its FY10 budget.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense also issued guidance 
on the insourcing process, including specific acquisition functions and broader contract 
services.  The guidance anticipates the insourcing process will proceed through 2012 with 
concentration on acquisition management positions. 
In a recent paper by the Federal Acquisition Innovation and Reform Institute (FAIR), 
the authors advise a deliberate and systematic approach to insourcing, based on facts and 
analysis, to include business case analysis and full consideration of inherently governmental 
positions, as well as core competencies. The paper further recommends careful assessment 
of federal pay scales to ensure competitive recruiting (Sharma, 2009). 
The concerns noted by FAIR appear justified based upon the recent injunction by the 
Federal District Court of San Antonio to stop an Air Force insourcing of audio/visual support, 
which had been provided by Rohmann Services, Inc., a small business.  The Rohmann 
Services, Inc., suit contended the Air Force used inaccurate cost estimates to justify the 
insourcing, and the cost analysis failed to include government overhead, benefits, and 
overtime (Hendricks). The Air Force now has opted to recomplete the contract of August 
2010. 
The Defense Science Board (DSB) study on integrating commercial systems into the 
DoD provides additional insights into the future requirements of the DoD workforce.  As the 
DoD and Congress move to accelerate development timelines, one reasonable approach is 
greater reliance on commercially available systems and subsystems (DSB, 2009). The DSB 
study highlighted the wide dispersion of how commercial solutions are acquired across the 
DoD.  In some cases, DoD design authorities rigidly enforced long-standing (military) design 
specifications, which drove major changes to COTS equipment.  If the DoD is to capitalize 
on a competitive commercial market, insourcing efforts must allow for commercially savvy 
acquisition personnel to join the federal workforce. 
Finally, the focus on acquisition “insourcing” has been extended by the Air Force to 
include weapon system sustainment tasks.  Recent statements by the Secretary of Air Force 




management functions.  This stated desire is based on a perception that the Service is 
losing its product support capability.  These statements are inconsistent with current DoD 
policy, FY10 NDAA Section 805 provisions, and best practices, as demonstrated by ongoing 
performance-based partnership programs.   
DoD Product Support Assessment Team (PSAT) 
In September 2008, a DoD Product Support Assessment Team (PSAT) was formed 
to analyze DoD product support enterprise activities, performance, and cost, and to outline 
actions for a way ahead for life cycle product support management (Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense, 2008). The team completed an assessment of overall and program-specific 
progress in capturing, managing, and reducing weapon system support costs while 
maintaining necessary readiness levels and mitigating sustainment risk (PSAT, 2009). 
The PSAT found that DoD product support is characterized by a dependence on 
transactional-based systems and processes, inadequate human capital, organizational 
challenges, and a lack of shared goals  (PSAT, 2009). Additionally, the PSAT study found 
that performance-based (outcome-based) product support strategies with government-
industry partnering, have delivered superior materiel readiness across multiple weapon 
system applications.  The PSAT provided eight principle recommendations (PSAT, 2009): 
 Adopt a product support business model that drives cost effective performance 
and capability for the warfighter across the weapons system life cycle and 
enables the most advantageous use of an integrated defense industrial base; 
 Align and expand the collaboration between government and industry that 
produces best-value partnering practices, both within and beyond the depots; 
 Connect platform product support strategies to enterprise supply chain 
approaches that produce best value across the DoD components; 
 Improve weapons system governance so sustainment factors are better 
considered early and consistently across a weapons system life cycle; 
 Develop an overarching DoD sustainment metric and management strategy for 
life cycle product support that strengthens formal data collection and analysis 
capabilities while providing insight and learning to support life cycle planning and 
operational management; 
 Make life cycle affordability a core business process for all communities and 
stakeholders involved in system acquisition and sustainment; 
 Clarify and codify policies and procedures pertaining to the use of analytical tools 
in the life cycle product support decision-making process; and 
 Integrate product support competencies across the logistics and acquisition 
workforce domains to institutionalize successful traits of an outcome-based 
culture. 
The DoD is moving forward with implementing the PSAT recommendations.  As that 
implementation proceeds, the requirements for greater scrutiny and competition for service 
contracts are also being implemented.  These simultaneous implementations create 
conflicting pressures that are evidenced by: 
 Extended timelines to conduct, review, and approve business case analyses; 




 Reduce contract lengths to enable continuous re-competitions. 
As these pressures unfold, the DoD is refining its performance-based partnerships 
for programs such as the C-17 and F-22. The refinements of the C-17 and F-22 platform-
level PBL sustainment strategies were both preceded by business case analyses (BCAs). 
Both BCAs documented difficulties in characterizing future performance for sustainment 
options, accurately capturing government costs, and estimating potential transition costs. As 
a result, the USAF requested an independent assessment of both BCAs by OSD. 
Both programs have been designated as lead programs for implementing the PSAT 
recommendations. The work share between government and industry is currently being 
evaluated for both programs, and transition plans are being developed. The key issue to be 
addressed through the transition is to retain an outcomes-based strategy for both programs 
as work (and responsibility) is re-aligned to the Air Force. 
Life Cycle Management and Product Support: The National Defense 
Authorization Act, Section 805 
Section 805 of the 2010 Authorization Act provided statutory guidance on life cycle 
management, including the requirement for a product support manager for all major 
systems, maximize competition at the system, subsystem, and component level, and 
outcome-focused product support strategies. The product support manager shall be 
responsible for (House of Representatives, 2009): 
 Development and implementation of a comprehensive product support strategy 
for the weapon system; 
 Providing appropriate cost analysis to validate the product support strategy, 
including cost-benefit analysis as outlined in Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-94; 
 Assuring achievement of desired product support outcomes through 
development and implementation of appropriate product support arrangements; 
 Adjusting performance requirements and resource allocations across product 
support integrators and product support providers as necessary to optimize 
implementation of the product support strategy; 
 The periodic review of product support arrangements between the product 
support integrators and product support providers to ensure the arrangements 
are consistent with the overall product support strategy; and 
 Revalidating any business-case analysis performed in support of the product 
support strategy. 
Section 805’s enactment is intended to enhance competition while leveraging 
industry and government capabilities to avoid high product-support costs while improving 
performance.  More importantly, it begins to attack an important issue of acquisition reform: 
accountability.  The DoD is currently preparing its implementation plan and report. 
Based on recent market data, the Section 805 focus on competition for product 
support is well founded.  Figure 2 presents the competitive nature of the sustainment 
market.  As shown, several elements of sustainment are intensively competitive; however, 




DoD should focus on developing alternate sources for critical parts, rather than shortening 





































Figure 2. Competitive Product Support 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is aggressively moving forward to achieve end-
to-end supply chain management and foster greater competition. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) directs the largest and most complex supply chain in the world.  The DoD 
spends at least $150 billion a year on goods and services and their delivery to end users 
(Daily, 2005).  DLA manages an inventory of tens of thousands of items, valued at 
approximately $80 billion.  The DoD supply chain also includes hundreds of original 
equipment manufacturers, many of which not only produce new items but also help support 
systems and platforms in the field (DLA, 2006). 
USA’s BRAC 2005 process recommended that the US Defense Logistics Agency 
privatize a series of product commodities, and eliminate the government’s wholesale stock 
in key areas.  These Commodity Management Privatization (CMP) activities take place with 
goals that include improved delivery and management, lower, more transparent cost of 
ownership, and a Strategic Supplier Alliance—an Umbrella partnering agreement defining 
mutually beneficial objectives to improve logistics operations and warfighter support (DLA, 
2006). 
The Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC, DLA), the supply chain manager for 
tires, competitively awarded a contract worth $368 million for aviation tires with Michelin for 
a base period of five years and an additional five-year option period, worth more than $300 
million.  Under this contract, Michelin has the responsibility for procurement, storage, and 
distribution of these tires, as well as the disposal of scrap tires for CONUS locations and 




The privatization effort of aircraft tires continues to save the customer and the DoD 
money on costs associated with procurement, storage, maintenance, and disposal by 
placing these requirements on Michelin.  This privatization effort provides the warfighter 
direct benefits as they now receive their supplies from Michelin, who provides direct delivery 
of these commodities from their stock. As of Calendar 2009, Michelin and the DLA have 
delivered 9,235 orders for 26,636 tires, with the average delivery time of 1.97 days and a 
98.9% on-time delivery rate.  Program-to-date, the on-time delivery rate has been 98.5% 
and a 100% fill rate—with no backorders incurred and with a project annual savings of $46 
million (NSSC, 2009). 
HASC Panel on Acquisition Reform 
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition 
Reform was appointed by Chairman Ike Skelton and then-Ranking Member John McHugh in 
March 2009 to carry out a comprehensive review of the defense acquisition system. The 
HASC review was motivated by the lack of responsive within the DoD acquisition system to 
today’s mission needs, not rigorous enough in protecting taxpayers, and not disciplined 
enough in the acquisition of weapons systems for tomorrow’s wars (HASC, 2010). The 
Panel took a year to perform its review, holding 12 hearings and numerous briefings 
covering a broad range of issues in defense acquisition.  
The Panel found that while the environment of defense acquisition has significantly 
changed, the defense acquisition system has not, with the current acquisition system 
structured largely for the acquisition of weapon systems at a time when the acquisition of 
services, and of information technology, represents a much larger portion of the DoD 
budget. The Panel also reported that there is little commonality across the defense 
acquisition system with the acquisition of weapon systems, commercial goods, commodities, 
services, and information technology. The Panel recommended the following: 
 A Rapid Acquisition Fielding Agency be created to meet urgent operational 
needs, and the “DoD and Congress should not accept development timelines 
routinely measured in double digits.”  
 Recognize accelerated life cycle for IT acquisition (including embedded 
software). Defense related IT systems are typically taking 2-3 years to deliver; a 
time-frame that ensures the technology is two to three generations out of date by 
the time it is delivered. 
 Achieve auditable financial systems. The Panel recommended The Under 
Sectary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Comptrollers of the military 
departments should rely more on individual obligation and expenditure plans for 
measuring program financial performance. 
 Expand outreach to commercial/small business. The Panel recommended 
improving competition and access to more innovative technology by utilizing 
more of the industrial base, especially small and mid-tier businesses. 
 Enhance requirements process and analytics with “greater emphasis on the up-
front market analysis to best leverage limited funds by buying good solutions 
from the commercial market when they are available, and husbanding resources 




These recommendations directly enhance effects-based requirement, commercial-
like R&D (for IT systems), and a healthy, competitive industrial base. The effect on these 
recommendations is dependent upon DoD implementation. 
Initial Assessment 
As summarized, Congress and the DoD initiated significant acquisition reform efforts 
simultaneously. As noted, several of the reform provisions are not strategically aligned. 
Furthermore, in some cases, DoD implementation has extended development and 
procurement timelines, demonstrating a lack of agility. Finally, DoD and congressional 
desires to expand the industrial base (to include more innovative, mid-sized companies) 
must be enabled by life cycle processes that foster greater private-sector involvement. 
Current reform efforts to expand oversight, extend development and test, and insource may 
actually inhibit greater commercial involvement. 
Based upon these considerations, an initial assessment of the effect of current 
reform efforts on agility and affordability is shown in Table 2. As presented, across the 
numerous reform efforts, positive steps are being taken to address warfighter-focused 
requirements, commercial-like R&D for IT systems, and outcome-based sustainment. 
Unfortunately, these positive indicators are offset by other aspects of reform such as 




Table 2. Initial Assessment of Reform Efforts 
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- - 9 9 -
Competitive industrial 
base 9 - 9 9 9
Enhanced DoD 
workforce 9 - 9 9 9
 
Recommendations 
Based on this initial assessment of DoD acquisition reform policy efforts and their 
potential impact of those efforts on the inherent, structural incentives that are embedded in 
DoD life cycle processes, the following policy actions are recommended: 
1. Accelerate requirement process reform: Incentivize industry to control 
requirements creep, select mature technologies for product integration, and 
develop solutions in an incremental and timely fashion with the timely and 
collaborative development of requirements and potential solutions at the 
commencement of the specific program. Increase requirements acceleration 
by increasing the reliance on commercially available systems and 
subsystems. 
15. Strategically balanced insourcing and desire for competitive industrial 
base:  Implement and enforce a deliberate and systematic approach 
to insourcing based on facts and analysis, including business case 
analysis and the full consideration of inherently governmental 
positions, as well as core competencies. Simultaneously, the DoD 
needs to continue to cultivate partnerships with industry.  If the DoD is 
to capitalize on a competitive commercial market, insourcing efforts 
must allow commercially knowledgeable acquisition personnel to join 
the federal workforce. 
16. Develop competitive sustainment framework consistent with NDAA, 
Section 805:  Maximize the value of Department of Defense funding 
by providing the best possible product support outcomes at the lowest 
operations and support cost. This is achieved by providing guidance 




support manager to consider competitive alternatives at the system, 
subsystem, and component level every five years. 
17. Transition fielded systems to outcome-based sustainment: Implement 
an outcomes-based sustainment model and strengthen total life cycle 
systems management, Depot Maintenance Partnering, and Condition-
Based Maintenance, enabling end-to-end weapon system 
support,providing required readiness at reduced costs. 
As the United States advances into the 21st century, the DoD will continue to be 
faced with the challenge of maintaining a persistent expeditionary military presence while 
engaged in a long-term conflict.  Victory in part, will be measured by the DoD’s ability to 
effectively sustain and maintain equipment, while concurrently preserving its ability to 
display flexibility in meeting the evolving and changing operational conditions of irregular 
warfare and stateless actors.  Furthermore, both the global economic environment and the 
requirements associated with growing competition for scarce resources generate conditions 
in which the DoD will have to do more with less. 
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Abstract 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been responsible for the majority of the 
casualties suffered by US forces in military activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq 
and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  A family of heavily armored vehicles, that had been 
in use in very limited numbers for specialized missions, quickly gained a reputation for 
providing superior protection for their crews, leading to a suggestion that similar vehicles 
might be a better alternative for transporting troops in combat than Up-Armored High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). The decision was made to develop 
and procure a fleet of combat vehicles capable of sustained operations in a chaotic, mine-
infested, non-linear battlespace.  These vehicles were identified by the acronym MRAP—
Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected.  Due to urgent fielding requirements, the MRAP program 
pursued a very aggressive schedule, while at the same time grappling with a significant 
number of unknowns, such as the total quantity required and the long-term sustainment 
strategy.  The MRAP program’s successes highlight the limitations of both the traditional 
acquisition system and the ad hoc organizations that cater to rapid acquisitions.  This case 
clearly identifies the need for a separate rapid acquisition agency within the Department of 
Defense.   
Executive Summary  
As the largest and fastest industrial mobilization since World War II, the Mine-
Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle program is a testament to the scale and 
efficiency possible when government and industry collaborate with a sense of urgency, 
patriotism, and pragmatism.  Public pressure over rising casualty numbers, intense political 
scrutiny, and support from the highest levels of government all combined into a set of unique 
circumstances.  Given great uncertainty in the nature of future security issues, however, 




program, precisely because of its size and scope, brings into sharp relief the merits and 
deficiencies of the current system for rapid acquisitions.  
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the number one killer of troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In response to increasing IED attacks, the Defense Department began adding 
armor kits to High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and procuring up-
armored HMMWVs.  Even with added armor, the HMMWV’s flat bottom made it vulnerable 
to buried IEDs.  Beginning in early 2005, field commanders made formal requests for MRAP 
vehicles.  These vehicles—essentially armored trucks—have V-shaped hulls and high 
ground clearance to deflect and diffuse bomb blasts.  A small number of MRAPs were in 
theater as part of explosive ordinance disposal teams.  They had a reputation for 
survivability—about 400% safer than a HMMWV.  Despite earlier requests for MRAPs to be 
procured for use in combat missions, it would take until November of 2006—almost two 
years later—for MRAP requirements to be validated and a request for proposals to be 
released.   
The MRAP program had one primary objective—to field the maximum number of 
survivable vehicles in the shortest period of time.  Cost and all other concerns were explicitly 
secondary.  Using funds from supplemental war requests outside the normal budget 
process, Congress flooded the program with money, often providing amounts in excess of 
initial requests. Secretary Gates declared MRAPs the military’s highest priority acquisition 
and put them at the head of the queue for scarce steel armor and tires. 
The MRAP program sought commercial off-the-shelf technology, with minimal 
requirements.  It provided production contracts to all manufacturers that could meet 
minimum automotive and survivability standards.  In fact, production orders were signed 
even before initial testing was completed, in order to prime industry. This was risk 
acceptance by the DoD on two fronts—it was agreeing to buy vehicles it might not ever field, 
and it was committing to flood the theater with several different MRAP variants (each with its 
own parts, support, and logistics needs).   The DoD provided incentives to vendors and 
subsidized capacity expansion.  As testing progressed, designs were modified for 
subsequent models.  Manufacturers’ representatives were embedded at the Aberdeen 
testing site to speed communication back to the production line.  User feedback from the 
field was also fed into ongoing production modifications.  The entire acquisition process was 
compressed for MRAPs.  Testing, production, fielding, and feedback were all done 
concurrently and continuously.   
The MRAP program’s successes highlight the limitations of both the traditional 
acquisition system and the ad hoc organizations that cater to rapid acquisitions.  The 
traditional acquisition system is ill-suited to rapid acquisitions, and its bureaucratic 
processes can at times resemble the convoluted means used in a “Rube Goldberg” 
machine.  It is linear, stove-piped, and risk-adverse.  Because of extraordinary levels of 
support at the highest levels, the MRAP program was able to extend deadlines, or bypass a 
number of bureaucratic processes.  The program office is still in the process of completing 
some of the pre-production paperwork processes, even though production has finished.  
This suggests that perhaps some of the bureaucratic requirements are not particularly 
relevant to rapid acquisitions.  The experience of MRAP procurement demonstrates that 
there is ample room to streamline the process without sacrificing results and accountability. 
Only because of media scrutiny, Congressional pressure, and the personal 




received approval from the requirements process.  A high-level MRAP Task Force convened 
regularly to get all decision makers into the same room to solve problems. The nature of 
future combat is likely to require more—not less—fielding of urgent and unanticipated 
equipment for the troops.  Congressional pressure and involvement of the Secretary of 
Defense cannot be expected to quickly materialize to push through urgent requests.  So, the 
current system is unlikely to ever reproduce the impressive results of the MRAP program 
without serious reform.   
Rapid acquisitions will always be in a disadvantaged position if they are forced to 
work within the same system (and compete for the same funds) as traditional, deliberate 
acquisitions. We recommend a stand-alone rapid acquisition organization within the DoD, 
with requirements different from the existing deliberate acquisition process.  It should have 
its own bankable funding stream.   
Absent creation of a separate organization, it is clear that rapid acquisition projects 
would benefit from a senior-level champion to shepherd them through the acquisition 
system, ensuring they do not get sidelined in one of the myriad stovepipes.  Better still 
would be a task force periodically assembled with relevant stakeholders empowered with 
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Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are commonly used in cost risk analysis (and in other 
fields as well) for values that either are not available in historical data or for which no 
appropriate analogy can be found.  Problems commonly arise in two areas in particular: (1) 
when multiple experts give opinions on a single effect or entity and the inputs are not 
identical in distribution (which is almost inevitable), and (2) when a single expert provides 
distributional information that is intractable or suspiciously unlikely in its form (which is 
common). 
This paper will put forward correct solutions in case (1), in which the authors’ 
experience shows that practitioners (and even experts) use incorrect solutions.  It is 
important to note that the commonly exercised incorrect solution underestimates the 
dispersion, and thus the 80th percentile, in some cases by a large margin.  The authors 
believe that their solution is rare and, further, are unaware of any use of the solution, and 
will recommend tenets to guide the practitioner.  In preparation for the solutions laid out 
above, the authors will first describe the method of expert-based risk analysis, with the 
erroneous method for combining SME testimony, and then show the correction.  An 
analytical treatment will quantify the impacts of the erroneous approach.  The paper will also 
explain why the new method of conflating expert assessments is to be preferred to the 
common Delphi technique, which may fall prey to both anchoring and domination by a vocal 
minority. 
The paper will also briefly address case (2) by presenting common examples of 
problematic formulations and proposed resolutions.  These include intractable specification 
of a triangular distribution, specification of a discrete categorical distribution when triangular 
was intended, and specification of a triangular with low and high values that are not the true 
extremes as well as errors committed by the risk analyst. 
In any situation, correct treatment of risk is important.  In the current era, with 80th 
percentiles required for all weapon systems cost estimates by the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and budgeting to the 80th percentile as the default practice, 
the correct determination of the distribution is more important than ever before. 
Overview 
 Expert-based risk methodologies are a common approach to cost risk.  Expert-
based risk methodologies are defined for the purposes of this paper as follows.  
Notwithstanding that the cost estimate may be based on actuals, expert-based risk methods 
rely on elicitation of the parameters of the risk distribution from expert opinion.  These 
parameters are for the distribution of various types of risk such as (typically, but not 




Single or multiple experts may offer estimates (expert testimony) of a particular risk via 
some form of parameterization. 
This paper will discuss two topics in correction of expert testimony:  1) The “best” 
approach to converting extrema and quartiles from expert opinion into risk distributions, and 
2) The “best” approaches to conflating multiple views of the parameterization of a single risk. 
For completeness, the paper will also discuss some difficult characterizations that 
they have encountered and the approach that they have evolved for “correcting” them.  
Problems with inconsistent percentiles and problems with unusual characterizations will both 
be discussed. 
This topic was addressed in general in a prior paper by Coleman, Braxton, Druker, 
Cullis, and Kanick (2009) under the rubric “Omission of Elements of Variability.”  A paper by 
St. Louis, Blackburn, and Coleman (1998) espoused a form of combination of expert 
testimony that this paper now recommends against. 
The “Best” Approach to Converting Extrema and Quartiles from 
Expert Opinion into Risk Distributions 
Correcting Extrema and Quartiles for Truncation   
The Problem.  Our estimated distributions tend to be “too tight,” as shown by 
Brown (1973) and Alpert and Raifa (1982).   Without feedback, we provide extreme values 
near the 20th percentile and 80th  percentile when we are asked Min and Max. This can be 
improved, with feedback to the 10th and 90th percentile.  This can be improved by asking for 
more-extreme values.  For example, “astonishingly-low-probability outcomes” equate to the 
0.1th percentile and 99.9th percentile.   Without feedback, we give 25th and 75th quartiles that 
actually contain only 33% of the outcomes versus the expected 50%.  This can be improved 
with feedback to 43% versus the expected 50%.  Independent investigations of this over-
tightness are remarkably consistent in the degree to which it occurs, as shown by Brown 
(1973) and Alpert and Raifa (1982).  Our ability to probabilistically characterize the past or 
future or to estimate our certainty on general-knowledge facts are all about comparable, as 
noted by Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982).   
Correcting Extrema and Quartiles.  For extrema, assume that experts will 
return 20th and 80th percentiles when asked for the full range.  In other words, when given 
highs and lows, assume you are getting something more like standard deviations 
masquerading as extrema; it’s not quite that bad, but it’s close.  It’s about 0.316 of the real 
base (see Appendix A). This could be presumed to improve to 10th and 90th, but only if the 
experts can be assumed to have gotten specific feedback about their accuracy at this task in 
the past.  Note that this is not the same as saying they are very well qualified; it refers 
specifically to feedback training.  We believe that practitioners have mistaken expertise for 
being trained and that this is why many practitioners believe experts provide 10th and 90th 
percentiles.  For quartiles, although we don’t typically ask for quartiles, we recommend 
assuming that a claimed 25-75 inter-quartile range is actually a 33-67 percentile range.  This 
can be improved to a 28-72 range with specific feedback. The two distortions above are not 
strictly coherent, meaning that they yield different corrections.  The full range case is a 
greater understatement than the inter-quartile case.  The wider the confidence interval you 
ask for, the more the witness will understate it.  When given expert testimony, therefore, it is 
appropriate to correct the testimony by adjusting the standard deviation or the end points 




Errors of Extrema—Pictorially.  The 20th percentile occurs at a point that is 
0.316 of the base, so the understatement of experts is on the order of 1/3.  Pictorially, then, 
we are experiencing a reduction in distribution on the order of the blue (claimed) to the white 
(actual) portrayed in Figure 1.  For a tutorial on computing percentiles, see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 1. Visualization of Expert Truncation of Dispersion 
The “Best” Approaches to Conflating Multiple Views of a 
Distribution 
Conflation 
By definition, conflation refers to the combining of different (independent) views of a 
thing to arrive at a single (better and more complete) view of it.  We seek to conflate expert 
testimony principally because we will arrive at a better estimate for the mean, but, what 
about the dispersion?  Conflation is the most difficult problem for expert-based risk 
methodologies; this is not immediately obvious, but it is so.  Dispersion is, in turn, the hard 
part of conflation.   Ad hoc conflations are often used for k experts each giving estimates for 
the same risk or WBS element.  For example: 
1. Use the individual expert testimonies in each run of the Monte Carlo: 
a. Make k random draws from the k different distributions and average 
them (as done by St. Louis, Blackburn, and Coleman (1998)).  
b. Make k random draws from the k different distributions with correlation 
and average them. 
18. Derive the parameters of a single distribution from the parameters of 
the expert testimony and then Monte Carlo: 
a. Make a new distribution with i) the mean of the k expert means and ii) 
the mean of the standard deviations, for normals, as demonstrated by 
Brown (1973), or the means of the respective end points for triangles 
[Average the Parameters]. 
b. Make a new distribution with the mean of the k experts and the lowest 
low and the highest high as end points.  
19. Sampling has been endorsed by Brown (1973).   Sampling is done as 
follows:  for each run of the Monte Carlo, pick the answer from a 
randomly selected expert who provided testimony. 
We will only examine ad hoc methods 1a, 2a and sampling.  The others can be 




symmetric triangles, and we speculate that for asymmetric triangles there is no significant 
difference, and so there is nothing to separate these beyond ease of implementation. 
The First Question  
The first question in conflation is to determine what we believe to be the underlying 
model.  No single conflation method will work for the two possible scenarios that can 
confront the estimator, namely single or multiple realities. 
“Single Reality.” There is a one (typically uni-modal) distribution, which we do not 
know, but which experts are presumed to know to some degree of accuracy.  Examples: 
What is your estimate for the GNP of Brazil for 2009? How big is a brown bear?  What is the 
range of technical risk for the cost of the engine? 
“Multiple Realities.” There are k (typically uni-modal) distributions; we generally 
know neither k nor the individual distributions, but experts are presumed to know at least 
one each to some degree of accuracy.  Examples: How far away is your favorite planet? 
(There could be up to 9 answers, depending on the inclusion of Pluto and Earth!) How big is 
a panda? (There is a lesser panda and a greater panda, but we don’t happen to know that 
and fail to specify) What is the cost risk for the engine on the F-35? (There is a main and an 
alternate engine, each has a range.) 
This problem may seem silly, but it is not, and our choice of conflation methods 
depends on the case we believe to apply.  We will recommend approaches for both; but 
first, decide which case applies.  The amount of spread in your expert testimony will give 
you an idea whether single or multiple realities is more likely.  We recommend against 
feedback or “drilling down” until after testimony is gathered because witnesses are 
notoriously vulnerable to witness leading, anchoring and all other sorts of mischief; you’ll 
never know if you lead the witness. 
Desiderata for Single and Multiple Realities. Cases dictate different 
characteristics for the conflation technique.  Single reality requires the best estimate for the 
mean, the best estimate for the dispersion and the best estimate for the distribution.  
Multiple realities dictate the best portrayal of the multiple choices we are confronted with.  
We will discuss each in turn.  
We will describe the apparent preferred solution for each method after asserting 
them.  For single reality, average the parameters and correct for the understatement of 
extrema (using method 1b or 2a from above).   For multiple realities, sample from the 
experts after correcting each for understatement of the extrema.  If we cannot discern 
whether we are in single or multiple reality, then we recommend sampling because this is 
more conservative, meaning it will have wider dispersion.  We reject the use of averaging 
answers on each iteration despite having used the method in a Conference Best Paper by 
St. Louis et al. (1998).  To see why, we will show its characteristics and indicate why it is 
probably unsuitable. 
Recommendation—Single Reality.  The mean of the single reality not 
troublesome, almost any reasonable approach will yield the same mean. (We use the word 
“reasonable” with trepidation.)  The standard deviation presents the problem, since 
individuals are known to under-report, and some methods are vulnerable to distortions.  We 
recommend averaging parameters of the expert testimony, as shown below, because it is 
clear what is happening.  Correct each expert’s testimony for truncation of the standard 




operations.  Techniques for correcting the standard deviation were shown in the first part of 
the paper.  
Conflation: Averaging on Each Iteration.  Averaging on each iteration can 
have an unexpected result:  Three very different sets of testimony by two experts will 
produce exactly the same picture.  This is not obvious at first, but it is so.  The standard 
deviation of k identical but scattered triangles, with SD = s, when iteration-averaged will 
produce a standard deviation s/√k.  The SD of the conflation can be thus be arbitrarily small, 
if k is sufficiently large.  This does not comport with our desire that the SD be well modeled.  
Correction for k can be achieved by a spreading with √k, but this is likely to be done wrong 
or omitted altogether, and at best, would require row-by-row corrections.  Correction for 
expert truncation can be achieved by treating the end points as if they were 20/80 points; 






















































































































































































Figure 2. Conflation by Averaging on Each Iteration 
We conclude that averaging on each distribution has some good and bad 
characteristics but, on the whole, is not desirable.  It produces a good confidence interval for 
the mean of the experts, but this is not what we want.  We already know the mean of the 
experts; the point estimate is the simple average of the means of each.  What we really want 
is the full range of the possible outcomes, but averaging on each iteration does not do this; 
instead, it shrinks the answer.  By analogy, this is the same problem as the confidence 
interval for a CER … it bounds the line, but not the data … what we really want is the 
prediction interval.  It is only a candidate (and flawed at that) for clear cases of single reality. 
Conflation: Averaging Parameters. Averaging parameters provides simple 
results:  Three very different sets of testimony by two experts will produce exactly the same 
picture.  The standard deviation of k identical but scattered triangles, with standard deviation 
of s, when iteration-averaged will produce a standard deviation s.  The standard deviation of 
the conflation will not vary with k.  Correction can be achieved by a spreading with √k, but 


























































































































































































































Figure 3. Conflation by Averaging Parameters 
We conclude that averaging parameters has some good and bad characteristics but, 
on the whole, is simple and wieldy.  It produces good estimates of the mean and the 
standard deviation.  It is insensitive to scatter of expert testimony, so is only useable in clear 
cases of single reality.  Correct the parameters as shown earlier because each expert is 
likely to truncate.  The order of the operations does not matter. 
Conflation: Sampling “Average.” The probability distributions of the k experts, 
using one of two schemes, depending on the speed implications and the ease of 
implementation in your model.  Put all the distributions in the mix, and scale each by 1/k, 
creating a (probably) multi-mode custom distribution, as recommended by Brown (1973).  
We will see this pictorially on the next slide.  Alternatively, characterize each of the k 
distributions and choose a first random number to select which expert distribution to use for 
each run of the Monte Carlo and a second random number to draw from that expert’s 
distribution, as used by Flynn et al. (2010).  The two methods are mathematically identical.  
The resulting distribution will have two characteristics: 1) a better estimate of the mean and, 
generally, better predictive performance than other conflation schemes;  2) a wider (actually, 
“not narrower”) standard deviation for the conflated result than those of the original 
individual distributions.  We don’t know the degree to which conflation will correct dispersion, 
although the more experts the wider the dispersion; we plan to attempt a study of this.  We 
will give a demonstration of this effect with representative data. 








The conflated (averaged) distribution
Each triangle has area A = 0.5, 
or more generally, A = 1/k
 
Figure 4. Conflation by Sampling 
The charts in Figure 5 portray the conflation of two triangles as the respective 
experts who estimated them come into alignment.  Each original individual triangle is 
symmetric, has a base length of 200, and a standard deviation of 40.8.  Conflation is done 
by averaging the two probability density functions (PDFs), (also described as sampling).  
The two triangles move closer in such a way that the conflated mean remains constant at 
200 to allow us to discuss the CV in a meaningful way.  When the two triangles merge, we 
get a triangle that has the height and width of each individual triangle before conflation.  The 























































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Conflation of Two Triangles by Sampling Maintaining a Constant 
Mean 
As two triangular PDFs move closer, the conflated standard deviation and CV drop 
until the triangles merge and achieve the same standard deviation as that of each triangle.  
Since we chose to maintain the mean of the conflation at 200, the CV drops.  The unsettling 
conclusion is that the CV of conflated expert opinion can be uncontrollably large, depending 
on how far apart their triangles.  Note that the variance of two identical triangles separated 
























































































































Figure 6. The Standard Deviation and Coefficient Deviation of Two Sampled Triangles 
as a Function of Their Separation 
The Dispersion of Sampled Distributions   
Let: 
σ = SD of the underlying risk 
Se = SD for the individual experts (we think it is about ½σ) 
Sm = SD for the meta-distribution of the experts opinions 
Sc = SD of the conflation 
Then, by examination, 
if Se = 0, then Sc = Sm  
if Sm = 0, then Sc = Se  
And, further 
Sc ≥ max(Se, Sm) 
This also implies that if Se is corrected to σ, then Sc exceeds σ.  We have shown, in 
backup, that once the experts have produced k triangles, then: 
Sc = √(Se2+St2) 
where St is the calculated sum of the squares of the differences of the k triangles from their 
means.  We have yet to prove that   
Sc = √(Se2+Sm2) 
but we believe it to be true. 
Thoughts on the Distribution of Expert Opinion.  We will now speculate on 
the distribution of the experts themselves, which we have come to call the meta-distribution.  
Our assumptions are that:  1) Experts will not be versed in the distribution of costs, but will 
be estimating the distribution based on the outcomes they have experienced and perhaps 
some hearsay; and 2) Experts are most likely to be technical people, not cost estimators, so 




The implications of the above are that: 1) Experts will perceive a mean (and perhaps 
the mode?) according to Chebyshev's inequality or a confidence interval bounded by σ/(√n), 
at best, where n is the number they have observed; and 2) Experts will perceive a standard 
deviation as a variance σ times a chi-square (n) divided by n, at best. 
The above thoughts do not yet consider the implications of truncation of the value of 
σ, but this needs to be incorporated.  
Combining Corrections for Extrema and Conflation.  We have shown that 
individual distributions can be corrected for a consistent pattern of understatement.  We 
have shown that sampling of multiple experts will improve the mean and widen the spread.  
But, we don’t have a good sense of how much the spread will be improved.  The implication 
is that we should not endeavor to both expand and sample expert distributions.  If we correct 
the individual distributions, then we will have the dispersion “about right.” If we then sample 
them, then we will have a dispersion that exceeds “about right.”  So, for “single reality,” do 
one or the other, but not both.  Expansion of a single distribution focuses on the dispersion.  
Sampling of diverse experts focuses on getting the mean right.  Since we generally 
recommend correcting lower order moments first, as recommended by Coleman, 
Summerville, and Gupta (2002), sampling is the priority.  Sampling of each distribution has 
excellent characteristics; it replicates what the experts told us exactly.  It has a problem in 
use for a single reality situation because the standard deviation is not easily correctible for 
scatter nor is it useable without correction.  We can easily correct each expert’s testimony 
for truncation, but we cannot undo the growth caused by expert scatter, which is 
theoretically unbounded … the adjustment would be a function of k, the number of experts, 
and has yet to be ascertained.  We conclude that, despite its popularity in the literature, the 
sampling technique is too tricky in a single reality case and should not be used. 
Recommendation—Multiple Realities. The mean of the multiple realities case 
is not troublesome; almost any reasonable approach will yield the same mean. (Again, that 
dangerous word “reasonable”!)  The standard deviation does not present as much of a 
problem in a multiple reality case because we believe each expert, like the six blind men, 
sees a piece of the truth.  We recommend using sampling.  Be sure to correct each expert’s 
testimony before sampling; you cannot easily correct it afterwards—order matters.  
Conclusion for the Conflation of Single and Multiple Realities  
As asserted, we have illustrated that the averaging of parameters for k triangles, is 
equivalent to averaging of draws from those k triangles with a single draw of a random 
number used to simulate expert’s draw, and then averaging the draws.  We have 
demonstrated why those two equivalent methods give the simplest and clearest result for 
single reality and seem the best representation of what the k experts seem to have meant.  
We have shown why sampling of k experts gives the best representation of what the k 
experts seem to have meant in the case of multiple realities.  The issue of deciding between 
single and multiple realities remains the most difficult issue.  Sometimes it will be as simple 
as learning that each expert has in mind “a different engine,” and sometimes it will be a 
concession to the wide dispersion and the recognition that there “must be a reason.”  We 
will now move to a different topic, that of correcting mischaracterization of distributions, 
without which this paper would seem incomplete. 
Correcting the (Mis)characterization of Distributions. The problem is that 
“experts” who may know a lot about the technical issues, and maybe even the cost of them, 
will not necessarily be well versed in probability.  Consequently, the characterizations they 




contradictory).  That said, expert testimony in risk analysis should be accorded the same 
respect that cost data is in cost analysis.  We recommend three tenets in correcting 
apparently erroneous expert testimony.  We will list them, and we will apply them in several 
actual examples of errors the authors have encountered, chosen because they are the most 
common. 
Tenet 1.  “Do no harm,” meaning preserve as much of what the expert said as is 
possible in achieving coherence. 
Tenet 2.  Preserve lower order moments above higher order moments. 
Tenet 3.  If particular aspects are more important than others, preserve those 
aspects (e.g., if the variability or upper percentiles are the focus, accord that greater priority). 
When making corrections, it is preferable to make the corrections with direct 
feedback to the expert, but this feedback should be done under the same precepts as the 
corrections, meaning follow the tenets in your persuasions and probing. 
Example One—Implausible Percentiles. The expert told us that “The 20/50/80 
are $0.0M/$0.9M/$3.6M.”   The difficulty is that no triangle can fit this, and the distribution is 
very skewed, so simplifying steps were taken.  We assumed that the stated “50% percentile” 
is really the mode.  We took the 20 and 80 as “about true,” and assume they are ±σ.  We 
used the rule that the half-base lengths of a symmetric triangle are √6*σ.  We noted that 
these triangles are not symmetrical, but we still used it as a factor that probably does a 
decent job.  The results are in the table in Figure 7. 
Inputs Outputs 
20%-ile 0 L -1.305 
50%-ile 0.9 M 0.900 
80%-ile 3.6 H 7.514 
Figure 7. Table of Inputs and Corrections 
Note that the correction may be distorting the central tendency, but this distribution is 
clearly intended to be skewed, and the mean is therefore above the median.  We cannot 
actually compute the mean with the information given.  We also knew that in this analysis, 
the ROS at the 80th percentile was a particular focus, so we felt that preservation of that 
point should take priority (Tenet 3). 
Example 2—Unlikely Distributions. The expert gave us three discrete points: 
20% probability of -$2M, 40% probability of $0, 20% probability of +$4M.  Suspecting that 
this was a just clumsy way to characterize a triangle, we asked if a triangle with the below 
characteristics was along the lines of what the expert meant:  20% percentile =-$2M, Mode 
= 0M, 80th percentile = +$4M.  The expert agreed readily that the precise distribution wasn’t 
what he meant, and the triangle captured the sense of it. 
Example 3—Errors of Characterization Induced by the Risk Analyst.  
Below are three typical errors of characterization introduced by the risk analyst after the 
expert has given his testimony.   They are actual examples, chosen because they are the 
most common. 
Categorical Risk Distributions.  Risk models cannot always easily (or, rather, 
obviously) implement a categorical random variable beyond a Bernoulli.  Categorical risk 
distributions are like Bernoulli’s but allow 2 or more values (the Bernoulli is a member of the 
categorical family.)  Many models can handle categoricals, but most analysts don’t realize 




two independent Bernoulli’s with values of 0 or 1 and 0 or 2.  This is an error as the results 
are not the same, the two Bernoulli’s can turn out as 1 and 2 at the same time, but the 
original formulation prohibits that.  To fix this problem, either implement it as a categorical or 
create two Bernoulli’s with the right characteristics. 
Triangular Risk Distributions. Sometimes the end points are set at the standard 
deviation of the formulation; sometimes triangles are used instead of normals, even when 
the normal was proposed—out of aversion to negative outcomes—even though in practice, 
negative outcomes are harmless in Monte Carlo; negative outcomes ought to be fairly rare 
anyway. 
Normals. Sometimes triangles are substituted incorrectly (see above.)  If the mean 
and standard deviation are captured correctly, then there is little harm; but this is often not 
done right.   Sometimes the negative portion of the normal is truncated, despite that this 
causes a shift of the formulated mean and a reduction in the standard deviation. 
Conclusion for Correcting Mischaracterizations. We have presented tenets 
by which apparent errors of characterization may be corrected and have listed the most 
common risk-analyst-induced errors.  We finish by reiterating that the testimony of the 
experts we consult should be handled much as we should handle data.  We must be careful 
in not ignoring the symptoms of the testimony and avoid such elementary errors as causing 
anchoring* and “leading the witness.”  We should, nonetheless, carefully repair any clear 
errors caused by the unfamiliarity with probability that can result in unlikely distributions. 
Final Thoughts 
The conflation of expert testimony has received some attention in the literature, but 
the conclusions seem to have permeated the cost risk discipline.  We hope that we have 
provided a reasonably thorough paper by which risk analysts might be guided.  We also 
hope that we have provided a few good tenets for correcting mischaracterization, along with 
some illustrative (actual) examples. 
We hope to be able to take on the issue of what we call the meta-distribution, the 
likely distribution of individual expert testimony.  Without a good model for the meta-
distribution, the full demonstration of the best answers will remain incomplete because the 
meta-distribution is the unseen ground truth against which these answers can be measured.  
Until we can be satisfied we have the meta-distribution, we are confined to showing the 
behavior of various methods and deciding if that behavior seems correct.   
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Appendix A. Derivations and Proofs 
The Geometry of Symmetric Triangles. For a symmetric Triangle(L, M, H), 
where M-L = H-M, find points l and h such that l and h are the pth and 1-pth percentiles (see 
Figure 8). 
If l-L = 1/4*(H-L), H-h = 1/4*(H-L), then p = 2*(1/4)2 = 1/8 = 12.5% 
If l-L = 1/9*(H-L), H-h = 1/9*(H-M), then p = 2*(1/9)2 = 1/18 = 5.6% 
The pth percentile corresponds to the √(p/2) base fraction, so the 20th percentile, 
expressed as 1/5, occurs at point √(1/10) = 0.316228 base fraction. 
L         l M          h         H L     l M             h      H
These two “tiled pictures” show two 
relationships of a fraction of the base 
to a fraction of the area, showing the 
above equation in a graphic way.  
 
Figure 8. Visual Aid to Demonstrate the Relationship of Percentiles and Base 
Fraction 
Triangles with Related Areas.  We wish to know how to draw triangular 
distributions that are related to one another for our illustrations: 
Triangles of Constant Area.  For area to remain constant, in this case A = 1, as 
the base increases by a factor, the height must be multiplied by the reciprocal of that factor: 
 
 
Similar Triangles of Reduced Area.  The dimensions of a similar triangle must 































Reduction of Height to Reduce Area with Constant Base.  For area to be 




Triangular Distribution—PDF and Mean.  For a Triangle(L,ML,H), denote L = 
a, H = b, ML = c denoted T(a,c,b).  Since the area of the triangle must be 1 (100%), the 
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Substituting a Triangular for a Normal: The √6 Factor.  For a symmetric 
Triangle(L, ML, H), let ML = m, L = m-w, H = m + w, where w is the half-base.  Then the 
mean is m, and the variance is w2/6 (see previous proofs) and the variance is thus w/√6.  It 
follows that the half-base is greater than the standard deviation by a factor of √6.  So, to 
approximate a normal, the factor of √6 is multiplied by the standard deviation of the original 
normal to be emulated to produce the half-base of the triangle we wish to use in emulation.  
By this means, end points are found that will produce a triangular distribution to emulate the 
underlying Normal(μ, σ)  in mean and standard deviation.  This symmetrical triangular 
distribution, Triangle(μ-√6σ, μ, μ+√6σ) differs from the underlying normal in all other 
moments, and at all percentiles other than the median and two “cross-over” points, but the 
















Figure 9. Comparison of Triangle(μ-√6σ, μ, μ+√6σ) and Normal(μ, σ) 
Variance of Hybrid Distributions—A Pythagorean Relationship.  The 
Mean Suppose k distributions with PDF pi(xi), mean μi, and standard deviation σi are 
sampled. Then the PDF of the hybrid distribution is the “average” of the PDFs: 
 
 
The mean of the hybrid distribution is the average of the means 
 
 
The variance of the hybrid distribution is the average of the variances plus the 
variance of the means taken as a discrete probability distribution!  See the next proof for the 
derivation of the variance. 
















































































Equivalence of Averaging Distributions and Averaging Parameters for 
Symmetric Triangles. In the case of symmetric triangles, averaging the individual 
triangles (with perfect rank correlation) can be shown to be equivalent to averaging the 
parameters.  We will prove it in the case of two triangles, but the proof can easily be 
extended to more.   
As previously shown, the pth percentile (p<0.5) for a symmetric triangle is at the √(2p) half-
base fraction, so the pth percentiles of the two triangles and their average are: 
 
 
But this is clearly just the pth percentile of the average distribution.  A similar proof 
works for p>0.5.  Since all percentiles are equal, the resulting distributions are identical.  
Monte Carlo simulation could be used to explore the difference between the two methods for 
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Acquisition programs are under pressure to deliver increasingly complex capability to 
the field without the cost growth associated with recent programs.  Evolutionary acquisition 
was adopted to help reduce system cost (through the use of mature technologies) and to 
improve system performance (through faster deployment of incremental capability).  While 
the ultimate verdict is not yet in on this decision, our previous simulation-based results have 
demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition can deliver improved capability more quickly than 
traditional acquisition, but that cost may actually increase over that of traditional acquisition.  
This is due to the overhead resulting from more frequent system deployment and update 
cycles.  Are there other factors that can help reduce the cost of evolutionary acquisition?  
This paper investigates the role of system modularity and production level in the cost of 
evolutionary acquisition.  Modularity typically imposes upfront costs in design and 
development, but may result in downstream savings in production and sustainment 
(including deployment of evolutionary new capability).  A simulation experiment is conducted 
to determine under which conditions cost increases are minimized. 
Introduction 
In today's fiscally constrained environment, cost is a major issue that must be 
addressed in military acquisition.  In particular, cost growth is of concern, where cost growth 
is the amount by which actual and projected costs increase over time from earlier cost 
estimates.  A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that for 
the fiscal year 2008 portfolio of weapons systems, there has been cost growth of $296 
billion (GAO, 2009).  Cost growth can result in fewer systems being produced than 
envisioned or desired (e.g., the F-22), or in program cancellation (e.g., the Navy Area 
Missile Defense).  In the current and projected fiscal environment, there is considerable 
pressure to reduce costs and to rein in cost growth. 
One driver of cost is the uncertainty and risk associated with development of new 
technologies for systems.  In an effort to reduce this risk, and hence attempt to reduce costs 
and cost growth, evolutionary acquisition was adopted, whereby systems are developed 
using more mature technologies and deployed in increments of capability.  At the same 
time, sustainment cost is increasingly factored into the overall acquisition cost equation, 
especially as system lifetimes increase.  For instance, the contract for the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter calls for a combined production and sustainment supply network to promote cost 
efficiencies over the system lifecycle. 
Not enough evidence has been collected to establish the effectiveness of 




work uses computer simulation to assess the potential effectiveness of different strategies to 
address cost.  Previous work indicates that evolutionary acquisition alone may not be 
sufficient to control costs (Pennock & Rouse, 2008).  This paper investigates the 
effectiveness of evolutionary acquisition when system modularity and production level are 
considered.  Modularity is hypothesized to help reduce sustainment costs associated with 
maintenance, repair and technology upgrades. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses acquisition 
costs, cost growth and the potential role of system modularity in helping address both.  The 
simulation model used to study these issues is described in Section 3.  Section 4 presents 
an experiment conducted to test the effect of modularity and production level on cost.  
Section 5 provides analysis of the overall experimental results.  Section 6 focuses on those 
results relevant to evolutionary acquisition.  Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents future 
research directions. 
Acquisition Cost and Cost Growth 
High cost and cost overruns have long been an issue with military systems.  Cost 
growth occurs for a variety of reasons, including uncertainty and lack of knowledge about 
technology, design, and manufacturing (GAO, 2009).  Candreva (2009) points to the role of 
institutional factors in organizational failures such as cost growth.  One effort to address 
more cost effective acquisition was the introduction of evolutionary acquisition.  Under 
evolutionary acquisition, the focus is on using technologies for new systems that are 
relatively mature, as opposed to traditional acquisition, which emphasizes use of new and 
immature technologies.  The theory is that use of mature technologies tends to reduce cycle 
times for new system development, due to less risk in the technology development phase of 
acquisition (Johnson & Johnson, 2002).  This should translate into reduced cost growth. 
Our previous research has studied cost by focusing on the process aspects of 
acquisition.  For instance, we have demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition processes 
can yield quicker deployment of capability than traditional acquisition processes, but at 
potentially higher cost due to overhead from the increased frequency of development cycles 
(Pennock & Rouse, 2008).  This work did not address sustainment, however.  Sustainment 
is estimated to constitute approximately 60% of lifecycle cost (Andrews, 2003).  As a result, 
the acquisition community is putting more focus on sustainment, its associated costs and its 
potential for cost growth. 
One avenue that may help address high cost in sustainment is the concept of system 
modularity.  Modularity is an important concept in design of systems and products (Baldwin 
& Clark, 2000; Ulrich & Tung, 1991).  Modular design seeks to reduce the dependencies 
between various system components.  This has the potential to help improve the 
maintainability of a system over time and to reduce the cost of sustainment by facilitating 
repair and upgrade activities.  Little research has quantitatively studied reduction in 
sustainment due to modularity, though.  A number of hypotheses have been formulated in 
the research literature that are of interest in terms of the impact of modularity on cost. 
1. Increasing modularity decreases the cost of implementing technology 
upgrades for deployed systems (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Gershenson, Prasad & Zhang, 2003; Huang & Kusiak, 




20. Increasing modularity decreases the mean time to repair a system 
that has failed and, hence, potentially the cost (Cheung & Hausman, 
1995; Gershenson et al., 2003; Tsai, Wang & Lo, 2003). 
21. Increasing modularity increases the upfront engineering design hours 
required for a system and hence potentially the cost (Ulrich, 1995). 
These hypotheses suggest that there is a trade-off between cost savings in 
sustainment due to system modularity and the cost of designing a modular system.  One 
goal of this paper is to explore this issue.  Previous work has demonstrated that increased 
system modularity tends to facilitate reduced sustainment costs, in terms of repair and 
technology upgrade activities (Bodner, Smith & Rouse, 2009).  The relationship is strongest 
for high levels of modularity, with diminishing returns as modularity levels are reduced.  
Thus, one question is what levels of modularity are required to balance the upstream costs 
of modularity design with the downstream savings from modularity. 
Model Description 
The simulation model used for this research can be characterized as three 
interacting sets of processes.  First, there are the systems being developed for deployment.  
These are housed within programs that conduct the various activities required for 
acquisition.  Second, there is the acquisition enterprise, which consists of a set of processes 
through which programs develop systems.  We address both procurement and sustainment.  
Finally, there are exogenous effects that impact systems and acquisition. 
We use discrete-event simulation, which has been used extensively for analysis of 
process-oriented domains such as acquisition (Law & Kelton, 2000).  Our model is 
implemented using ARENA 12.0, a commercially available and widely used discrete-event 
simulation package (Kelton, Sadowski & Sturrock, 2004).   
System Model 
The acquisition enterprise develops a number of different systems for military use.  In 
our model, a system is characterized primarily by its technologies in development and by its 
architecture in sustainment.  In development, each system has several technologies that 
must be matured and integrated into the system so that the system can be successfully 
deployed.  Each technology has an application area, a maturity level and a capability level.  
The application area describes the function of the technology (e.g., radar or stealth).  The 
maturity level dictates its stage of progress from new and potentially promising to proven 
and mature.  It is measured using the technological readiness level (TRL) scale (Kim, 2005) 
recently adopted by the DoD (DoD, 2006).  The capability level characterizes the functional 
capability of the technology relative to others in the same application area.   
In sustainment, the system architecture relates how different system components are 
arranged within the whole system.  This architecture provides the basis for systems to have 
a specified modularity.  In modeling system modularity, we assume that a system consists of 
n components, one of which is the system infrastructure.  The infrastructure serves as the 
platform that integrates other components, and it is assumed to be a large-scale and static 
in nature over the life of the system (e.g., an airframe).  Modularity is then conceptualized as 
a matrix denoting the relationships between components.  A relationship exists when two 
components are connected with each other, or more specifically when changes to one 
component necessitate changes to another.  In complex systems, components may be 




between components within a module, between modules, or between components spanning 
two different modules.  A relationship between two components affects whether a repair to a 
particular component requires a repair to another, and whether a technology upgrade to a 
particular component requires an upgrade to another. 
For a system k, composed of nk components, we define its repair modularity using an 
nk × nk matrix Rk.  Each entry rijk in this matrix represents the degree to which component i is 
related to component j for purposes of repair.  This is expressed as the Bernoulli probability 
that a repair to component i results in a repair to component j.  Similarly, we define Uk as the 
modularity matrix associated with technology upgrades, with uijk representing the Bernoulli 
probability that an upgrade to component i requires a compatibility upgrade to component j.  
Note that neither Rk nor Uk is assumed to be symmetrical.  Figure 1 illustrates the concept of 
a repair modularity matrix Rk with nk = 6.  In the matrix, diagonal elements are defined to 
equal 1.0.  In addition, component 1 is defined to be the infrastructure, and we assume that 
r1jk =1.0 for all j ≠ 1, and that ri1k = 0.0 for all i ≠ 1.  In other words, all components are 
assumed to be affected by a change in infrastructure, while infrastructure is assumed not to 
be affected by a change in any component. 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Figure 1. System Modularity 
We use the concept of a modularity index to parameterize the extent to which a 
system is modular (Guo & Gershenson, 2004; Hölttä-Otto & de Weck, 2007).  Since 
modularity is matrix-based and, hence, multidimensional in nature, an index provides a more 
concise characterization of modularity.  Our particular index for a repair modularity matrix is 












This index is the average of the probabilities that two different non-infrastructure 
components are related for repair purposes.  A system whose index mrk  is small, is 
considered more modular that one whose index is large.  The modularity index muk for 
technology upgrades is defined similarly. 
A system typically has a projected production level, targeted to provide the number 
of units needed to meet the need for which the system is being developed.  This projected 
production level can change over time, as threats change, as new technologies/systems 





Acquisition Enterprise Model—Procurement 
The acquisition enterprise consists of the five phases of a defense acquisition 
program, as defined by the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2006).  These 
phases include concept development, technology development, system development, 
production & deployment, and operations & support.  Here, the focus is on the procurement 
phases of acquisition, i.e., the first four phases.  Operations and support is analogous to 
sustainment and is discussed in the next section.  These phases are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Phases of Acquisition 
A program starts in the first phase and proceeds through the remaining phases.  
Sometimes, this process involves concurrency, or overlap between parts of two different 
phases (e.g., overlap between final testing in system development and low rate initial 
production).  In the procurement phases (the first four phases of acquisition), each phase is 
characterized by duration and a cost for the program.  Once a phase is concluded, the 
program moves onto the next phase.  The model assumes no concurrency.  This basic 
model, which does not incorporate modularity or production level, is described in greater 
detail by Pennock and Rouse (2008), who also discuss the parameters used for cost and 
duration figures for the various procurement phases.  Elaborations in system development 
and in production are discussed below. 
 Concept development.  Concept development is assumed to last for a duration of 
between 2 and 7.5 years, with a mode of 4.9.  Cost is assumed to be a linear 
function of duration, with rate $20 million/year. 
 Technology development.  The cost and duration of the technology development 
phase depends on whether the program is using evolutionary or traditional 
acquisition, as the program must mature the technologies to be used for the 
system if it uses traditional acquisition.  Technologies for systems being acquired 
are developed exogenously to the acquisition enterprise, from the military 
science and technology (S&T) enterprise.  These technologies are then brought 
into a program when needed in the technology development phase.  The maturity 
level of the technologies brought into a program is used to characterize 
traditional acquisition versus evolutionary acquisition.  The development process 
is risky, in that individual technologies may fail, thus causing a longer technology 
development phase (and higher cost) for the program.  A program that uses 
immature technologies typically has a longer, costlier and riskier technology 
development phase than one that uses relatively more mature technologies.  The 
duration and cost of this phase is the time and cost needed to develop the 
needed technologies for the system. 
 System development.  Here, we assume that the development cost and time are 
dependent on the level of modularity.  In particular, they are increasing functions 















simplicity, repair and upgrade modularity are assumed to be the same in the 
model, with a modularity index denoted simply as mrk = muk = mk.  Recall that as 
mk increases, the system is characterized by a lesser degree of modularity.  We 




Here, A is a scale factor related to the time in years, and a is a scale factor 
that represents the increasing effort it takes to make a system marginally 
more modular.  In the model, system development time is scaled to lie 
between 1.5 and 8 years, and its cost is a linear function of duration at a rate 
of $1,000 million. 
 Production & deployment.  The cost and duration of the production phase are, 
obviously, dependent on the production level of the system in question.  We use 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, a standard micro-economic model that 
relates input units to units produced to allow for increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale (Kreps, 1990).  Letting Xk = input resources used for 
system k, Pk = production of k, and b = scale factor, the functional form is 
b
kk XP =  
Inputs here are capital, labor and materials.  Letting b > 0 yields increasing 
returns to scale, which is typical for production of complex systems.  
Assuming a constant cost for inputs Bk, and letting Zk = the cost of the 









To determine the mean time needed for the production phase for a given 
production level, Zk is scaled to a cost between $6,000 million and $18,800 
million, and the production time is determined using a linear relationship 
between cost and duration with a rate of $4,000 million/year. 
Acquisition Enterprise Model—Sustainment 
The sustainment model includes repairs and technology upgrades for a particular 
system k.  The production level Pk is assumed to be the fleet size for the duration of 
sustainment (i.e., no systems are lost or retired).  Failures and technology upgrades are 
assumed to occur randomly according to a Poisson process.  Each failure or technology 
upgrade affects only one component directly.  Due to modularity, though, a repair to 
component i may require a repair to another component j (with probability rijk).  Similarly, an 
upgrade to i may require an upgrade to another component j (with probability uijk).  The rates 
for the failure and technology upgrade processes are defined below. 
 fi is the failure rate associated with component i. 
 gi is the repair rate associated with component i. 
 ti is the arrival rate of new technology upgrades for component i. 
 vi is the upgrade rate for component i. 




 qi is the cost associated with a technology upgrade to component i. 
 cij is the compatibility cost associated with making component j technologically 
compatible with component i if i is upgraded, and if the interaction between i and j 
necessitates that j be made compatible to the new technology for i. 
Since infrastructure is not affected by repairs or technology upgrades, we assume 
that f1, g1, t1, v1, p1, q1, ci1 and c1j are not defined.  In general, it is assumed that fi > ti, gi > vi, 
and pi < qi. 
Once a system is deployed into sustainment, it experiences failures and technology 
upgrades for its various components according to the above rates.  Technology upgrades 
are a significant concern for systems with long sustainment lifecycles (Singh & Sandborn, 
2006).  A failure invokes a repair process, and a technology upgrade opportunity invokes an 
upgrade process.  Upon occurrence of a failure in component i, all other components j (≠ 1) 
with rijk > 0 are evaluated probabilistically, using random number generation, to determine if 
a repair is necessary for j.  Any additional components are then repaired.  The cost is the 
summation of the repair to the original component i and the cost of other components being 
repaired.  Upon occurrence of a technology upgrade for component i, all other components j 
(≠ 1) with uijk > 0 are evaluated probabilistically, using random number generation, to 
determine if a compatibility upgrade is necessary for j.  Any additional components are then 
made compatible.  The cost is the summation of the summation to the original component i 
and the cost of other components being made compatible.  If a failure or technology 
upgrade for i arrives while the system is in downtime, that failure or technology upgrade 
queues until the downtime is resolved.  Multiple entities in this queue are processed first-
come-first-served.  This process continues for the sustainment life of the system over the 
active fleet, which is assume to range between 15 and 40 years, with a mode of 20 years at 
a median rate of $965 million per year.  The actual rate is influenced by the production level. 
This model provides cost for the direct activities involving maintenance and repair 
(including upgrades) within the sustainment phases.  Clearly, sustainment encompasses 
many other costs.  Unger (2009) presents analysis of the sustainment cost categories from 
the DoD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) for Air Force programs.  Approximately 
52.5% of sustainment cost can be categorized as related to maintenance and repair.  We 
assume that approximately half of these costs (i.e., 25% of sustainment costs) are tied to 
direct repair and upgrade activities represented in our sustainment model. 
It should be noted that there is no effect on the sustainment phase from the 
acquisition policy used in the procurement phases (i.e., traditional versus evolutionary). 
Exogenous Model 
Exogenous to the acquisition enterprise are two important outside influences.  The 
first is a model of technical progress, which represents basic research performed in the 
commercial world or via non-defense government funding.  Results from this model are 
immature technologies that are input into the second exogenous influence, the DoD science 
and technology (S&T) enterprise.  These new technologies enter the S&T enterprise at TRL 
1.  Technologies generated by the model of technological progress increase in capability as 
time progresses using a capability growth function that combines a learning effect (from 
other DoD applications) and an exogenous progress effect (from commercial and outside 
technical progress). 
The technology development process model matures new technologies for DoD 




working technologies that can be integrated into a system.  There is considerable technical 
risk in the development process, as ideas often do not work in practice, do not scale up to 
production, or do not integrate into systems.  The staged process mitigates risk by not fully 
funding a technology's development, allowing it to be culled if it fails or if it is outpaced by 
competing technologies.  It should be noted that the S&T enterprise model consists of a 
single, unified organization, rather than the myriad agencies that comprise the actual DoD 
S&T enterprise. 
Experiment 
This section describes the experiment to be conducted. 
Parameters 
We use the following parameter values in the simulation model for the experiment: 
 a = 1.3 
 b = 1.25 
 1/ti ~ Triangular (5, 8, 15) years for all i and over all systems 
 1/fi ~ Triangular (1.5, 2.5, 4) years for all i and over all systems 
 pi ~ uniform (0.025, 0.075) $ million for all i and over all systems 
 qi ~ uniform (0.2, 0.2375) $ million for all i and over all systems 
 cij = $0.1 million for all i and j and over all systems 
 k = 6 over all systems 
It should be noted that ti and fi are parameters for Poisson processes, and that their 
inverses are the inter-arrival times for those respective processes, distributed as exponential 
variables.  Thus, their inter-arrival times are shown here.  Repair times and upgrade times 
are assumed to be instantaneous. 
Experimental Design 
The goal is to study the effect of system modularity and production level on 
acquisition cost, including sustainment, with a particular focus on cost of evolutionary 
acquisition.  Thus, we adopt a factorial experimental design with three independent 
variables, as outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
Independent Variable Level 1 Level 2 
Acquisition Policy Traditional Evolutionary 
Modularity Index 0.50 (Low) 0.25 (High) 




This results in a 23 factorial experiment.  We are interested in studying the following 
six dependent variables: 
 C1 = program procurement cost 
 C2 = program sustainment cost 
 C3 = total program cost = C1 + C2 
 C4 = annualized procurement cost over all systems 
 C5 = annualized sustainment cost over all systems 
 C6 = annualized cost over all systems = C4 + C5 
Each simulation replication is run for a period of 150 years, with a warm-up period of 
50 years preceding.  This allows analysis of the steady-state enterprise behavior, since the 
enterprise model needs a warm-up period to reach steady-state.  After the warm-up period, 
the statistics collection begins.  Ten replications of each combination of factors are 
conducted to allow for statistical significance. 
Experimental Results 
Table 2 provides summary experimental results.  Columns two through four contain 
the level of each independent variable as shown in Table 1.  The value shown for each 
dependent variable in columns five through ten is the average over the ten replications.  The 
units of the dependent variables are in millions $. 
Table 3. Summary Experimental Results 
Run Policy Mod. Prod. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 1 1 1 12,657 22,248 34,906 5,305 5,075 10,380
2 1 1 2 18,640 26,409 45,049 6,378 5,653 12,031
3 1 2 1 13,832 20,623 34,455 5,378 4,441 9,819
4 1 2 2 20,078 23,096 43,174 6,189 4,296 10,485
5 2 1 1 11,518 22,248 33,766 5,960 6,316 12,276
6 2 1 2 17,548 26,409 43,957 7,071 6,556 13,627
7 2 2 1 12,629 20,623 33,252 5,884 5,210 11,094
8 2 2 2 18,910 23,200 42,109 6,981 5,290 12,271
Analysis of Overall Results 
We use a balanced analysis of variance (ANOVA) method to determine which 
independent variables (or factors) have significant effects (Box, Hunter & Hunter, 1978).  
The ANOVA also computes whether there are significant interaction effects among more 
than one factor.  In performing the analysis of variance for this experiment, Minitab® version 
15 software is used.  Tables 3 through 8 report the analysis of variance for each of the 
dependent variables, C1 through C6, respectively.  Main effects from each independent 




Table 4. Analysis of Variance for Program Procurement Cost (C1) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 26486575 26486575 384.31 0
Mod 1 32315116 32315116 468.88 0
Prod 1 752794480 7.53E+08 10922.85 0
Policy*Mod 1 24451 24451 0.35 0.553
Policy*Prod 1 8505 8505 0.12 0.726
Mod*Prod 1 330508 330508 4.8 0.032
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 207 207 0 0.956
Error 72 4962185 68919  
Total 79 816922028  
From the analysis, we infer that each of the main effects are significant (with p < 
0.10), as is the interaction effect between modularity and production level.  Similar to 
Pennock and Rouse (2008), programs using evolutionary acquisition tend to have a lower 
program cost than those using traditional acquisition, due to higher technology development 
costs.  As expected, low levels of modularity have lower procurement costs, due to less 
systems engineering work in the development phase.  Also as expected, higher production 
levels lead to higher procurement costs.  High modularity and high production level interact 
to increase procurement cost more than each individual factor. 
Table 5. Analysis of Variance for Program Sustainment Cost (C2) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Mod 1 119354720 119354720 63.02 0
Prod 1 223440510 223440510 117.97 0
Policy*Mod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Policy*Prod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Mod*Prod 1 13382709 13382709 7.07 0.01
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Error 72 136366569 1893980  
Total 79 492598085  
For sustainment cost, there is no effect from acquisition policy.  This is to be 
expected, since the simulation model assumes no difference in the sustainment profile 
between the two policies.  However, the effects from modularity, production level and their 
interaction are significant.  Low levels of modularity tend to cause higher sustainment costs, 
and high production levels, of course, result in higher sustainment costs.  Introducing high 





Table 6. Analysis of Variance for Total Program Cost (C3) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 25308713 25308713 12.6 0.001
Mod 1 27460953 27460953 13.67 0
Prod 1 1796490516 1796490516 894.42 0
Policy*Mod 1 1651 1651 0 0.977
Policy*Prod 1 43247 43247 0.02 0.884
Mod*Prod 1 9506987 9506987 4.73 0.033
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 10271 10271 0.01 0.943
Error 72 144615531 2008549  
Total 79 2003437868  
Looking at total program cost, each of the main effects is significant, as is the 
interaction between modularity and production level.  The effect of the main factors is 
explained by the combined effect of these factors on the constituents of C3 (i.e., C1 and C2).  
However, the effect of modularity combines opposite effects noted in C1 and C2.  The effect 
of reduced cost from increased modularity noted in sustainment cost wins out, as 
sustainment costs overpower development costs.  Similarly, the interaction effects between 
modularity and production level in each of the constituents are in opposite directions.  Once 
again, the effect from sustainment costs wins out, and we can infer that high modularity 
helps mitigate the effect of cost increases due to high production levels. 
Table 7. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Procurement Cost (C4) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 8745812 8745812 853.98 0
Mod 1 99301 99301 9.7 0.003
Prod 1 20921804 20921804 2042.9 0
Policy*Mod 1 3027 3027 0.3 0.588
Policy*Prod 1 131703 131703 12.86 0.001
Mod*Prod 1 94557 94557 9.23 0.003
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 78033 78033 7.62 0.007
Error 72 737368 10241  
Total 79 30811604  
In analyzing annualized procurement cost, we find that each of the main effects is 
significant, as are most of the interaction effects.  Confirming Pennock and Rouse (2008), 
the annualized procurement cost for evolutionary acquisition is significantly higher than that 
of traditional acquisition.  This is due to the higher number of refresh procurement cycles.  
Similar to C1, high production levels are associated with higher annualized costs.  However, 
in this case, low levels of modularity are associated with higher annualized costs, in contrast 
to the effect from C1.  This is likely due to the increased development time required for high 
levels of modularity, which reduces the number of systems deployed over the lifecycle and, 
hence, the annualized cost.  Likewise, there is a corresponding significant interaction effect 
between modularity and production levels whereby low levels of modularity in conjunction 
with high production levels are associated with increased costs.  Interestingly, there is a 
significant interaction effect here between acquisition policy and production level.  The 
increased number of programs under evolutionary acquisition interacts with high production 
levels to increase annualized procurement costs more than each individual factor.  Finally, 




as a reduction in the difference in cost between different production levels and acquisition 
policies as modularity level is increased. 
Table 8. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Sustainment Cost (C5) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 19079848 19079848 134.12 0
Mod 1 23789768 23789768 167.23 0
Prod 1 707084 707084 4.97 0.029
Policy*Mod 1 181790 181790 1.28 0.262
Policy*Prod 1 16048 16048 0.11 0.738
Mod*Prod 1 971557 971557 6.83 0.011
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 397276 397276 2.79 0.099
Error 72 10242758 142261  
Total 79 55386129  
For annualized sustainment cost, the three main effects are again significant.  For 
modularity and production level, these effects are consistent with the reasons noted for 
program sustainment cost C2.  For acquisition policy, the effect is consistent with the 
analysis for annualized procurement cost C4, i.e., the increased number of refresh cycles 
means that there is an increased number of programs needing sustainment.  In this model, 
we assume that the program sustainment profiles are the same under evolutionary and 
traditional acquisition.  This does not account for the possibility that, under an evolutionary 
system, it may be the case that system lifecycles are reduced, allowing a reduction in 
sustainment costs.  The interaction effect between modularity and production level is 
consistent with the effect noted for individual program sustainment cost C2, whereby high 
modularity mitigates cost increases associated with high levels of production. 
Table 9. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Total Cost (C6) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 53661197 53661197 292.72 0
Mod 1 26963050 26963050 147.08 0
Prod 1 29321345 29321345 159.95 0
Policy*Mod 1 231729 231729 1.26 0.265
Policy*Prod 1 55804 55804 0.3 0.583
Mod*Prod 1 1672308 1672308 9.12 0.003
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 827448 827448 4.51 0.037
Error 72 13199104 183321  
Total 79 125931985  
Finally, in terms of annualized total cost, each of the three main effects is significant, 
as is the interaction effect between modularity and production level.  The effect for 
acquisition policy is explained by the effect noted for the constituents of C6 (i.e., C4 and C5), 
i.e., the increased number of programs due to evolutionary acquisition.  The effect for 
modularity is explained by the larger effect of modularity in reducing sustainment costs than 
increasing procurement costs, while the effect of production level is explained simply by the 




Analysis of Evolutionary Acquisition 
We now focus on evolutionary acquisition by analyzing the experimental results that 
just pertain to it.  The observations below summarize our findings relative to those of the 
overall experiment.  These results come from reducing the observations to a 22 factorial 
experiment involving only modularity and production level as independent variables. 
 For C1, the program procurement cost, both modularity and production level have 
similar significant effects.  The interaction effect is somewhat weaker, though, 
registering only a p-value of 0.136.  Thus, we infer that this interaction effect 
predominates for traditional acquisition due to the relatively larger program 
procurement cost. 
 Similarly, for C2, the annualized sustainment cost, both modularity and production 
level have the same type of significant effect.  The interaction effect is also 
somewhat weaker than in the overall experiment, with a p-value of 0.077. 
 The same observations hold for C3.  Here, for the effect of modularity and the 
interaction effect between modularity and production level, the sustainment cost 
predominates, causing increased modularity to have a reducing effect on the 
total program cost.  The p-value for the interaction effect is relatively weak at 
0.138. 
 For the annualized costs (C4, C5 and C6), modularity retains its significant effect 
in the same direction as in the overall experiment.  However, production level is 
significant only for C4 and C6.  In addition, the interaction effect between 
modularity and production is not significant across the three dependent variables.  
This is likely captured in the three-way interaction effect among the three 
independent variables noted in the overall experiment for C4, C5 and C6.  It may 
be that additional replications are needed to get statistically significant results for 
these effects.  This bears further investigation. 
Discussion and Future Research 
The above results imply a number of conclusions relevant for military acquisition.   
 Increased system modularity yields increases in the system development cost, 
but the decrease in sustainment cost over the system lifecycle may more than 
compensate for these increased costs.  This points to the need to view 
acquisition as an investment process.  While the short-term budgeting nature of 
the federal government works against this perspective, a longer term view does 
show the benefit of investing current costs to achieve long-term savings. 
 Modularity can help mitigate the cost increases associated with higher production 
levels through an interaction effect between these two factors. Similar to the 
previous point, this effect involves the way in which sustainment costs overpower 
those of development, due to long lifecycles. 
 Evolutionary acquisition seems less susceptible, especially from an annualized 
cost point of view, to this interaction effect between modularity and production 
levels.  While this bears further investigation, it should be noted that those 
programs that do maintain characteristics of traditional acquisition may wish to 




 Evolutionary acquisition may decrease individual program costs, but the more 
frequent refresh cycles may drive cost growth in overall procurement and 
sustainment.  Thus, discretion is needed in managing these refresh cycles, 
especially when high production levels are involved. 
This work has addressed the process aspects of the acquisition enterprise.  Clearly, 
processes are an important and critical part of the acquisition enterprise.  However, 
acquisition occurs in the context of organizational behavior that is impacted by incentives 
and information availability.  The DoD has spent significant resources on incentive programs 
to facilitate positive acquisition outcomes.  Some research suggests that these resources 
have not been used effectively (GAO, 2005).  However, economic research suggests that it 
is possible to design incentive programs under different information availability scenarios 
(Hildebrandt, 2009).  Thus, an avenue of future research is to integrate organizational 
behavior modeling of acquisition, combined with process modeling. 
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Abstract 
Unless program managers (PM) tackle cost containment head-on, future weapon 
system acquisition successes may be jeopardized, resulting in fewer products and services 
to equip the nation’s warfighters. The United States can ill afford any decrease in its 
preparedness when the nation is currently waging war on two fronts. This research 
examines cost containment in the context of Total Life Cycle Cost Management. A more 
thorough understanding and aggressive application of cost-containment strategies could 
conceivably shift acquisition outcomes to a more cost-effective posture. Responding to a 
survey conducted as part of this research, 887 Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
professionals provided input on cost containment, including tool types and associated 
processes. Of those 887 respondents, 223 were current or former DoD PMs with over 11 
years of experience—the primary basis of this research analysis. 
Keywords: Life Cycle Cost Management (LCCM), Cost Containment, Cost as an 
Independent Variable (CAIV), Performance Based Logistics (PBL), Cost Analysis 






Is there a superior acquisition development decision aid that can assure more 
program successes and help contain costs? Interestingly enough, some of the most basic 
tools currently at our disposal in the Department of Defense (DoD) are already ideally suited 
to help achieve acquisition excellence. They can also have a significant impact on fiscal 
outcomes. For some time, program managers (PMs) have had access to these in the form 
of a customized Tool Kit that outlines and characterizes a wide array of helpful decision aids 
and measures (DAU, 2009b), including: 
  
Figure 1. Technology Readiness Level 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL). 
Tempers technology insertion by measuring technology 
maturity; ensures technology properly finds its way into 
development efforts, while accounting for any associated risks; 
and considers performance and life-cycle factors before a 
technology solution is finalized. 
 
 
Figure 2. Earned Value Management 
Earned Value Management (EVM). 
Predicts cost and schedule perturbations, provides early 
warning, and serves as a forecasting tool that ties itself to 
traceable physical work packages (under an overall Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS)). 
 Figure 3. Cost Analysis Requirements 
Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD). 
Provides comprehensive and detailed descriptions of 
acquisition programs; supports Program Office Estimates 
(POE), Component Cost Analyses (CCA), and independent 
Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE).  
 
 
Figure 4. Technical and Management Processes 
Technical and Management Processes.   Ensure 
products properly evolve from concept to deployment; set the 
stage for the selection of a wide range of alternative design 
approaches through an integrated superset of design, 






Figure 5. Performance-based Logistics 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL). “Provides a means for 
the resource-constrained program management office to 
develop, implement, and manage the sustainment of a system 
over its life cycle” (Fowler, 2009). 
 
Figure 6. Cost as an Independent Variable 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). Weighs 
affordable performance capabilities and scheduling based on 
cost goals that can be realized by a set of decisions that 
balances programmatic risks (Rush, 1997). Also serves as a 
trade-off tool to achieve Reduced Total Ownership Costs 
(Pallas & Novak, 2000). 
Taken together, these tools can give PMs the power to overcome many of the 
looming programmatic hurdles that continue to surface as often as the weather changes. 
Many other helpful decision aids are available and designed specifically to combat the 
challenges PMs face every day. Considering this wide and diverse array of decision aids, 
what is missing? What have we actually failed to characterize that ostensibly fuels cost 
growth? Why do examples keep surfacing like the MV-22 Osprey, in which costs per flight 
hour—currently at $11,000—are expected to more than double the target estimate (Clark, 
2009)? If so many variable costs can fluctuate, can they be properly tracked and addressed 
in time to contain costs? 
One methodology in particular was expected to give truthful predictions of total costs. 
But, its value has presumably diminished in the face of the very dynamic and complex 
processes normally associated with acquisition programs in the DoD. It goes by the name 
Life Cycle Cost Management (LCCM). Up to now, it has been used to understand both the 
wide array of system costs that start with a program’s initial baseline and run all the way 
through disposal. 
Discussion 
Conceptually, LCCM is not new. As early as 1936, T. P. Wright had already created 
cost-estimating equations to predict the cost of airplanes over long production runs 
(Hamaker, 1994). Oddly enough, many are still in use today. In varying degrees, support for 
LCCM continued to grow ever since. In 1975, an Air Force working group recommended five 
required actions to effectively institute LCCM capabilities in program offices. They 
recommended:  














NASA ? ? ? ?
CASA Cost Analyses Strategy 
Assessment
LOGSA ? ? ? ?
EDCAS Equipment Designer’s 
Cost Analysis System
TFD Group ? ? ? ?
MAAP Monterey Activity‐base 
Analytical Platform
TFD Group ? ? ? ?
FLEX Navy Material 
Command LCC Model
NAVAIR  ? ? ? ?
LCCA Life Cycle Cost Analyzer Northrop 
Grumman ? ? ? ?
LCCH Life Cycle Cost Model Air Force(TASC) ? ? ? ?
Price Family of Models for 
Costing/Evaluation
Lockheed Martin ? ? ? ?
ZCORE Cost Oriented Resource 
Estimating Model




(USAF, USA) ? ? ? ?
 Engineers and analysts be given general guidance on how to develop, adapt, 
and use life-cycle cost models for specific applications; 
 Program office and supporting personnel have access to a short course in the 
subject of development and application of LCC models and methods; 
 Periodic life-cycle cost methods workshops be held; and 
 Program office personnel be provided with a central focus of expertise in which 
lessons learned in each new life-cycle application are integrated with existing 
LCC models and methods (McKenzie, 1978). 
LCCM is certainly not an underdeveloped concept, either. Over the years, a number 
of LCC models have surfaced to help programs fashion their overall funding profiles. Each 
model takes into account the broad range of a system’s true costs, including its economic 
life, inflation rates, discount rates, total number of cost elements that comprise the system, 
magnitude of cost elements, salvage value, etc. But to this day, when asked about their 
experience with LCC models, their applicability, usefulness, ease of use, and limitations are 
viewed as questionable by many, including the DoD’s most experienced program managers 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1. Program Managers Quantify LCC Models 
Sentiments like those expressed by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA, 2008) are common among many acquisition professionals with 
comparable years of experience on the subject of developing/relying upon the accuracy of 
LCC estimates that models like these provide: 
It involves using incomplete, inaccurate, and changing data for an outmoded & 
ineffective space system to derive the precise cost of purchasing an unknown 
quantity of an undefined new space system to satisfy an overly exaggerated and 
unvalidated requirement at some time in the future, under uncertain conditions, with 




Whatever model or methodology is selected, carefully (and frequently) applying it 
can have a lasting effect on cost containment. Of primary importance is the selection of the 
most suitable LCC model(s). Each characterizes a number of important variables a little 
differently. Nonetheless, each LCC model also has the capacity to magnify cost drivers, 
early and often. Regrettably, Booz Allen-Hamilton reported that the “real issue is one of 
obtaining the data in a timely manner and of reducing the redundant data collection effort 
needed every time a cost-effectiveness question arises in the decision-making arena” 
(Leggitt, 1981, p. 13). However, unless PMs alter their views on their usefulness and 
frequency of use, these models/methodologies will likely have less influence on key 
decisions.  
Fundamentally, LCCM is actually an extraordinary concept, which is generally 
described through two manifestations. The first, LCC, accounts for research and 
development costs, investment costs, operating and support costs, and disposal costs over 
the system’s entire life cycle. The second, Total Ownership Cost (TOC), consists of LCC 
elements as well as other infrastructure or business process costs not necessarily 
attributable to the program (USD(AT&L), 2008). Understanding all the costs and all the 
implications associated with LCCM may seem intimidating. So many unknowns and so 
many combinations and permutations come into play that can easily vary, making it difficult 
to quantify any system’s total costs, especially when it matters most—during the birth of a 
program.  
In 2006, to raise more awareness, the DoD elevated the ranking of ownership costs 
to a Key System Attribute (KSA) in anticipation of drawing more attention early on (Kobren, 
2009). Have we given LCCM enough attention to have an impact though? Probably not. And 
if not, how can we garner even more attention and emphasis on this KSA? Perhaps we 
should just call it what it is—Aggregate Management. After all, it aggregates everything that 
could possibly affect the cost of materializing anything that actually gets built and eventually 
fielded in the DoD.  
Investment budgets are shrinking, and without additional attention, initial concepts 
designed to meet some requirement might take a lot longer to materialize or cost a whole lot 
more to produce and sustain—both problematic scenarios that we as a nation can ill afford. 
LCCM needs to be somehow re-energized. Increasing its use would trigger the robust part 
of the LCCM challenge—encouraging deeper thinking, acting more critically, and pursuing 
more creative methods to contain overall costs. “Years earlier, Lt Gen James T. Stewart, 
USAF (Ret.), indicated  one of the threats to cost containment and described it as ‘yo-yo 
funding’ (Dapore & Bryant, 1984) that persists even today in the DoD’s Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.” 
Exchange with Subject Matter Experts 
The authors conducted two focus sessions with a handful of acquisition experts who 
teach the art and science of LCCM and cost estimating. Their experiences, combined with 
frequent contact with acquisition colleagues inside and outside the classroom, highlighted 
specific cost-containment issues that PMs face every day.  
Their first meeting was with the Logistics Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Each SME 
confirmed that LCCM issues persist. They noted LCCM considerations continue to be 
minimized up front, where they could have the most significant impact. They also stressed 




continuum and after initial modeling (R. Burroughs, personal communication, September 17, 
2009). 
To amplify the importance of LCCM, the SMEs recommended instituting an LCC 
breach construct (similar to the intent behind Nunn-McCurdy breaches). For example, if a 
program exceeded its LCC baseline by a fixed cost percentage similar to the construct 
established by Nunn-McCurdy, PMs would have to report any infringement to Congress. 
They also indicated that it would be beneficial to establish a formulary similar to TRLs where 
a program could not proceed to the next phase until it demonstrated some minimum level of 
achievement (M. Sherman, personal communication, September 17, 2009). 
Currently, the DoD expects LCC reassessments after an initial one is developed, but 
do these subsequent updates give enough attention to cost containment? Not explicitly.  
The logistics SMEs emphasized both the lack in LCCM discipline and the absence of 
cross communication in programs that generally need it the most throughout a program’s life 
cycle. They accentuated that funding allocations and key decisions typically seem to be 
focused on development and not sustainment. And, without a tool to respond to the dynamic 
nature of LCC that accounts for all costs, including Operations and Support (O&S), there will 
be little forewarning that a sustainment breach might be close at hand (M. Sherman, 
personal communication, September 22, 2009). 
O&S costs constitute the majority of a program’s total costs—a widely recognized 
tenet in DoD program management. As recently as March 2007, the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) reaffirmed that “projected O&S costs average 60-65 percent of 
projected life-cycle costs after reviewing 34 Major Defense Acquisition Programs, or 
MDAPs” (CAIG, 2007). Just as strikingly, at the end of a program’s research and 
development effort and just prior to production or operations, 95% of the cumulative LCC 
has already been committed (DoE, 1997). So, is the lack of attention actually warranted in 
subsequent life-cycle phases given the questionable ability to influence O&S costs? The 
authors suspected so, but were anxious to hear and consider divergent views from the 
Budget, Cost, and Financial Management experts.  
The authors next met with four Budget, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management 
(BCEFM) SMEs. This group echoed the same sentiment voiced by the Logistics SMEs: 
Sustainment tends to get minimized early in the development phase. However, they added 
that the “ilities” are generally not well defined. They stated LCCM typically suffers from a 
lack of sufficient cost detail to adequately address sustainment costs that predominate once 
systems find their way into operations (J. Rego, personal communication, September 22, 
2009). 
The BCEFM SMEs quickly reached a consensus on one of the major obstacles to 
cost containment. They stated that funding instability makes cost containment an 
insurmountable prospect. Already faced with many other daily programmatic challenges, 
they asserted that funding instability, typically manifested by perpetual budget cuts, creates 
a gyrating funding baseline on top of other strategic concerns including: 
 Industry partners who are not necessarily motivated by cost containment, 
 Frequent changes in requirements, 
 Internal staffing shortfalls that are sometimes tough to fill, 
 Lack of certain key functional experience in program offices, and  




The BCEFM SMEs also affirmed that if PMs found a cost metric that had a strong 
influence in controlling costs well after the “truthful predictions,” then it would be widely used 
and could perhaps help contain costs (J. Rego, personal communication, September 22, 
2009). EVM satisfies the forecasting piece of the equation, but without specific and practical 
motivational methods that help contain costs, its usefulness is questionable. So, do those 
specific methods exist today? The answer is yes. Contract incentive strategies are one of 
many tools available, and have been used extensively in the DoD to help curb some of the 
escalating technical risks and associated costs. However, they have tended to provide more 
short-term gains than the ones needed for longer-term, and more enduring, outcomes in the 
past few years, especially when technology maturity is so fluid (GAO, 2005).  
LCC in Practice Today 
Today, in the context of containing costs in acquisition programs in the DoD, PMs 
are compelled to address LCCM across their program’s life cycle. As mentioned earlier, 
though, well before a PM’s arrival, much of the projected life-cycle costs for future systems 
or products is rooted in decisions made during the early phases of advanced planning and 
conceptual design (Blanchard, 1992). Consequently, initial LCC assessments have always 
been a key component of a program’s “go/no go” decision process since they address a 
program’s affordability and are ultimately dependent on the military department’s (or 
agency’s) ability to secure the necessary funding. Each military department and agency 
gives LCCM a lot of attention at the beginning of a system’s life cycle. However, in addition 
to LCCM concerns, military departments and agencies must balance today’s operational 
needs with future requirements, while simultaneously ensuring that they do not neglect more 
capable systems still in various stages of development. These considerations are critical—
all designed to either boost current system performance or meet new warfighter/user 
requirements. 
LCC projections are not expected to be dormant once PMs take charge. Title 10 of 
the United States Code § 2434 requires the Secretary of Defense to consider an 
independent Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) before approving Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD), or Production and Deployment (P&D) of an MDAP. In 
practice, LCC gets looked at closely via an assortment of predictive analyses (probabilistic 
and deterministic) that sometimes can be difficult to absorb. So much so, that it is generally 
left to the experts to decipher. Very few PMs ever find themselves digging into LCC 
parameters. Besides, they have the experts in their respective program offices who analyze 
and weigh the output. Even so, many variables make it sometimes difficult for even the 
experts to fully quantify. The experts, who generally populate the models with key 
assumptions, do their best to leverage the behavior of analogous systems. Still, quantifying 
all the assumptions is a daunting task when so many parameters are so variable or have not 
been captured or qualified. Ultimately, the responsibility resides with the PM to embrace 
LCC estimates, but do they and their staffs revalidate these estimates on a more routine 
basis? Do they dive deeper into the basis of the original LCC estimate and make any 
necessary adjustment(s) to contain costs? 
PMs recognize that LCC generally starts out with an “inferred” cost-containment 
element before their programs leave the initial approval process gate. What happens later is 
a combination of art and science mixed with some uneasiness. PMs are expected to 
quantify the anticipated costs of their development system across the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP). For ACAT IC and ID programs, LCC is carefully revisited by Congress in 
the context of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) when costs escalate by least 15% or 




However, in addition to LCCM concerns, military departments and agencies must balance 
today’s operational needs with future requirements, and not neglect more capable systems 
still in various stages of development—designed to either boost current system performance 
or meet new warfighter/user requirements. 
After Milestone B (formal initiation of an acquisition program), PMs tend to narrow 
their focus on managing their programs day-to-day. This day-to-day strategy is about 
program survival. PMs dwell on cost, schedule, and performance parameters in the face of 
too little funding, too little schedule flexibility, and too many technology hurdles. If LCC 
models are seen as an initial forecasting apparatus only to give a reasonable grounding of 
all known costs—but not necessarily designed to contain costs—how could cost, schedule, 
and performance become more tightly integrated into the overall LCCM equation? And, what 
about CAIV? Where does it fit in? As originally envisioned, CAIV was designed to give PMs 
the flexibility to balance all the factors that could help contain costs—but has it? What do 
PMs have to say about CAIV? How are LCC and CAIV related? Are they related? What do 
PMs think about these questions? Their perspectives follow. 
Survey Findings 
The objective data generated by this opinion survey confirmed what some earlier 
studies found in LCCM. In addition, the data offered quite a few other interesting 
perspectives as well, especially in the way PMs view LCCM and CAIV regarding cost-
containment principles. The survey also reinforced how PMs unevenly apply LCCM 
principles and cost-containment strategies across their programs.  
Even though the opinions expressed in this survey were based on fundamental 
beliefs, opinions invariably drive decisions since they are inextricably linked to 
“experiences”—an imperative in the DoD’s acquisition enterprise, and one of the key factors 
designed to help meet the certification requirements of the acquisition corps. In other words, 
opinions matter in the acquisition profession when such opinions are steeped in years of 
acquisition experience. Burrowing into the invaluable experiences that have shaped the 
DoD’s current PM workforce can also be a very meaningful bellwether. In this particular 
survey, PMs provided specific narrative comments that acknowledged certain cost-
containment hurdles. The survey also found a couple of misconceptions regarding the use 
and usefulness of some of these cost-containment tools in the Tool Kit. The discussion that 




LCC Model Familiarity and Experience 
When PMs were asked to rate the LCC models that they had previously used, many 
were simply unfamiliar with the models. Provided below are representative comments from 
the opinion survey results (See Table 2). ACAT I Program Managers with over 11 Years of 
Experience, Review LCCM Models 
Sorry, just not that familiar with the models. 
Somebody else uses them and provides data 
to me. 
~ 
As a PM, I have not been involved with 
the detailed execution of the specific model 
used to derive cost estimates. In many 
instances, costs and cost estimates were 
derived from legacy numbers of the previous 
program. 
~ 
To be honest, not my field of expertise, 
and I am only familiar with the tools to the 
extent my team uses them. 
~ 
I have no first-hand knowledge of any of these 
systems/models. 
Usefulness of LCC Models 
PMs believed that the P&D and O&S phases are better predictors of costs, while the 
Technology Development (TD) and EMD phases are generally the most influential in driving 
decisions. Contrary to what the DoD would prefer, they did not believe the pre-acquisition 
phases (Materiel Solution Analysis and TD) are suitable for cost containment given their 
inability to qualify, let alone quantify, some of the major “unknowns.” More importantly, by 
the time their programs entered EMD, a large number of PMs declared that LCC models 
have significantly underestimated costs. PMs also stated these models need more precision 
in the early stages of program initiation since they drive so many future decisions (Table 2). 
Organizations like the CAIG recommended that PMs should seek more research that 
focused on “scrubbing development and procurement, more detailed analysis of 
sustainment profiles, and identification of causal factors” (CAIG, 2007). 
Representative Narrative Comments. A sampling of comments on the way PMs 
view LCCM and its cost-containment principles follows. 
Most models have many assumptions, and those assumptions are not 
monitored over time; and risks are not addressed to keep the 
assumptions valid, so the models are not valuable when decision makers 
really need the information. 
 
LCC for O&S appears to be generally unrealistic. 
 
As programs proceed along their life cycle, LCC doesn’t seem to be 
appropriately updated. 
Table 2. ACAT I Program Managers with over 




LCCM never captures changes allowed/forced on programs, and fails to 
"predict" well. Models are used early on, but eventually lose influence as 
"inertia" takes over and programs enter "make the best of it mode." 
 
Overly optimistic estimates. 
 
No one seems to put the thought and time into a thorough estimate of 
determining LCC. 
 
No one seems to update LCC and use it as a yardstick. 
Major Obstacles to Cost 
Containment   
Of the many typical challenges that 
PMs face, five obstacles accounted for 
a noticeable majority of the reasons 
that made cost containment difficult to 
overcome, according to PMs with at 
least 11 years of experience. As seen 
in the Figure 7, those five standing in 
the way included requirements creep, 
underfunded programs, annual budget 
fluctuations, ambitious program 
schedules, and too many policy and 
bureaucratic obstacles.  
Revisit Rates for LCC Estimates 
Despite whether revisiting LCC estimates was viewed as a burden or resource constraint, 
about half of the PMs routinely or frequently 
reviewed their program’s LCCs unless in 
preparation for an upcoming milestone review 
(Figure 8). While a great forcing function, 
performing LCC updates only in preparation for 
the next milestone is probably too late to 
significantly influence cost containment. 
However, PEOs and/or senior managers 
showed even less interest in LCC estimates, 
other than for preparation for the next milestone 
(Figure 8). Without more frequent and intensive 
reviews by either PMs or PEOs, the ability to 
make cost adjustments becomes more difficult 
to defend.  
Representative Narrative Comments. A 
sampling of comments on revisiting LCC 
highlights this seemingly low level of interest in 




Figure 1. Program Managers Rate the Challenges They Face





The costs that are of the most concern to me are those in the immediate execution 
year. I have considered out-year costs but not as much as I should have. 
~ 
My focus is on providing most capability within budget, not on future life-cycle costs. 
~ 
General knowledge on cost containment among all program office personnel is very 
low. 
~ 
Many of the cost growths are based on not really understanding the requirements 
and instead based on assumptions on both sides. 
Significant Cost Drivers 
Identifying and knowing the significance of key cost drivers are paramount. 
Otherwise, the ability to contain costs could easily weaken. As seen in Figure 9, when asked 
how they would rate the 
significance of many of 
the classic cost drivers, 





instability, and artificially 
low cost estimates, were 
the most significant. With 
the addition of artificially 
low cost estimates and 
too many policy and 
bureaucratic obstacles, 
these were the same 
obstacles that made cost 
containment difficult to 
overcome when an even 
wider selection of survey 
choices was posed to PMs in an earlier question (see Figure 7).  
Connection Between CAIV and LCC 
CAIV is another key tool available to help 
contain costs as previously discussed. It gives PMs a 
flexible instrument to help quantify the undeniable 
relationship(s) between certain performance requirements 
and realistic cost constraints. However, only 65% of the 
PMs acknowledged either a “strong” or “moderate” 
connection to LCC (see Figure 10). Subsequently, PMs 
might see CAIV as a quick fix only, and not fully appreciate 
the extent of the long-term gain; not believe there is a long-
term gain; or perhaps not fully believe in the concept as a 
whole. 
Figure 4. Program Managers Rate Their Cost Drivers 





Representative Narrative Comments. A sampling of comments on the relationship 
between CAIV and LCC shows a program management community less comfortable with 
CAIV as a cost control tool. 
Strong in theory but weak in practice. 
~ 
I think the relationship between LCC and CAIV has been diminished. 
~ 
I’ve never seen CAIV used to contain costs on a program. 
~ 
I don’t believe CAIV has anything to do with CAIV. It’s an artificial constraint that prevents 
the PM from meeting the requirements. 
~ 
I didn’t see CAIV used in any organized way because hardly anyone on the PM team has 
enough practical experience. 
~ 
Unfortunately, the CAIV tool of last resort became common to overcome cost overruns due 
to funding stability and poor execution. 
~ 
CAIV trades are rarely supported by the requirements community. The requirements 
community is 99 percent focused on capability and mildly interested in long-term O&S cost-
reduction efforts. 
Training Challenges 
PMs stated a need for additional training, primarily LCCM and Risk Management 
training, to help them better contain costs. Perhaps this increased training could help 
strengthen cost-containment strategies.  





To reconcile some of the shortcomings of LCC and, just as importantly, better 
prepare PMs to contain costs and achieve more successful acquisition outcomes, the 
authors of this research recommend the following: 
 Take the chill out of cost containment and re-energize LCCM. Make it everyone’s 
business. Even though PMs cannot serve as LCC experts, they and their 
teammates should know the basis of their own LCC estimates throughout their 
program’s life cycle, and not wait until the next milestone to make any necessary 
adjustment(s). 
 Elevate LCC to a Key Performance Parameter—it will compel more PMs and 
senior personnel to rigorously exercise LCCM principles. Establishing LCC as a 
KSA is not enough. 
 Continuously challenge strategies that are tightly coupled with their underlying 
assumptions. 
 Base cost decisions on programmatic realities and more current data since these 
influence LCC outcomes. 
 Establish an LCC Continuous Learning Model (CLM) that amplifies the objectives 
and characteristics of an LCC model and identifies the family of LCC models that 
best apply where, how, and when. 
 Add an LCC best practice link to each functional Community of Practice (CoP) 
where PMs can learn from others. 
 Establish LCCM trip wires throughout a program’s life cycle, and do not penalize 
PMs for reporting unfavorable but essentially accurate program information to 
seniors or higher headquarters. 
 Reward and incentivize PMs for containing and/or lowering costs. 
 Develop cost-containment strategies that are carefully evaluated and painless to 
execute.  
 Embrace innovation and dismiss mundane strategies that guarantee less-than-
optimal outcomes. 
 Promote more CAIV. Conceptually, CAIV was placed into the acquisition arsenal 
to give PMs a little more latitude with performance versus cost trade-offs. As 
ADM Mike Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said at 
the Program Executive Officer/Systems Command Commanders’ Conference at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on November 4, 2009, “The acquisition community and the 
warfighter will have to jointly accept the 80 percent solution…we have to be 
realistic with what we can afford” (Mullen, 2009). 
 Let PMs lead. PMs have the knowledge, skill, and ability to carefully guide their 





This research reinforced the many contrasting perspectives that PMs possess with 
respect to cost containment and their ability to influence and/or control it. As originally 
conceived, understanding the usefulness and criticality of LCCM can have a major impact 
on weapons systems developments by keeping a lid on rising costs—a growing necessity. 
The acquisition environment will invariably change. Budgets will shrink; fewer new systems 
will be built and fielded; more pressure will be exerted on extending and sustaining current 
systems; and more pressure can be expected on containing costs—much more pressure. 
The remaining weapons systems under development will come under political fire. As 
external scrutiny swells, programmatic decisions will be challenged since there will be so 
much more information immediately available about emerging systems. So, how can PMs 
once and for all silence the skeptics and achieve positive acquisition outcomes? For 
starters, they can shock the critics by challenging the programmatic “cost status quo” at 
every juncture and not just the major milestones. They can no longer “kid themselves” about 
what something is going to cost, as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics Ashton Carter recently stated (Carter, 2009). They can increase programmatic 
“cost accuracy” by better understanding and re-energizing one key cost-containment 
practice that has seen less action or become ineffective in recent years—LCCM. Inarguably, 
yo-yo funding will continue. Poor outcomes need not. The DoD cannot afford more of the 
same. Changes to DoD 5000.02 that now call for Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) prior to 
Milestone B and earlier measured prototyping to lower out-year costs will go a long way. 
Warfighters need every penny applied to capability, not cost overruns. Ultimately, PMs and 
their staffs must be more introspective and tightly integrate the art and the science of 
containing costs in the face of global economic changes. It’s time to take the chill out of 
containing costs. The DoD depends on it; our nation depends on it; and the warfighters need 
to count on it. 
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACWP Actual Cost of Work Performed 
ADM Admiral 
BAC Budget at Completion 
BCEFM Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management 
BCWP Budget Cost for Work Performed 
BCWS Budget Cost for Work Scheduled 
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
CAIV Cost as an Independent Variable 
CARD Cost Analysis Requirements Description 
CDR Critical Design Review 
EAC Estimate at Completion 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
CDD Capability Development Document 
CPD Capability Production Document 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoE Department of Energy 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EVM Earned Value Management 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FRP Full Rate Production 
FYDP Future Years Defense Program 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
KPP Key Performance Parameter 
KSA Key System Attribute 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LCCM Life Cycle Cost Management 
Lt Gen Lieutenant General 




O&S Operations and Support 
PAUC Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
PBL Performance Based Logistics 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PM Program Manager 
POE Program Office Estimate 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
P&D Production and Deployment 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
Ret. Retired 
SME Subject-matter Expert 
SYSCOM Systems Command 
TAB Total Allocated Budget 
TD Technology Development 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
USAF United States Air Force 
USN United States Navy 
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An Information-theoretic Approach to Software Test-
retest Problems  
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include decision-making under uncertainty, particularly with regard to command and control (C2) systems; 
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applications (e.g., complex system testing, allocation of effort for reconnaissance, etc.).  
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from randomly distributed inaccurate measurements, with application to mobile communication; patterns 
and image recognition in biometrics; computational biology algorithms for microarray data analysis; 
Kolmogorov complexity, with application to value allocation for processes without saleable output; and 
Monte Carlo methods for branching processes and simulation of random variables with arbitrary 
distribution functions.  Valery’s most current work is focused on statistical inference about the state of a 
system based on distributed binary testing.  Another area of interest is in the so-called needle-in-a-
haystack problem: searching for multiple dependencies in activities within public communication networks 
as predictors of external events of significance (e.g., terrorist activities, stock market anomalies).     
Thomas J. Housel—Thomas J. Housel is a Professor of Information Sciences at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Prof. Housel specializes in valuing intellectual capital, knowledge management, 
telecommunications, information technology, value-based business process re-engineering, and 
knowledge-value measurement in profit and non-profit organizations.  His current research focuses on the 
use of knowledge-value added (KVA) and real options models in identifying, valuing, maintaining, and 
exercising options in military decision-making.   His work on measuring the value of intellectual capital has 
been featured in a Fortune cover story (October 3, 1994) and Investor’s Business Daily, numerous books, 
professional periodicals, and academic journals (most recently in the Journal of Intellectual Capital, 
2005).   
Abstract 
Open architecture systems developed from a standard library of reusable components 
should be fielded faster than systems crafted as monolithic software projects.  This reliance on 
reusable components, however, will add to the complexity of life-cycle maintenance.  The cost 
to repair or upgrade any one module in this library will require that we perform regression testing 
across all systems where this module is employed.   This test-retest cycle is required to ensure 
that no previously satisfied requirements have been left uncovered; that is, we seek to 
guarantee with a suite of tests that we have not “broken” any existing functionality.   Models of 
software debugging abound, and much of this previous research has focused on models of 
software fault (or bug) distributions throughout the body of the system.  In this work, we examine 
not only this fault distribution but also the effectiveness of the test suites employed to find these 
faults.  We evaluate the suite of regression and diagnostic tests for their potential information 
return versus cost.  This analysis framework is flexible enough to cover many testing scenarios, 
and is grounded in a mathematical model suitable for rigorous analysis and Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The goal of this work is to construct a decision-support tool for the Navy Program 
Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) offering quantitative information about 
cost versus diagnostic certainty.  
Keywords: diagnostic testing, regression testing, automated testing, Monte Carlo 




The Rapid Integration and Test Environment: A 
Process for Achieving Software Test Acceptance  
Patrick V. Mack—Commander Patrick V. Mack, US Navy is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate 
School with degrees in Computer Science and Operations Research. He is the Principal Assistant 
Program Manager (PAPM) for the Navy’s Maritime C2 Program Office (PMW 150) responsible for the 
development of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Maritime and Navy version of 
GCCS-Joint programs.  An Engineering Duty Officer, he has served five tours at the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR): Technical Director for the DoD’s Joint Simulation System–
Maritime component; Flag Aide for Commander, SPAWARSYSCOM; Deputy for the APM for Naval 
C2 Systems, Research and Development; and PEO Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) as the 
Program Director for the Cooperative Engagement Capability before his current assignment. Other 
assignments include OIC of SPAWAR Systems Facility Pacific, Yokosuka, Japan, and a one-year 
tour in Baghdad, Iraq, at the Multi-National Security Transition Command, deputy Chief of Staff for 
reconstruction, where he was awarded the Bronze Star.  
Introduction 
The Rapid Integration and Test Environment (RITE) initiative, implemented by the 
Program Executive Office, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence, Command and Control Program Office (PMW-150), was born of necessity.  
Existing processes for requirements definition and management, as well as those for 
software development, did not consistently deliver high-quality Navy command and control 
(C2) systems on time and within budget.  Navy C2 software programs experienced an 
increase in software defects that were not discovered until the completion of development 
activities and, because of the pressure to deploy software on schedule, product releases 
were distributed with defects.  These defects were then repaired post delivery at significant 
cost.  This situation was untenable and required new procedures and processes to solve the 
programmatic and technical challenges while operating with reduced budgets.   
This paper introduces a new life cycle model for Navy C2 software that places 
increased emphasis on early and frequent software testing, as well as on necessary 
software engineering practices at the source code level.  RITE is a more structured 
approach to software development, taking full advantage of technology advances and open 
source models to automate processes and shorten development cycles—thus increasing 
the maintainability of the software baselines.  The initiative also clarifies software delivery 
requirements, adding additional engineering rigor to deliverables and reducing opportunity 
for misunderstanding between customers and developers.  Its goal is to reduce overall cost, 
streamline delivery of quality C2 software, and, ultimately, resource focus toward the early 
stages of the life cycle, where the return on investment is maximized.  RITE provides 
comprehensive oversight of software development from initial product design to customer 
acceptance.   
RITE has four foundation pillars:  
 Software Development Contracts.  The need to provide detailed system 
requirement specifications and acquire favorable product licensing agreements.  
 Process improvement.  The adoption of industry software engineering best 
practices; testing early and often to detect, track and correct software defects 




 Infrastructure development.  The establishment of a centralized repository with 
web interfaces to streamline and automate product testing, information sharing, 
and end-product distribution.  
 Organizational change. The alignment of technical skills and staffing levels to 
support new life cycle processes. 
RITE was initially developed within the context of the Maritime Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS) Family of Systems (FoS) (MGF) project at SPAWAR Systems 
Center Pacific (SSC Pac). However, it is applicable to a wider range of software 
development programs.  This paper compares and contrasts the RITE Life Cycle with 
current Navy C2 development processes, highlighting program benefits achieved through 
the new initiative.  Also, future implementation activities are presented, along with proposed 
program metrics and areas for further consideration. 
Current Navy C2 Development Model  
Total appreciation of the benefits associated with the RITE Life Cycle requires an 
understanding of existing development activities and how they have been adapted under the 
RITE initiative. The Navy C2 release life cycle is a subset of the overarching Department of 
Defense (DoD) Acquisition System descripted in DoD Instruction 5000.2 (USD(AT&L), 
2008).  It takes place within the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase 
and follows the Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) model used for rapid acquisition of mature 
technology by implementing a spiral development approach.   
This section describes the current release life cycle and presents limitations inherent 
in existing processes that prevent effective EA performance.   
Current Release Life Cycle  
The current life cycle consists of the five stages shown in Figure 1.  These stages 
run serially and are scheduled annually.  The percentages associated with each life cycle 
stage are work-years of the level of effort, and to some extent project timelines, expended 
during a complete project life cycle.  Projects spend a majority of the total ownership cost 
(TOC) after software development is completed.  Because the model produces software 
components with “audidable” defects, there is a self-perpetuating cycle of allotting little time, 
or funds, for upfront requirements, design, and development, causing the majority of the 
budget expenditure in the later release stages on defect detection and fixes.  Usually, 
multiple large scale development tests (DTs) are required, resulting in schedule creep and 
installation delays.  Historically, few programs make it through operational test (OT) with a 
deficiency-free report. 
 




Procurement Stage.  The product release life cycle begins with the contracting 
officer’s preparation of the contract request for proposal (RFP).  The RFP is based on the list 
of specifications (product features) provided by the Acquisition Program Manager (APM).  
New specifications are based upon key performance parameters (KPP) that are derived 
from operational requirements and are influenced by corrective actions required as a result 
of the software trouble report (STRs) process.  New features may be often designed to fix 
problems discovered either during the previous product testing or as a result of fielded 
system trouble reports.  The final specifications are the result of a trade-off between the 
prioritized list of specifications and the allotted RDT&E budget, operational schedules, and 
established product release date.  It is important to note that many of the detailed product 
and software documentation requirements are not clearly established in contract language 
under this model.  The Procurement stage output is the award of an executed contract.  
Implementation Stage.  After contract award, the developer conducts a modified 
product design review and develops the software to contractual specifications.  There tends 
to be limited interaction during this stage between the contractor development team and the 
Government’s project team because under the terms of the contract, the contractor has 
proprietary ownership of the software product and sole responsibility for product delivery.  
Outputs from this stage are the executable software segment and any contractually required 
documentation.  
Test Stage.  The project team accepts delivery and assumes responsibility for the 
integration and several levels of testing.  Software defects discovered during this stage are 
reported to the Configuration Control Board (CCB) via the STR process, where corrective 
action (fix) and prioritization decisions are made.  By contract, the developer is required to 
fix critical and high-priority defects (referred to as Priority 1 and 2, respectively) prior to 
undergoing final testing.  Lower priority category defects may be repaired, if time and budget 
permits.  Once the software product successfully passes a final testing, a recommendation 
is made to support a fielding decision.  Exit criteria include a demonstration that the software 
has matured to an acceptable level of Fleet readiness and the software meets systems 
integration and interface standards.  
Approval Stage.   The Approval stage involves many approval steps, including 
security certification and accreditation (C&A), successful operational test (OT), and the 
formal release approval.  These activities are primarily conducted by outside certification 
agencies, such as the Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
(COMOPTEVFOR).  The output from this stage is the final fielding decision and the granting 
of final release approval by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  
Maintenance Stage.  The final stage includes installation, training and continued 
maintenance of the C2 system.  
Life Cycle Limitations 
There are many program limitations inherent in the current life cycle model.  In 
previous efforts to streamline and shorten the development cycle, the Government allowed 
the software developer to assume too much responsibility for the project’s success.  There 
were insufficient checks and balances built into the model to ensure that the Government 
received a quality product on schedule and within budget.  Major limitations are highlighted 
below and were the drivers for the RITE initiative.    
Limited Requirements Definition and Detailed Design.  The previous life 




system design.  Detailed system requirements should be developed by the Government and 
specified to the developer as part of the contracting process. Additionally, requirements 
need to be based upon end user (warfighter) inputs and prioritized to meet the most 
pressing operational needs.  Contracts lacked the detailed design specificity needed to fully 
define the end product. Developers need to have specifications to build to, and test and 
evaluation (T&E) personnel need those specifications to test against.  A frequently cited 
study, conducted by the Standish Group in 2000, reported that American companies spent 
$84 billion for cancelled software projects. Another $192 billion was spent on software 
projects that significantly exceeded their time and budget estimates. The Standish Group, 
and other studies, list three top reasons why software projects fail:  
 Requirements and specifications are incomplete 
 Requirements and specifications change too often 
 There is a lack of user input (to requirements) 
The cost of cancelled and failed projects is likely to have increased since the initial 
study but indications are that the reasons for failure have not changed.  Under the current 
release life cycle model, making Navy software programs suffer from all three of these 
shortfalls. 
Insufficient Noncommercial Computer Software Rights.  Previous Navy C2 
contracts failed to acquire the appropriate rights to the software products, thereby allowing 
the developer to control the product and, essentially, all future enhancements, citing 
proprietary ownership.  As defined within the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS), the Government can receive “Unlimited Rights” for noncommercial 
computer software, including source code, whenever the product is developed solely with 
Government funding.  When Government and industry team in the research and 
development (R&D) effort, using both Government funds and industry funds, the 
Government is able to retain “Government Purpose Rights” which still affords the authority to 
receive, assess, and modify the source code of noncommercial computer software products.  
The lack of Government control of the software source code prevents the Government from 
ensuring the quality of the software products.  Without the source code, product reviews are 
conducted at too high of a level to determine the condition of the deliverable.  It is too easy 
for defects to go undetected and even for defects to find their way back into new builds after 
having been previously repaired.  Without the rights to the source code, the true quality of 
the released product is often not known until receipt of user trouble reports. 
Limited Schedule Control.  Under the existing life cycle model, the SPM only has 
direct responsibility for the Test stage activities.  All other stages are under external 
ownership and, from a project viewpoint, are essentially fixed in duration and effort.  Even 
during the Test stage, the SPM has limited control because the level and schedule of the 
integration and testing conducted is primarily dependent upon the quality of the executable 
software and associated work products delivered by the developer.  The Government needs 
to have greater involvement in the Implementation stage, working in partnership with the 
developer, to ensure the quality of the delivered product.  Doing so allows the Government 
to monitor and influence the development schedule and to have better control of the 
subsequent Test stage.  
Insufficient Government Technical Oversight. As stated above, current 
contracts do not provide rights to the noncommercial computer software source code at the 
level necessary for effective Government technical oversight.  However, just obtaining 




of direct Government responsibility for software development has taken its toll on the 
quantity and quality of resident software development skill sets.  Professionally trained 
software developers were faced with the career decision to either attain new skill sets or 
transfer to private industry and write software code.  Therefore, for the Navy to provide 
effective technical oversight and serve as “trusted agents” requires a retooling of its work 
force.  New software engineers will need to be recruited or current staff will need to be 
trained in new software development techniques and tools. 
Reduced Competitive Environment.  Lastly, many software development 
contracts have essentially become sole source contracts.  Because incumbent developers 
have proprietary ownership of the software source code, new contractors attempting to 
compete for follow-on development contracts basically have to “rewrite” the code because 
the incumbent is not generally required to relinquish control of their work products.  Further, 
much of the current contract language may not require detailed documentation of the 
software, making it difficult for anyone other than the original developer to understand or 
modify the delivered code.  These barriers-to-entry greatly reduce the competitive landscape 
and afford the incumbent a significant competitive advantage over its competition.  Also, 
with little or no true competition, the Government experiences a reduction in pricing power 
and control over the final contract. 
The RITE Initiative  
The implementation of the RITE Life Cycle by PMW 150 represents a dramatic shift 
in the way the Navy C2 Program Office develops noncommercial computer software.  RITE 
provides a software oriented set of engineering standards, processes and guidance, tools, 
and contract language, all available through a software development, test and distribution 
infrastructure.  It impacts all stages of the life cycle and facilitates Government control of the 
various stages, reducing project costs and improving schedule performance.  
The RITE Life Cycle Model  
As previously stated, a major goal of RITE is to reduce overall cost and streamline 
delivery of quality Navy C2 software.  It promotes an open standards-based culture of 
modularity and reuse to keep pace with evolving technology.  The national security 
implications of open technology development are clear: increased technological agility for 
warfighters, more robust and competitive options for program managers, and higher levels 
of accountability in the defense industrial base.  Technologically advanced Navy C2 systems 
are vital to the warfighter’s ability to plan and execute missions.  The RITE initiative entails a 
parallel shift in acquisition methodologies and business processes to accelerate the delivery 
of advanced C2 systems to the operational forces.  
This section describes RITE’s open architecture approach and how information will 
be accessed, used, reused, applied, distributed, and managed under the new initiative.  
RITE involves changes in organizational structure, processes, strategies, policies, and 
business practices, including the shifts in traditional Government and contractor software 
development roles.  It provides the necessary guidance to organize, manage, and employ a 
distributed, interoperable, and scalable net-centric, collaborative development and 
distribution environment. 
RITE Pillars  




RITE Contract.  A baseline requirement for RITE’s implementation is the adoption 
of specific contract language that changes the existing relationship between the prime 
software developer and the Government project team.  New contracts address the following 
contract stipulations. 
 Requirement Definition. The Government assumes responsibility for developing 
the system requirements and baseline design specifications used by the software 
developer and the Government project team for contract performance.  These 
requirements are based upon operational requirements and are at a level of 
specificity that provides developers and testers product acceptance criteria.  
Requirements definition involves the interaction of all stakeholders early in the 
Procurement stage.  This Government engineering task is a vital part of 
preparing the contract language to insure the Government gets the desired 
product from the developer. 
 Licensing Agreement.  The Government obtains either Government Purpose 
Rights or Unlimited Rights, as defined in DFARS and applicable agency 
supplements, for all noncommercial computer software items developed with 
Government funding.  This includes the delivery of software source code and 
related software version design documentation. 
 Process Adherence.  The Government mandates that use of the RITE Life 
Cycle be processed through the Statement of Work (SOW).  New SOW language 
includes: 
o Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) and Data Item 
Descriptions (DIDs) that define an expanded set of delivered 
software work products, including source code and software 
version documentation;  
o Streamlined test processes, requiring the use of automated 
and focused testing procedures; 
o Contractor Performance Acceptance Reporting System 
(CPARS) metrics that satisfy RITE entrance and exit 
acceptance criteria; 
o Specified Quality Management (QM) procedures; 
o Specified Configuration Management (CM) to the source 
code level; 
o Implementation of disaster recovery techniques; and  




RITE Process.  The RITE Life Cycle is shown in Figure 2.  A major change is the 
coupling of the Implementation and Test stages and the direct involvement of the SSA 
project team in software development.  There are a number of test events (engineering 
drops) of the software as it is being developed. Similarly, developers integrate RITE 
processes, techniques and tools into their development process. Both stages now take 
place seamlessly as part of the RITE process, aligning early defect detection, tracking and 
resolution with development activities. The RITE Life Cycle includes the implementation of 
front-end engineering, source code quality management, a distributed development 
environment, and automated development and test tools.  A key assumption of RITE is that 
software development projects will always contain bugs and defects regardless of the skill 
and diligence of the development team.  RITE has been designed to mitigate the overall 
program impact of software problems by the use of early and frequent software 
assessments. 
Also shown in Figure 2 are the adjusted levels of effort (LOE) associated with the 
each life cycle stage.  RITE places an increased emphasis on the early stages in an effort to 
detect and correct errors in the product design and code while the cost to correct is relatively 
inexpensive.  Therefore, the Procurement stage has been expanded to allow for additional 
upfront Government effort needed for the development of requirement specifications and 
detailed designs.   Additionally, the Implementation and Test stages have merged, signifying 
closer continuity between the two stages.  Frequent testing of incremental software builds, 
referred to as “engineering drops,” during the Implementation stage has been 
accommodated by an increase in development schedule time.  The increase in LOE during 
the early stages is offset by a reduction in the time needed to complete the formal Test, 
Approval and Maintenance stages, respectively.  Under RITE, the software release exits the 
Implementation stage with fewer defects, thereby reducing the uncertainty, and the project 
duration, associated with the latter stages.  RITE improves the overall life cycle process to 
the extent that TOC is expected to be reduced while the frequency and quality of the product 
releases increase. 
 
Figure 2. RITE Life Cycle Model 
Automated and Focused Testing. Testing is critical to the overall development 
process success and is the means to validate and drive software quality improvement.  
RITE’s testing philosophy is based upon the need for early and frequent testing of software 
source code.  Software development and defect detection activities begin almost 
simultaneously during the Implementation stage.  Therefore, RITE mandates additional 




program to test the product.  Quality needs to be built-in (and validated with incremental 
integration and testing), not tested for at the end.  
The RITE concept of testing is based on testing to a level of acceptable risk.  Since it 
is not feasible to test 100% of the software code, available resources, such as funding and 
personnel, time or urgency, and expertise of the test team, influence the extent of 
acceptable risk.  To minimize the level of risk, the RITE uses automated inspection and test 
tools wherever possible, thereby increasing test coverage and allowing faster discovery of 
defects remaining after requirements and design inspection and assessment.  The 
automated tools range from simple scripts to complex commercial tools and exercise the 
software and identify outstanding defects.  Testers use the tools to measure software 
complexity and assign quality ratings to segments entering the integration process.  They 
also use automated test tools to perform time-consuming repetitive procedures, such as 
executing a test case multiple times under a variety of conditions, over an extended period 
of time, or both.  Automated tools also are useful to simulate large numbers of users for 
performance or load testing, or exercise software that does not have a graphical user 
interface, such as device drivers or software libraries.  
Where manual testing is necessary, the RITE test team follows a rigorous test 
methodology that focuses on predetermined test cases derived from real world situations.  
Testers prepare and execute detailed test procedures that provide clear and concise test 
steps and expected outcomes.  
Testers document test results derived from automated and manual testing in 
standardized test reports that incorporate quality metrics indicating the level of software 
maturity (lack of defects).  Sponsors use these reports to reduce risk and determine when 
the software is ready for release. 
 Detection and Acceptance Process.  RITE implements a systematic integration 
and test process to maximize efficiency in defect detection, thereby accelerating 
the release of high-quality software products to the Fleet.  This systematic 
approach to testing allows more coverage per unit of test time, leverages 
automated testing to help identify bugs early, and uses Navy use-cases for test 
scenarios.  Figure 3 illustrates the RITE Gated Acceptance and Detection 
process performed on each delivered incremental software build.  This process is 
a part of the overall RITE Process, as shown in Figure 2, and is conducted 
repeatedly throughout the various life cycle stages to identify product defects and 
to validate product development milestones.  Inputs to the process are the 
engineering drops that include the executable segments and associated software 
work products such as Software Version Description (SVD), test plans, test 
procedures, test reports, and load and installation instructions.  Process outputs 
include a qualified system, system test reports, installation instructions, and 
training plans.  The process gates are described below.  Note that these gates 
are serial.  Regardless of gate, whenever a drop fails to pass an inspection or 
test, team members notify configuration management (CM), who, in turn, notify 
the development contractor.  If resolution of the root cause for the failure requires 











Figure 3. RITE Gated Detection and Acceptance Process 
o Gate 0–Pre-Delivery Qualifications.  Prior to the delivery of a new 
software component from the contractor, candidates are required to 
meet specified criteria that include contractor conducted pre-delivery 
testing and the development of test reports. 
o Gate 1–Configuration Management.  The contractor delivers an 
engineering drop to the RITE CM team.  The team reviews the 
delivery to ensure all contractually required work products are 
present.  Upon validation, the CM team delivers the software to the 
RITE Acceptance Test team. 
o Gate 2–Source Code Analysis (SCA) and Functional Testing.  The 
RITE Acceptance Test team schedules an Acceptance Readiness 
Review during which they check the delivery against the acceptance 
checklist to ensure the delivery media is readable and that the media 
and documentation are correct and complete.  This process includes 
checking that all required licenses are present and current, and that 
test plans, procedures, and installation instructions are included.  
Following the review, the Acceptance Test team performs an 
installation test to ensure the segment installs correctly.  Automated 
tools are used to perform an analysis at the source code level.  Exit 
criteria for this phase are a readable and correct segment, correct 
documentation, a successful installation test, and a quick look test 
report.  The Acceptance Test team notifies CM to deliver the software 
to the Integration team. 
o Gate 3–Integration with Baseline System.  After CM delivers the 
software, the Integration team reviews the segment installation 
procedures and attempts to integrate the segment with other C2 
system segments into a complete system or “build.”  If they can 
successfully build the complete system, they perform high-level 
checks to ensure the build starts up correctly and major functionality is 
present.  Exit criterion for this phase is a successful Independent 
Verification and Validation (IV&V) Test Readiness Review indicating 




o Gate 4–Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Test.  The 
IV&V team develops test plans and procedures covering all types of 
functional testing.  They perform functional testing to verify that the 
build meets specified requirements and validates that it achieves the 
desired functionality, and perform interface testing to ensure that the 
build meets external interface requirements.  If both these tests are 
successful, the IV&V team performs system-level and stress testing in 
an environment that closely simulates the operational environment.  
Exit criteria for this phase are a successful IV&V Test Review and 
delivery of the IV&V Test Report to PMW-150 or other sponsors. 
Once PMW-150 accepts the IV&V Test Report, the RITE team supports a 
Developmental Test (DT) by performing laboratory DT testing at the operational site.  The 
RITE team provides on-site training to shipboard operators and resolves issues that occur 
during DT testing.  Exit criterion for this phase is a qualified system that is ready to enter the 
Approval stage. 
 Early Defect Detection. Since the foundation of the testing process is based 
upon the early identification of software defects, research supporting this 
principle is provided in this section. Software defects have different names in 
different agencies but, for the purposes of this paper, a software defect is any 
development error, issue, bug, defect or incident. 
In an Internet article, Mukesh Soni (2010) states that the "Prevention is better than 
the cure" adage applies to software defects as well as medicine.  Potential software defects 
detected during the early stages of software development, such as during requirements 
specification, are easier and cheaper to resolve than during later stages presented in the 
IBM Systems Science Institute study chart shown in Figure 4.  Defects introduced during the 
requirements and design phase are not only more probable but also more severe and more 
difficult to remove during later stages of development, test and maintenance.  This is 
because of the increasing number of interfaces and dependencies that exist in the code as 
well as the time it takes for developers to refresh their knowledge of the specific code being 
repaired the further removed they are from the original development.  Pre-test reviews and 
inspections are the most efficient way to detect errors in requirements and design.  
A result of early detection is the reduction in the number of defects released with 
delivered systems.  This will reduce the need for expensive software maintenance programs 
and free up future budget dollars for increased RDT&E expenditures.  It is a RITE goal to 
demonstrate the ROI associated with the new life cycle processes by validating the 
improved system performance of fielded systems.  A premise is that over time, budget 
allocations can be adjusted to allocate more money to the early stages (Procure and 





Figure 4. Relative Cost Required to Fix Errors During Software 
Development 
RITE Infrastructure.  A Distributed Development Environment (DDE) is a virtual 
collaborative environment that spans multiple organizations and/or multiple physical 
locations.  In a DDE, project members share ideas, information and resources, and actively 
collaborate to achieve a common goal.  They may not see each other face to face, but are 
all working collaboratively toward the project outcome.  This may be accomplished through 
e-mail, the Internet and other forms of long-distance communications.  The primary 
advantage of DDE is availability of resources and access to software development tools 
from different locations.  The objective is to lower development costs, increase productivity, 
decrease time-to-release, and improve product quality.  
Software development in the Navy is transitioning to geographically distributed 
development environments.  Distributed development is one of the highest forms of 
collaboration in the development environment, but many challenges face project managers 
responsible for the success of distributed teams.  Four characteristics common to many of 
today's collaborative failures include:  
 Cultural incompatibility,  
 Leadership struggles, 
 Lack of trust, and  
 Inbred notions of competition.  
RITE DDE strives to overcome collaboration challenges.  Success requires 
understanding relationships and taking practical and affordable actions to achieving 
successful virtual operations.  These include building an organization that supports working 
in a distributed development, with the right incentive systems that reward collaboration.  It 
requires urbane management and oversight, a highly efficient infrastructure, a well-
developed organization, and daily interaction with open communication. 
The hub of the RITE DDE infrastructure is the Development and Distribution (D2) 
Center.  The D2 Center allows access to, and sharing of, applicable Navy C2 program 




technical documentation generated as part of the RITE Life Cycle process.  Developers, 
testers, and other stakeholders have access to the Center through a private cloud using a 
web-based interface and a set of intuitive tools for locating and extracting desired 
components and associated work products.  The D2 Center provides strong configuration 
control of the various project artifacts and assures that contractor and Government teams 
are working from a common set of project components. 
Project members, using the RITE D2 Center, have the ability to specify and validate 
requirements using interactive simulations and a collaborative process that involves all 
stakeholders.  Project members take ownership for achieving the overall project goal.  No 
one can succeed without everyone being successful. Accurately identifying software 
requirements and effectively managing those requirements throughout the life cycle are 
keys to reducing rework activity and creating applications that accurately reflect end users’ 
needs. 
The infrastructure architecture is shown in Figure 5 and takes advantage of an open 
architecture to support the following project functions:  
 Government management of key project artifacts, 
 Management of source code, 
 Definition and management of the development and integration environment, 
 Configuration Management (CM) for validation and control of software deliveries,  
 Support tool development, 
 Architecture, and 
 Guidance and governance documentation.  
RITE D2 products are available on the site for sharing by all stakeholders and 
improve project communication and coordination while providing a common set of standards 
and tools for use throughout the project.  Examples of how the D2 Center might facilitate 
software development and distribution include: 
 Development.  Using the D2 Center, a developer can log into the site and, by 
reviewing the available service catalog, discover that a new multi-tactical data 
links capability (MTC) component exists.  Coding changes to the software 
component can then be made and automated acceptance tests can be re-run, all 
done remotely.   
 Distribution.  Similarly, Fleet users can access the site to download new Navy C2 
components and automatically upgrade and test their systems without requiring 
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Figure 5. RITE Infrastructure Architecture 
RITE Organization.  Lastly, one of the key components of the RITE initiative is the 
organizational change needed to efficiently and effectively perform within the new life cycle 
model.  Current project structure evolved to support existing processes and personnel skill 
sets were optimized for the needed job task capabilities.  As the model changes, increasing 
the need for more software engineers and reducing the number of fleet installation teams, 
the organizational core competencies need to change.  The projected changes include: 
 Project Manager Performance Measures.  New performance metrics are needed 
for the Government management team.  In a distributed work environment where 
success is dependent upon frequent communication and collaboration, success 
factors need to reduce the current competitive environment.  Additionally, 
success needs to be measured by program efficiencies and effectiveness that 
result in budget optimization, not the overall program budget size.  Therefore, 
additional metrics associated with product quality improvement and the ability to 
meet Fleet operational requirements need to be captured and used for overall 
performance assessment.  
 Personnel Qualifications.  As highlighted previously, the Government lacks the 
number of qualified personnel, either educated or trained in the software 
engineering disciplines, to perform the job task functions required by RITE.   
These technical qualifications include knowledge of current operating systems, 
databases, and functional applications.  Of importance are skills associated with 
open architecture development and web design.  The Government needs to 
begin the transition, selecting a cadre of technically qualified software engineers 
to lead the workforce shift from current methods and processes while initiating 
focused recruitment and training programs. 
 Organizational Structure.  In addition to the personnel qualifications, the project 
organizational structure needs to evolve to meet the changing life cycle model.  
Under RITE, the staffing levels associated with software development and testing 
will need to grow to meet the increased level of effort and product throughput 
associated with those stages. Conversely, although not immediate, there will 




activities performed during the Maintenance stage.  As the ability to remotely 
control the distribution of new software releases through the D2 Center becomes 
widely accepted, the need for installation teams is reduced.  Therefore, the 
organization needs to be modified to reflect these changes in staff levels to free 
up budget dollars for use elsewhere. 
Case Study—Multi-Tactical Data Links Capability  
 Casualty Description   
The casualty to the multi-tactical data links capability (MTC) on the USS John C. 
Stennis (CVN 74)  was first reported in May 2008 via the casualty report (CASREP) system.  
The stated problem was a “channel crash” that prevented the use of XXXX and degraded 
the Stennis ability to perform in mission areas  
Contractor Approach  
 As a result of the CASREP, the development contractor was tasked with the 
responsibility of troubleshooting and repairing the problem.  Their initial response was to 
form a technical “fly-away” team and travel to the forward deployed ship location to conduct 
an onboard investigation.  In August 2008, the team boarded the Stennis, while on 
deployment, and began troubleshooting the reported problems, working alongside shipboard 
technicians.  While onboard, the team did attempt to repair the MTC by reloading the current 
software release version (v4.5.9.14) but this did not resolve the problem.  Upon return to 
San Diego, the contractor team continued troubleshooting at their  facility as part of the 
future product release version (v4.5.9.15) ) but achieved little or no success.  By November 
2009, unable to isolate and repair the MTC problems, an STR was written to more 
thoroughly document the problems and provide a current status update.  Subsequently, in 
January 2009, seven months after the problems were initially reported, the contractor again 
sent a team of system experts to the ship to further investigate the issues.  Their actions 
included the installation of the new MTC software release.  Initial indications were that the 
new release corrected the channel crash but further investigation determined that the 
problem persisted.  In April 2009, the program office called for a review with the contractor to 
determine a course of action.   The decision was made to use the RITE process to aid in a 
timely repair.  This effort was implemented in phases to monitor the effectiveness of the 
approach.  Throughout this initial phase, the SSC Pac SSA team had limited government 
oversight involvement in the software maintenance activities by only tracking activities via 
the STR process and providing laboratory support, as needed.  The initial Phase milestones 





Figure 6. Phase 1 Milestones 
In Phase 2, the next level the RITE process implementation was instituted as a 
software repair had not be identified. Phase 2 instituted the Engineering drop process 
consisting of  engineering reviews and MTC assessments conducted by the SSA team for 
cause and effect. The engineering drop process by itself did not yield a repair.   A 
modification to the existing process instituted a lower level STR investigation by conducting 
source code analysis using a set of automated source code analysis tools and peer reviews.   
The analysis identified key potential failure areas within the code. 
 
 
Figure 7. Phase 2 Milestones 
The RITE Solution 
In August 2009, Phase 3 was initiated.  The activities undertaken in this phase were 
the combination of several independent testing process changes previously implemented in 
segments of the MGF program.  Key actions taken to successfully correct the MTC repair 
included: 
 Incorporating the use of automated code assessments, memory usage analysis, 
and debuggers. 
 Establishing a tiger team (2 team: contractor and SSC-Pac), working from a 
common work list.  Responsibilities were divided between the teams with the 
SSA team primarily responsible for engineering oversight and source code 
analysis.  The SSA became the source code authority and a repository was 




 Implementing one-week build cycles with relevant sections of current code (RC) 
being distributed from the repository each week.  The weekly schedule was fixed 
with specific functions being performed (and monitored) daily. 
 Testing of each incremental build was conducted by the SSA and incorporated 
into the baseline release version. 
 Working from the existing STRs, STRs were reviewed and updated to accurately 
explain the root causes of general symptoms.  No new MTC STRs were to be 
generated unless new symptoms were observed and were not already covered. 
MTC Lessons Learned 
By implementing the activities discussed above, the SSA was able to identify, track 
and repair the causes of the long-standing Stennis MTC problems.  Using the RITE 
processes, problems that had lingered for over fifteen months were satisfactorily repaired in 
less than three.  Using an integrated Government/industry team and employing code level 
assessments, strong configuration control, and diligent development oversight, software 
code issues that had gone undetected throughout many versions of the software release 
were repaired.  Key lessons learned have been incorporated into the evolving RITE initiative 
and are highlighted below.  
 Delivery code assessments 
o Established standardized process for acceptance product delivery are 
accepted 
 Identified STR causes in code 
o Debugging and defect isolation 
o Recommended fixes passed back to developer as necessary 
 STR fix management and oversight 
o Was correct thing fixed? 
o Reduce churn with fix attempts 
o Used SECP (Software Engineering Change Proposals) 
o Final fix incorporated code from both the government and contractor 
team SSC, XFEDS, NGMS 
RITE Benefits  
Although RITE is a relatively new initiative, it is achieving positive results in the 
Navy’s C2 development activities and providing significant benefits to the program office.  
Benefits include the following: 
Budget Multiplier 
By allocating time and budget dollars to the earlier stages of software development, 
the Government is getting “more bang for its buck.”  As shown in Figure 4, for every dollar 
that is spent in the implementation phase, you get more than a 10 times multiplication effect 




and frequent defect detection activities are ultimately saving overall Navy C2 program 
dollars for the Government.  
Increased Product Features or Reduced Cost 
By reducing the TOC of Navy C2 programs, the Navy is theoretically faced with the 
decision to either reduce its overall program budgets or increase the number of component 
features assigned to future programs.  It is recognized that because the budget categories 
(RDT&E verses OMN) are distinctly different, the ability to move money between the 
categories is not as simplistic as the author is suggesting.  However, it is believed that over 
time, reductions in software rework will allow the OMN (maintenance) budgets to be reduced 
in order to increase RDT&E expenditures.  Much like the RDT&E, budgets have shrunk to 
cover the costs associated with the rework needed for previous systems.   
Improved Schedule Performance 
The ability to accurately predict Navy C2 software delivery schedules, a weakness 
under the existing release cycle process, has been improved with RITE.   Because the RITE 
model is based upon early and frequent interaction between the developer and the 
Government project team, there are fewer project surprises.  The Program Manager has the 
opportunity to adjust the project execution, including the allocation of additional development 
staff, the adjustment to key milestone delivery dates, or even the reduction of product 
features if project issues are discovered early.  Also, because RITE's automated and 
focused testing identifies software development problems earlier in the cycle, there is less 
corrective action required during the later stages, allowing the software development team 
to more accurately assess the impact of the defects and the time it will take to correct. 
“Focused testing” allows for testing and retesting of specific problem areas in a surgical 
precision model and does not require the (re) testing of the total deliverable whenever 
defects are repaired.  This makes it less manpower intensive and therefore less expensive 
to conduct.  
RITE is not only about highlighting issues; it also provides continual status updates 
to the Program Manager, demonstrating positive tangible results of project successes.  The 
ability to repeatedly integrate and compile the binary code into executable software validates 
that the system is performing as expected.  RITE, through its use of automated testing tools, 
also provides solid development metrics that can be used to track the project progress and 
process improvement. 
Lastly, because the RITE process ensures that the software being developed is 
monitored and corrected throughout the development cycle, when the system enters the 
Approval stage, including the security accreditation and certification requirements and the 
operational testing (OT) program, the success rate is expected to be higher, thereby 
reducing the time and cost of performing this stage. 
Improved Product Quality 
A major benefit of the RITE process is that the released system (end product) is 
delivered to the warfighter with fewer defects, thereby reducing the need for continual 
software rework using the trouble reporting process.  This is due to the improved testing 
processes, as well as the detailed acceptance criteria derived from the design 
specifications.  The Government is able to hold the developers accountable for the quality of 




designated delivery date.  The importance of delivering a quality product cannot be 
overstated.  Besides the benefit of reducing the costs associated with the product rework, 
the inconvenience to the user caused by numerous system errors and the loss of credibility 
and confidence in the delivered product has long-term ramifications to future development 
programs.  Studies have shown that most customers place a higher importance on quality 
than on timely delivery.  As critical operational components of the US Navy, it is paramount 
that Navy C2 systems perform satisfactorily when released for operational use.   
Shortened Release Life Cycle 
Navy C2 is able to deliver new functionality to the end user sooner due to the 
reduction in timely and costly defect repair.  One of the major game changers for RITE has 
been the ability to manage and control the software source code by acquiring “unlimited 
licensing rights” for the Government.  This licensing agreement has established a 
partnership between the software developer and the Government’s project team, giving the 
project team authority to require more frequent submission (drops) of the development 
product.  By implementing a more frequent validation and inspection program, which 
requires the integration and testing of the software at more frequent intervals, the team has 
identified potential software defects earlier in the development cycle.  Additionally, being 
able to view the development program down to the source level has allowed the project 
team to more accurately project program schedule and cost and, ultimately, has led to more 
realistic schedule development.  In many programs, deliverable due dates were arbitrarily 
set early in the contracting stage and rarely adjusted to accommodate development 
progress.  
 Contract Competition 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, having unlimited rights to the noncommercial 
computer software source code and the ability to share this code with 3rd party software 
vendors, greatly improves the Government’s ability to implement a true competitive 
contracting environment, and will ultimately help improve product quality while reducing the 
overall program cost.  The Government has begun to lower the barriers to entry into this 
market and has reduced the program risk, thereby improving its negotiation position. 
2011 And Beyond  
 Future Implementation Activities 
RITE is a dynamic program with much left to accomplish.  PMW-150 has taken an 
aggressive approach to changing its software development life cycle management and is 
currently reviewing plans for FY 2011 and beyond.  Areas for consideration are shown in 




Table 1. Future Program Considerations 
Conclusion 
It is widely accepted in the software development industry that early detection and 
repair of software defects is most cost effective.  Early detection also contributes to 
enhanced software quality and better schedule performance.  However, to achieve this 
requires key changes in the way the Navy C2 program office conducts its software 
development programs.  Fundamentally, the relationship between the development 
contractor and the Government project team needs to change.  The Government needs to 
exercise its oversight responsibility throughout all stages of the life cycle.  To achieve the 
needed changes, PMW-150 has implemented the RITE initiative based upon four pillars 
consisting of contract standards establishing the Government’s responsibilities in the 
development processes; life cycle process changes to implement the automated and 
focused integration and testing needed to reduce defect rework requirements; infrastructure 
enhancements required to expand the communication, cooperation, and collaboration 
amongst all stakeholders in the Navy C2 program; and, lastly, organizational changes to 
ensure that the Government has the requisite skills to monitor and support the development 
contractors in the performance of their contractual obligations.   
Pillar Next Steps 
Contract   Detailed Arch and Design specs as part of contract. Include 
stakeholders in process 
 Refine acceptance criteria 
  Establish defined stages for deliverables/testing 
  Define how to manage large software library and to resolve 
legacy issues through future maint contracts 
 Refine CDRLs/DIDs 
Process   Determine correct/applicable perf Metrics for Project 
 Determine metrics for “acceptable risk” to assist with test 
exit criteria 
 Establish Performance Scorecards 
 Measure respective Stage Level of Effort (LOE) 
 Validate cost savings assoc with  “rework” reduction 
 Improve tool set (dependency tool) 
 Focus testing on “what changed” not total build  
  Increase number (and fidelity) of operationally based “test 
cases”  
Infrastructure    Implement RITE Conops into MGF POR 
  Establish Applications Store as part of D2 
  Coordinate/Share with Industry (3rd Party developers) 
 Establish partnerships with other testing facilities 
  Expand RITE to Team SPAWAR and DISA—provide 
programmatic support 
Organization   Personnel technical qualifications—“Trusted Agent” role 
requires diff tech skills  
  Institutionalize RITE development model for all s/w dev 





Although additional capture and analysis of RITE metrics is needed to fully validate 
the total program benefits, early indications are that changes implemented with the RITE 
initiative provides the Navy C2 Program Office a potentially significant return on its 
investment and should be considered for broader Navy software program adoption.   
References 
USD (AT&L). (2008, December 22). Operation of the defense acquisition system (DoD 
Instruction 5000.2). Washington, DC: Author. 





Improved Software Testing for Open Architecture  
Valdis Berzins—Valdis Berzins is a Professor of Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  His research interests include software engineering, software architecture, computer-aided 
design, and software evolution. His work includes software testing, reuse, automatic software 
generation, architecture, requirements, prototyping, re-engineering, specification languages, and 
engineering databases. Berzins received BS, MS, EE, and PhD degrees from MIT and has been on 
the faculty at the University of Texas and the University of Minnesota. He has developed several 
specification languages, software tools for computer-aided software design, and fundamental theory 
of software merging. 
Valdis Berzins 
Computer Science Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: 831-656-2610 
E-mail: berzins@nps.edu 
Paul Dailey—Paul Dailey is a systems engineer with the Naval Postgraduate School and has 
worked for the Department of the Navy for seven years, including as a test and evaluation engineer 
for the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Detachment Louisville from 2002 to 
2009. He holds a MS in Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School and a BS in 
Electrical Engineering from the University of Louisville. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Software 
Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, focusing his research on the automated testing of 
software. 
Paul Dailey 
Software Engineering PhD Student 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: prdailey@nps.edu 
Abstract  
Applying traditional manual US Navy testing practices to OA systems will limit many 
benefits of OA, such as system scalability, rapid configuration changes, and effective 
component reuse.  Pairing profile-driven automated software testing with test reduction 
techniques should enable these benefits and keep resource requirements at feasible levels.  
Test cases generated by operational profiles have been shown to be more effective than 
those developed by other methods, such as random or selective testing, and more resource-
efficient than exhaustive approaches.  This research effort increases the fidelity of the 
operational profile, creating an environment model referred to as a High-Fidelity Profile 
Model (HFPM) that can statistically describe individual software inputs.  Samples from the 
HFPM’s probability distributions can generate operationally realistic or overly-stressful test 
cases for software modules under test.  This process can be automated and paired with 
output checking functions, enabling automated effective software testing, and potentially 
improving reliability.  Such models would be ideal for US Navy Open Architecture (OA) 
software because of the defined interface standards.  HFPMs can enable effective testing in 
software reuse applications and are ideal for testing multiple releases of maturing software.  
This research defines the HFPM, presents a methodology to develop, validate, and apply it. 
Keywords: Software Testing, Software Reliability, Operational Profile, Software 





Current software testing methods will limit some of the key benefits that Open 
Architecture (OA) can provide for the US Navy.  More specifically, the ability to rapidly 
change a system’s configuration in order to meet new requirements is possible when using 
an OA but if current Test and Evaluation (T&E) practices and policies are applied, the 
updated system will likely not be fielded in a timely manner.  With the ability to rapidly 
update software comes a need to rapidly field that software (Berzins & Dailey, 2009). 
In order to rapidly field US Navy combat and weapons system software, two new 
approaches are required.  First, the current software testing process needs to be changed 
from a manually conducted process to an automated process that provides better test 
coverage for a given cost and period of time.  Second, the total amount of testing required 
should be safely reduced to a minima acceptable level.  Instead of conducting complete 
end-to-end testing after every configuration change, testing should only be conducted where 
necessary.  The ability to test more rapidly while providing better coverage combined with 
the ability to determine when retesting is not necessary should enable the ability to rapidly 
field OA combat and weapon system software (Berzins & Dailey, 2009). 
Model Driven Automated Software Testing 
The recommended automated software testing process, outlined in detail by Dailey, 
Berzins, and Luqi (2009; 2010), focuses on developing a High-Fidelity Profile Model (HFPM) 
for each software component under test (SUT) and then using it to automatically generate 
test cases, execute test cases, check SUT outputs and analyze the results. Analyzing the 
results automatically can be challenging for services with new or modified requirements, but 
can be accomplished easily and economically for components whose behavior is not 
supposed to change from the previous release. This can be done by running both the new 
and the previous version of the software component on each input generated by the HFPM 
and then comparing the results. That process is easy to automate. 
The HFPM contains High-Fidelity Profiles (HFPs), which are validated probability 
distribution functions (PDFs) that characterize the component’s environment. Operationally-
realistic or stress-inducing test cases are automatically created by sampling from those 
HFPs and processing the samples through test case generation algorithms.  Once 
generated, the test cases are queued up for automated SUT execution by the software tools 
implementing the HFPM.  Following execution, output analysis algorithms integrated into the 
HFPM, are used to automatically check the test case outputs and calculate the resulting 
reliability of the SUT with respect to the HFPs used in testing.  The overall process (Figure 
1) and the HFPM functional concept (Figure 2) are outlined below.  For a more detailed 





Figure 1. HFPM-Based Automated Testing Process  





Figure 2. HFPM Functional Concept  
(Dailey & Luqi, 2010) 
Application to US Navy Acquisition 
In order to make the process described above work for US Navy acquisition, it 
should be employed in a way that enables the HFPM model to be used by all relevant 
commands that play a role in software development or T&E.  This type of focus provides a 
common practice across the acquisition testing community with the ability for customization 
for specific roles.  The HFPM should be developed in parallel with new components and 
should be created for a component when acquired off the commercial shelf or in reuse 
applications where one does not yet exist.  The research, development and acquisition 
agency should use the HFPM to check each component as it is developed and/or integrated 
into its specific operating environment until such time that the component is ready for 
Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V).  At that time, the component along with the 
HFPM, are passed to an IV&V test team, which has the ability to modify the HFPs as 
desired, for Developmental Testing (DT).  The IV&V test team can be another group of 
independent testers in the same command as the software developers or they can be part of 
the In-Service Engineering Agency (ISEA) responsible for maintaining the software once 
fielded.  This level of DT is generally the most stressful type of testing, focused on 





Once the DT IV&V testing is complete, the results along with the profile(s) used in 
the testing are passed back to the software development team.  If bugs exist that require 
correction, the software development team can make the proper changes, update the 
configuration, test internally and send out for another round of DT IV&V.  If the software has 
reached a desired level of maturity for field use, the software component is sent out for 
Operational Test (OT) certification.  OT should be conducted by a command outside of the 
software development and ISEA, such as the Commander Operational Test and Evaluation 
Force (COMOPTEVFOR), ensuring independent certification and utilizing more operationally 
realistic HFPs for test case generation.  Often however, such OT agencies do not have the 
technical expertise to evaluate all types of software.  In such cases, members of the 
software development team can become OT trusted agents and provide support for OT 
evaluation under control and supervision of the primary OT command.  If OT is 
unsuccessful, the test results and profile(s) used are sent back to the software development 
team for analysis and correction.  Upon successful completion of OT, results are passed 
back to the software development team and the software is certified for deployment.  This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 3. 
  
Figure 3. HFPM-Based Automated Software Testing Process Employment 
Scheme  




Deriving HFPs from Historical Data 
The most important element of the HFPM-driven automated testing process is 
deriving the HFP(s) for use in automated test case generation as the reliability calculated 
during testing is only accurate relative to the HFP(s) used.  If we develop HFPs 
characterizing several different deployment environments, the methods described in this 
paper can be used to determine the reliabilities to be expected in each deployment 
environment. These can vary considerably.  
Collecting Historical Data 
The first step in deriving HFPs from historical data is collecting the historical data.  
To effectively do this, the component to be tested must be understood, including its 
operational and technical requirements, functional behavior, and expected inputs and 
outputs.  Once all the component inputs and outputs are identified and defined operationally 
and functionally, the next task is to collect data that can directly or indirectly be used to form 
characterizations of the expected component inputs in the operating environment. 
Depending on the specific application and information available, any type of historical 
or environment data can potentially be useful in this process.  The most ideal case is to 
obtain actual input data that will be processed by the component in the new environment 
and directly characterize that data.  If this is not obtainable, other indirect but relevant data 
can be collected and characterized along with information that relates the collected data to 
the SUT inputs.  For applications where the operating environment is not known, a method 
proposed by Voas (2000) can be helpful if access to the end users during development is 
possible.  In this process, an instrumentation tool is used to collect data from fielded 
software that can then be used to generate accurate operational profiles.  If access to the 
end users is not possible, it is up to the software development and acquisition team to 
determine how to best collect useful environment data in each specific application for 
analysis and HFP generation.  Specific methods could include trial data collection efforts 
during training exercises, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), 
modeling and simulation, or technical intelligence collection and analysis.  Once collected 
and characterized, indirect data may require further processing by input test case generation 
algorithms if necessary, in order to transform samples from those characterizations into 
usable test case inputs. 
Characterizing Historical Data 
Once a particular set of raw environment data is collected and related to the specific 
component input(s), the data can be analyzed using one of many established data 
characterization methods and available commercial tools for HFP PDF generation.  One 
such example is the Matlab® Dfittool application within the Statistics Toolbox® (“Dfittool,” 
2009).  Regardless of the tool used, parametric methods such as Maximum Likelihood 
Parameter Estimation, and Maximum A Posteriori Probability Estimation, or non-parametric 
methods such as the Histogram, Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) (Wikipedia et al., 2009), 
or Parzen Neural Network (PNN) (Trentin, 2006) methods can be applied to generate HFP 
PDFs using available raw environment data.  Parametric methods should be used when an 
understanding of the data is available prior to characterization.  If there is no such prior 
understanding of the data, nonparametric methods can be used more effectively.  The 
desired tool(s) used to perform the necessary analysis should have the flexibility to modify 




PDF fit.  The output of this analysis process should be one or more PDFs that can be used 
to either directly or indirectly generate test case inputs based on samples from those PDFs.  
Direct examples include applications where a sample from the PDF can be used as a 
component input.  Indirect examples include PFD samples that require further processing in 
order to generate component inputs.  These PDFs are referred to as HFPs in this study. 
Simple Example of Deriving HFPs from Historical Data 
Dailey (2010) illustrated the concept creating HFPs from collected environment data.  
In the example, performance data on various small boat platforms from a US Navy study 
was acquired and modeled using Matlab®.  The US Navy data provided the following data 
on six different types of small boat platforms: 
Table 1. Small Boat Collected Data  



















Boghammer  40  13  1.5  4  10  10 
FB 38  50  11.85  2.5  4.3  15  12 
7m RHIB  27  7.25 2.5 4.2 28 7 
Boston 
Whaler  36  6.78 2.5 4 30 8 
Zodiac  23  4.7  6.25  4.5  32  5 
Wave Runner  44  3.66  6.25  4.4  47  15   
The data in Table 1 was entered into Matlab® and then characterized using the 
Statistics Toolbox® dfittool resulting in a HFP PDF and inverse cumulative distribution 
function (Inverse CDF) for each of the parameters.  Due to the limited number of points per 
parameter and the lack of specific knowledge on the specific type of distribution applicable 
to each parameter, the nonparametric KDE calculation was used to characterize the data.  
The KDE function is: 
 
where K is some kernel and h is a smoothing parameter called the bandwidth 
(“Kernel Density,” n.d.).  In this case, K was taken to be a standard Gaussian function. 
Several iterations of characterizations were generated taking into account the actual 
data as well as establishing logical finite ranges for each parameter.  The result is a 
collection of distributions that effectively describes a notional small boat platform from a 





Figure 4. Notional Small Boat Maximum Velocity PDF (Knots)  
(Dailey, 2010) 
 






Figure 6. Notional Small Boat Acceleration PDF (Knots/Second)  
(Dailey, 2010) 
 
Figure 7. Notional Small Boat Acceleration Inverse CDF (Knots/Second)  
(Dailey, 2010) 
The HFP functions generated above were exported to the Matlab® workspace for 
use in automated test case generation as part of a HFPM concept demonstration prototype.  




Validating High-Fidelity Profiles 
Since testing results from this process are only valid with respect to the HFP(s) used 
to generate the test cases, it is important to take measures to check their validity.  In any 
application, a qualitative analysis of the HFP(s) should be conducted by subject matter 
experts to ensure that the derived profile(s) provide adequate coverage for testing.  In 
addition to the qualitative assessment, it would be very useful to define a quantitative 
process to perform this function.  When trying to determine the best characterization 
method, it is possible to compare the different methods taking into account the methods 
themselves as well as their results.  Various methods currently under investigation to assess 
the best characterization method include the use of Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
and goodness of fit tests.   
BIC can be used to compare multiple alternative parametric models with different 
numbers of parameters of a particular environment.  When estimating parameters using 
maximum likelihood estimation, it is possible to modify or increase the likelihood using 
additional parameters, but this also can result in overfitting.  In this method, the model with 
the lowest BIC score has the best fit.  This technique does not apply to non-parametric 
characterizations such as KDE, but is useful for deciding between different parametric 
techniques.  In addition to BIC, other similar approaches, such as the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), also exist.  BIC applies a stronger penalty than AIC for having additional 
parameters.  The formula for the BIC is as follows: 
 
where x is the observed data; n is the number of data points in x; k is the number of 
free parameters to be estimated; and L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for 
the estimated model (“Bayesian Information,” n.d.). 
Another approach for comparing different characterization methods is to perform a 
goodness of fit test for each characterization to the actual empirical data.  One specific type 
of calculating the goodness of fit of a PDF to an empirical distribution is the Cramér-von-
Mises criterion.  It is defined as: 
 
where  is the characterized distribution and  is the empirical environment 
data distribution (“Cramér-von-Mises,” n.d.). 
The methods described above are useful for comparing different HFPs to determine 
the best method.  Ongoing research is being conducted to determine the level of confidence 
in the HFP with respect to the sample size of empirical environment data.  This would be 
beneficial as it can be used to determine how much environmental data collection is 
adequate. 
Deriving Stress-Testing HFPs from Historical Models 
By definition, stress testing exercises a software system beyond the range of normal 
operating conditions. There are two basic approaches to this–black box and clear box. Black 
box approaches can be combined with the profile model transformations described in this 




relative to the stress testing profile(s) (PDF(s)). The black box approaches described in 
sections 6.1-6.3 can be combined with the method for reducing retesting of reusable 
components described in Berzins and Dailey (2009) to eliminate redundant repetition of test 
cases from the previously tested ranges.  
Clear box approaches are heuristic methods that seek to uncover particular types of 
errors. Although clear box criteria can be applied using stress-profiles, other methods should 
also be considered, as discussed in more detail in sections 6.4 and 6.5. 
Standard Deviation Based Methods 
The simplest kind of stress testing profile is based on the mean and standard 
deviation of the HFPM that characterizes the expected operating conditions (Berzins & 
Dailey, 2009). This approach is applicable to numerical data types and uses a distribution 
that exercises two intervals symmetrically placed about the mean, from one to N standard 
deviations set off from the mean in both directions. The parameter N determines how far 
beyond the expected operating range will be exercised by the stress test. We recommend a 
series of stress tests with increasing values of N such as (10, 100, 1000, …) up to the entire 
range supported by the underlying data type.  
The approach can readily be generalized to vector data types by choosing a uniform 
distribution that takes the form of a ring (in 2 dimensions) or a shell (in 3 or more 
dimensions). The distribution is centered on the mean of the HFPM, and the radius from the 
center ranges from 1 to N standard deviations. If the HFPM is not isotropic (not the same in 
all directions), an ellipsoid with different radii along each axis can be used, derived from the 
covariance matrix of an HFPM over a 2 or more dimensional input space. 
Scale Expanding Transformations 
Another approach that works for numerical or vector valued inputs is to use a scale 
expanding transformation. If the HFPM is a distribution P(x-m) where m is the mean of the 
HFPM, then the stress testing profile derived via the approach in P((x-m)/s), where s is a 
numerical scale factor. The stress testing profile then has the same mean as the HFPM, and 
a standard deviation that is s times larger. The shape and orientation of the stress profile are 
similar to the original, but spread out more by a factor of s, which is similar to the parameter 
N in the previous section. We recommend a sequence of tests with s = [10, 100, 1000, …] 
for applying this method. 
Probability Scaling Transformations 
The approaches described in sections 6.1 and 6.2 apply only to numerical or vector-
valued input data. In contrast, probability scaling transformations apply to any kind of input 
data, including discrete enumerations such as classification categories and other non-
numerical data types. For a HFPM with a distribution P(x) the stress testing profile derived 
using this approach is proportional to P(x)1/N, where N is a numerical parameter with N >1, 
and where the proportionally constant must be chosen to normalize the distribution to make 
all probabilities add up to 1. This family of transformations increases the probabilities of rare 
events and decreases the probabilities of the frequent ones, as illustrated by the example 




Table 2. Original and Derived Probabilities 
  Original N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 10 N = 15 N = 20 
P1 0.88888889 0.670925 0.526601 0.432891 0.369481 0.233181 0.134859 0.128692
P2 0.1 0.225035 0.254214 0.250707 0.238684 0.187417 0.128468 0.12409 
P3 0.01 0.071162 0.117996 0.140983 0.150599 0.14887 0.12206 0.119418
P4 0.001 0.022504 0.054769 0.079281 0.095022 0.118252 0.115971 0.114922
P5 0.0001 0.007116 0.025421 0.044583 0.059955 0.093931 0.110186 0.110595
P6 0.00001 0.00225 0.0118 0.025071 0.037829 0.074612 0.10469 0.106432
P7 0.000001 0.000712 0.005477 0.014098 0.023868 0.059266 0.099468 0.102425
P8 0.0000001 0.000225 0.002542 0.007928 0.01506 0.047077 0.094506 0.098568
P9 0.00000001 7.12E-05 0.00118 0.004458 0.009502 0.037395 0.089792 0.094857
Table 2 shows an original PDF and a series of transformed and renormalized derived 
stress testing PDFs. Note that the probabilities in each column add up to 1 and that the 
original distribution spans a wide range of frequencies of occurrence. These distributions are 
shown as bar graphs in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Original and Derived Probabilities 
The transformations increase the proportions of the rare cases in the stress testing 
samples, while preserving the rank ordering of the probabilities. The degree of enhancement 
of the rare events increases with the parameter N.  
Dominance Relations and Stress Testing 
Stress testing does not have to be done solely using HFPM’s.  Another useful 
approach is based on the concept of dominance. One test case dominates another one if 
the first one will expose at least as many software faults as the second, and may expose 
more. Even if there is not a single test case that dominates all of the others, often there will 
be some that are more likely to expose errors than others. This approach is particularly 
useful when the tester is focusing on a specific class of errors. Many of the commonly used 




representative sample of these is listed in Table 3, organized by the error type addressed by 
each. 
Table 3. Focused Stress Testing Strategies 
Coverage Criteria and Stress Testing 
Traditional coverage criteria, such as statement coverage and branch coverage, are 
useful for checking low probability paths through the software. This can be an important 
defense against unwanted features deliberately placed in the code by malicious insiders. 
For example, an “Easter Egg” is a hidden feature function in the software that is triggered 
only when a particular input is provided. Such code is typically deliberately hidden and can 
easily be made statistically invisible to black box testing approaches. For example, if the 
function is triggered only when a particular input sting is provided the probability of detection 
by black box testing is 1 in 88n, where n is the number of characters in the input and we are 
assuming all the characters on a standard keyboard can be used. For a field of length 30 the 
number of test cases needed to detect such a path this is about 2.16 x 1058, which is not 
technically or economically feasible. 
However, a branch coverage criterion coupled with a constraint logic solver for 
finding test cases to exercise infrequent branches has be found to be effective at detecting 
such faults (Molnar, 2008). 
Conclusions 
Effective and cost-efficient testing for US Navy OA software can be achieved by a 
mixture of automation methods to determine which tests can be safely eliminated by reusing 
previous test results, and methods for choosing test cases that are most likely to expose 
errors without duplicating coverage of other test cases. 
This paper explains how automated testing can be systematically performed based 
on historical data, in a way that exposes the most frequently manifesting errors earliest in 
the process.  We also identify some of the weaknesses of purely statistical approaches to 
testing and identify methods for overcoming these weaknesses. 
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